Words of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, in a master class at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, from the Great Hall of that institution, in Israel.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

12 June 2025 · Master class at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem · Great Hall of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Context
Milei delivered a master class at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on June 12, 2025, presenting Argentina's economic turnaround as a case study in radical fiscal reform.
Main themes
Argentine economic miracle, fiscal adjustment, deficit reduction, myth-busting in economic policy, inflation reduction, GDP growth, poverty reduction, Central Bank quasi-fiscal deficit, credibility and reputation, economic reform, employment stability
Duration
~62 min
96th percentile
Words
7,430
96th percentile
Sentences
308
95th percentile
Readability
55
77th percentile
Grade
11.3
37th percentile
Syntax
3.26
79th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
22nd percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 79%78%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Social 5%5%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

308 sentences in 42 paragraphs

Good morning everyone. Thank you very much to all those present here. I truly feel honored to have the opportunity to speak at this prestigious institution. Basically, the idea today is to talk to you about what we are doing in Argentina. And, essentially, to provide the foundations of what in some places is being referred to as the Argentine miracle. The first part, what I am going to present are: the three myths - in terms of economic policy - that we have debunked, as a sort of preliminary conclusions, before starting to explain how we did it.

Basically, the first myth has to do with quantum and time. Specifically, many world leaders and many ministers of Economy and Finance often consult our ministers about the adjustment; that is, the logic and dynamics of the adjustment and so on; then, our ministers usually respond: “Well, how much do you need to adjust?”; “Four or five points of GDP”; “And how do you plan to do it?”; “Well, at most I can do 1 per year.” Then, our ministers reply: “And why not 5 in a month?” They say: “No, that is impossible.” Well, that is what we did: in the first month of our administration, we put public accounts in order; we closed the deficit of the National Treasury, which was about 5 points of GDP. Later, when I describe, I will show the seriousness of the situation, because - strictly speaking - the first stage of the adjustment was 7 points of GDP.

Moreover, this violates all definitions of quantum and time. But not only that, but also, to avoid hyperinflation, it was not enough to adjust the deficit of the National Treasury. We had a quasi-fiscal deficit - that is, the deficit of the Central Bank - which was double that of the National Treasury. In other words, we had a deficit of 10 points of GDP. And this was tremendously complicated because - even having made the fiscal adjustment - that did not ensure that we could avoid hyperinflation. In that sense, we began to work on the Central Bank's balance sheet. What also seemed impossible to fix; within 6 months we ended the quasi-fiscal deficit. Therefore, we could say that - in the span of 6 months - we made a fiscal adjustment of 15 points of GDP, which obviously everyone considered impossible.

The other characteristic or the other myth that we debunked was that if Argentina made an adjustment of this magnitude - it would inevitably fall into a great depression. Argentina, with adjustments half of what we made, experienced declines of - at least - 15 points of GDP, that is, declines of 15%.

And, in that sense, the reality is that we did not have credibility, we did not have it because Argentina was a serial defaulter; because basically I was an outsider, I had no credentials in the position that supported what I wanted to do and - therefore - I also had no reputation. And you know that - even when we were under rational expectations - if we made a monetary squeeze of these characteristics and given that there would be no credibility, there would be no reputation. The flip side of this would be a violent drop in GDP, with what that implied, in terms of activity, employment, and social balance. However - unlike what everyone expected - we, if we take what has happened with GDP - GDP had actually been falling since the previous year and, basically, the previous government left us a statistical drag that implied a decline of about 3%. When you take the average GDP over the year, it shows a decline of 1.5. But if you focus on what happened from April onwards, the Argentine economy began to expand. And not only did it begin to expand, but - until December - it did so at 10%. And when we take the monthly estimate of economic activity - which is a proxy for GDP on a monthly basis - the GDP of December 2024 ended 6% above the GDP we had in 2023. That is to say that we managed to make an adjustment of 15 points of GDP and that the economy also grew by 6%. Obviously, the flip side was also a sharp drop in inflation. If we take wholesale inflation, which has the least distortion and always leads, it went from 54% monthly, which - in annualized terms - would be 17,000% to an inflation of less than 1% monthly, which - in annual terms - would be around 10%. That is to say, we also exterminated inflation.

