Speech by President Javier Milei at the Annual Convention of the IAEF in Mendoza

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

6 September 2024 · Annual Convention of the IAEF · Mendoza, Argentina

Context
Milei addressed the Annual Convention of the IAEF in Mendoza on September 6, 2024, outlining his administration's strategy to eliminate inflation and critiquing past governments' economic mismanagement.
Main themes
Eradicating inflation in Argentina, monetary policy design, Central Bank of Argentina history, Kirchnerist economic failures, currency devaluation and hyperinflation, convertibility program, statistical manipulation by government, economic stabilization, political criticism of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, fiscal responsibility
Duration
~81 min
98th percentile
Words
9,775
98th percentile
Sentences
456
98th percentile
Readability
60
87th percentile
Grade
10.1
22nd percentile
Syntax
3.04
53rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.05
18th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 84%78%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

456 sentences in 64 paragraphs

Hello everyone. And if not, it’s not me. Well, today I had a presentation plan, but since things are happening in Argentina, I had to modify the presentation a bit and I want to start the presentation with a quote from the former President of the Nation, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which says: ‘Argentina is that strange place where even the obvious must be explained.’ So, given the aberrations and inconsistencies in your letter today and all the damage it has caused to Argentina, well, I will have to explain obvious things. So this is for Cris, greetings Cris, this is for you.

Today's talk, basically, is about the approach we have to definitively eradicate inflation in Argentina, and that involves a description of initial conditions, a diagnosis, and a design of monetary policy. Therefore, ideally, as Friedman said: first the data, and in that sense, before that nefarious institution called the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic was created in 1935, in the 50 years prior, Argentina had an inflation rate of 0.9% per year.

Then, in one of the great plunders in Argentine history, in one of the most colossal scams that have been made, in 1935 the Central Bank was created, a mixed Central Bank, and in the first decade of the Central Bank's life, that is, between 1935 and 1945, the inflation rate jumped to 6%, a rate that today in Argentina could even be celebrated, but for the standards of the time, it was a very, very high inflation.

But as if having a mixed Central Bank was not enough, in 1946 the Central Bank was nationalized. And from then until 1991, the average inflation in Argentina was 240%. In that interval, we had two hyperinflations without even having a war, and we removed 13 zeros from the currency. And the widespread repudiation of the currency led to what was the most successful stabilization program in Argentine history, which was convertibility. Although between 1991 and 2001 the average inflation was 9%, it is true that this level of inflation was concentrated between 1991 and 1992. And from 1993 to 2001, Argentina was among the countries with the lowest inflation in the world.

Then, when the State ran out of financing and defaulted, instead of trying to put the accounts in order, they decided to scam us again. In fact, if you look at the bills we had at that time, they said ‘convertible legal tender’ and today they are no longer so, they do not have that slogan. That is to say, therefore, they do not have the backing that those bills had, that is to say, the political caste scammed us again. But they told us that this time it would be different, and it was not different at all. I will round off the numbers, I warn you, because then you will start with the number, that the comma, I don’t know what, I warn you beforehand that I will round them off.

If I take the average inflation of the first period of the Kirchnerist regime, let’s say, with Néstor Kirchner at the helm, the average inflation was 10%; in the second period of the Kirchnerist regime, that is, in the first presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the inflation jumped to an average of 20%; in the third period of the Kirchnerist regime, that is, the second presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the average inflation climbed to 30%. Perhaps in the document she published, she forgot to mention that one of her ways to combat inflation was to lie about it. That is to say, we do not think that the formula is to break the thermometer; the formula is to measure things. Or when they are so scared about the poor, where poverty is as much about falling into poverty as it is about getting out of poverty, it is not something that happens instantaneously; it requires time, it requires genuine economic growth. That is to say, it does not appear overnight just because, nor does it disappear overnight just because. And among other things, as they were bothered by the poverty index, they considered it a stigmatizing measure and decided not to publish it anymore. So of course, it is easy; by manipulating numbers, it must be much easier to achieve results and show better government performance.

Well, that is not the way we have decided to take; we have decided to tell the truth. Because we prefer to tell an uncomfortable truth rather than a comfortable lie. So at least, ma’am, if you want to make criticisms, start by making a self-criticism that is costing the country quite dearly, which is due to having lied about the numbers. Or the disasters they caused, for example, with the case of YPF, which is also going to cost all Argentines dearly.

But not only that, during the Macri period, the average inflation ended up climbing to average levels of 40%. So, it is not a matter of inflation appearing now. Moreover, Mr. Alberto Fernández, the autocratic abuser, basically left with an inflation rate of 210%. But that also does not reflect the dynamics he left behind, because as his government progressed, inflation was advancing. And I remember when we had already won the elections and were finalizing details to take office, during the first week of December, prices were rising at a daily rate of 1%. That annualized, the good thing is that I don’t have to explain to you how a geometric function works; that is, you know how to compute exponentials—and that annualized gives 3700%.

