Speech by President Javier Milei at the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICyP)

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

15 May 2024 · Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICyP)

Context
Milei addressed the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production in May 2024, delivering an economic lecture critiquing analysts' claims of currency lag in Argentina.
Main themes
Real exchange rate debate, currency lag analysis, Austrian economics and Hayek, equilibrium price vector, economic methodology, Argentine economic volatility, critique of economic analysts, preferences and market knowledge problem, extrapolation fallacy
Duration
~53 min
95th percentile
Words
6,408
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Sentences
320
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Readability
64
94th percentile
Grade
9.2
12th percentile
Syntax
2.96
43rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.03
14th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 92%85%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Institutional 2%2%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

320 sentences in 40 paragraphs

Good afternoon. While I come in my capacity as President, given the intense debate about whether there is a currency lag, I cannot help but be an economist. Therefore, I find it relevant to have this debate because, from my point of view, barring rare exceptions, what the majority of analysts are saying is wrong. Hence, what I am going to do is show why what they say is wrong. The thing is, I called it “The Dilemma of Reservations,” because, the truth is, if reservations are not made, they are essentially frauds. But if they do make them, what is the point of doing this analysis if it is wrong? This is quite complicated, and the issue is that a few have profited for many years with these shoddy analyses, and now, let’s say, they need to justify, or let’s say, as a result of all the mistakes they made in December and January, and since now, as they got it wrong, instead of accepting that they were wrong, they want to force reality to wash away their guilt.

So what I propose is a more serious debate, an intellectually honest debate, and to raise this: the first thing, which seems much more serious to me, is that if I am going to define a lag, it means that to define a lag I am comparing against something. That means I have to know the equilibrium price vector in the economy. This means that, since it is an open economy, I need to know the preferences of all the agents in the economy, across all goods in the economy, the endowments, and the technology, but not only for the Argentine economy but for the world as well. Poor Hayek, at this moment, must be turning in his grave. I mean, he could not believe, let’s say, the level of fatal arrogance we have in believing that we can make that calculation.

Sometimes mathematical models are good for understanding how things work, but let’s say, from there to believing it, I mean, for someone to come and bring me that price vector, let’s see if we are talking to someone serious or if we are talking to a fraud. It would be good if they read a bit of Hayek. Now, beyond that, in fact, one of the things Hayek said was that one of the fundamental missions of economists was to tell people all the things we do not know, that is, here we are pretending to believe things we do not have the faintest idea about, because if I ask each of you to define your preferences, I can assure you that I see you struggling to define the axioms and those things.

In that sense, now I am going to get into the methodology. So, let’s say, the real exchange rate, let’s say, is fundamentally the exchange rate times the international price level over the local price. Therefore, you look at the international inflation and the local inflation, and with that, you determine whether the exchange rate appreciates or not. So one of the things they do is take a type of… Let’s suppose they want to do it more seriously, so they take the entire series from the Argentine nation. If you want, and they average that, and the first point is to define the interval of the series, to say where it started. Okay. Now, the problem is that when you are working with an average, the reality is that if that series has a lot of volatility, the average is worthless.

And if there is something that characterizes Argentina, it is that it has a lot of volatility, and it is not the same the real exchange rate in times of crisis where, let’s say, the currency depreciates very strongly, or in times where there is confidence, where it appreciates very strongly. And Argentina has all those characteristics of volatility, therefore taking an average measure with that level of volatility in the variable, I don’t know, let’s say, implies a rather ungraceful qualification. Now, let’s say, moreover, in other cases they also cut the series, so the question is why do you cut it from this year and not from the other. Or some do it differently, they directly consider, yes, that at some point the real exchange rate was in equilibrium and let’s suppose that, let’s say, someone came and said “It is this” and then, let’s say, they took it, let’s say, they are like a sort of Moses of the economy, let’s say, and he gave the info and said “It is this,” so let’s suppose that happened to him once. And then it’s me.

