Statement by Mr. François Hollande, President of the Republic, on nuclear deterrence, in Istres on February 19, 2015.

France François Hollande · President of France

19 February 2015 · Statement on nuclear deterrence · Istres air base, Istres, France

Context
Hollande addressed military personnel at the Istres air base on February 19, 2015, delivering a major speech on France's nuclear deterrence strategy and global security threats.
Main themes
Nuclear deterrence, French defense policy, nuclear proliferation, Iran nuclear negotiations, arms race, terrorism, Air Force capabilities, chemical and biological weapons, North Korea, Syria, international security, peace and disarmament
Duration
~35 min
87th percentile
Words
4,146
87th percentile
Sentences
210
90th percentile
Readability
42
40th percentile
Grade
12.3
49th percentile
Syntax
2.94
40th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
72nd percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%59%
  • Ceremonial 9%7%
  • Institutional 7%5%
  • Economic 6%5%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 24%

210 sentences in 72 paragraphs

Gentlemen Ministers,

Ladies and gentlemen elected officials, parliamentarians,

Mr. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,

Mr. Chief of Staff of the Air Force,

Ladies and gentlemen.

I am at the Istres base, an air base. You welcome me today, it is the Air Force, and I want to pay tribute on this occasion to the navigator pilots and mechanics who have paid with their lives, who were severely affected in their flesh less than a month ago, during that terrible accident that occurred in Spain, in Albacete.

Once again, our armed forces have paid a heavy price for the security of our country. I want once again to pay tribute to the military personnel who dedicate themselves to the independence of France.

This is the very purpose of my visit here.

The Air Force demonstrates every day its ability to ensure the protection of the national territory against potential attacks from the sky. The Air Force is also capable of deploying powerful means far from the metropolis for external operations. This is one of the responses we provide, in our place, within the limits of our commitments, to the fight against terrorism. The Air Force can strike hostile targets, as it does in Iraq or in the Sahel. Finally, the Air Force contributes to the implementation of nuclear deterrence, and this is the subject of the speech I want to deliver today, before you.

I belong to a generation that has had the invaluable luck of not having experienced war on the soil of its country. My father, my grandfather experienced war, wars. Born in the early 1950s, I indeed had the tremendous luck of being spared from these conflicts. But at the same time, what has happened in Eastern Europe over the past year reminds us that peace must never be taken for granted.

In the same way, the arms race has resumed in many regions of the world, with a significant, even rapid increase in military spending and arsenals, in a context of rising tensions. There are states that invest in technologies that could undermine the strategic balances we know. Several are even developing logic of influence, of threats, in their immediate terrestrial or maritime environment.

Thus, and it is particularly serious to note, the possibility of state conflict concerning us directly or indirectly cannot be ruled out. In the field of military nuclear power, new powers have emerged in the last twenty years. Others seek to emerge, and the states that had been, until now, equipped with nuclear weapons and who professed the urgency of their disarmament have even increased their capacity with the development of new nuclear components, or the continued production of fissile material for weapons.

In parallel, tactical arsenals are strengthening, which raises fears of a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, what should France do? Always call for the organization of a safer world; that is what our diplomacy does. But France must be clear-eyed. It knows that it is not enough to proclaim immediate and total nuclear disarmament; the reality of each one's actions must be consistent with the speeches.

France has therefore decided to fight against one of the most serious threats to the stability of the world, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Any increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons is a major risk for peace; in the affected regions first, but also for international security.

This is the meaning of the position we have adopted for several months, if not several years, in the negotiations with Iran. If I wanted to summarize what our expectation is regarding this negotiation, it is very simple: yes to civil nuclear power, no to nuclear weapons. The problem is that for now Iran has not yet demonstrated that it wants to give up the bomb. But as soon as it does, the agreement will be concluded.

On its side, North Korea conducted a third nuclear test two years ago. This is as unacceptable as it is concerning.

But there is not only nuclear proliferation; there is also chemical and biological proliferation and the associated vectors.

In Syria, it was in the summer of 2013, a fundamental taboo of our collective security system was broken, since the regime of Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against its own population. It took the threat of resorting to force for the destruction of the stocks, factories, and chemical weapons declared by the regime of Bashar al-Assad to be initiated.

This process is now complete. But I am not completely reassured, as there remain areas of uncertainty, and it is highly probable that bombs containing chlorine were dropped less than a year ago on Syrian villages.

Proliferation is a global threat to the world. Proliferation is necessarily a threat to France.

Certainly, France does not feel directly threatened; it has no declared enemy, but we have seen, as I recalled, over the past twelve months, the Ukrainian crisis, the rise of Daesh, the unprecedented cyberattack against SONY; surprises, therefore, even ruptures are possible. And the reappearance of a major state threat to our country cannot be ruled out.

