Speech by President Javier Milei at the El Cronista Leaders' Meeting in La Rural

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

3 December 2025 · El Cronista Leaders' Meeting · La Rural

Context
Milei addressed business leaders at El Cronista's Leaders' Meeting in Buenos Aires, outlining Argentina's exchange rate and fiscal policy framework in December 2025.
Main themes
Exchange rate policy, fiscal adjustment, reserve accumulation, crawling peg band scheme, real exchange rate analysis, Argentina's economic crises, fiscal surplus, current account deficit, monetary policy, GDP at PPP, criticism of economists, La Libertad Avanza economic program
Duration
~88 min
98th percentile
Words
10,549
98th percentile
Sentences
501
98th percentile
Readability
63
92nd percentile
Grade
9.7
17th percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.01
11th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 82%78%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

501 sentences in 21 paragraphs

Good afternoon everyone, I come to give a conference happy, La Dolfina won, so it changes my mood. Well, first of all, I want to thank El Cronista Comercial for inviting me again, it is a pleasure for me to be here. Moreover, I see many people for whom I have great affection, such as Hernán, who has dealt with my notes in the past, in my other life, when I wrote more profusely about economics, nothing more. It is also a pleasure to see Willy, a pleasure to see Julián. Ah, you came, in the end, you came. Vladimir was watching the polo match with me. We have the luxury of having the Vice President of the Central Bank here as well, who can imagine what we did during halftime of the match? We talked about economics. Minister Quirno, Minister Toto Caputo, Furiase, the Hawk of Orthodoxy, Feli, Congresswoman Lemoine, and the great architect of the triumph of La Libertad Avanza, Karina Milei.

Today's talk I have framed in terms of exchange rate discussion, it seems to me that it is not my style to address something that is being debated, given that for so many years I have debated these kinds of things, to talk about another topic, it seems pertinent that I talk about issues precisely related to this debate about money, prices, the exchange rate, and obviously the accumulation of reserves. The talk has three blocks, in the first block I will show why many times with these issues economists are part of the problem, not the solution, that of looking at the real exchange rate series, to put it very politely, is very intellectually precarious. Block two is about why we have chosen a band exchange rate scheme and block three will be directly about the accumulation of reserves. So, the first point is that when you do that analysis of the real exchange rate, by the way, it seems quite arbitrary to me that you only do the calculation with the price index, honestly you have the estimates from the International Monetary Fund and other organizations that estimate GDP at PPP and you can stripe the quantities, which is also done, but not only that but the difference between GDP at PPP and GDP at current values, that tells you whether the economy is truly expensive or not. So, if my GDP at PPP is higher than my GDP at current values and you are taking all the prices of all the products that enter into the GDP computation, it is quite whimsical to choose an index to say that there is a problem with the exchange rate. It also has another problem and that is that you are looking at a macro issue and doing a partial equilibrium analysis, ignoring all the other situations in the economy. For example, I have seen Toto explain to exhaustion, for example, when they make the comparison, “no, this is like 2017.” What part is like 2017? I would like to know what is the part that coincides with 2017, because basically the fiscal adjustment was never made. In fact, when Macri's government took office, instead of making the adjustment, what it did was increase the fiscal deficit. Moreover, at no time did it correct it and only corrected it with debt. That is, during Macri's government, 60 billion dollars were taken in net debt. And the reality is that we, after 123 years, put the Treasury in the box in a single month and in 6 months the Central Bank. We made an adjustment of 15 points of GDP. In fact, one of the things that Toto often mentions with great insight is that we could have made the fiscal adjustment, put the accounts in order, and there could have still been hyperinflation. So, we have fiscal balance, we have barely a current account deficit, where the main driver of the current account deficit — which is not an important number either — is generated by private investment, that is, it is not generated by fiscal deficit. So, how am I going to compare a situation of fiscal surplus, practically balanced current account, and all the impetus of the current account is generated by an increase in the demand for capital goods? So, the truth is, and to set aside fiscal balance, it seems to me is to set aside precisely the element that explains 20 of the 22 crises that Argentina has had from 1900 until now.

So, the truth is that it seems capricious to choose only a set of prices to make that calculation, second, it has a partial equilibrium analysis problem ignoring everything else, by the way, we paid 50 billion dollars of debt, we canceled debt, so there is quite a problem, they look at a general equilibrium problem with partial equilibrium tools, inexorably that is going to be wrong, on the other hand, they take a series and calculate the average and the reality is that they calculate the average according to where they like the exchange rate to be, especially to save clients who are victims of their bad recommendations. There is one who is known for sending a very important company to bankruptcy with his exchange rate errors. So, wanting to dilute the hunger of Argentines with their forecasting errors is a whole issue. There is in one of Von Bohm-Bawerk's books, the one called Power or Law of the Market, it says it is like the case of supposing that you have a doctor and the doctor is stubborn with a diagnosis and is dedicated to finding a way to break that diagnosis from all sides until the diagnosis is what he wants. Well, the question is would you go to that doctor? Because he is going to kill you, literally. So one can say “well average value.” When could you use an average? You would use the average value of a series that has a lot of volatility as an approximation of a value. Just if you have a problem of high volatility, the average is not a good indicator. And what characterizes volatility in Argentina? You have the times of unrestrained populism, the real exchange rate goes through the roof; when you have a government that does things in an orderly manner, the real exchange rate appreciates. Moreover, when you take the stylized facts of successful stabilization processes, the counterpart is that the real exchange rate appreciates.