Now, let’s suppose that he indeed gives that number and knows that number by some divine mystery, do you realize that if you take that reference exchange rate from that moment, it implies that you, going forward, are extrapolating the same conditions of supply and demand for each of the goods in the economy? And I ask you a question: if I gave you the best cell phone from ten years ago, what would you do today with that cell phone? You wouldn’t even use it for waste. Can you imagine the first ones, which were like bricks, do you remember? You realize that that extrapolation makes no sense. That is to say, the population has changed, preferences have changed, goods have changed, technology has changed, so it is an absolutely foolish extrapolation.

Therefore, and also you, again, if you wanted to do it right, you would need to know the preferences, the technology, the endowments of Argentines and the world, but not only now, in static terms, but you should also know it intertemporally. That is to say, from now until the end of the history of humanity. Don’t you think it is a little arrogant to believe that you can make that calculation and cheerfully define ‘there is a lag’? I mean, just to consider what that little number says when you look at the number. Now, does that mean that as economists we cannot say anything? No, no. It does not mean that we cannot say anything. There could be indirect ways or mechanisms to believe that there is some problem or there is some imbalance. That is to say, one would have to do is… well… What does the profession understand about these types of issues and under what circumstances could one believe that an imbalance could be occurring that would lead us to crash? to put it elegantly.

So, what I am going to do is review two standard models and see, let’s say, what those indicators could be that show that there is a problem in the exchange market; or that there is an imbalance, that there is a situation that could lead to an explosion. The model, let’s say, the most conventional, most standard, I mean one could work with what is the Mundell-Fleming model and could correct it to add a supply curve, let’s say, so that it does not yield that silly model of only quantity adjustment.

So, I brought you the different variants. So, I mean, for example, let’s take the case of a fixed exchange rate. So, I have a fixed exchange rate, in the Mundell-Fleming if I apply expansive monetary policy, what that is going to do is, in fact, if the model of quantity adjustment, the imbalance in the rate is going to make capital flee, the counterpoint is that I lose reserves. Therefore, let’s say, the imbalance one of the things that one should be appreciating, then, if there is some macro imbalance problem, is to be losing international reserves.

If I am not mistaken, the gentleman sitting there has bought more than 16 billion. It seems that is not the way to go. So, well now let’s suppose the case that now we do active monetary policy but there is a vertical supply curve.

So, not only does it lower the interest rate and that generates capital outflows, but it also raises prices and in that rise in prices, the exchange rate appreciates, the trade balance deteriorates, so not only do I have a loss of reserves, but I also have a deterioration of the trade balance and the current account, and with prices on an upward trend. I mean, that is not happening, because let’s say, we are accumulating reserves and prices are on a downward path, that is, the inflation rate is falling and, let’s say, none of these things manifest in losses of reserves. Not only that, but look at the intellectual dishonesty of those who want things to go wrong because they got it wrong, that is, the serial predictors, again, look, there is a political analyst from the United States who when he analyzed the rise to power of our space, surely very influenced by the things that were said here, like the dollar at 7000 to 10,000 and all those things that were said, let’s say, he had a very negative view and the man says “Look, the truth is I was wrong” and he is not someone, let’s say, a libertarian liberal.

But well, here it seems that, let’s say, it is not easy to recognize that they were wrong and it is easier, let’s say, to criticize until it resembles the thing they predicted. I mean, I give you as an example those who spoke, for example, that the real interest rate had to be positive and the number of things they have told Toto and Santiago for that. And that if we had listened to them, today the ratio of remunerated liabilities over the monetary base would be eight or nine times and today we would be talking about carry trade and hyperinflation and all the problems and, let’s say, about how we would have to be fixing this by expropriating.