And, while everyone expected unemployment to soar, that did not happen, and that poverty would reach stratospheric levels. When we arrived, the reality implied a jump in poverty to 57%, but the year ended at 35%. That is to say, 22% of the population was lifted out of poverty. In other words, in 1 year, we lifted 10 million human beings out of poverty. Indeed, there we also debunked another myth.

And the third point is that the adjustment is unpopular. And there it was more than just a matter of having brilliant ministers, because the truth is that I am grateful to the forces of heaven for allowing me to assemble an excellent team, like the one I have, where each of the ministers excels in their respective areas, but we had to make the decision to put everything we had as political capital, because - most likely - in the face of an adjustment of this magnitude, popularity would be eroded.

And, in that sense, the iron triangle, that is, my sister Karina Milei, who is present here, my chief advisor Santiago Caputo, and I, at that small table where everything is cooked and where one has to sit in the electric chair, the decision was: we came to do what had to be done and we were willing to pay the costs of doing what was right. In fact, we preferred to be kicked out for doing what was right than to end up being blown to pieces for not doing what had to be done and having to regret it for the rest of our lives for not having done what we always said we had to do.

And, in that context, surprisingly, in which we always spoke with reality, because we did it from the elections themselves. We campaigned saying that we were going to adjust public spending and I took a chainsaw to the events. Not only that, but I also said that I basically wanted to eliminate the Central Bank and would create a currency competition, which the popularization of the measure was thought of as a dollarization. And so I took huge dollar bills with my face to the campaign events. And, in addition, I always spoke of making pro-market reforms. I was also very clear about our security policy, in internal matters. I said that “those who do it, pay for it.” And we have certainly shown that those who do it, pay for it.

I want to say that I have no merit in the fact that Justice has definitively acted in accordance with the Republic. It is all the merit of the Judiciary, of the Supreme Court. The only thing I can say is that I have been consistent with my republican vision and let the judges act freely. That is to say, being the first president who does not interfere in justice, the results are evident: Justice has done justice.

And, I was also clear in international policy: I declared myself in favor of peace; in favor of free trade, and - from the very first moment - I clearly defined who were or who I intended to be my allies. And those allies, whom I said I would embrace, are the United States and Israel. In fact, I will share a very interesting anecdote, because - at each of our campaign events - there would always be lines whenever I came with the flag of Israel. There are more emblematic cases, because they were very large flags - like in Mendoza or in Santa Fe - where the flags were truly very large and we carried them in the truck I was moving in. But, the most shocking case of all was something that happened in the Greater Buenos Aires area, in a very, very humble, very marginalized place. It is a flag that a boy gave me, made on a white cloth, with the two blue stripes and the star, handmade. Obviously, it is not like the others, but it has so much feeling, so no one should feel deceived by my international policy.

And today my popularity is higher than when I took office. In each of the local elections, when in 2023 we were not getting more than 5%, we are now getting more than 30%. We have been beating Kirchnerism across the country 6 to 0 and it is expected that by October not only will La Libertad Avanza win, but La Libertad will sweep. That said, these are all the myths we have debunked; now I will move on to explain what the initial conditions were and what we did to avoid disaster.

Basically, Argentina had the combination of what had been the three worst crises in its history. Basically, it had a monetary imbalance, for those who understand monetary issues, there was a money overhang, which - basically - was double what we had before the Rodrigazo. At that time, freeing the exchange market implied sextupling the inflation rate; therefore, we were set to multiply it by 12, solely due to the effect of the monetary surplus. Imagine, we were coming with inflation rates above 200% for consumers, so imagine that we would have quickly gone to inflation rates of 2500% annually.

But not only that. Additionally, we had a situation in the Central Bank that was even worse than what it was in 1989, when Alfonsín's hyperinflation occurred, where wholesale inflation, for example, was 5000%. Basically, we had - I will repeat this later - but we had four monetary bases in interest-bearing liabilities, and where the previous government had managed to reduce them from an average of 60 days to 1 day. That is to say, that the amount of money could have quintupled in just one day. That is one of the many bombs they left behind. And also, we had poverty and indigence indicators that were even worse than those we had at the exit of convertibility in 2001. Moreover, at the time of taking office, inflation was already being measured in daily terms and was showing above one and a half daily. Furthermore, while consumer inflation was 25%, wholesale inflation - which always leads - was 54%. Additionally, Argentina had not grown since 2011, therefore, per capita GDP was 15% below that historical mark.

