Speech by President Javier Milei at the AmCham Summit 2026

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

14 April 2026 · AmCham Summit 2026

Context
Milei addressed the AmCham Summit 2026 in Argentina on April 14, 2026, delivering a candid speech explaining rising inflation and his government's economic strategy.
Main themes
Inflation dynamics, monetary policy, fiscal balance, demand for money, Argentina economic crisis, political destabilization, working capital and credit, Milton Friedman monetarism, electoral results, Central Bank liabilities, economic reform progress
Duration
~36 min
88th percentile
Words
4,334
88th percentile
Sentences
183
87th percentile
Readability
57
82nd percentile
Grade
11.1
33rd percentile
Syntax
3.12
63rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
20th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 85%85%
  • Institutional 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

183 sentences in 26 paragraphs

Javier Milei: Good afternoon. Politicians usually pretend to be oblivious or talk about something else when they receive bad news. Moreover, we would have a lot of very good things to talk about today. But since I am Milei and I detest the way traditional politics operates, and since I hate inflation, and since I did not like the data and it disgusts me, I am going to talk about inflation.

Clearly, I believe that one of the important things about this is to explain and have a clear understanding of what is happening. So, when one understands what is happening and has a diagnosis, that implies that it is the first step to finding a solution. In that sense, what we need to understand is why 3.4? Why has inflation been gradually rising since mid-last year? And it needs to be explained, and we have no problem explaining it. For us, what is happening is quite clear.

So, aside from explaining why we find ourselves with this data today, I will also explain why we are convinced, and something that the Minister of Economy, Toto Caputo, hinted at today, that inflation will decrease going forward, because the most important thing is not to argue about two tenths more or two tenths less; what is important is to know why inflation will decrease going forward.

Basically, Argentina since mid-last year has had to face two shocks of enormous characteristics. Moreover, in May of last year, inflation had reached 1.5%. After that, when Manuel made that extraordinary election in the city of Buenos Aires, which allowed us to win that place against all odds, the most interesting thing is that from that moment on, there began a fierce attack by politics, a destabilizing attack, an attack on the heart of the model where more than 40 laws were passed in Congress trying to break the fiscal balance. They did not succeed.

In that hyper-turbulent situation, we must be aware that Argentina faced a run equivalent to 50% m2; at any moment in history, if something like this had happened, Argentina would have blown up, and yet not only did it not blow up, but we also received strong support at the polls, where we not only won by 41%, we took 17 points of difference from Kirchnerism and turned around an election in the province of Buenos Aires that seemed impossible, therefore, the people know about the effort being made and know that they do not want to return to the past and that if we continue to do things right, sooner or later things will start to work well.

In that context, what you have is: we have sustained for a very long time; in fact, before I became President, I had spent more than 10 years in the media, and probably more than 20 and almost 30 years, from different platforms talking about the economy, explaining the monetary nature of inflation. That famous phrase by Milton Friedman that says "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, generated by an excess of money supply, either because the supply increases or because demand falls, or both things happen at the same time. This generates a loss of purchasing power of money and that means that all prices expressed in monetary units rise." That said, what happened in the second half of last year was a monstrous drop in the demand for money. That is, 50% of m2; the drop was equivalent to 41 billion dollars. Moreover, not only that: if we correct for reserves, the monetary base measured in dollars fell to levels of 20 billion dollars, that is, to half the average that the previous government had with inflation traveling at 1.5% daily. That is, a dynamic that was leading us to a monstrous hyperinflation, even worse than what Alfonsín had in 1989. And, in that context, the monetary liabilities of the Central Bank were double what we had left in this run, which the number is higher because the increase allowed it to be closer to 30 billion dollars. It is important to keep that in mind because the monetary liability of the Central Bank is the working capital of the economy, and what happens? When you see that, notice that as the demand for domestic assets falls, that causes the price of bonds to fall, that interest rates rise, that the Country Risk rises. The Country Risk reached levels above 2500 basis points, the interest rate reached levels almost above 150%. The flip side of that is that, as the financing mechanism is delayed, demand becomes heavier, that is, it becomes harder to sell. As it costs more to sell, what happens? You contracted the inputs. What do you do? Do you return them? Do you not pay? No, you put them back into the system, you put them back into production.

From there, you generate production, a product in process is generated, then a good for exchange, then you have to sell it. And it takes more time to sell it now. And also, as demand is heavy, it takes more time to collect it. All of that increases the demand for working capital. And the demand for working capital, either you finance it with your own capital, that is, with contributions; or you do it by taking credit. So what happened was a strong increase in the demand for working capital. But the flip side is that, as the economy, individuals were running against the currency, it contracted the working capital of the economy. The consequence of this was that the interest rate skyrocketed and activity, which had been expanding at 6% in the first quarter, in the first months of the second quarter, the economy had accelerated to 8%, came to a screeching halt. And that made the economy end the year with 4.2% growth, when we could have grown 7. That is to say, the speculative attack and the attempt by politics to generate a coup was not free. It was not free. What needs to be taken into account is what we were subjected to in the second half of last year, and especially since the election in the province of Buenos Aires in September.