That’s how we are, go and look for the reports of those who talked about positive real interest rates. So, that scenario is not happening either and what I said about yesterday’s inflation data, look, we, unlike others, look I am going to compare it with the stabilization plan of convertibility, which was the most successful in history to see the size of the problem. Convertibility, let’s say, comes after two hyperinflations, it is not necessary to clarify that, let’s say, having two hyperinflations makes the monetary issue much easier because it destroys monetary assets, therefore, let’s say, the possibility of the demand for money falling from those levels becomes almost impossible. Which is not minor to the effects of stabilizing an economy. But not only that. There was an expropriation, there was a Bonex Plan, in addition it was anchored by force by fixing the exchange rate, right? And not only that, but there was also a sort of price agreement. So, we were facing a crisis that had the monetary imbalance of the pre-Rodrigazo, a broken balance sheet like that of the Central Bank of Alfonsín. By the way, recently the Central Bank showed the disaster that Kirchnerism generated in its last term, skating 45 billion dollars, leaving the Central Bank bankrupt, where there is a reconstitution of assets of more than 25 billion dollars. A round of applause for Mr. Santiago Bausili, please.

We did everything in the market, there was no expropriation, everything in the market. I am not to blame for them not understanding how the problem of the Nominal Anchor works, which I will explain later. The reality is that we are doing this entire process of stabilization of disinflation with correction of relative prices. So, why do I speak of intellectual dishonesty? Because it is true, the inflation rate yesterday we learned was 8.8%. But we are recomposing relative prices. It is not that, let’s say, we are not doing them. And when you look at the core, it was at 6.3%. When you look at what is happening with food and beverages, almost all indicators are below 3%. In fact, the most common is, let’s say, the one from FIEL, let’s say, gave 1.7%.

That is to say, it is happening. The thing is that those who got it wrong find it easier to say that there is no stabilization plan. The question is: If there is no stabilization plan, what do you think lowers inflation by coincidence? It is truly insulting, let’s say, for someone who thinks for two minutes about the things they are saying. As you will see, today I am a little more bloodthirsty than usual. I still have more, just a heads up. Then, another mechanism is, let’s say, to use active fiscal policy. That is to say, then, in that context, I would be generating a fiscal deficit, I would be raising the interest rate and that would bring in capital, right? And that would increase my reserves. But the reality is that we are not raising the interest rate. In fact, the effective rate when we arrived was 250%. Today the rate is 40.

Therefore, it is not working from that side either, and if I put the effect of rising prices that this fiscal movement would cause, one of the things that I would have to be seeing is a strong deterioration of the trade balance, the current account, and that would have to be compensated, let’s say, with what has to do with the capital account and, therefore, reserves would hardly be moving, but the counterpart of this is that I would have a deterioration of public accounts and an increase in country risk, and like it or not, those who said it was impossible to adjust more than one point of the deficit in a year, we made an adjustment in the treasury of seven points of GDP, obviously, yes in the middle of the crisis we faced, obviously, and we overreacted a little, yes obviously. But, let’s say, that made us reach fiscal balance in the first month of management.

So, imagine, now we can start to relax and return, why? Because we have already overreacted to fiscal balance. But they had said that making an adjustment of one point was impossible, and we adjusted seven. And in the Central Bank, which no one answered about how it was corrected, we have already gone down from a 10-point deficit, we have reduced seven and with the new rate cut we are going to 8 in reduction. Therefore, as you will see, we are making an adjustment of 15 points of GDP. Impossible? Nothing. We are doing it.

Therefore, all these forms of indebtedness... I mean, now we are not going into debt because we have fiscal balance, we have balance in the financial account. This means that debt is not increasing. If debt is not increasing, then the debt-to-GDP ratio is not rising. Consequently, we are solvent. And the market has realized this. The country risk, which was at 2900 points, fell to 1200 points. The bonds that cost 18 dollars when we won now cost 60.

Not to mention that, let's say, if you have a fixed exchange rate scheme and wanted to implement active monetary policy, and prices start to rise and external conditions deteriorate, one of the consequences is that you would impose capital controls, then you would see a growing gap. Hello gap, where have you been because we don't see you. Right? Because, let's say, the gap when corrected for the Impuesto PAÍS is zero. Therefore, you also don't see the problem from that side, let's say. Obviously, if you had a flexible exchange rate, that would be corrected quickly through the exchange rate. You could raise a concern in the case of fiscal policy, because basically you would be under pressure on prices, your trade balance would deteriorate, and the day you run out of financing, that's when the problem would appear.