So, given that volatility, it does not make much sense to work with the average, moreover, you have a stylized fact of how the real exchange rate moves in Argentina in light of whether the stabilization process is more or less successful, what you have never had before was fiscal balance and in that sense not only that, but also those series have trends, so you have a trend problem, you have a volatility problem, but not only that but also ignores, let’s say, exogenous shocks and exogenous shocks can be, because if you had any change in the terms of trade that has to do with the international issue or it can have to do with an internal shock, call it the kuka risk. Those who lived prophesying the Apocalypse denied the kuka effect and after the country risk collapsed after the elections, they continue to deny it; that is, there is an attempt to force the diagnosis to give what they want it to give, and the most interesting thing is that all this does not qualify as economic theory because this is absolutely precarious, of very poor quality, and when one responds with serious economic theory they accuse you of being dogmatic; no, using good economic theory is not dogmatic, it is being a good economist. Now let’s go to the other problem. So now let’s think seriously about what a real exchange rate problem is about. From my point of view, it must be looked at from a macro perspective, what would be general equilibrium. There is also another thing of poor level and regrettable: economists believe that a system of equations is general equilibrium; no, the general equilibrium system has certain characteristics in the equations, it is not just anything, they have a certain format, and at the risk of the vast majority of those who talk about these things not knowing what a homogeneous function of degree zero is. So, I already suspect that they know nothing about general equilibrium, but that is another topic, now, when you take a general equilibrium model to determine the vector of equilibrium relative prices and suppose then that money is the numeraire and then all goods are expressed in relation to money, what determines the solution of a general equilibrium model, it is determined by preferences, it is determined by technology, it is determined by endowments and that is in normal cases, but it is not the only thing you should consider because for example if I in the determination of the general equilibrium model only take these three elements and do not worry about the issue of property rights then it gives me the same the extreme socialist solution, real socialism or capitalism, it seems to me that it does not work, these things are not even made explicit and they do not specify them because they do not know them. Not only that, but also the other issue is the institutions. Because you have a legal framework but then it is not complied with, that also plays an important role. Now, it means that I, to solve the scaled general equilibrium system in a numeraire called money, which can be the one issued by the Central Bank or another, basically in that model I have to know to solve in a single period what the preferences of the agents are, what the technology is, what the initial endowments are, how much the property rights are worth in that economy really and how well the institutions function. Not for nothing Hayek spoke of fatal arrogance, because whether we like it or not, economists, as Hayek said, what we can talk about is what we do not know; that is, we can have an idea of what we do not know, of what cannot be done, of where we should not get involved because the remedy is worse than the disease. That is, there is no way for you to know that vector so that you can solve the system.

Therefore, any appreciation you make about the real exchange rate is worthless. Because for you to say that the real exchange rate is high or low, you should know the equilibrium value and to know the equilibrium value, not only in general equilibrium you have to know the whole vector, and to know the whole vector you have to know all the things I just said, which you do not know. Now, it is also not a static problem, the economy does not end today, the problem of the economy is a dynamic issue. So if I have a dynamic problem, now I not only need to know all these parameters, but I should also know them intertemporally, that is, I would have to know today’s preferences to infinity, but for that I would have to know, for example, what is going to happen with the population, how preferences are going to mutate. Not only that, but also, as if all that were not enough, you are going to have to infer technological progress. Moreover, things that today you would not have registered in the set of endowments may be that in the future you discover that there are things you can use that you did not know. Or is it not what is happening with a lot of minerals and other things that today are known to be usable for other things, perhaps 100 years ago it was not known, to put it in some way. Therefore, I have to know all these parameters, that is, preferences, technology, population evolution, technological progress evolution, endowments, institutions, and property rights from here to eternity. And to know that I would have to be omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent, that is, I should be God. I have news for you: economists do not qualify in that category. The knowledge of economics does not qualify in that category and only those who believe they can have that level of knowledge are the fatally arrogant socialists, the heirs of rationalism but the heirs of rationalism led us to communism, it did not work, it was a failure in economic, social, cultural terms and there is a detail that for me is not minor, but perhaps for communists it is, because in fact they consider it something that was necessary, they killed 150 million human beings, while the difference of the whole branch that makes it with John Locke onwards recognizes that man is fallible, that he can make mistakes, that he is not perfect and from there go to the author of the Austrian school you want. Therefore, that analysis is not only of partial equilibrium, but it has the worst of combinations of what Hazlitt would say is the bad economist. Hazlitt says, in a wonderful book that I emphatically recommend, it is a wonderful book, it avoids a lot of nonsense that is repeated daily, it is called Economics in One Lesson, and in that book he says what the difference is between the good economist and the bad economist. Well, the bad economist only looks at one market and ignores all the other markets, that is, he does partial equilibrium versus general equilibrium, and also ignores time, that is, he does one-period economics. So, in that context, see that this way many economists look at the problem, I would not even qualify it as doing economics. So, someone who raises and makes me an analysis of the real exchange rate saying this, who answers me that I am dogmatic, that they stop resorting to the ad hominem fallacy, that they demonstrate to me that I am wrong, not with worthless things that do not add up.