That brutal drop in the demand for money, the consequence is that the price level will jump and that manifests as an acceleration in the inflation rate because it represents a situation of lower demand for money, the best way, and this is very important going forward, to see what is happening with the demand for money is to look at the relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate, so for example when interest rates rise, the exchange rate falls, and if interest rates fall, the exchange rate rises. Now when you have a situation where both interest rates and the exchange rate rise, that means that your demand for money has collapsed, that is what happened to us during the second half of last year, the rates flying high, I just said reached up to 150 percent in pesos, the country risk at 1500 and the exchange rate approaching the ceiling of the band, that said, what that was predicting was that the inflation rate was going to accelerate and if you listen to the various interviews we have given with Toto, we were systematically pointing out that this drop in the demand for money was inevitably going to hit the inflation rate.

To that, March is a month with very negative seasonality in terms of inflation, and in the specific data for this month, education impacted; everything related to the war and how that affected everything linked to transportation; and obviously also, due to a seasonal issue, the impact of meat. Therefore, that is what explains this jump in the inflation rate: we are still purging what was the drop in the demand for money in the second half of last year, plus these seasonal effects. The first interesting point: monetary policy did not change.

Therefore, this is not strictly inflation, it is that the price level jumped due to changes in relative prices; but long-term inflation converges to the international. That has not changed. That is to say, the equilibrium we are heading towards in the long term has not changed. What has changed is the dynamics, how it moves over time. That is a very important first point.

So, now there are other things. If we take the core and remove the effect of meat, that is, we take the truly underlying, it is the same as last month, at 2.5. But the most important: if we take the basic food basket, which directly impacts indigence, for example, that is at 2.2; or the total basic basket at 2.6. Therefore, the effect of education, the effect of the war, and the effect of meat are clear. Therefore, once those effects are overcome, the inflation rate will fall. But there is an additional element, two additional elements: if you look at wholesale inflation, which is the one that anticipates, wholesale inflation travels around 1 and 0.8%. That means that inflation, the one that is ahead, is indicating that it will travel around 10%. That is to say, we have to finish readjusting relative prices and it will converge towards there. The only thing to do is to be patient, do not panic, when one panics, one makes bad decisions. And we are not going to go against either economic theory or empirical evidence; and we are not going to violate and undermine our moral values when designing economic policy.

Now then, that said, that these specific factors will disappear and inflation will fall, I also have another good piece of news and that is that the demand for money has started to grow. If we said that if the interest rate rises simultaneously with the exchange rate, it implies that the demand for money is falling and that will put pressure on the price level and will manifest as an inflationary acceleration, we should start to see the opposite effect going forward because the demand for money is rising. For example, today the Central Bank bought 180 million dollars, a few days ago it bought about 260 million dollars. When one looks at what has been bought this year, it is around 6000 million dollars. Therefore, if we had not bought all this monstrous amount of dollars and assumed a linear model, not only have the rates dropped to levels of 25%, today 23%, but also, the exchange rate would have gone to the zone of 1150.

Therefore, what that is showing us, lower exchange rate and lower interest rate means that the demand for money is recovering. And does that make sense? Of course, it makes sense. The demand for money rises, for example, when economic activity increases. If we look at the revenue for the month of March, economic activity began to bounce back, began to revive. Today we are at record GDP, we are at record consumption, we are at record exports. The RIGI is soaring with the amount of investments that are coming in. That is to say, it is starting to function, credit is growing strongly, that is to say we are starting to rebuild working capital. When working capital is rebuilt, Argentina will grow again. The good thing about this data is to become aware that inflation going forward will collapse and the economy will return to the strong growth path we had prior to the political attack.

That said, what is the situation… to not overwhelm you with time, I was going to give the foundations of our economic policy designs, actually state policies, it is something that I have been presenting for a while which is this idea of morality as state policy and in the second part I was basically going to make an application to the debate on inflation and growth that is being raised today, between, let’s say, concretely in the Círculo Rojo. That is to say, the Círculo Rojo makes a hypothesis, let’s say that if we want to grow, we have to accept having more inflation. The first thing I will say is that this hypothesis and that we would then have to relax fiscal policy, relax monetary policy so that in this way we can grow and thus win an election accepting to have more inflation, from my point of view seems like garbage, that hypothesis seems filthy, it seems repugnant. And what I will do is explain why that persistent proposal from the Círculo Rojo, from the media and from professional economists, if they could be called professionals, is erroneous.