But again, it always pivots on what happens with country risk and whether or not you can secure financing to do it. But I say that could be a case that... let's say... But, also, there is no fiscal deficit. Country risk is falling, and we are not losing reserves, and we are not needing anyone's financing. Now, I understand that one could say to me 'this model is not the most elegant model'. So I will use another model that is a little more fun... the funniest thing is that the model, which is more fun, will leave you more ridiculous, the ridiculous, that is the funniest part of this. Because it is so obvious what I am going to tell that, honestly, the next time an economist comes to you and says that there is exchange rate lag, they will have to be embarrassed or at least if they did not listen to this talk, you will laugh in their face because you already know they are robbing your money.

One way, let's say, to see the problem of whether the exchange rate is lagging or not, is to make a model with tradables and non-tradables. So, the real exchange rate, if you want, is given by the price of tradables over the price of non-tradables. So, for example, if you implement active fiscal policy and how you consume tradables, what you will do is that the price of non-tradable goods will rise, and there you will be generating an appreciation of the currency. That would be the case. The reality is that, then, the currency appreciation would result in a fiscal deficit. We have just described an adjustment that will be around 15 points of GDP, therefore there is no more State in the economy, there is much less. Therefore, in principle, the model would say "Hey, this is not the way."

But now I will make it even funnier, more ridiculous, I will take it to the extreme to give you an idea of the absurdities that another family of economists says, because I cannot call them heirs of Adam Smith, surely not. Now I will make it easier, let’s suppose that for some reason, I don’t know, a torpedo comes and blows up half of the non-tradable sector of the economy. A negative supply shock on the supply of non-tradables in the economy. What would the natural response be? That the price of non-tradables rises, right? According to these fanatics of devaluation, they would say that this is corrected with a devaluation. This is a stupidity the size of a house, I just blew up the productivity of the non-tradable sector. If I go and devalue to correct that, what will never happen is that I will have the allocation of resources that the prices are indicating, the prices are telling me that non-tradables are rising and I have to send resources to that sector.

But they are so fatally arrogant that they want to touch the exchange rate when they do not realize that the problem is not in the exchange rate. The problem is not in the exchange rate, it is that I suffered a productivity shock. It is called 20 years of populism. And if you want to take it better, it is called 100 years of populism. Wanting to correct it by devaluing only increases the number of poor indigents and does not solve the problem. Because with that devaluation, what I am doing is aborting the process in which I reallocate resources. That is to say, when I clean the whole system, if it is going to give face Argentina in dollars, but it does not correct by devaluing, it corrects through structural reforms in the non-tradable sector, that would be the rule. Therefore, it is absolutely ridiculous. So an indicator that I have a problem that from economic policy I am generating exchange rate lag would have to be seeing a fiscal deficit and growing. We just said that we implemented an adjustment of 15 points of GDP. Done. There is no room for discussion there.

The other is, I am implementing active monetary policy. So I carry out active monetary policy, and I am generating these imbalances, the reality is that the amount of money in real terms is collapsing. We will discuss this a little later, about how the exit from all this is. Therefore, let’s say, if I see how monetary assets in the economy are falling in real terms, it is clear that we are not conducting expansive monetary policy. And in fact, we are doing a huge job to stop all the emission taps. We have stopped the fiscal tap. In fact, fiscal policy today is a mechanism for money contraction. It seems like a joke, but this is Argentina now under the government of La Libertad Avanza.