But now I am going to do the most fun thing, I am going to do it with a very basic general equilibrium model, which is the model of tradables and non-tradables. It is not a very difficult model. So, the real exchange rate in that model is determined by the price of tradables divided by the price of non-tradables. So, let’s assume we are in an equilibrium situation because, I don’t know, I had a revelation and found out that this is the equilibrium. So, in that context, I suffer a negative external shock, excuse me, a negative productive shock on the non-tradable sector. What do you think is going to happen if I have a supply contraction in the non-tradable sector? The price of non-tradables is going to rise. If I look at that model, what I am going to have is that the real exchange rate is appreciating, and that appreciation of the real exchange rate is indicating to me what: that I have to direct resources to the non-tradable sector, because I just had a negative productive shock. Therefore, there is a price signal that says you have to invest in the non-tradable sector. So, here comes the group of pyromaniacs fanatical about devaluation who, deep down, have to wash their guilt with their clients, or because there is another one they got scammed by directly, what are they going to ask for? Devaluation? I mean, if you devalue, instead of fixing the problem, what do you do? You worsen it, because you start to modify the price of tradables upwards, and the price signal goes the other way. That is what happens when someone wants to determine prices by finger.

How does it end? Badly, Argentina has been doing this for 90 years, so from being one of the richest countries in the world, it became a middle-income country, and if we hadn’t done what we did, today we would be worse than Venezuela, therefore, that is not a minor fact, on the other hand, you have to be shameless and ignorant to take the real exchange rate series and ignore the fiscal issue, basically, if you look at this model, look it is quite elementary, there is a macroeconomics book by Gregorio, the Chilean, yes, it explains it very easily, believe me it is very APB. What do you think happens in this model if public spending decreases? The currency appreciates. No, excuse me, it’s as if you were in the equivalent of a devaluation; therefore, you can withstand a lower real exchange rate because, basically, you pushed the State out of the way. If I want to take it in terms of adjustment, we made an adjustment of 15 points of GDP. If I want to take it in terms... you don’t like to take the one from the Central Bank because it exposes you that you don’t know about monetary issues, I remember an experienced consultant, in an interview, criticizing what we did with the LEFIs, and it turns out he doesn’t know what an overnight operation is, and when he had to explain it, he stumbled. But, aside from that, we reduced public spending in real terms by 30%. That allows you to live with a lower real exchange rate. Therefore, the first thing I would say is that if the foundation that an economist provides to say that something doesn’t add up using this variable, I would tell you: at least be suspicious. And if not, look at the track record, because it might be that in the last two years they have been systematically wrong.

The second point I want to make is about the floating bands, what I see in terms of macro analysis is bad, but what I see in terms of open economy analysis is even worse, I don’t know, look, I like to hit the bibliography hard and evenly from both sides but I find it hard to believe where they do these things, the first point that seems most interesting to me and is what triggers this problem, I would love to see because I bet there are many who talk about rational expectations and at the same time talk about fast through, it is a song of inconsistency but how would the expected price vector be given the real structure that determines the set of relative prices, the expectation of prices would be given, in a model of rational expectations, by what would be given, by the amount of money. That is, if you derive a general equilibrium model, it is a model with excess demand functions that all depend on relative prices. And if you use money to buy those goods, the demand function for money would also be a function, it would depend on what: on the intertemporal consumption path. And the intertemporal consumption path would depend on relative prices, that is, with which, if the deep parameters do not change, the ones I mentioned before, which we have no way of knowing, the demand function for money would have to be granite-like, and that should equal the real balances, that is, the amount of money divided by the price level. Therefore, when I clear the price level, I have the amount of money over the demand for money. And if I increase the amount of money, the nominal scale of the economy, what has to happen? It has to rise. This is called the problem of the nominal scale of the economy. I challenge you to ask many economists what the nominal scale of the economy is, they don’t know what it is. Or the nominal anchor of the economy, the same: they don’t know what it is. That is why this type of discussions they have is rare and they do not resolve this type of things well. Well, if you understand that, then the price level of the economy will be determined, why? By the amount of money. Now, inflation is always and at all times a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess supply of money, either because the supply increased or because the demand fell, or both things happened at the same time. Money loses purchasing power and all prices expressed in monetary units rise. The exchange rate is one more: it is the price of the dollar. Now, is this instantaneous? No. We have said it to exhaustion: the lag of monetary policy, as we studied it, showed between 18 and 24 months. There is a new paper from the University of Córdoba that proves it is 26 months. So, if we set the amount of money in the middle of last year, when we finished cleaning the balance of the Central Bank because it had monetary sterilization instruments that generate endogenous growth of the amount of money, that is why we do not want to return to those instruments. We are not dogmatic: we do not want to see more inflation in Argentina. That is the difference. We have a larger customer base. We have to report to 47.5 million Argentines, not to three or four scoundrels from the red circle who have lived by impoverishing Argentina. In that context, therefore, if the price level is determined by the nominal scale of the economy, the money supply. The flip side of this is: what will determine the inflation rate is the monetary rule. Someone may have read about Friedman’s rule. So, Friedman proposed that the amount of money grow by 4%. There are different discussions, there are different monetary rules. Well, our monetary rule is zero issuance or, in other contexts, zero excess supply. Which is not the same because if there is growth and the demand for money grows there is room for issuance, and that I will discuss in the part where we discuss the accumulation of reserves. Now, what is the problem in Argentina? Expectations, and rightly so, Argentines do not form them according to a rational expectations model. The most recent book, this one I presented at the Movistar Arena, no; the previous one, the one I presented at the Luna Park, the central argument is: when economists see that they have a problem in the model or reality, it all depends on whether you work in decision-making; if the model does not serve you, you throw it away and look for another. That is why the experience that Toto has accumulated in the financial system is so valuable. How much do you think he would have fallen in love with the model and lost money? Instead, since consultants are like the Oracle of Delphi, they give advice but do not make decisions, they can err systematically, which they have been doing for two years. So, the problem now is: Argentines form their expectations by looking at the dollar. I don’t have to get angry with the models, I don’t have to get angry with Argentines. I have to solve problems. I was put in the position I was put in to solve problems, and if I don’t solve the problems, it would be very well that they do not renew my contract. I mean, I was put here to solve problems, not to do exercises of onanism with the models. In that sense, one of the important parts that was lost in economic analysis after the appearance of the nefarious and sinister book of 1936... I am Milei, let me pass...