However, in the first 15 days of December, that is, during the second week of December, there was a stronger acceleration, the average inflation rose to 1.2% daily, which means that, in reality, inflation was traveling at 7500 percent annually. And when you computed the various imbalances that the Argentine economy had in the monetary realm, that is, because let’s remember that we were facing what was going to be the worst crisis in Argentine economic history, because it combined a monetary surplus that was double what we had before the Rodrigazo. An experiment that involved explaining the inflation rate. Not only that, we also had an absolutely bankrupt Central Bank. It was in a situation even worse than what Alfonsín had at the beginning of 1989, which ended with a hyperinflation of 5000% in wholesale prices. Additionally, we had social indicators worse than those in 2001, so everything was set for a disaster. Moreover, we had the equivalent of four monetary bases inside the Central Bank, but in remunerated liabilities that generated endogenous money creation. We had 90 billion dollars maturing in pesos, in pesos equivalent to 90 billion dollars. We had external debt maturities of 25 billion dollars, where most of it was with the International Monetary Fund, but the program was collapsed because the previous government had not fulfilled anything.

Therefore, we did not generate inflation; it was generated by these 20-plus years of wild populism. And the reality is that we describe the inheritance, but we do not complain about the inheritance, because we will also be honest, under normal pressure and temperature conditions, a libertarian liberal does not win the presidency. Therefore, we are clear that the conditions under which we were going to arrive were going to be on the brink of total collapse.

In that sense, for us it was fundamental, besides my job description has two things and it is very clear, which is on one hand the demand to end insecurity, where this morning was that wonderful minister I have, who is Dr. Bullrich, who is fighting and who, for example, has achieved the first month without homicides in Rosario, and the truth is that she is doing truly exceptional work. So that part of the job description is going great, and the other part of the job description says that we have to eradicate inflation. So, as I said, inflation in wholesale prices was traveling at 54 monthly, that is, at 17,000% annually, and that was feasible because what you needed was to validate fiscal deficit, validate quasi-fiscal, or that was maturing, the passes were maturing in one day, there was the problem of the puts. There was the problem of the debt in pesos. Therefore, everything was set for that to be validated, plus the monetary surplus. And if you take the latest wholesale inflation data, it is around 3%, and if you annualize that 3%, it is something like just over 20, if you were to subtract what we call or denominate induced inflation, which has to do with the crawling peg of 2% and international inflation, that gives about 2.5% and leaves an inflation that annualized is 6%. So, this part of the job description we are also fulfilling, despite the kicking and that some who messed up so much resist recognizing it.

So, beyond this, the point is how we got here. And now I will make a small introduction to monetary theory that I hope Cris, take note, take out your notebook and pencil and write down, because those next to you will not help you at all, because they are the ones who generated this disaster. Basically, to have a diagnosis, one must have a good theoretical framework; one must understand what one is talking about, because if one does not understand what one is talking about, that betting on type 2 error is not something that works recurrently. Type 1 error is doing everything right and it goes wrong; type 2 error is doing everything wrong and it goes right. And it is clear that theory has overwhelmingly defeated the caste in that inflation is a monetary phenomenon.

Now, to understand the nature of what inflation is, inflation is the loss of purchasing power of money. That is to say, it is a clearly different definition than that of generalized price increases. Because if for you inflation is the loss of purchasing power of money, it means that there is a problem of excess money supply and the problem lies with the Central Bank. If you believe that in the generalized price increase you will blame the price makers, then you will do price controls, a tool that we have evidence of not working for 4000 years.

So, we need to understand the nature of money, because I clearly apologize for having to explain this, but clearly, we have to explain even the obvious. If anyone knows this, it is the giant who is here, Federico Sturzenegger, and what you had to deal with the caste. Look, I believed that before believing that the Central Bank should be eliminated, I believed that there could be a Central Bank, especially when undoubtedly one of the most talented economists in the world was in charge of the Central Bank, with a truly exceptional group. After what I saw them do, I lost all hope and decided that the best thing that could happen is not to have a Central Bank. But I will also explain that now.

In that sense, what one should explain is where the existence of money comes from. So, what is the economy like when it has no money: well, it is a barter economy, that is, goods are exchanged for goods. Now, if you have a barter economy, you basically have two problems: one is the problem of double coincidence; that is, you have to find someone who wants the good you have to sell, but at the same time that person has to want the good you have. Which obviously poses a huge problem that causes a lot of transactions to be lost, so there is a huge problem. And the other problem is indivisibility, because it may be that I want to eat bread and the baker on the corner wants a chat about economics. But the problem is how many kilos of bread, obviously, those that… let’s say, before being president, were a few kilos that I could not eat.

So, that raises a problem of indivisibility, that is to say, because let’s say, perhaps for what it would give for a kilo of bread from the conference, it is of no use to him. Now, the issue is that the human being in the face of that situation did not start to cry, that is to say, and he also did not call, I want to call Daddy State. He did not call the State either. What did he do? He found a way, he solved it, he figured it out and fixed it somehow. And one of the things that human beings discovered was that there were goods that were exchanged more than others, so they started to buy those goods that were exchanged much more and used them as a mechanism of indirect exchange. So, suddenly they bought that good and with that good they then bought what they wanted. That is to say, that is where money appears, the good of indirect exchange is a good that is used to make transactions, that is money. So, in this situation, throughout history, different types of indirect exchange goods appeared that served as money. The first of all was livestock. And why was it livestock? Because man was nomadic and so he traveled with his own food, that is, with livestock. So, it was something that they regularly exchanged. And then, they used it as a good of indirect exchange and the money was livestock. Now, later man became sedentary and when he became sedentary, one of the things he ate more deeply, so to speak, was bread, so they noticed that many transactions were made in wheat, so then wheat became currency. Thus, we have different types of currencies, we have, for example, linen, coffee, tobacco. Moreover, there is a very funny phrase from Milton Friedman that talks about hyperinflation in Germany and says that nails were used as money or also, whisky, no, sorry, cognac. So, he said that it was the most liquid definition of money he had ever found in his life.