The first point is simple, it would break anyone's eyes, that scheme of Argentine policy has been systematically applied since 1935 onwards. Argentina has removed 13 zeros from its currency, we could remove three more. And the reality is that if generating inflation generated growth, Argentina would have to be a world power. And when we came to power, Argentina was on its way to becoming Cuba, with a scale in Venezuela. From being one of the richest countries in the world at the beginning of the 20th century, we were going to become the worst on the planet, thanks to 21st-century socialism that was taking us to that place. Therefore, the first point, beyond any explanation, is obvious to the eyes of any semi-reasonable observer, a primate with a slight deviation: no one would think that the path of inflation leads anywhere. It leads nowhere but to hell. Therefore, we are not going to yield to the idea that we have to resign ourselves to having inflation. It is false.

And even though my work goes against the economist in me, because it demands a lot of time in my job, my Ministers have it worse because they at least have to work as much as I do. So they have to work at least 16 hours, which is what I work. But aside from that, now I am going to put myself in the shoes of those I am with, but also in those of an economist. If we think in terms of inflation and growth, which, by the way, professional economists do not understand. I warn you because it is evident that they do not know and confuse growth with the debate on the trade-off between inflation and unemployment according to Phillips. But since one cannot be so rudimentary, I will try to explain how to look at these things, why the results are wrong, and why it would be absurd to yield to this idea that we need to loosen policy to have more growth. You have different variants in inflation and growth models. The most popular one, which supposedly achieves the result that these people claim, is the Tobin model. Basically, in the Tobin model, if you increase the rate at which you issue money, the nominal interest rate rises with higher inflation. As the nominal interest rate rises as a consequence of higher inflation, the associated result is that the demand for money falls, and that favors capital accumulation. This increases the capital stock per capita and, therefore, the economy grows.

Well, that is a nonsense the size of a house; it seems reasonable, the math is aesthetically beautiful, but it is nonsense because then the Tobin recipe would be to crank up monetary policy, create a hyperinflationary disaster, money will disappear, and that will maximize capital accumulation. Do you think that in a modern economy with so many agents, with so many goods, do you think it can work without money? Who could come up with such stupidity?

If you go to a barter economy, given the problem of double coincidence, given the problem and indivisibility of goods, the number of transactions in the economy will collapse, and you will live a miserable life. That is to say, man did not invent money because he is foolish; he invented it because it precisely improves the quality of life. If he had not done anything else. Therefore, the result of that model is nonsense. Not only is it nonsense: that model is limited to a closed economy. I know an economist who in 2008 published an article in Córdoba taking the Tobin model but extending it to an open economy; and if you did this kind of madness, what actually happened is that the money did not go to capital, it went to foreign currency; and that jump that implied in the real exchange rate also meant that capital left and went to foreign currency. Do you know the story? The consequence is that the capital stock per capita fell, and they all ended up being poorer. I have it dormant, but somewhere in my life it is: the one who wrote that was me. Therefore, it is nonsense, it is theoretical nonsense, it is empirical nonsense. And now we already know that this does not work, that it makes no sense, that the result is nonsense.

Now I will explain how economists look at this, who confuse short-term GDP variation, short-term fluctuation with growth, which is truly… hard to assimilate and not use a term, an outburst to define them. But in reality, they refer to what is called the Phillips curve. That is to say, a relationship between inflation and unemployment. So, as they link unemployment linearly to activity, not necessarily, but to make it easier, so that if you increase the inflation rate, the product increases. That was what Phillips developed in 1958 and that Samuelson and Solow tested in 1961. So, at one point it became fashionable to talk about the sacrifice ratio and how much inflation we had to endure to have more activity; having more activity does not mean that you will be growing, the growth process is a more complex long-term thing.

Consequently, when you had this situation of inflation and unemployment, in 1968 Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps appeared, and what they did was increase, improve the model with expectations augmented by inflation; when you do that, which he did with adaptive expectations, you could achieve a favorable short-term trade-off, you could crank up demand, you could generate an increase in employment, an increase in activity based on deceiving agents with false prices. If someone wants to see it in detail, it is in an article in Milton Friedman’s Nobel Lecture of 1976 or you can also see it in the second edition of “Price Theory” by Milton Friedman, which has a chapter dedicated to this and explains how monetary policy can distort the labor market and then agents transact at false prices and consequently an increase in activity is generated. But when they learn that they have been deceived, they correct, and you are left with the same level of original activity, but with a higher inflation rate, that is a truly dreadful business.