Which implied a huge setback in economic theory, one of the things we lost in the middle is what is called the Hume-Cantillon effect and that has to do with the way money enters the economy and the reality that, because of that work, for more than 30 years they were discussing things in economics that do not make sense, but beyond that, I am not going to start discussing all that because that discussion takes me, I already have it measured, it takes me about 8 hours, so I am not going to overwhelm you with that, but what the Hume-Cantillon effect does is show how the entry of money impacts different prices. So, I am going to do it with two cases, suppose I have good A and good B, suppose now, for some reason, the demand for A increases and the demand for B falls, the counterpart of that, what should it be, is that the price of A rises and the price of B falls, while I have the nominal amount of money fixed, everything that rises A and has a set of consumers angry about continuing to consume A, will spend more on A, therefore, if they spend more on A, they must necessarily spend less on B. Therefore, the price must fall, the only way that does not happen is when there is monetary validation. If you have monetary validation, what happens? They increase the amount of money, so the price of B does not fall and the price of A rises more than proportionally. In general, the argument for why Central Banks do these atrocities is because they say that prices are rigid downwards. Well, you don’t really know that because you don’t know if they are rigid downwards. Because if in the last 90 years, except for 10, they have been issuing, how do they know that they are rigid downwards? If they have spent their whole lives with monetary validation. In fact, there is a wonderful book by Philipp Bagus called Defending Deflation. One of the things it shows is that the classics, who did not do economics for leisure but did economics to solve serious problems, if you review all the classical literature, no one was worried about deflation. No one dealt with deflation issues; however, they had a gold standard. So, wasn’t it that at that time they had no way of doing monetary validation and, consequently, prices moved? Of course, if prices always go up, well, when in doubt I leave it. But Menger will discipline them if that were the case.

So, rising prices will depend on whether there is monetary validation. What is the problem in Argentina? That in the last 90 years, since we have a Central Bank, in 80 we have lived with monetary validations due to fiscal deficit. Therefore, when the problem of the crisis of confidence arose, the demand for money fell, they bought dollars, the price of the dollar rose, then the price of tradables rose, then the price of wholesalers, then of retailers, and finally, wages, that is why devaluation is also so unpopular, because it destroys real wages. That is, every time you have an oracle of Delphi calling for devaluation, I would directly ask you why you are telling me that you want to favor a group of criminals who do not want to compete to impoverish the vast majority of Argentines? That is the question I would ask myself, clearly, because you are paid by the one who got scammed and the other Argentines, no. So, notice that if you repeated this exercise recurrently, someone who does not know about economics and is not obliged to know about economics, that is what economists are for, that is why they studied economics. If I study sociology, study psychology, study law, I don’t know, whatever you want, architecture or whatever, when a topic like this comes up, I listen to an economist, the economist should know what the Hume-Cantillon effect is, not the people. But what happens? In this dynamic that I just described, you then see that the exchange rate rises and what is going to happen next? All prices are going to rise, so if you don’t know anything about economics, the first thing you say is that if the exchange rate rises, prices rise. Moreover, the only experiment that did not have inflation since we have a Central Bank was what? Convertibility, just when the exchange rate was fixed. So, when you want to explain: “Look, the amount of money is fixed, when all the money overhang burns and when the lag of monetary policy finishes acting, there will be no more inflation.” Well, that’s fine, I believe you, but you know that, in the meantime, I buy dollars and obviously. Now, what are you going to do in that situation? Are you going to get angry with reality or are you going to act considering that good Argentines have been scammed for 90 years by an institution called the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic that was dedicated to financing a group of scammers who are the politicians who made fiscal deficits?

You should not get angry with the consequences; you should get angry with the causes. The cause, the mother of all evils, is the fiscal deficit. I went out during the electoral campaign with a chainsaw, which they said was impossible, that there was no way I would be able to make an adjustment, to balance the fiscal accounts in four years, especially with 15% of the Chamber of Deputies and 10% of the Senate. We did it in a month. So, when you have this mechanism of expectation formation, if you want to work with it as if you were working with rational expectations, do you know what will happen? You will be thinking about reality with a mechanism with agents that are not what you have. And you know what? If you think that way, you will be wrong. That is to say, you will only be right when type two error appears, meaning you did everything wrong and it happened to work out by chance. That said, another topic. There are many people linked to finance here. As far as I know, when you want to evaluate whether a portfolio is good or not, how do you evaluate it? With the Sharpe ratio. That is to say, with which, in principle, ex ante, I would believe that for everyone in general, volatility is bad. I do not believe that volatility is good. In fact, if you have two portfolios that yield the same and one has more risk, which one would you choose? The one with less risk. It seems that would be more or less the criterion; that is what economic theory says. Now, if that is dogmatism, okay, call me dogmatic then. But then, what is the problem? So, if I am risk-averse, I do not like volatility, and my mechanism of expectation formation is not that of rational expectations, because if the agents look at me with rational expectations, they look at the amount of money, the broad monetary base, okay. I finish cleaning the lags and everything, and that’s it, the problem is over. The problem is: do the agents do that? No. They have bad experiences from the last 90 years. The one who got burned with milk sees the cow and cries. So, what do I do? Do I get angry with the agents or do I design the policy based on the agents I have? This second path seems more reasonable, rather than trying to impose a model in their heads that they do not think with. So, why is it important to take into account the role of volatility? Because if I now have this mechanism of expectation formation based on the exchange rate and not based on the amount of money, the volatility I have in the foreign exchange market will spill over, where? In the goods market, which will lead to price volatility. And if the price level goes above what is determined by the amount of money, the nominal scale, what do I generate? Recession. I face a recession. That is, a drop in GDP, a drop in employment, a drop in real wages, an increase in the poor and indigent. What brilliant ideas do they propose to us? It is clear that these guys not only have never sat in the electric chair, but they also ignore what the electric chair is.