As if that were not enough, with the exchange controls, there was an exchange rate gap of 200%; that is, the relationship between the parallel exchange rate and the official one was 3 to 1. Net international reserves were negative, at 12 billion dollars. We had a fiscal deficit of 5 points of GDP and a quasi-fiscal deficit of 10 points of GDP, meaning that the imbalance in public accounts was 15 points of GDP. Additionally, the program with the International Monetary Fund was down. Argentina had not met a single target, not one, not one. Therefore, the program was down. We had debts with importers amounting to 45 billion dollars and, as if that were not enough, we had debts in pesos, equivalent to 90 billion dollars, which - basically - amounted to seven extra monetary bases. So imagine that we had seven monetary bases in debt in pesos, we had four monetary bases of the interest-bearing liabilities of the Central Bank; that already adds up to 11, it would have multiplied the amount of money by 12. The money overhang would have multiplied inflation by 12 times. We were heading directly towards an inflationary catastrophe, and in that context, surely, because it is very similar to what happened in Venezuela, we would have gone to levels of 95, 98% poverty.

I will be a little non-technical, because this requires it, but we have demonstrated that we are libertarian liberals and not that we are libertarian liberals. I mention this because some radicalized anarcho-capitalists accuse me of being a communist, basically because I did not close the Central Bank, which I could have done on the first day. Specifically, one of those who does this is Hans-Hermann Hoppe and what he does not realize is that if I had closed the Central Bank on the first day, the passes and the monetary base are debt. And that if you do not honor your debt, the value of that debt becomes zero. For the value of money to become zero, that is, for real balances to become zero, means that prices tend to infinity. I point this out because one has the regulatory framework and tries, each time, to resemble that regulatory framework more, but - sometimes - it is not so easy, sometimes it takes time and in that context, if we had done that stupidity we would have unleashed hyperinflation, even worse than what I am describing, in monetary terms given the imbalances. And if we had done that - surely - the Peronists would have started with the looting and all that type of machinery that they handle perfectly. And - probably - they would have ousted us. Today, I would not be here in this role as President of Argentina. Argentina would resemble the worst version of Venezuela. And, surely, they would use - our case - as a case where the ideas of Liberty failed.

Therefore, another thing we have to take into account is that, in politics, sequentiality is important; that is, we have to be clear about where we want to go, but we must always keep the intertemporal general equilibrium model in mind, and take into account not only what is happening with the economy, but also what the interactions are with politics and social equilibrium. So, proposing to close the Central Bank on the first day as a task that takes an hour is truly foolish. Fortunately for Argentines and against all leadership, we did not do it and we are getting out.

In fact, what I am going to tell you now is basically what we did to avoid this calvary. The first thing we did is, we considered that inflation is of a monetary nature. We consider that inflation is—always and everywhere—a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess supply of money, whether because the supply increased and/or demand fell, that is, both things can happen together and that leads to a loss of purchasing power of money, and that means that all prices—expressed in monetary units—rise. Therefore, the first thing we had to do if we wanted to end inflation was—basically—to cut monetary issuance.

The first faucet we had to cut monetary issuance was the fiscal deficit, and there we had to make an adjustment of 5 points of GDP, but you can imagine that—given the circumstances—it was not the work of a surgeon, it was the work of a butcher. So, the original adjustment was not 5 points of GDP, it was 7. We basically cut public works outright, which is a huge source of corruption in Argentina; we cut discretionary transfers to the provinces outright. Not only that, but we also laid off 50,000 public employees. On the other hand, all contracts that were expiring were not renewed, unless they were in very, very particular situations.

And, in addition, we started to restore tariffs; we began to make the tariff adjustment. When we arrived, the price of public services only covered 20% of costs; today, we are proud to say that it covers 100% of the cost. Therefore, we also did all this with tariff restoration.