Moreover, if you look at movies from many years ago about prisons, what was the money? Cigarettes. What did the prisoners ask for? They asked for cigarettes, but suddenly they started to smoke, no, they used them to exchange within the prison. Now, what is the problem with this type of good? That it does not serve as a store of value, that is to say, what happened with this type of goods is that they degraded. So, it’s like having - Cris note that you had another lesson - it’s like having a negative interest rate, it’s like ice cream. You have an ice cream, as time goes by, it’s worth less. That is a negative interest rate and, in fact, what needs to be understood, you cannot tell the price of money, ma’am, because the interest rate exists independently of whether money exists. The interest rate exists because time exists. The interest rate has to do with the mechanism of passing consumption over time, that is, what is saving? Future consumption. It is a way of passing consumption over time.

So, those who go into debt are the ones who advance consumption and those who lose are the ones who defer consumption. And that is independent even of whether the Central Bank exists. The interest rate has to do with the relative price of present goods with respect to future goods. It has nothing to do with the monetary issue, it exists because time exists. Otherwise, there would be no interest rate, it would be a monster that has no explanation, like the one Keynes made in the general theory. A mistake that we have dragged for a long time.

But then, to try to preserve value, they moved to metal coins. And thus gold, silver, and bronze appeared. Gold was used for large transactions, silver was used for smaller transactions. Probably the most well-known silver coin was the Taler, which is the dollar today.

And in that sense, there was also another problem which was the problem of portability. So, there I made the example of Zorro, to graphically show the problem. Then they started with the story of Zorro, the version of I don’t know what, whatever, I talked about the version that I saw, let’s say on television of Guy Williams, the other versions, I mean… So, what I said is that I really loved that version of Zorro, because he is a true anarcho-capitalist. Because what did Zorro do? He fought against the wrongdoers who robbed merchants and fought against soldiers. This is very interesting because this is what… This is what surprises me, because instead of capturing the abstraction, they get stuck in the fine print, well, that’s why we are where we are. Or maybe all that dye did him harm, it darkened his thinking.

No, but Cristina wasn’t talking. That said, what was happening? If you were going to trade, what were you going to go with: either with goods or with gold. So, it’s like you were carrying a sign on your forehead that said: ‘I have gold, come rob me, come rob me.’ And what did the criminals do? They would try to intercept those carts, because there was gold. And in that sense, what is interesting? That Zorro fought against those criminals, why? Because if they did not reach the city with the goods then they had a loss of capital, they would eat the effect of the gold coins at that moment, they would eat it with a higher price level expressed in gold; and in that sense what would happen is that no one would bring them goods again; so, it’s as if they had closed the economy, which would have resulted in a huge loss of well-being. So Zorro was also a social benefactor, because as he protected, let’s say, the roads so that thieves would not rob merchants, he was also in favor of free trade. Very liberal, but on top of that he fought against Monastery and others, so he fought against authority. He fought against the issue of tax payments, therefore, Zorro was an anarcho-capitalist, don’t have any doubts.

I mean, you could also be an anarcho-capitalist at the head of the State and be like the State mole that comes to break it. Or do you think that reducing public spending by 30% is something? Only after the war and there are no such great experiences. That said, then what appeared? Paper money. So, you left the metal, you left it in one place and were given a certificate in exchange, then you would go and pay with that certificate. Obviously, there was no shortage of those who got clever and issued certificates without having the gold or silver behind them. Well, obviously it ended with a couple of uprisings, but what did the State do? It said ‘no, well, now I will do it,’ and that is where they ruined the currency.

So, that is where the problems of society begin and central banks are a relatively new invention. But here what is important, again, now we pass, - underline here ma’am - money is an indirect exchange good. I mean, that the course of history has turned it into a paper that is counterfeited by the central banks of the world, that is another problem. That is the great scam in the history of humanity called Central Bank, but money is an indirect exchange good. And why is it so important to emphasize that it is an indirect exchange good? Because if it is an indirect exchange good, it means that it is a derived demand. That is to say, let’s see guys, who among you is thinking of accumulating what currency to take it, let’s say, to the wooden suit, I mean, you would have to be quite foolish, on the other side it doesn’t buy, it doesn’t buy anything, it only buys here, in the fiction that is the visualization that one makes; or has anyone ever thought that the amount of ink in the bill of a dollar, two dollars, five, ten, twenty, fifty, and one hundred is the same? The only thing that changes are the little drawings, that is, the heroes and the numbers, but there you are making a mental representation of that. So, what needs to be understood is that in the end the demand for money is a derived demand for money. Why do they demand money? To demand goods. They don’t eat money, they don’t eat it. Take out a bill now, try to eat it, it doesn’t work. Moreover, it will probably upset your stomach. So, in the end, the demand for money is a derived demand, it is a mirror demand of the demand for goods, and this is interesting because if it is a mirror of the demand for goods, all the macroeconomics books that say that the demand for money is a function of income and the interest rate, it’s a horror. In reality, the demand for money depends on consumption and obviously depends on the intertemporal consumption path. And if I want to take, let’s say, in the end what it depends on, why do I not need to put income? Because if I am building a general equilibrium system, my income comes from the sale of leisure in the labor market and comes from the participation I have in the profits of the companies. Therefore, I do not have to put income. That is an aberration, that is a nonsense that Keynes made to be able to invent the quantity adjustment effect and, above all, to invent the Keynesian multiplier, which is to violate the budget constraint. Of course, by violating the budget constraint, of course, if you finance it with monetary issuance, it generates inflation, ma’am, yes it generates inflation; if you finance the fiscal deficit with monetary issuance, it generates inflation. I mean, in other countries that have deficits they finance it with remunerated debt, that is, not that of the Central Bank.