I am going to tell a very funny anecdote. Everyone knows that I am very good friends with Professor Juan Carlos de Pablo. And when I read Rothbard for the first time, Rothbard is very revealing. I realized that what I had been studying and teaching for many years, a large part of that knowledge was wrong, and that made me very critical of the policymakers. And when I spoke with De Pablo, I noticed him as condescending towards the politicians. I could not understand how a person with knowledge and experience could be condescending towards these guys. I could not believe it; I mean, I could not stand it in any way. I mean, it could not be. So, we argued recurrently, and the professor, with great wisdom, given that we had watched World Cups together, had spent holidays together, we had a wonderful bond, said: "Let’s disconnect until it matures a bit." That is why it makes me laugh when they say there are two idiots who say, “no, he wants to apply anarcho-capitalism." This is not anarcho-capitalism. It is more common sense than anarcho-capitalism, but it seems that there are people who do not separate the philosophical from the real. But it does not matter; they are the same ones who do not differentiate the model from reality. And in that context, one of the things that happened, later we met again and returned to have the same relationship as always, and already in the role that the Argentines have conferred upon me, at the dinners in Olivos, in which you can obviously imagine what we talk about, economics. In front of a group of friends, I publicly apologized to the professor because one of the things I realized is that I tried to contemplate the restrictions when I did my analysis in my other life, which was as an economist, and I realized that being in the electric chair, the restrictions are somewhat more. But it is very funny because after what has been this brief season in hell, which started back in March and ended on October 26. It is very interesting because I did a whole learning. I believe that all of us who were in the electric chair did a very strong learning, because not only were we in the electric chair, but there were people wanting to press the buttons. Some with incentives to press the buttons, others from the inside pressing the buttons, others who did it by accident. I mean, the whole process was very interesting, a lot of learning.

And so, one of the things he told me was that when, from his experience of having spoken with so many ministers of economy and presidents of the Central Bank, he was surprised at how those people did not have a heart attack every month. And the feedback he gave me: "I don’t know how you don’t have a heart attack every day." So, I can assure you that the problem of restrictions, volatility, and... because, besides, I set a north. Now I am going to tell you something: life is not a uniform rectilinear movement. So I try to go towards that; I ask my ministers to do it. The only restriction I impose on them is ethical and moral values. That is to say, it is not worth using all the instruments. I mean, if you have to choose between political utilitarianism and moral values, the rule is to choose moral values, because the political issue is my problem; I take responsibility for it, and I came to do the things that need to be done. Remember when last year closed and this year started, I said: I am going to enter the year with fiscal adjustment, and we did it; I am going to enter this year and I am going to tighten monetary policy, and we did it; I am going to enter this year and we are going to lift the capital controls, and we did it. Moral values are non-negotiable; the pillars of public policy design do not violate our values dynamically, because I cannot take responsibility for the decisions made in the past; for me, those are already initial conditions. So, in this sense, exchange rate volatility translates into price volatility, into quantity volatility, into real wage volatility, into employment volatility, into volatility of the poor and indigent. And that is not a minor issue, because then what are the bands for? The bands are there to put a limit on volatility, that is, so that the Argentine can get up and the exchange rate cannot be just anything. Why? Because it comes from 90 years of being scammed. So, that is the reason for the bands, and as we believe in freedom, the bands open over time, that is, at some point the bands will be so open that the market price relative to the bands will be a free exchange rate. But you cannot expect to win a race against Ben Johnson if you are just learning to crawl. It is a matter of common sense. And this is a technical issue, and I want to discuss it technically. Because what is the inspiration behind the issue of the bands? What were we thinking when we thought of the bands? When you study general equilibrium, you need to use a fixed point theorem to resolve the existence of equilibrium, and that set has to have the function that has to be continuous, and the set has to be convex and, moreover, has to be bounded. But real life, especially if you want to think in dynamic terms and think in terms of growth, is quite uninteresting to work with bounded economies. But if it is not bounded, the set can be infinite. Consequently, I cannot apply either Brouwer's fixed point theorem or Kakutani's or any other that is floating around.