So as head of state, I have the imperative duty to take these threats into account, for nothing must undermine our independence. The international context allows for no weakness. And that is why the time for nuclear deterrence is not over. There can be no question, even in this area, of lowering our guard.

I have told you, it is my responsibility as President of the Republic, as head of the Armed Forces.

In this matter, as President François Mitterrand said, the head of state is the first citizen in France to have a say and to decide.

Nuclear deterrence aims to protect our country from any state-origin aggression against its vital interests, wherever it comes from, and in whatever form it may take. I add that for France, nuclear weapons are not intended to gain any advantage in a conflict. Due to the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, they have no place in an offensive strategy; they are designed only within a defensive strategy.

Deterrence is also what allows us to preserve our freedom of action and decision in all circumstances, because it is what enables me to eliminate any threat of state-origin blackmail that would aim to paralyze us.

France is one of the few countries in the world whose influence and responsibility are indeed at the global level. Because France can exercise its responsibilities. Because everyone knows that when France speaks, it can act. And the deterrent forces ensure that France's international commitments will always be honored, even if the use of nuclear weapons is only conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate defense.

Our nuclear forces must be capable of inflicting absolutely unacceptable damage on the adversary at its centers of power, that is to say, on its political, economic, and military nerve centers.

It is the supreme responsibility of the President of the Republic to continuously assess the nature of our vital interests and the threats that could be posed to them.

The integrity of our territory, the safeguarding of our population constitute the core of our vital interests. Whatever means are employed by the state adversary, we must preserve our nation's capacity to live. Such is the meaning of nuclear deterrence.

Nevertheless, I cannot rule out that an adversary may misinterpret the delineation of our vital interests. That is why I want to remind here that France can, as a last resort, assert its will to defend our vital interests through a nuclear warning aimed at restoring deterrence.

The definition of our vital interests cannot be limited to the national scale alone, because France does not conceive its defense strategy in isolation, even in the nuclear field. We have repeatedly affirmed, with the United Kingdom, with which we have unparalleled cooperation, this conception. We participate in the European project; we have built with our partners a community of destiny; the existence of a French nuclear deterrent provides a strong and essential contribution to Europe. France also has, with its European partners, a de facto and heartfelt solidarity. Who could therefore believe that an aggression that would threaten the survival of Europe would have no consequences?

That is why our deterrence goes hand in hand with the constant strengthening of European defense. But our deterrence belongs to us alone; it is we who decide, it is we who assess our vital interests.

I also want to clarify what our relationship is with many states that, parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, seek guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is a legitimate aspiration. France has made a unilateral declaration, which does not detract from its right to legitimate defense, and the Security Council took note of it in 1995. France has confirmed its commitments regarding the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world. This was necessary.

Today, I solemnly reaffirm that France will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that respect their international obligations regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I also want to clarify our relationship with the Atlantic Alliance. The Atlantic Alliance has a nuclear vocation, and independent strategic forces, like those of France and the United Kingdom, have a specific role to play and contribute to global deterrence.

This observation, made by all, does not imply a change in our country's posture. France does not participate in NATO's nuclear planning mechanisms, and France will not participate in these mechanisms. This principle will remain. However, France wishes to contribute to the definition of the Alliance's nuclear policy. In this regard, all NATO member countries must demonstrate consistency and determination in this commitment.

So, ladies and gentlemen, this is what I wanted to say about the very foundations of our deterrence policy.

I now want to address the forces that enable it to be mobilized and organized. More than fifty years ago, following a decree from the President of the Republic creating the Strategic Air Forces, a Mirage IV took alert for the first time with a nuclear bomb. Since that decisive act, not a day, not an hour has passed without the permanence of nuclear deterrence being assured by our forces. I want to pay tribute here to the military and civilians who guarantee the credibility of our deterrence and thus the safety of our compatriots.

By definition, deterrence is exercised permanently. What would intermittent deterrence be? In fifty years, it is true, the world has changed profoundly, and our forces have too. To ensure this permanence, we had to continuously adapt them, in capacity as well as in volume, to the evolution of the threats that could target our Nation.

France thus made the choice, in 1996, to eliminate one of its components, the ground-to-ground component, by closing the Albion plateau and dismantling short-range missiles. We have retained two components, one airborne and the other oceanic. This has not prevented us from reducing the volume of our forces to maintain them at a level of strict sufficiency. This principle of strict sufficiency also underpins the organization of our deterrent force.

So, there are voices that regularly rise to question the maintenance of these two components, to contest the simulation program for tests or the necessity of the permanent at-sea presence of our SSBNs, our submarines. These debates are legitimate in a democratic society, and I do not want to dismiss them out of hand. But we must also be capable of justifying our choices and therefore regularly revisit the necessities of deterrence.