Now, so it means that if my money demand function now depends on my intertemporal consumption path, I have to know what the demand for consumption comes from. When you pose an exercise, you go, take a micro book and when you look at the functions of excess demand of general equilibrium or the demand functions of a good, what does it depend on? On all the prices of the economy, that is, income does not appear, all the prices of the economy appear. And at the same time if that economy is intertemporal, it includes today’s prices of tomorrow, and so on; it is not necessary to put the interest rate, the interest rate is implicit in the vectors, in the part of the price vector that contains future prices.

Therefore, the demand for money depends on consumption. And this is very interesting because then what does the demand for money fundamentally depend on? It depends on consumption, which depends on those prices, all of that derives from where? From what Robert Lucas Jr. - may he rest in peace - called the deep parameters. And the deep parameters what are they? The utility function, that is to say preferences, technology, endowments, and the type of economy I have, if it is a private property economy, let’s say. But, therefore, all those parameters are given; therefore, under normal conditions, without someone shaking the economy, issuing money like a pig, the consumption path would be determined by these parameters, which are deep parameters and are given. Therefore, the classics were not so foolish when they believed that the demand for money was something granite. Yes, of course under normal conditions of pressure and temperature it is something granite. I mean, if preferences do not change, technology does not change, endowments do not change and that intertemporal consumption vector does not change.

Therefore, if the demand for money is a granite structure, the real demand for money must equal what? The real supply of money. Did you see that Muhammad Ali or Cassius Clay, however you want to say it, called the photographers and said: get ready because the knockout is coming? Take the picture because another knockout is coming for Mrs. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

If the demand for money is a granite structure, which is the real demand for money, this must equal the real balances. Real balances are the nominal amount of money over the price level. Therefore, the price level will be given by the amount of money that the Central Bank offers over the demand for money, which is this real demand for money. Therefore, when the Central Bank issues money, all it does is change the nominal scale, that is, prices go up. Note, ma’am: inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess supply of money, either because money is issued or because the demand for money falls or both things happen. Moreover, I will tell you more: if you have already been able to get up, they have already told you eight, come back and I will give you again.

In this context, when you have this situation, there is a loss of purchasing power of money, which means that all prices expressed in monetary units rise, and the dollar is just another price in the economy. What happens, note another point, there is something called the Cantillon effect, which has to do with which prices rise first and which come afterward. So, for example, if you had a situation of a fall in the demand for money, that situation, let’s say, okay, they do not demand domestic money, what are they going to demand? Well, initially, they will demand dollars, that is, they make a portfolio change, so the price of the dollar jumps, why? Because it is a financial asset, it adjusts quickly. Now, once that happens, the price of tradables rises, after that the price of wholesalers rises, then the price of retailers, and finally, wages. That is why, when you have an event of this nature, it destroys workers. I mean, it creates a tremendous problem. It has to do with a case of falling demand for money, that is, it is not that the dollar causes prices to rise, no, it is an early indicator in a scenario of this nature, and also it cannot always be like this, because in reality what may have happened is that you increase the money supply, thus feeding the demand for goods; then the price of what would be retail prices rises, as that puts pressure on wholesalers, then they put pressure on wages, and since they are not given the numbers if it is not competitive, the exchange rate jumps. You realize that everything depends on where the excess supply was generated.

Madam, it is nonsense to say that the exchange rate is what determines the rest of the prices, but I will explain it to you more later. Therefore, we, working with general equilibrium seriously, not like those econochantas who say they do general equilibrium and cannot solve a Lagrangian, and in fewer intertemporal cases, our diagnosis was and is and will continue to be that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess of supply, either because supply rises or because demand falls or both things happen at the same time. Therefore, faced with the disastrous scenario we had, that we were heading towards an inflation of 17,000%, with which the fall of GDP would have been monstrous, with which the number of poor would have also been monstrous, we would have gone to more than 90% of poor and more than 50% of indigents, that is, we would have replicated the case of Venezuela without a doubt, then, our first fundamental idea was to end inflation, to attack inflation, which I warn you that during the campaign I said that monetary policy has a lag of 18 to 24 months. I say this because it seems that I am speaking, I don’t know, in Sanskrit. Everyone is very rushed and it has only been 9 months. Go and see my files, not the edited ones, see the complete ones. Not the dirty ones from the bribed journalists, not all, a large part, edit to distort the information and to lie. So, go and see the original videos, they are there.