That is to say, the interesting thing about this Stabilization Program is that it never violated property rights; the debt of the Central Bank was respected, because, at other times, Bonex plans were made and applied. We have honored that debt, we have not violated property rights. Not only that, we have not applied price controls. Not only that, but we also never lied to the people by adjusting tariffs beforehand and launching the stabilization program afterward. We did it during the program itself. That is why the decrease in the inflation rate in the retail indicator, that is, in consumer prices, is slower. Not only that: we also did not take the shortcut of fixing the exchange rate and, despite all that, today the inflation rate has decreased much more rapidly than the most successful program in Argentine history, which was convertibility. If you take inflation in dollars, that is, correct for the crawling peg we had, you will basically see that inflation in dollars fell much faster. That is to say that—in terms of stabilization—the program designed by Toto Caputo, Santiago Bausili, and the whole team is better than the convertibility program designed by Domingo Cavallo.

At the same time, we—in monetary matters—had to go through different stages. So, the first stage was to cut the fiscal deficit; the second stage, then, required now to cut the quasi-fiscal deficit, which is the debt of the Central Bank. In fact, that debt should never have been in the Central Bank, because it was the deficit that the National Treasury had, which was financed with monetary issuance, and since so much money was thrown into the street, the Central Bank sterilized it and paid interest rates. I don’t need to tell you what that implies in terms of the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace. So, basically, once we corrected the exchange rate to close the gap, one of the things that happened is that we arbitraged the rates in dollars, and that had the effect that, while the rates in dollars were positive; in pesos in real terms it was negative. And that allowed, in part, to dilute the debt in pesos, even while maintaining positive returns in dollars. And, while the Treasury continued to show fiscal balance, it allowed us to transfer the debt from the Central Bank to the National Treasury, and in 6 months we finished cleaning the balance sheet of the Central Bank.

But, once that part was concluded, we moved on to a program, as we had a speculative attack, we realized that we were making a mistake with monetary policy, and that was that we were buying dollars. And we, originally and mistakenly—because we believed that this dollar purchase was accompanied by money demand. In general, when you have a fixed exchange rate, or have a crawling peg, it follows that path—which is also a way to fix it, but allows it in "jumps"—we were buying a lot of dollars, which we also used to pay debt. To give you an idea, it is the first time in Argentine history that Argentina pays 45 billion in debt in one year. That is, we reduced the debt by 45 billion dollars. In fact, Argentina's debt-to-GDP ratio fell from levels of 90% to levels of 40%.

But this situation meant that—basically—we were buying dollars and injecting pesos, but of course, since there was capital control, it is not that they were really buying pesos from me. Since I had the restriction of liquidating exports, it is not that they were buying pesos from me; in reality, they were selling me dollars because they were forced to. That which—in a free market—the operation is the mirror of one another, with capital controls, it is not; and that made us be issuing too much money, and that made inflation take longer to decrease, which generated a situation for me that... you can imagine that I am not very fond of inflation. And there we realized that this was a mistake, that we were giving fuel to inflation ourselves. So we moved on to what was the Zero Issuance Program, that is, zero monetary base. And since we were basically forcing exporters to liquidate, then we bought the dollars, but—through another window—we returned to the market, and then so that—it looked somewhat like a free market; it is not that we were going out to control the exchange rate, no. I mean, my obsession was that the amount of money did not grow. And that is how the broad monetary base has been fixed since last year—and if one considers that the lags of monetary policy in Argentina are between 18 and 24 months, I can assure you today that—by the middle of next year—in Argentina inflation will have been a bad story, but one that is over.