But not only that. The other is, if I implement active monetary policy and have controls, then I should have a gap, I remind you, I say, that when we arrived, the gap was 200%, I mean there was a three-to-one relationship. That is to say, and there are shameless, liberty-killers, who throughout their lives have been talking about putting sand in the wheels, right? And now they come to talk about the controls, the controls, the controls, the controls. I mean, or those who you raise the issue with and they say, but the controls, but the controls, and they are the same ones who said that a gap of 60% was fine and that it could be lived with. I mean, there are such shameless people around that... I say they must not read the things they wrote before. That is why, let’s say, something very funny that is going around on Twitter is when they are held accountable, and they start sending the reports they wrote in December, January, it is a treat. And the same ones who talk about the lagging exchange rate are the ones who said we were crazy because we brought it to an equivalent of 800 and the correction for the Impuesto PAÍS, and it was close to 1000 and who said it was nonsense to do that, are the same ones who said it should be set at 600 and had a hypothesis of inflation higher than what we have in real life and now they talk about exchange rate lag.

The model does not hold, I don’t know, they do fuzzy math. The other case is the issue of international reserves. If we had a lagging problem, we would have a systematic decline in reserves... But we have not stopped buying. And then there is the issue of prices, where the decreasing path of inflation is clearly seen. This is interesting because when we arrived the first week of December, prices were running at one daily which was equivalent to 3700% annually. In the second week, it accelerated a bit more and that annualized gives 7500. And if you look, it may be that wholesale prices are published after the CPI, but, in reality, it is an indicator that leads. The CPI gave 54%. That annualized gives 17000%. And that would have been possible if there had been monetary validation. But monetary validation did not occur because we decided to stop the emission because we decided to stand on top of public spending and implement fiscal adjustment, not the largest in Argentine history, but in the history of humanity.

That is to say, something that is recognized worldwide, except here. 'Because the quality of the adjustment is not optimal.' I will tell you something, 'No, because it has a lot of blender and has little scissors.' First, let’s say, we have cut public works, we did zero, we cut discretionary transfers, we have not stopped cutting thefts, we have brought the structure of the State down to half. "No, but it’s little scissors." What little scissors? We are, let’s say, recomposing tariffs. "But it’s little scissors," those who said that on top of that, you could not adjust more than one point. And then I tell you something: when the blender becomes permanent, it is also a chainsaw. That is to say, let’s say, I will call it "Plaster Pig": to take a coin out, you have to break it all, which I endorse. It is unbreakable, and I will tell you something more, if someone wants to break it, they will have to break me first, because I will not deliver the fiscal result. So, again, decreasing public spending, decreasing country risk, falling interest rates, therefore, the model does not hold. I mean, there is no element of economic theory that justifies the nonsense of exchange rate lag. The problem of Argentina is not a problem of exchange rate lag. I mean, again, and this is because they do not know, most are so fraudulent that they do not know what the problem of the nominal anchor is. It is that brutal and I know it. So, I will explain what the problem of the nominal anchor is.

When you want to know the demand for money, the demand, money exists because there are basically two problems regarding the barter economy. One is the double coincidence, let’s say what I want to sell has to coincide with what another wants to buy, and be the same good, let’s say, so that we can make a reciprocal transaction, which is difficult. In a small society, it may be, in a large society it becomes difficult. And then there is the problem of indivisibility. So, human beings did not start crying when it happened, they took it and fixed it. In that context, money appeared, now money, I mean it does not matter, let’s say, under what form I say, when man was nomadic it was cattle, when, let’s say, he settled and became sedentary as what he ate the most was bread, then wheat became money. Why? Because it is a good of indirect exchange, that is to say, it is not that they demanded it because they wanted the wheat, they demanded it because it served to make other transactions. If you understand this, then the demand for money, in reality, is a way of financing the intertemporal path of consumption.

No one is thinking of taking the money to the wooden suit. On the other side, they buy nothing, they buy here. So why would I take it to the other side? It is a miscalculation. In fact, inheritance is a miscalculation. But having said this... Hello professor! I do not envy you... It is Professor Espert who just arrived from Congress. So the demand for money is a way of financing the intertemporal path of consumption but consumption depends on what the deep parameters would say Robert Lucas Jr., may he rest in peace, that is to say at the bottom of preferences, endowments, and technology and how those parameters are given under normal conditions of printing and temperature, the demand for money is a granite issue and that has to be equal to real balances. That is to say, the amount of money divides the price level. So, what is the nominal anchor? It is that I fix the amount of money so that the price level is determined.