So, the issue was to stop monetary issuance, how we would stop monetary issuance. So one of the sources of issuance that existed was the financing of the fiscal deficit. When we arrived, the consolidated fiscal deficit between the treasury and the national treasury was 15 points of GDP, where five were in the treasury and 10 in the Central Bank. Therefore, the task that the Central Bank and the Financing Secretariat had in front of them—and I have the honor of having the giant Pablo Quirno and Vladimir Werning here, let’s say they have been great architects of fixing this problem—was to attack those two sources of money creation.

So, what we proposed was zero deficit. I remember that during the campaign I went with a chainsaw and they told me I was crazy, why I was going with a chainsaw. In fact, we had fallen the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which was a huge difficulty to resolve the fallen agreement. And in that context, we decided to go to the Fund and show a zero deficit plan. The Fund was satisfied as long as we met the goals of the previous government, where, madam, you will criticize that government, but you were also part of it.

So, in that sense, we had proposed the zero deficit. Obviously, just as during the campaign they said it was impossible and that we were delusional and I don’t know how many other things, the Fund was satisfied as long as we complied with the program that had fallen due to the disaster of the previous government. We proposed the zero deficit, it seemed like a very ambitious thing because it implied an adjustment of five points of GDP in the treasury. And despite the fact that in the last 123 years of history, during 113 we had a fiscal deficit, only in 10 that we did not have it were we in default. It was the first time in these last 123 years that we reached zero deficit, but we did not do it, it was not in one year, we achieved it in the first month of management. That is quite a management.

Obviously, all those who said it was impossible to do this, those who failed repeatedly throughout history and should be silent, because they are part of the damage and destruction they caused to Argentines, should have a little more humility, or at least self-criticism. So, what happened? We ended up making a public spending adjustment of more than 30%, then they started to say it was because we were not paying, because we were cooking the numbers, they said anything, the same things that the lady here says. It is far away and late with those comments, those comments were already being made in January, in February, in March, today no one raises those arguments that belittle the work we have done. And clearly today it is understood that this is a monetary policy rule that has come to stay, and that soon I will go to Congress to present the Budget based on the zero deficit law.

And that implied that we stopped issuing to finance the treasury. Now, the quasi-fiscal was generated endogenously, which had to do with the remuneration of the Central Bank's remunerated liabilities and that generated 10 points of fiscal deficit, quasi-fiscal, and in that sense we had to end the endogenous issuance and as we showed the positive fiscal result and began to accumulate financial surpluses, this giant here, Mr. Pablo Quirno, was able to start reconstituting the curve in pesos and by being able to reconstitute the curve in pesos, it allowed us to take the debt that was in the Central Bank and pass it to the Treasury. Because in the end it was always Treasury debt. Because, what did Kirchnerism do, for example?: it issued money with a fixed exchange rate, lost reserves. Madam, you took the country with 52 billion dollars in reserves and destroyed it. With how many did you hand it over to Federico? Net minus 5000, a marvel madam, huh?

But aside from that, the problem of the future dollar, which was like 25 billion dollars, and in that context, of course, when you issue with a fixed exchange rate, one of the things that happens is you lose reserves. And what did they do? They placed bonds to the Central Bank. They placed bonds to the Central Bank for more than 100 billion dollars, a true scam. And that is how they took out the dollars, so, in fact, one of the things that the Central Bank recently did was recognize that capital loss generated by the previous government, for the staggering amount, for example, of 45 billion dollars. Not only that, but when we started doing this, no one believed we could solve the quasi-fiscal problem, moreover, madam, at one point you complained that the real interest rate is negative. I tell you that if we had listened to the econochantas who proposed putting the real interest rate in positive terms instead of having four remunerated basis points regarding the existing one, today we would have 8 or 9, 10, the carry trade, today would be a discussion about the carry trade and we would clearly be on the brink of hyperinflation.

But we did something else. I tell you to send the fools you have next to you to study, because do you know what we did? We arbitraged the dollar rate with the peso rate, corrected for risk obviously. And that made that given… Ah, then the devaluation: the devaluation, madam, was already there. That is to say, that you hide the data under the rug does not mean that the devaluation was not there, the relationship between the parallel dollar and the official one was about 3 to 1. In fact, when we took office, the parallel was around 1300; today it was at 1240. Oh, how the mandrills suffer. It doesn’t matter, there is a flourishing business called the production of vaseline for serial blundering economists.

And that which no one said how to fix, or that it was impossible, or that they proposed expropriations, we and these two giants here, Pablo and Vladimir, made the quasi-fiscal zero. What seemed impossible, we did in seven months. I mean, in one month we achieved the miracle of zero deficit and in seven months we achieved the miracle of ending the quasi-fiscal. There is indeed management, gentlemen.

However, it was not the only bomb that the previous government had left us, it also left us the problem of the puts. Something that the previous government did was fiscal deficit and the International Monetary Fund decided to turn a blind eye. And since banks did not want to finance the treasury, they preferred to do it with the Central Bank, the puts appeared; but of course, accounting-wise, the puts only go for the contingent, not for the contingency. But of course, in a scenario of macroeconomic debacle, that was in the money.