But then, we encountered another problem. As you can see, economic policy constantly solves problems. So, what we launched was the idea of endogenous dollarization, that people could use any currency in their transactions: that is, to pay, to buy, to sell. Because what we were starting to see is that—if we left the amount of money fixed—if the demand for money began to recover, because—for example—the monetary base, in terms of GDP, was at 2.5 points; historically, the monetary base in Argentina has floors of 8 to 9% and ceilings of 15. So, clearly, there is a problem of very little money in the economy. And also the economy is growing. So, evidently, a strong excess demand for money was going to be generated. That did not worry us too much, because as there is still excess monetary supply, as long as there is excess monetary supply, the inflation rate will start to yield, but the problem lies in that the day it reaches 0, it means that we have absorbed all the money overhang, and consequently, we have to prepare for a deflationary economy, and we do not have the contractual structure set up to have deflation. And, if that happens, it could end up generating a bottleneck, or that economic growth gets stuck. So, that is why we proposed that people start using their currency. But it did not work, it did not work. People did not want to use their dollars, people did not want to make transactions in foreign currency. So we had fixed the fiscal issue; we had fixed the liability of the Central Bank. So—to give more security to Argentines—we decided to fix the asset of the Central Bank, concretely. So we went to the International Monetary Fund and made a proposal to recapitalize the Central Bank. That is to say—unlike what all the programs with the International Monetary Fund were—which were to finance the fiscal deficit and manage the transition, we had already made the adjustment. In addition, there is a strong commitment not only from me for fiscal balance, but also from each of my ministers.

There are some anecdotes from my ministers that are wonderful. For example, one day Toto Caputo, the Minister of Economy, had to leave the meeting because he was in some negotiations, and then I said to the rest of the ministers: “This man is making an enormous effort, we are making a huge fiscal adjustment. What will keep us inside the administration is the balance of public accounts. So I ask you to start thinking about an extra 10% adjustment on each of your ministries.” The most surprising thing is that when I went to the subsequent Cabinet meeting, everyone had brought me their PowerPoints with their adjustments. That is wonderful. I have all the ministers aligned with maintaining fiscal balance. This is rarely seen. In general, ministers tend to spend, and the bad guy in the movie is the Minister of Economy. I don’t know if it is because my current ministers do not like to spend or because they know that they will not have to deal with the minister, but they will have to deal with me.

And, in that sense, one of the things that previous governments did: they placed debt on the Central Bank, in the form of non-transferable notes, with which, absolutely illiquid instruments, and took the dollars. And if you look, if the long-term real balances have to tend to zero, that is, the condition of transversality is zero, I can reach, let’s suppose I put it in a big tea, then they make it as big as they want, but if the real balances have to be zero, or are zero because M is 0 or because P tends to infinity. So, what does that do? The more damaged the balance sheet of the Central Bank is, the price level that makes the real balances zero is increasingly higher. So, you take the line that connects current prices, with that price level that closes the transversality condition: it gives you implicitly the inflation rate at which the Argentine economy was traveling. Therefore, to the extent that we restored the balance sheet of the Central Bank, the price index to be zero is increasingly lower. And, in that sense, we went and restored the balance sheet of the Central Bank. We calculated that we needed 12 billion dollars for that operation and to be able to open the capital controls. Since both “Toto” and I are very risk-averse, although it may not seem so, but the electric chair corrects some behaviors. And in that sense, we said: “well, let’s say that if they give us 15 billion dollars we will go out”; that way we had 3 billion dollars to throw into the market. And, well, we started working on an agreement with the Fund, and the truth is that we received a package of 20 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund; 12 billion dollars from the World Bank; 10 billion from the IDB, plus a REPO for 2 billion dollars, which we took out yesterday. And also, China renewed the maturity of the swap, which was another 5 billion dollars. That is to say, the total package was basically 49 billion dollars, where about 20 billion would be cash. Therefore—unlike what the entire political class and all economists said—that we were not going to open the capital controls, in an election year, we went and opened them.

Moreover, at the moment of lifting the restrictions, they told us that the exchange rate would hit the ceiling of the band, that we would lose a lot of dollars, that we would not be able to sustain it, that inflation would jump to levels of 5 or 7 percent and that it would remain stuck at those levels. The reality is that the months of March and April were very tough months. During March, both in my case and in that of the economic team, we slept four hours a day. Obviously, on weekends we tried to recover, and in the last 15 days we slept 2 hours a day. In other words, it was quite, quite hard that whole process. But all the political noise caused the demand for money to fall and the inflation rate to jump to 3.7%. But then—unlike all those who said it would go to five and seven—it was 2.8%. And today the consumer price index is coming out, and the reality is that if the number clearly breaks the 2% mark, it may be that—effectively—as one of my great ministers, Federico Sturzenegger, says, inflation falls sooner than we are expecting by mid-next year, and that zero starts to show up already in December or towards the end of the year. So good economic theory works, even if politics doesn’t like it.