From there, the monetary nature of inflation, that if I issue, prices rise. And that is the problem of the nominal anchor, that the demand for money is determined by individuals. And by being determined by individuals, the Central Bank can only do harm, it cannot do good. Why? Because, basically, let’s say, that is a parameter that is there. And if you start messing with the inflation rate and generating inflation and all that, I mean, the demand for money starts to move. Obviously, of course. And then other problems appear. But, basically, you fix the amount of money, for what? So that the price level is determined. So, when you anchored the amount of money, you will anchor the price level. Let’s see if you understand, we with the fiscal result, right? What we are doing is anchoring what? The amount of money. And why haven’t we opened the controls yet? Because we have mechanisms of endogenous emission, such as the passes, as well as the puts. The day we finish with the remunerated passes, which with the successive rate cuts we are eliminating, once we also finish, let’s say, with the problem of the puts, one of the things that will happen is that the amount of money will remain fixed and there you will find the nominal anchor. That is to say, it is not always, let’s say, the exchange rate. I mean, you cannot be so square as to believe that there is only one way to anchor the economy.

Of course, if I set the exchange rate given the international prices, the local prices are determined, and given the demand for money, the quantity of money is endogenously determined. But I say, this is not the only way to anchor. How am I going to anchor the exchange rate if I was left with 12 billion dollars in negative reserves? Is that clear? So, all this does is demystify the notion that there is a currency lag; that is, there is no currency lag, meaning what I have are other problems. I have an infrastructure problem, for example, I have a soft infrastructure problem, that is, I have a contractual base problem. I have a hard infrastructure problem, meaning I have a problem with physical assets, and we are working on that with the DNU, with the law, let's say, of bases; we are working on what has to do with soft infrastructure.

We are looking for mechanisms, let's say, of private initiative to correct the hard infrastructure. Obviously, we have issues in the commercial area and little by little we are lifting restrictions, little by little we are opening up. It’s not that we are not doing it. One of the things that the IMF praised us for the most is how we lift restrictions in the exchange market every day. Now, we are not going to do it all at once, and now I will explain why. When we arrived, only 15% of imports were being paid. Today, 70% is paid. Small difference, they don’t tell you that, do they? ‘The clamp, the clamp, the clamp.’

But then, again, we are finishing with the problem of the passes, which is on track, fixing the problem of the puts, something that the International Monetary Fund allowed as an indirect financing mechanism for the previous government, and that turned a blind eye and looked the other way, and left us with the mess, which is a mechanism, let’s say, it’s an American put, meaning that whenever the banks feel like it, they can execute it, which transforms into monetary issuance for me, so I need to correct that too. And not only that, we have the problem of the debt of dividends, where the other day, let’s say, we already removed, we managed to clean up 1.7 billion dollars more. That is to say, what we are doing, if you were a financial manager, is matching the flow of foreign currency funds. Why? Because they generated a stock problem in the previous government that if I release that stock instantly and it transforms into flow, it makes the exchange rate jump temporarily, but if you make the exchange rate jump temporarily and the demand for money falls, I could end up in hyperinflation.

How close are we to opening? The truth is that we are very close to opening. Why? Basically because, on one hand, when we look at the monetary base - historically, what should be around 9% of GDP in the 21st century - the pure base is 2.5. So there is a lot of room. When we take the remunerated, we go to 8. So we are in a zone where we can open. So, if we solve the problem of the remunerated liabilities, which we are doing by lowering the interest rate; if we solve the problem of the puts, something we are actively working on. The gentleman from God has been waiting quite a while on that issue. And, on the other hand, we are fixing the problem of the dividends. If you look, we are matching the flows of foreign currency funds, and when we finish doing that, we will open the clamp.