And obviously, when we announced the part of the monetary program that is zero excess demand, that is, we stopped issuing for the treasury, we stopped issuing for the remunerated liabilities and we were going to enter a phase in which only external sector issuance would occur. And we were sitting at the table with the banks discussing the issue of the puts, Banco Macro went and executed us for the equivalent of 2000 million dollars. That is to say, I want to know how many times in your life you have seen Argentina attacked for the equivalent of 2000 million dollars in one day and the economy resisted. Another miracle. That is to say, there is more strength in heaven than we believe.

In that sense, we were also able to carry forward the issue of the puts and faced with the possibility of generating another situation of run and macro instability, with Minister Caputo, who will be remembered in textbooks as the best Minister of Economy in history, we decided—in conference also with Santiago Bausili—to move to a deeper stage of monetary policy, which is to move to a zero issuance regime. Basically, the problem was that we, following the textbooks, believed that the purchase of dollars was matched with money demand and, therefore, if money demand was matched with supply, that does not generate inflation. However, one of the things that was not in the textbooks and that we discovered is that, of course, with capital controls that is not necessarily true. What happens? When you have free mobility of capital and if you want to make transactions in pesos, you go with your dollars and buy pesos from the Central Bank; and with those pesos you have matched a real operation. Therefore, in that case, it is money demand and hence in that case it does not generate inflation. The problem lies in that when you have a clamp, which we basically have to fix the stock problem that the previous government left us. That is to say: madam, I did not stop being a libertarian liberal. What happens is that I am a libertarian liberal, not a libertarian liberal.

So, I also understand the economy as stock and flow problems. So, if I had four monetary bases in one day, if I had 90, maturities in pesos for the equivalent of 90 billion dollars, if I had 50 billion dollars of debt in the SIRA, it is as if I did not dismantle that bomb, it would not end well, it would end quite badly. I understand that is what the previous government wanted, for us to act like libertarians, for everything to catch fire and already by January, after supermarket looting and other Peronist liturgies, they could return and definitively kill any semblance of freedom. In that sense, we do serious economics. That is to say, we do not only do textbook economics.

So, in fact, what happened in terms of interest rates is a great triumph that we have also had in terms of economic theory, because, what did the econochantas tell us? That we had to raise the interest rate. If we had raised the interest rate, the balance of the Central Bank would have exploded. In this way, having jumped the exchange rate to a level similar to the parallel exchange rate corrected by the Country Tax, in that context, what happened? The interest rate in dollars arbitraged with the peso rate, but the peso rate implied being negative in real terms and that also allowed us to dilute the stock of passes. That is so you learn, madam, in monetary theory it is not only a matter of looking at flows, stocks are also looked at. And sometimes the problem of stocks is much bigger than one imagines, because in fact it generated a quasi-fiscal deficit that was double the fiscal deficit.

In that sense, we decided to move towards something more radicalized. Because what happens? When you have capital controls, which we need to maintain until we finish addressing the stock problems and until we clean up the money overhang, the money overhang will disappear when inflation is zero, the induced inflation, excuse me, the macroeconomic inflation is zero. You have the observed and the induced; the macroeconomic is the one in the middle, that is, it is that residue. That today in wholesale is 0.5, in consumer it is one and a half, and it is on its way to disappearing.

In that context, what happens? When you have capital controls, exporters are required to liquidate in the MULC, and what is the problem with that? That exporter is not necessarily buying pesos; what we do know is that they are selling dollars, and notice that when there is a clamp and capital controls, wanting to buy pesos is not the same as having to sell dollars. That difference is fundamental because then, those dollars were not coming in because they wanted pesos; those dollars are coming in because there is a regulation that imposes it. So, that generated an expansion of the money supply beyond demand. And that is why inflation persists, not because there are indexing mechanisms, not because there is inflationary inertia, it is because more was issued than was demanded. So, to correct this, we moved to a deeper phase of the program, which is zero issuance.

And it is not intervention because the level of net intervention falls. Because if I liquidate 3 dollars, to put it one way, and I issue for 3 dollars, my level of intervention is 3 dollars. Now, if I have a gap and I return dollars such that the pesos remain constant, suppose with a 30 gap, I have one dollar left in the Central Bank and I return two to the market, I am not intervening; I am making the money supply remain constant.

Or what other way do you come up with? What do you want, for me to sterilize them and pay interest rates again? Again soup? So, if you look, the intervention went from three to one; therefore, in this equilibrium, there is less intervention, and it looks much more like a free market equilibrium than an intervention equilibrium. Why? Because when you... there is no intervention, how would zero intervention be? The variation of the exchange rate is free, the variation of the money supply is zero, and the variation of reserves is zero. Here another issue arises: Hey, that one... the Central Bank does not buy dollars, does it fall into default? Could it be that we are so foolish as to say such big nonsense? I understand that the doctor says this because she is not an economist; she is supposed to be a lawyer, but she does not show the title either. But let’s suppose she were a lawyer; it seems she does not know that; it is not part of her training. I say, how do you come up with the delusion that the debt has to be paid with dollars bought by the Central Bank in the market?

That is to say, what you are saying with that is that you are going to issue pesos to buy dollars, and then the State, the treasury, is going to snatch the dollars from you, is going to give you back public bonds, with which it is cheating you back and is cheating you with the very seigniorage. If you want, a more rudimentary version, easier to understand, although incorrect, the inflation tax.