There is a beautiful phrase from a Chicago economist named Thomas Sowell, who—originally a Marxist—later became a libertarian, and he says: “The first law of economics is scarcity, that is, there is not enough for everyone. And the first law of politics is to ignore the first law of economics.” Fortunately for the Argentine economy, and unfortunately for the thieves in politics, I am going to enforce the budgetary constraint to the letter.

And so, now endogenous dollarization had to start functioning, and it wasn’t working. People were not taking dollars out of their mattresses or safes or wherever. And that’s when we took an additional step, which is what is called the Historical Repair of Savers. In reality, Argentines were not fleeing the system with their dollars because they hated the country or something like that; they were actually fleeing their dollars to escape the inflation tax. That is to say, you cannot expect someone to save in vanilla ice cream—because that’s the flavor I like—in the middle of the Sahara Desert; it’s going to go badly for them. Ice cream is precisely a good that has a negative interest rate.

So Argentines were looking for ways to protect themselves from the archvillain thief, the greatest thief of all, which is the State, and one of its most perverse mechanisms of theft, which is the inflation tax. So, because several amnesties were made in Argentina, it’s as if they had done something wrong, and in reality, they did nothing wrong; they were just escaping from the torturer. Moreover, that’s why the left and the journalists annoy me so much, saying, “Oh no, well, but then those who stayed inside…” But it’s like they come out of Cuba, fighting with sharks; they arrive in Miami, and you want to punish those who made it to Miami because there are still people left on the prison-island. It’s absurd, it’s truly absurd.

Therefore, what we did was change the way the tax authorities viewed things. In Argentina, everyone was guilty unless proven otherwise, which is absurd; the revolution is that now everyone is innocent unless ARCA can prove otherwise. And that means that people can now use their dollars freely, but it wasn’t just a matter of saying, “Well, now they can use them freely,” that is, reforms had to be made. The total number of reforms involved in that operation is 500; it was practically a Soviet system. But, then, I will give an example to make it easy: for example, you declared income, but at the same time, they made you declare your consumption. So, what happens? If you had 100 in income and spent 400, somehow you had to explain those 300. So they asked for your consumption to detect if it matched with your income, but—at the same time—they looked at the variation in your assets; your assets, in this case, would have to be falling by 300. What did we do? We eliminated the consumption; we eliminated the variation in assets, so now everyone can spend without any problem, and I am not going to come after them.

And well, now it seems that it is working: up to 50,000 dollars per month, they can spend freely, whatever they want, and no one has to declare anything. And if they want to spend more, they have to adhere to a regime that also erases all operations related to that, so that there is no trace left. So this persecution by the tax authorities is over; that is, we are punishing the thief, not the honest person. And that is what has to do with monetary policy. And another thing that is going to happen is that, basically, Argentina has the equivalent of 10 monetary bases outside the system. Therefore, monetization will end up being done by the individuals themselves. Still, if you take a system of... look, it doesn’t matter, whether it’s a flexible exchange rate, a variable exchange rate, the real amount of money in the economy is determined by individuals. Because—in reality—the demand for money is a mirror of what you do with the goods market; it is a mirror of the intertemporal consumption path. But, beyond that, when the Central Bank determines the amount of money, all it does is determine the price level, and if it starts to bother quite a bit, then it generates some additional damage.

When you have a fixed exchange rate, that relationship that the amount of money is determined by the people becomes even more obvious, because it only expands against the demand for money, it becomes much more evident. Now, what happens is that we do not want to issue; we want fiscal balance, we do not want to issue money, we want a free exchange rate, a sound balance sheet for the Central Bank. So, what happens? The dollars to make transactions have to be brought in by the agents whenever they want. Monetization will remain in the hands of individuals, and when the economy is reliable enough for individuals in relation to their cash needs, they will start to monetize. And that means that if today I can back the entire base with the dollars I have, it means that I am going to go to a ratio of 11 to 1. That is to say, the system will be, with a snap of the fingers, able to be dollarized and to close the Central Bank.