It is, let’s say, in our plans to open it as quickly as possible. But do you know why we are taking time? Because we do it in the market. Because it is determined by the will of individuals. That is, we do not do it by force, we do not do it by coercion. That is a distinctive characteristic of this government, which strictly respects property rights. But not only that, it is not the only problem we have. We also have another problem, which is the issue of taxes. So, you have national taxes, provincial taxes, and municipal taxes. In the Pacto de Mayo, what we are proposing is that the public sector goes to 25 points of GDP for the whole consolidated.

Thus, the intention is to lower taxes, and we intend to lower taxes, and I will show you where it is demonstrated that we want to lower taxes. First, if I look at Rothbard or Friedman, I say, when I look at the size of the public sector, it is the true fiscal burden. And with everything we did to lower it, let’s say, evidently, to return 15 points to the private sector, if in the transition we change some type of tax, it is a second-order issue, because in net terms they have decreased a lot. But having said that, we are going for explicit taxes. What would the dynamics be?

The dynamics would be to first eliminate the PAÍS Tax, then the withholdings, and then the tax on bank debits and credits, for example. Where can you see our willingness to want to lower taxes? In that we never wanted to share them, because if we share them, we will never lower them again. So, the best proof that we want to lower them is that we do not share them. But it is not just us. We have the will to lower taxes. As the economy starts to rebound and grow, we will lower them, make no mistake, but it is not just us; we are in a federal country. And that is something you also have to incorporate; if you cannot ask me to do what a municipality has to do, nor a province, then sometimes I say they ask for things that are not within my function.

So, the reality is that once we do all this, if you look, what will happen is that if we finish cleaning up the issue of the remunerated liabilities, if we finish with the puts, and also finish cleaning up the dividends, what will happen is that from there, we will stop all the monetary issuance taps. That is, there will be no issuance from the treasury because we have a fiscal surplus, there will be no issuance from the financial sector because we do not have these mechanisms of endogenous issuance, and there will be no issuance from the external sector. That is, we will go to a flexible exchange rate. This is not minor, because the anchor in pesos will be precisely the amount of money which will not move. Moreover, we will send a zero issuance law so that when money is issued, the president of the Central Bank, the board of the Central Bank, the Minister of Economy, the President of the Nation, and all the deputies and senators who approve such a thing will go to jail. And at the same time, we will launch a currency competition. So, when the economy starts to expand, I say, now they will cry more about the currency lag, now they will have to feel ashamed. The other thing we will do is launch the currency competition, so as the economy expands, that is, as the consumption path gets bigger, let’s say, in amounts of consumption, assuming the same time, because we already said we do not know the time, that is why we said that the inheritance is a calculation problem, then what will happen is that it will increase the demand for money, but we are not putting pesos into the economy. So, what is the consequence? That the economy will start to monetize endogenously by the individuals themselves, putting, if you want, more dollars into the economy, or whatever currency you feel like.

Therefore, let’s say we will go to a regime where the peso will remain fixed and you will choose the currency you want. All currencies will compete against the peso. Do you like the exchange rate, the currency basket? Well, the place that is determined by a bureaucrat, a weighted average, you will determine yourselves with your decisions. That is, the problem of currency appreciation is over. That yes: the peso will be as solid as a rock. Because it does not move, but you will be able to choose in which currency you will make transactions. And as the economy expands, the amount of pesos will relatively be smaller. And, when you realize, the amount of pesos will be so small that I could dollarize the economy or any monetary scheme and eliminate the Central Bank. And the possibility of any thieving politician in this country robbing you again with taxes will end.

Therefore, it is not that there is no economic program. If you are shortsighted, it is not my fault. If you are ignorant, it is not my fault. Because, again, those who say “no, it has to have a projected productive matrix,” I say I am not Leontief, I am not a communist, I am a liberal. I believe that the architects of the future are you. Therefore, do not ask me for the impossible. I will not be an interventionist. I will be a libertarian liberal and I believe that you are the creators of wealth. Thank you very much.