So, what are you telling me? That I have to annihilate Argentines with inflation to pay the debt? No, guys, the debt is paid with fiscal surplus, not like an idiot buying dollars in the market by issuing pesos. That only generates inflation. So, the dollars to pay the debt are bought with the fiscal surplus, which is what we are doing.

Then, I want to address a matter of the discussion of endogenous money because it is incredible. The lady says that the exchange rate is what determines inflation or prices, or if you want, devaluation determines inflation. In essence, I tell you that this is applying the PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and saying that the domestic price is the international price times the exchange rate. I tell you, ma'am, that this is consistent with quantitative theory; in fact, do you know what? A gentleman named David Hume did that, which was later taken up by Adam Smith and the classics. Therefore, far from being unable to be contemplated, in fact, if the level of domestic prices is determined in the monetary plane by the money supply divided by the real demand for money, and that will apply the same in the world. The exchange rate, which is given by the local price divided by the international price, means that it is given by what are called relative monetary conditions. Let me do the math for you: local supply divided by international supply, international demand divided by local demand. So, as the world conditions are given for us, if the money supply increases or the demand for money falls, that impacts prices, but it also impacts the exchange rate. That is to say, do you realize that it doesn’t even have consistency in what you say?

It is also interesting to discuss that model, right? Because, in essence, what does it say? Well, the problem of inflation is the lack of dollars. A total nonsense. Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Of course, they start from this idea that local prices are the exchange rate multiplied by the international one and that the exchange rate is determined by the excess demand for foreign currency. So, what is the solution? Is it to export more? I mean, more excess demand for goods? It’s strange. What is the other solution? Default, restructure; are those the solutions you propose to lower inflation? They seem quite comical, you know why? Because they have already done all of those.

And then, nothing, they claim external restriction, another stupidity the size of a house. How does the external restriction model work? You stimulate demand, make GDP grow, that makes imports rise, and if they cannot be financed, then you have a limit to GDP expansion due to external restriction. Do you know why that happens? Because there is a fixed price. Leave flexible prices and the external restriction disappears. The external restriction exists in a fixed price model; if you free prices, there is no external restriction.

And fixed prices, fixing the exchange rate with fiscal deficit and issuing, was what made all the reserves skate away and destroy them. Today Argentina should have, if they had done things reasonably, about 120,000 to 150,000 million dollars in reserves, and we do not have them precisely because of the monetary populism of Kirchnerism, because of these barbarities.

So, moreover, it is interesting because it says, ‘no, the problem is not fiscal.’ Because there is a hypothesis that holds that the problem is fiscal, because I have a fiscal deficit, I finance it with monetary issuance, and that is what generates inflation. It says, ‘it has nothing to do with the fiscal deficit.’ It’s funny because then it says that the problem is the excess demand for foreign currency generated by the debt. And where did the debt come from? From a cabbage? The debt is the child of the fiscal deficit, ma'am; it is called budget constraint. Try to see what happens when you spend more than you earn; you go into debt. And that pays interest. That started because you went into debt. And who went into debt for 450,000 million dollars? The previous governments. I will tell you something: we reduced the debt, which means we are doing our job. Therefore, there is also a contradiction in your terms. But of course, they believe that prices are generated by a markup on costs, that is, the theory of value, the objective theory of value. That is to say, they have regressed to before 1871. I tell you something: I read Menger and I am proud to be Austrian.

In that sense, it is clear why they have caused us so much harm and continue to cause so much harm. And it is interesting because these kinds of stupidities are not only thought of by Kirchnerism; there are many more people who think with these things. And these things are what made Argentina, from being the richest country in the world, fall to the middle of the table. Starting from being the richest country in the world, in the last 50 years we multiplied poverty at least ten times. That is to say, in the country that produces food for 500 million human beings and the treasury takes 70%, that is, the food of 350 million human beings, there are 5 million Argentines who cannot afford to eat. That is the disaster they generated; it was generated by the entire political caste, not us, who came to fix all these messes. And I’ll give you one more piece of information: because they say, ‘no, the fall of GDP, the fall of GDP.’ It’s very interesting. If you take the fall of GDP in the first quarter, which is when we make the bulk of the adjustment, in fact, we overreacted the adjustment, GDP in the first quarter fell 5%. I remind you that, with Peronism in power in 2002, with an agreement with a gentleman named Alfonsín, they took down De la Rúa. And in that context, it is very interesting because they made a much smaller adjustment, and GDP in the second quarter of the year, when they made the adjustment, fell 16%. Therefore, 5% is quite notable, considering that we made a much larger adjustment.

But I’ll tell you something: in the last quarter of the previous year, GDP had already fallen 2.5%, and when you look at the seasonally adjusted figure for the first quarter, it fell 2.6%. So, it wasn’t something so alarming. And I will tell you more: the other day I was having dinner with Professor De Pablo, and he pointed out something I hadn’t noticed. If you take the EMAE, which is the proxy for GDP in monthly version, if you take it seasonally adjusted and take the last observation against December, GDP fell 2%. Therefore, not only are we making the largest adjustment in history, we are lowering inflation, but also the activity did not fall that much either. I understand, this is very painful for the political caste. We are demonstrating that they are useless, that they are good for nothing, that all they do is harm, and that removing the State from the middle benefits us and is not detrimental; it is something that improves our quality of life, not only for what we gain in freedom but also because we are more productive and more efficient.