Thus, by then the Phillips curve was severely wounded, and we had to wait until 1972 for Robert Lucas Jr. to appear with the formulation of rational expectations and theoretically annihilate them. And in 1973 they were annihilated empirically. Moreover, Robert Lucas Jr. himself, when he does the empirical estimation, then focuses on two cases: one is the United States, the other is Argentina. This means that since 1973 we have learned nothing; that is, our professional economists have learned nothing. It is just a matter of them continuing to repeat the Cepalian model of center and periphery. Well, they continue with the Infante industry and all those things, it has changed names, but… life. So, having said that, that debate is also over. And there is an interesting part, which is that the only way you can exploit that trade-off is by deceiving people. That is to say, the only way you can explore and exploit that trade-off is by lying with monetary policy. And that has several problems: the first point is that you are lying to people, that is wrong; and you are also defrauding them because monetary issuance is a fraud. Therefore, if you want to exploit that trade-off, you have to be immoral, you have to be scum of people. Imagine how dangerous it is to have such scum in the head of state power. And what does Robert Lucas Jr.'s model demonstrate? It is that you can do that, you can violate agents by lying to them, defrauding them, robbing them, but agents learn. So they automatically correct and return to the original situation. And the next time you want to deceive them, what happens? The effect you achieve is much smaller and for much less time. In fact, in the Argentine case, that mechanism was abused so much that already in the 1973 paper, Robert Lucas Jr. does not show a Phillips curve with a negative slope for the Argentine case; he shows it with a positive slope. In fact, Friedman’s Nobel Nature thought of a Phillips curve with a positive slope, all inspired by whom, in the Argentine case. And it cannot be that the only ones who have not learned are us; it is tremendous. So, having said that, moreover, the red circle, journalists, econochantas, and others pose a false dilemma. We have to inflate, we have to stimulate, and we have to do this, and this will allow us to win elections. It is false. That arm of the decision-making process is false. Because if you change economic policy, you start lying to agents, you start deceiving agents, you start defrauding agents, you will blow up your reputation. If you blow up your reputation, you are not credible, and if you are not credible, not only will you not achieve expansion, but you will also go backward. Thus, it will come crashing down on you, the result will be infinitely worse, and obviously, that will punish us at the polls. Therefore, what they are proposing is that we commit suicide, and we are not going to do it. But not only that. Economic theory and empirical evidence say that what we have to do is maintain fiscal balance, continue tightening fiscal balance, keep with the chainsaw. The chainsaw does not stop. In the last cabinet meeting, I gave the thick order that the chainsaw does not stop.

We will continue cutting public spending to be able to keep lowering your taxes because taxes are theft. Not only that, we will continue with tight monetary policy; we bought a monstrous amount of dollars, and the broad monetary base does not move, we will take all the pesos off the street until the inflation rate collapses, and we will not stop in that, we will not yield an inch in monetary policy, we will not yield an inch in continuing to deregulate, because when you regulate, you release increasing returns, and that generates economic growth. Furthermore, we will continue opening the economy because when you open the economy, the size of the market expands, you release more increasing returns, and it generates more economic growth. Therefore, we will not move an inch from that; we did not come to eternalize ourselves in power; we came to write the best page in Argentine history.

We are convinced that we were voted to do what is right, and therefore, we will do what is appropriate. We will not deviate from the manual of doing things right. Later, people may choose another path; it will be the responsibility of the Argentines. And also, when they see how inflation falls, how poverty falls —because we have lifted more than 13 million people out of poverty— and when they see how the Argentine economy recovers, how wages rise, they will probably support us, and we can continue with more liberalism and work to make Argentina great again.

Therefore, if I were a cynic in terms of political utilitarianism, I would have to choose to follow the manual of correct policies because I have stochastic dominance: if I do things wrong, it will go badly for me; if I do things right, it may go well or it may go badly. Thus, if I were a sinister mind, a Machiavellian, I have to choose to remain attached to orthodoxy. That is to say, false dilemma: there is no dilemma there; I have to continue embracing orthodoxy even if I were a filthy, repugnant cynical politician like Machiavelli. But on the other hand, economic efficiency supports me. Economic theory and empirical evidence say that I am right: there is no trade-off between inflation and growth or between inflation and unemployment, unless you deceive the agents. Therefore, I am also supported in this by economic analysis, empirical evidence, and the Argentine case. The Argentine case says that we must continue on the path of non-negotiable orthodoxy.

But, as if that were not enough, our policy is also just, and that is the most important thing of all; it has to do with our moral values. Our moral values indicate that lying is wrong, that defrauding or stealing is wrong. Therefore, above all things, we are not going to do that because it is a fraud, because it is a lie, because it is a scam, because morally it is incorrect. Therefore, morality as a state policy says that we are not going to deviate in any way from Judeo-Christian values, and we will tie ourselves to the mast of the ship because we are not going to listen to the siren songs.

We are going to write the best page in Argentine history, whether you accompany us or not. If you do not accompany us, we go back home; it does not matter: we can all go back to work in the private sector. But if it goes well, Argentina will have taken a step to be great again. Thank you very much.