So, what is the point? What do general equilibrium theorists do? Do they start crying? No, they do not start crying. How do they solve that problem? They create an artificial bound. That, by creating an artificial bound, allows them to solve the model. You realize all the amount of conceptual things I am throwing out there, and these frauds who start talking about the real exchange rate have no idea. Because I doubt they have the knowledge of topology to have this debate. But aside from that, you put that bound, that allows you to solve the model. And what do they check? Whether the restriction is effective or not. "Hey, as long as the dollar is between the bands, the restriction is not effective." I understand you have a problem with your clients. Some got burned at 1700, others at 2000 last year. Others said that, for example, if we did everything right, inflation would be 400% and the exchange rate... But they also said we were doing everything wrong, so. They track record me all day. I would like them to track record everyone, to see who survives the giant magnifying glass. So, that is the argument by which you can think between the bands and the exchange rate. The exchange rate has not touched the bands many times. The exchange rate touched the bands in very specific cases. What do those who have to wash their guilt say? "No, what happens is that the United States saved you." Ha ha ha. And I ask a question: the dollarization of the portfolio prior to the election was 42% of M2, the highest level of dollarization in Argentine history. It has never been so dollarized. Kuka risk. I mean, look how strong the program was that supported that. Because I ask a question: is the entire explanation the support from the United States? How much did we end up using from the Swap? 2000, 3000 let’s say, 2000. Out of 40 billion. How much is that? 5%. And I want to see them review what the National Congress did by passing 40 laws aimed at breaking the economic program. They have never seen that in history, and yet all the help to fix problems was 2000 greenbacks. It’s a joke. They need to wash the guilt of the mistakes they made and need to load it all onto an exogenous element. That is to say, besides, if you told me that the economy operated under normal pressure and temperature conditions, okay, then the inconsistency would be evident. Now, if in the middle I voted for 40 laws to break macroeconomic equilibrium, I say, what are you talking about? Because before that whole process started, the country risk was below 600, and we did not stop doing things. We cleaned up the Central Bank's assets, we cleaned up the Central Bank's liabilities, we did a lot of things. Even so, the country risk kept rising. If that is not called Kuka risk, I would like to know what it is, but that is another point.

Another point that is brilliant. I will try to explain it. Toto's explanation is infinitely better than mine, which is the idea of the safe asset. Did you explain it to them this morning? That's great. So, I will look better today. There came out the microeconomist part. The relative, thank you, so I look better today. It's that Toto had my bullets for today. So, the idea of the safe asset is: if you are in the United States, people get scared, risk aversion increases, what do people do? They move out of risky assets and invest in Treasury bonds or cash. So, they have a problem of deflationary pressures, and since buying Treasury bonds causes the price to rise, the interest rate to fall, it generates a compensatory effect. And so it acts as a buffer, it makes activity not suffer as much. Sometimes the increase in risk aversion is so great that they would almost have to resolve it with negative interest rates, but since they also don’t know what the interest rate is, I mean... For example, every time you hear someone say that the interest rate is the price of money, cross them out, because that is a fool. I ask you a question: in the Ramsey model, the prototypical model of intertemporal choice, today the basic macroeconomic model, the question is: that model has no money and yet has an interest rate. The interest rate exists because time exists, not because money exists. The interest rate is an intertemporal coordination mechanism that allows you to transfer consumption from the present to the future and vice versa, and the same with production. The first is called saving, the second is called investment. And the problem of the safe asset is that the safe asset in Argentina is the dollar. And given the mechanism of expectation formation, when my intertemporal solvency conditions are torpedoed by 40 laws and they affect the bonds, they leave the bond market and what do they buy? They buy the same thing that Americans do: dollars and U.S. Treasury bonds. The difference is that our exchange rate skyrockets and the price level becomes a kite. So, the discussion of the safe asset is a tremendous discussion. Now, I just gave you a lot of arguments, but there is one that is even stronger than all those. And that shows how foolish these guys are, it is clear that in their whole life they have never traded anything, which is the problem of market depth, it is called economic theory, you need complete and deep markets to have perfect markets, well, for example, the foreign exchange market in Chile trades 2.5 billion dollars daily, in Brazil it trades 4.5 billion, in Argentina 200. There are days when it trades less than 100 million, two hours pass, three hours, it hasn’t traded anything and not to mention if two guys appear, from the trading desk, with their cell phones saying “hey, put a price here and I’ll pay you.” So, with half a million greenbacks, they make the exchange rate jump and immediately the journalists appear, complicit in this, and say the exchange rate exploded, which messes with people's heads. So, you are going to tell me that in truth, it should not float, it does not meet any of the conditions to float like the United States or countries with much more complete and much deeper markets, one way to fix this is to make the economy more open but when we talk about opening the economy, the prebendal parasites appear demanding that Argentines pay more for worse quality goods, it is clear to you that when someone is asking for protection, they are asking for lower wages, whether the protection can effectively be via a tariff or some restriction or generating an uncontrolled monetary policy to devalue and everything leads to the same thing, blowing up wages and increasing the number of poor indigents.

I don’t think it should be done because what do they say, how many times have we heard “no, because if you open the economy, sector X is going to fall” or “it will leave a trail of unemployed”? False, again, the fallacy of what is not seen, if you open the economy and that good, that specific sector goes bankrupt, it is because the good you are bringing from abroad is of better quality and/or cheaper, when that happens, you have a saving and that saving will be spent on another good that is also more productive and that people want, so, in reality, there is no loss of employment and as you go to a sector that is more productive, the economy gains in productivity and also, as individuals have a greater quantity of goods, they are also happier. That said, the prebendal businessman who wants to defend his privilege and who wants to hunt in the zoo, that one will be worse off, the question is a moral question: are we going to save a prebendal corrupt? Bribes to other politicians from another time, not now because he cut off their heads and bribes to the media to defend that filthy position, against the rest of the Argentines.