But they also predicted that we would have a social catastrophe, a catastrophe that we did not have. Why? Because from the Ministry of Human Capital, while we were making the adjustment in items that do hurt politics, today, if you take the Universal Child Allowance plus the Food Card, today it covers 99% of the basic food basket, when the previous government left it around 60%.

Therefore, our social policy is also much better. But I will give you a piece of information that is not in that correction: when Minister Pettovello decided to remove the counterpart in social programs, everyone screamed and said, “Oh, well, now they are promoting laziness.” No, they did not realize what we were doing. Look, what we were doing was very simple: when you delivered a social program, although there was a card with which they collected, they then had to go to account for the counterpart, and it had to be signed. And that is where the bribe remained; that is where the poverty managers appeared. Everyone was talking about how to end the poverty managers. We are the ones who ended the poverty managers, and that was achieved in a battle from the first day that Minister Bullrich took control of the streets, and Minister Pettovello cut this scam. Because look how interesting, because now, if you cut it, they did not collect and were not obliged to go to the marches because they did not have to go to account for the counterpart, which in essence was that they went to the marches to make a mess. So, of course, when we announced that the counterpart was ending, a few days later, Belliboni announced a strike. Of course, because we were cutting the mechanism by which they were robbing half the money from the beneficiaries of social plans. And at that moment, he said that 50,000 people would go because he thought 100,000 would go, and he showed it as a success. And the truth is that only 3,000 ended up going; there were more police officers than people. And that allowed us to win the streets.

And, moreover, you have three types of war: the war that is stocks against stocks, the one that loses is the one that runs out of bullets first, so to speak; there is one that is flow-flow, that is, there it is a mess because it never ends. But there is one that is stock and flows. The war that the picketers and all this social overflow posed to us was flow-flow, and the State itself was putting money into those who were breaking things. And what did they say? That it was impossible to end the pickets. What did we do? We cut that cable, and it was a battle of flows, the State against stocks, the picketers. Their stock ran out, and the pickets ended. Four months ago, what seemed impossible, we have gone four months without pickets. Look at how we are managing.

Finally, moving on to how monetary policy will be in the future and how the exit from the restrictions will be, again, the first thing you need to understand is that I cannot set dates. I understand that your minds have been battered by years of collectivism, but did any of you think to demand that the Central Bank, looking ahead a year, know where the interest rate will be? I mean, really, you are asking us for things; soon you will be asking us how much the exchange rate will be tomorrow at a certain hour, let’s say a certain minute; I mean, it’s delusional. In other words, one progresses by objectives, and the point is that these achievements depend on the decisions of individuals, therefore, it is endogenous. That is to say, when, let’s say, could we end the remunerated liabilities? And when individuals wanted to switch to Treasury debt.

That said, we have the broad monetary base and we have the observed monetary base, the traditional one. So, to the extent that the traditional monetary base, as a consequence of the increase in the demand for money, leads to the unwinding of remunerated positions, you will not only have a situation where the two bases are mapped, but the flip side of that is that the money overhang has been eliminated and inflation is zero. When I talk about zero inflation, again, I mean that it is the difference between the observed and the induced. When we are in that situation, the only inflation that will remain is that the observed is equal to the induced, and then we can lift the restrictions and we won’t need dollars because the demand for money is matched with the supply of money.

Why is this important? First, look at this because it is very important: economic activity, despite what you were told, is recovering and is recovering in a very interesting way, and that naturally leads to an increase in the demand for money.

What happens with that increase in the demand for money? Companies need, you have to understand this, they need to generate working capital. And if they need working capital, what are they going to do? Are they going to go into debt or are they going to exit the money market? When they exit the money market to demand working capital, which is demand for money, what do you start to unwind? The remunerated positions in the banks, and that is why banks exit the remunerated positions, and what do they ask for? Cash. So, that is generating that the demand for money leads the traditional monetary base to the broad monetary base. So, what is the big risk? We have kept the supply of money constant and the demand for money is growing. Obviously, what is happening in the middle is that the money overhang is being cleaned up, and you will have less and less inflation.

Once we reach that point, what is now the problem? That the monetary base coincided with the broad one. It is that now the demand for money can continue to grow and the supply of pesos does not grow anymore. In that case, the risk, what is it? The risk is that there is deflation, and the problem lies in that, as the speed of adjustment in financial markets is faster than in the real market, the exchange rate may fall sharply and lead to the bankruptcy of companies and a slowdown in economic growth.

What did we say for this? Currency competition. Why do we talk about currency competition? Let’s suppose that the two currencies were only the peso and the dollar. You can, and in fact you can do it today, that’s why the case of Diarco is so wonderful because they accept payment in dollars. So, you automatically, what are you generating? You don’t have to be throwing dollars into the market and generating a brutal appreciation, you start making transactions in dollars. The monetization of the economy will be done by individuals, as always, and they will do it by bringing in dollars and making transactions in dollars. And what is interesting about this? That the amount of pesos will remain fixed, that you will have a market exchange rate that will not experience a jump because the supply and demand for dollars are mapped, and as there is more economic growth, there will increasingly be more dollars compared to pesos. And at some point, the amount of dollars will be so much greater than the amount of pesos, that we will be able to close the Central Bank, and thus the cancer of Argentine inflation will be permanently eradicated. Thank you very much.