That said, I want to finish with two issues that are very important for growth and that are unconventional things that we did: one is the issue of the Ministry of Human Capital. If you review the literature, I am not going to start from Adam Smith, which I would love to do, but I don’t have time; you don’t have time; those waiting for me don’t have time. So I will start in 1956. In 1956, two authors separately, Robert Solow and Trevor Swan, developed what is known as the Neoclassical Economic Growth Model. That model, in 1957, was tested by Solow and could only explain 15%, that is, everything remained in the residual, so the model explained very little. In light of that—from the University of Chicago—George Stigler suggests that, in reality, that result derives from not having considered human capital. For those who know the discussions that were also taking place at that time, the input-output matrix of the United States had also been made, and it showed labor-intensive. There were a lot of things circulating in the environment that had them puzzled. So what he says is that human capital needs to be included. And in that sense—at the microeconomic level—the Human Capital Theory is developed, with Gary Becker, and at the macroeconomic level, the Uzawa Dual Model is developed, which was also the thesis advisor of Miguel Sidrauski, probably one of the five most important Argentine economists in history, who was also Jewish and came to Israel, bringing children to vacation colonies, which is how he made a living. And then it was believed that what needed to be done was to patch these models: the Golden Rule of Phelps appeared; the Cass-Koopmans version of the Ramsey model appeared, but the truth is that everything remained finger-pointing, and the line that won was the line of putting exogenous technological progress, so everything was explained outside the model, which made the model not make much sense. Until in 1983, Paul Romer, in his doctoral thesis, developed the Endogenous Growth Theory, also supervised by a Chicago professor, Robert Lucas Jr. And, in that sense, the whole discussion of endogenous growth and human capital appears, a discussion that ends in 1989, when Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil conduct an empirical test incorporating human capital and demonstrate that 85% of growth could now be explained. Therefore, if one wants to grow, one has to invest a lot in human capital. I feel that I am in a place that—precisely—bears witness to that.

And, in that sense, we established the Ministry of Human Capital, precisely, from day one we planned to grow. So, the first role that the Ministry of Human Capital had was to contain poverty in the face of the adjustment. There, Minister Pettovello had a brilliant action and discovered that when beneficiaries of social plans were asked for benefits, at that time, half of the plan was taken away from them. So, they received two plans and were charged for one. And in that context, one of the things we did was to remove that counter-prestation. Obviously, the next day they were threatening us with a march where supposedly 100,000 people were going to come, and there too, along with the courage of Minister Patricia Bullrich, who proposed the anti-blockade protocol—consider that Argentina had about 9,000 blockades per year—and the actions of Minister of Infrastructure, Guillermo Ferraro, who used all the infrastructure to communicate that those who block do not get paid and to report those social plan managers who extorted them—there were 18,000 reports. The most interesting thing is that, on the one hand, we were able to double the amount of resources that reached the most vulnerable sectors, without transferring a single additional peso, and—at the same time—they tried to take to the streets, but the mechanism was so effective that of the 100,000 they expected, only 3,000 showed up; that is, there were more police than protesters. And as a consequence of that, from that point on, we also achieved order in the streets.

The Ministry of Human Capital has played a fundamental role in this reduction of 10 million poor people, and—basically—what it does is integrate childhood and family with health, in order to meet the needs of first-generation human capital, so that they can later enter the market to study; the second-generation human capital, which has to do not only with education but also with people being able to retrain to enter the labor market. And, those two ideas, which are also within the Ministry of Human Capital, whether on the education side or the retraining part, link with what has to do with the labor market and the pension system. Because—as long as we can continue to bring more people into the labor market, not only to accompany growth but also for the fact that people in the informal market move to the formal market; once we have a more robust labor market and a larger economically active population, that will open the door for us to undertake serious pension reform. Therefore, there we are determining one of the blocks of economic growth.