As far as I am concerned, I determine myself based on the only issue that matters: the ultimate security of France. I have therefore decided to maintain an oceanic component and an airborne component. Neither is dedicated to achieving an objective that would be its own. Both contribute to the overall missions of deterrence, and it is their complementarity that allows the head of state to have, at all times, the range of necessary and sufficient options and to never be dependent on a single type of means.

Let me explain. The oceanic component, through the permanent at-sea presence of our submarines, their invulnerability, the range of the missiles, constitutes a key element of the deterrent maneuver. Since a potential aggressor, tempted to exercise blackmail against France, must have the certainty that a retaliatory capacity will always be operational and that it will neither be detectable nor destroyable. This is the interest, the utility of the oceanic component.

The airborne component also ensures the permanence of deterrence alongside the strategic air forces. Next to them, the nuclear naval force, operated from the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, offers other modes of action. The airborne component provides, in the event of a major crisis, visibility to our determination to defend ourselves, thus avoiding a spiral towards extreme solutions. This is the interest of the two components, if I may say so: one that is not visible and another that is visible.

It is also necessary to maintain the capabilities and credibility of these two components. This implies translating into reality, that is to say into weapons, the technological developments in the field of air defense, missile defense, and underwater detection.

The military programming law is precisely what allows us to continue adapting the SNLEs, our submarines, to the M51, which enables us to put the oceanic nuclear warhead into service starting in 2016, to launch the design studies for the third-generation SNLE, and to replace, by 2018, the last Mirage 2000Ns with Rafales carrying the ASMPA missile. Furthermore, the military programming law has initiated the renewal of the fleet of refueling aircraft, with 12 Phénix aircraft ordered, and the first two will be delivered starting in 2018.

This programming law has thus ensured the preparation, adaptation, and translation of the commitments I made to ensure the reliability and safety of our deterrent force. For my responsibility is to anticipate but also to prepare for the more distant future, which will be the renewal of our components. What gives meaning to the action for the head of state is not simply to prepare to potentially face threats today, but to ensure that our country, long after the President is no longer in office, that one - another will be - so that there is this continuity, this chain that cannot be interrupted in the adaptation of our forces for deterrence.

I have also ensured, regarding the oceanic component, to launch future adaptations of the M51 missile, to ensure that the tonnage of future submarines remains very close to that of our Triomphant. Studies have also been conducted to explore what the successor to the ASMPA might be. The most demanding technologies will be implemented to, in particular, be even more effective in the areas of speed of materials and stealth.

At the same time, I have instructed the Atomic Energy Commission to prepare, at the end of their life, the necessary evolution of the nuclear warheads. And then, there is what must be done to renew the weapons, without conducting nuclear tests. This is therefore the simulation program, which is fully compliant with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

But again, I want to solemnly remind of the commitments. France does not produce and will not produce new types of nuclear weapons. I would therefore like to commend the extraordinary scientific and technical challenge that this simulation program represents. The Military Applications Directorate of the CEA meets all deadlines for this project while controlling expenses.

The year 2014 thus saw the first experiments at the Megajoule Laser and the EPURE installation. Again, for this simulation program, essential for preparing the future, we are conducting a strategic collaboration with the United Kingdom. We have committed to cooperate for a period of at least fifty years, sharing two simulation facilities, one in France and the other in the United Kingdom. We will soon inaugurate the first achievements, less than five years after the signing of the Lancaster House Treaty, which once again allows us to commend all the efforts that have been made.

So, I also hear that the nuclear deterrence budget would have been spared from the savings efforts requested from our armed forces. As if it were desirable to maintain some kind of competition within our defense. As if ensuring that we can preserve the deterrent force would be contradictory to the other missions entrusted to our armed forces. I therefore wish to respond to these possible questions.

The budgetary context is restrictive for all expenditures, including military expenditures, and within military expenditures, for all weapons. However, we have, in the programming law, safeguarded the credits that are necessary, both for the deterrent force and for conventional armaments. Those responsible for managing this expenditure related to deterrence have been required to make realistic efforts, like others, but without ever compromising on credibility, autonomy, and reliability, as far as the survival and sovereignty of France are concerned through the deterrent force.

But I add another argument. Nuclear deterrence is complementary to our conventional means and exerts a pull on our entire defense apparatus. Thus, certain means that contribute to deterrence are directly used for our conventional or classic operations. I think of reconnaissance satellites, fighter jets, refueling aircraft, nuclear attack submarines, anti-submarine frigates, and mine hunters.

I want to give another illustration. The fighters of the strategic air forces have capabilities that are said to be dual. These aircraft have carried out about a quarter of the strikes conducted during operations in Libya and the Sahel. These same dual-capacity aircraft are currently operating in Africa and Iraq, and contribute every day to air defense alert.

Finally, deterrence stimulates our research and development efforts and contributes to the excellence and competitiveness of our industry. It is because there have been these research efforts that there have been innovations. It is because we have been able to be at the highest level in terms of nuclear deterrence that we have been able to disseminate, in the industry, unparalleled know-how and technologies that have served the economy and thus employment.