From a moral perspective, do you think it is right to rob all Argentines to save a criminal who colluded with politicians and the media to defend the indefensible? I have already taken a position, so we have more than enough arguments to defend the fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate scheme we are having. By the way, what happens is that they do not see what is in plain sight, let alone will they see a counterfactual. I mean, they will not consider that we saved ourselves from hyperinflation of 15,000%, because they do not internalize the problem of the money overhang ratio, which was double that of the Rodrigazo, so prices, inflation, would have multiplied by 12. I mean, if it was coming at 300%, it would have gone to 3600%. But they also do not consider that we could have quintupled the amount of money in one day with the remunerated liabilities. Not to mention, they do not know what an overnight rate is. The only one who spoke about the problem of LELIQs after the campaign was me and I will pretend that they understand that there was the equivalent of nine monetary bases maturing in pesos. And we did the entire stabilization program unlike great talkers who either sent another minister to do the Bonex Plan, or imposed corralito, corralón, and so on. We did this respecting property rights, we did this, moreover, recomposing relative prices of controlled tariffs. We made the fiscal adjustment, we did not fix the exchange rate to make it easier. We have fiscal balance, 123 years they say others have not had. This is interesting, it is interesting, because just as they deny that we paid the debt, they say that, historically, I mean, since I have been aware and look at the numbers of the treasury, it has always been looked at on a cash basis, for those who come from accounting, in what is called received. Fiscal numbers have always been looked at this way. Since we have fiscal balance on a cash basis, in the received, as it has always been looked at... No, there is no fiscal balance, because on an accrual basis, no. I mean, they change the methodology. What they do not realize is that they show that they are foolish in terms of accounting, that they are doing double accounting. When I have zero-coupon bonds, the interests will be redeemed the day I pay the debt. But that debt I already have registered, it is already accounted for, it is accounted for in the debt. That is to say, what they are doing is double accounting. That is to say, to try to deny the achievements of this giant that is Toto Caputo, they deny and do bad accounting on purpose, because I no longer understand why they make this mistake. But, moreover, that would be valid even with fixed debt. I mean, it means that it would have to be discussed in case the debt rises. Bad news for these people who also deny it: we have reduced the debt by more than 50 billion dollars. But of course, they have to wash their guilt with their clients.

So, now let’s go to the issue of reserve accumulation. The whole debate, from my point of view, is not posed in the correct way, because the truth is that if I had a fully flexible exchange rate, international monetary economy one on one, I am not asking you to be Rogoff, whom I had the privilege of meeting. But you don’t need to be Rogoff to understand this. If you have a flexible exchange rate, by definition of a flexible exchange rate, the variation of reserves is zero. That is to say, asking for a flexible exchange rate, I mean, it should float, and asking to accumulate reserves, is a contradiction in terms. Now, then they say: “No, well, but actually, it is that we have to pay the debt.” Okay, let’s discuss then the payment of the debt. So, we have to discuss the condition of intertemporal solvency in a country, because there is a non-trivial issue that seems they do not take into account, which is that a country has infinite life. It is not trivial in terms of mathematics and neither in finance. That means that if the debt-to-GDP ratio does not grow over time, that is, if it is constant or falls, you are solvent. When you have zero deficit, the variation of debt is zero. And if the variation of debt is zero, if the gross product expands, the debt-to-GDP ratio automatically falls. In fact, since we took office, the debt-to-GDP ratio has not stopped falling. But then, the point is: what is the key value driver? What is the central issue there that has to do with the rollover? If I had a rollover, what is this thinking that I have to have reserves to pay? If I pay the interests with fiscal balance and roll the debt in the market, what are they talking about? I mean, they are so foolish that they also want to break the finance books. So, of course, if you on the other side have the kuka who tells you that they are not going to pay, and if it may be that you have a rollover problem. So, basically, if I have a rollover, the biggest problem Argentina had was the kuka risk. The interest rate is the relative price of present goods with respect to future goods. If I have a guy on the other side who says he is going to destroy everything, going to destroy everything, going to break everything, when the strategy was to break Milei's model, the strategy was not to pay, not this, not that, break contracts, break everything. That scenario looks a lot like a scenario called the end of the world scenario in what is the typification that De Pablo makes in the economy as a decision-making process. If we are in the end of the world scenario, what sense does it make to transfer consumption to the future? If there is no future, it is the end of the world scenario. If it is the end of the world scenario and there is no sense for future consumption, because only today matters because I have myopic agents who only care about today, it is called intertemporal myopia. The future disappears. So, there is no demand in the future, therefore, what is the price of future goods? Zero. Therefore, the interest rate, how much is it? Infinite. Look at how good we are that we managed that, despite the nonsense that the Neanderthals said, it only reached 1500.

Sometimes it also requires knowledge to understand counterfactuals. Now, but again, since we do not get angry with reality, we take it as it is. So, okay, I do not have rollover, I have to have reserves. So, if I have to have reserves, then I check if I have enough to pay or not. And if I use them to pay, then, if I had a problem where I go to the edge of the band, I cannot defend it. That is the discussion. So, now, did anyone ask what reserves are? Did anyone ask why they accumulate reserves? The United States does not accumulate reserves, Europe does not accumulate reserves. So why accumulate reserves? Because then, I have a problem that occasionally my capital market closes. So, what I need to buy is insurance. Are we all in agreement? Because if we are not in agreement. So, I buy insurance. So, the key, when I am going to buy insurance, what is it? The premium. Well, let’s see what premium we are willing to accept as Argentines. Well, one possibility is that, ignoring everything I said before, from the mechanism of expectation formation, from the problem of volatility, of the safe asset and the depth of the market, I go out to buy like an elephant in a bazaar, I go out to buy dollars by issuing. Since that does not have a counterpart in money demand, it generates an excess supply of money and what does that generate? Inflation, that is, the tax on the poor. That is to say, those who are asking me to do that are asking me to ruin the lives of Argentines. It took us a lot of work for 13 million Argentines to get out of poverty. You noticed that if you take each of the achievements of this government, if I had been Peronist, today half of the streets in Argentina would bear my name. But of course, since I am a heartless liberal, nothing. Now, you achieved this which was impossible. Well, now let’s go for more. I am going to ask for more. They ask for things that are inconsistent. So, the truth is that it seems to me that that insurance against generating poor people to ensure dollars for I don’t know who can buy them... I don’t think it’s wrong for those who want to buy dollars to do so, as they please. But the problem lies in whether it is fair. Do you think it is fair to artificially buy insurance ruining those who have the least? What do you want the insurance for then? Insurance is to protect. So, you are telling me that I have to ensure myself against a crisis by generating a crisis. It’s strange. I mean, because I end up, on top of that, with the problems I pointed out before, I end up self-generating it. Therefore, excuse me, but the option to generate inflation and ruin the quality of life for millions of Argentines, that is not mine.