The other, which is also very popular, is led by that formidable and wonderful economist, Dr. Federico Sturzenegger, which is the Ministry of Deregulation. The idea is very simple: if you have a model and you have reality, and reality does not map with the model, and the model is systematically wrong, what would you do? You would throw out the model, right? If you are making decisions, where they fire you from your job, you will see that you will choose the data, not the model that says anything. Well, neoclassical economists have a flaw that when reality does not map with the model, we call it a market failure. Well—from my point of view—market failures do not exist, because the market is a process of social cooperation, where property rights are exchanged voluntarily, therefore there cannot be a market failure if transactions are free. That does not mean that I am not going to make mistakes, which is another problem. So, if you look at neoclassical economics—critically—the core is built on the nature and characteristics of equilibrium, which has to do with existence, uniqueness, and stability, but with the aggravating factor that then comes the idea of Pareto and the First Welfare Theorem and the second, and that’s where it gets more complicated because then every time the world does not resemble what we believe, we call it a market failure.

The market failure that irritates me the most of all - I am not going to go into all of them because I am already out of time - is what is called Non-Convexities: that is, concentrated structures, if you want to take it to the extreme, monopolies. And the reality is that monopolies - unless they are monopolies generated by the State - where the State says: "well, in this little square only X X participates and if someone violates it, I will smash them," except in that case, the monopoly does not have to be bad. Because, in fact, suppose I have 10 cell phone companies and one appears and makes a cell phone of better quality, at a better price, what do you think will happen to the other 9? They will go bankrupt. And yet, I am much better off. And they say: "no, well, but he makes a lot of money," what do I care? If I now have a good of much better quality at a better price; on top of that, it frees up resources for me to spend elsewhere and he makes a lot of money. And what is the problem with him making a lot of money? If he spends it elsewhere, he will generate activity elsewhere; if he saves it, he will generate investment elsewhere; and if he is a tyrant and is so bad and hates people so much that he buries that money in the ground, what he does is - basically - lower the price level; that is, a social benefactor. That is to say, what must be clear is that making money, the social function of the entrepreneur is to make money, because he can only make money by serving others with better quality goods, at a better price. Therefore, successful entrepreneurs should be carried on shoulders every day, and not pursued.

And, in that context, what happens? As in Neoclassical Economics... I make an additional point. When you encounter this in Neoclassical Economics, what are you going to do? You are going to regulate it so that it ends up resembling a competitive company. Now, what is the problem? The problem is that if I make it resemble a competitive company, the returns are constant to scale. If you look at the risk, from the Christian era, the GDP per capita, in the Madison series, you will see that until 1800 the GDP per capita was constant, or if you prefer, it grew at 0.02% per year. That is to say, to double the GDP you needed 3500 years. Quite boring in economic terms. Now, if you look - from the year 1800 to the year 2000 - the GDP multiplied by nearly 10 times, and the population, until the year 2000, multiplied by nearly 8 times. So, despite the population multiplying by 8, production multiplied by 10. This means that GDP rose 80, so that per capita multiplied by 10. This is called increasing returns. And the problem is that increasing returns is a Non-Convexity, which would imply that you cannot obtain a maximum... There are a whole series of errors in the neoclassical analysis here, but that is not the point. But the important thing is that when you regulate it, you kill the increasing returns. And the problem is that when you kill the increasing returns, the model ends up, for example, resembling that of Solow or Ramsey. And what happens to you in those models in steady state? They have no growth. Therefore, when you regulate the economy, what you are doing is killing the increasing returns, and when you kill the increasing returns, you are killing economic growth.

And then, from the Minister, from the actions of Federico Sturzenegger and many of the ministers involved in this, we - in Argentina we have already made 2500 structural reforms in a year and a half. And why is this important? Because - I had told you - that the most successful stabilization program in Argentina until the one that "Toto" Caputo did, had been the convertibility. And, basically, there is a work by Gerardo Della Paolera, Bózzoli, and Irigoin, called "Passing the Buck" that compares all the governments in Argentine history. And the best government in history is Menem's first government, where basically it was convertibility, plus 100 structural reforms. We have a stabilization program much more successful than convertibility and 25 times more structural reforms. Therefore, I have no qualms in telling you that we are the best government in history.

Thank you very much.