But military expenditures cannot be justified simply by the desire to stimulate the economy or create jobs. Military expenditures must have a foundation in relation to the very stakes they represent, namely the security of France, the defense of our interests, the promotion of our values, which is what makes us France.

Defense and security are not just any burden! It is not simply an investment, even if it can have that character! It is what allows us to be free.

In a dangerous world, and it is, France does not intend to let its guard down. But at the same time that it is ready to defend itself, it does not want to renounce the very objective of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. France is a power of peace, and that is why it defends itself, for peace! France is what is called a nuclear-armed state in the sense of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is to say, it recognizes us as a state possessing nuclear weapons. And this situation confers upon us particular responsibilities. I therefore share the long-term goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but I add: when the strategic context allows it. France will continue to act tirelessly in this direction. It will do so with consistency, transparency, truth, I would say with wisdom and in good intelligence with our Allies.

Nuclear disarmament cannot be an incantation or even an invitation! It must be demonstrated, and first by the state that proclaims it. France has been exemplary in applying the principle of strict sufficiency. It has therefore halved the total number of its weapons in recent years. By half! It has reduced the airborne nuclear component by a third. It has renounced the ground-to-ground missile. We have not just talked about disarmament; we have done it to the necessary point. France has been exemplary in terms of irreversibility. It has not only stopped nuclear tests but has also ceased the production of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. It has completely dismantled the corresponding facilities, now basing deterrence on a limited stock of nuclear materials. France has been exemplary regarding the volume of its stock of weapons, that is to say, 300. Why 300? Because that corresponds to the assessment we make of the strategic context.

If the levels of other arsenals, particularly Russian and American, were to one day drop to a few hundred, France would draw the consequences, as it has always done. But we are still far from that today.

I want to go even further in transparency, whether it is about our doctrine, which is what I am doing today, before you, thus before the whole world; transparency also about our arsenals and our concrete disarmament efforts. That is why I do not hesitate to inform you that France has three lots of 16 submarine-launched missiles and 54 ASMPA vectors. And I hope that all nuclear-armed states will make the same effort for truth that I am making before you, for all categories of weapons in their nuclear arsenal.

In this same spirit of transparency and truth, France will soon propose visits to the new sites that no longer host nuclear weapons: the Albion plateau, where the silos that housed the ground-to-ground component are completely dismantled, the Luxeuil base whose weapon storage depots are now empty, and here too I hope that this gesture inspires the attitude of other nuclear powers, with visits that our experts can also attend.

It is also important to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons and to dismantle the production facilities for these materials, as well as the nuclear test sites. All of this is something that France once again invites all nuclear-armed countries to do as well.

Finally, France's diplomatic tool, France's foreign policy, remains fully mobilized in favor of disarmament, and this is particularly true just weeks before the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Our first priority, within the framework of this discussion, remains the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I say this all the more easily because France has demonstrated that the complete, irreversible renunciation of nuclear tests was compatible with maintaining credible deterrence. And this message must be conveyed to all our partners.

Our second priority is the definitive cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons. This has been discussed for years, but negotiations have yet to start due to the lack of agreement among the main concerned states. And that is why I call today on all nuclear-armed countries to engage without delay in this discussion on the total cessation of the production of fissile materials. And France will propose in the coming weeks an ambitious, realistic, and verifiable treaty project on these issues.

I wanted to come here to Istres to carry out this exercise of truth, transparency, and at the same time, recognition of what the Deterrent Force means for our country. To reaffirm the fundamental issue it represents, this nuclear deterrence, for the security of France. It is not the entirety of defense policy. It is complementary to what we must pursue in all areas to ensure the protection of our territory, to conduct external operations, to promote what we represent, and also to fight against terrorism, wherever it may be.

The credibility of the Deterrent Force requires a rigor and professionalism, I would say, extraordinary, and that is what you demonstrate, because you have pushed to perfection, in the specific training you carry out, this demand for high quality, know-how, and handling of the most sensitive technologies. And that is why, before you, I want to express all the confidence of our country. It is our entire Nation that knows what it owes to you, that knows what it owes to the Deterrent Force, which thus testifies to its recognition. For what you do, what the Deterrent Force enables, is to ensure for a Nation, for France, for your country, what is most dear, most precious, most essential, namely its independence. And there is no independence if there is no freedom to choose one's destiny. The Deterrent Force is what allows us to have the capacity to live freely and to be able, everywhere in the world, to carry our message, without fear, without dread, because we are sure of our ability to defend ourselves.

Independence, freedom, the ability to uphold our values, that is why we must every day ensure the permanence of nuclear deterrence and be capable, at every moment, of further improving its organization, functioning, and weapons.

Long live the Republic and Long live France.