The other alternative, at some point, some consultant labeled me as dogmatic. What is the problem? If we issue money, we take it out on the other side, sterilizing the Central Bank. All central banks in the world use it. Why don’t we do it? They didn’t understand what it was, for example, not only this case, what we had, what we avoided, the catastrophe we avoided using that instrument. I am going to tell you something: this disaster also happened in 1989, and that same consultant who accuses me of being dogmatic told his clients that he spoke with Machinea and that he said he was not going to devalue. Then he devalued. So they said to him: "But you said Machinea told you he was not going to devalue," "well, he lied to me." I will tell you something, that consultant didn’t even talk to Machinea. This is how you get to know them, let’s take off the mask from everyone. The other alternative is: well, I now not only pay the interest, I also pay the principal. So, to pay the principal, if I am today at zero deficit, what am I going to have to do? Cut public spending even more? Look, we are cutting it, but I warn you that about 75-80% of public spending is social. So, what are you proposing to me? Then, to raise taxes. You know what? Inflation tax or explicit tax, for me they are still taxes. Consequently, that insurance is very expensive, because it kills economic growth. That is to say, in the end, it ends up harming good Argentines. The other alternative is that I do it with debt. I roll over. And if I also want to have more reserves, well, what I can do... Ah, thank you. This man has one of the most difficult jobs in the world, which is my protocol chief. You don’t know how badly he suffers because I have a problem with compliance with the protocol that exceeds me. I apologize. But I need the cold air so that my face does not disintegrate. If I turn on the cold air it hits my back and I catch a cold. But I prefer that my face does not disintegrate, while you see me. So, what I have to choose is: okay, I get into debt to have insurance. Well, I can do it, because it is the debt that I may not be able to take at the moment I have to do the rollover. Well, then if we take on more debt beyond the rollover, they will start complaining that we are getting into debt. Yes, of course. Didn’t you want to accumulate reserves? That is another way. This seems more reasonable. So, it’s like: well, I am risk-averse, I am afraid of losing access to the market. So, when the window opens, I take advantage of it, I change the maturity profile, lower the rate, and also save some extra dollars in case I have problems. It seems more reasonable. It is not neutral in terms of distributive effect, but we can discuss it. And the other is to do privatizations. Obviously, what is the premium there? The size of the assets I am liquidating. So, I liquidate those assets and leave them in the Central Bank. Or the other thing, or I take on more debt, and the Treasury with that debt pays its creditor, the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic.

That is reasonable then. But for that we need to return to the market, and we are highly confident that we will do it, because the payment is due in January. So in that sense we are going to honor the debts, and we hope that the quality of economic analysis in Argentina improves and that we do not have to explain that 2 + 2 is 4. Beyond that, we believe that we have a huge opportunity. We have left the kuka risk behind. The election on October 26 has been truly impressive. If it had been a presidential election, the result of the election would have been 41 to 24. That is called the first round. Not only that, but many ghost lists were also used to deceive people. If you correct for that effect, we would have achieved 45 percentage points, which would have made the beating even bigger. And even if they had gotten more, it wouldn’t have been enough. It is no longer even necessary to get 10. And also, my face was not on the ballot. I was campaigning and my face was not on the ballot. Moreover, we won the Province of Buenos Aires and our candidate's face was not on the ballot and we still won. And that is why the other day with Toto, oh no, it wasn’t with you, it was with Fede, we said that the single paper ballot had been the greatest productivity gain in Argentine history. Why? Because it collapsed the kuka risk, by collapsing the kuka risk it collapses the interest rate, by collapsing the interest rate it allows the marginal product of capital to be lower. What is the flip side of that? More capital in the economy. If I have more capital in the economy, it increases labor productivity and real wages rise. That is to say, it is a productivity shock because fraud has ended in Argentina. No government being in power wanted to implement the single paper ballot and the only ones who had the courage to do it were us. But also this election, not only did it allow us to achieve a third in the Chamber of Deputies to defend the vetoes, in reality there were 127 seats at stake. We won 64. That is to say, due to how the distribution of votes occurred, we obtained more than 50% of the available seats in the Chamber of Deputies and that today allowed us for Martín Menem to be the President of the Chamber of Deputies for two more years and we are the ones who will manage the committees in Congress. But as if that were not enough, there were 22 seats at stake in the Senate and of those 22 seats we won 13. Not only do we now have 20 Senators or 21, depending on how the count is done, but also Peronism lost its majority. Today they have 28 Senators, therefore, we find ourselves in front of a possibility of having the most reformist Congress in Argentine history. Because if we with 15% of the Deputies and 10% of the Senators have made the largest structural reform in Argentine history, with this Congress do not doubt that we will go to the bone to make Argentina the freest country in the world that will allow us to be great again. Thank you very much.