- Context
- Mao set out the strategic problems of China's revolutionary war in a work dated December 1936, covering the laws of war, Party leadership, the war's special characteristics, and lessons from the failed fifth encirclement campaign.
- Main themes
- Laws of China's revolutionary war, strategy and the war situation as a whole, learning warfare through war, abolition of war through just war, leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, characteristics of China's revolutionary war, Kuomintang encirclement and suppression campaigns, errors of Left and Right opportunism, mobile warfare, quick-decision campaigns within protracted war, war of annihilation, lessons of the Soviet civil war and the Northern Expedition
- Duration
- ~230 min
- Words
- 27,622
- Sentences
- 1,055
- Readability
- 44
- Grade
- 13.6
- Syntax
- 3.19
- Vocabulary
- 2.26
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other1,055 sentences in 249 paragraphs
Chapter I: How to Study War
Section 1: The Laws of War Are Developmental
The laws of war: this is a problem that anyone directing a war must study and must solve.
The laws of revolutionary war: this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and must solve.
The laws of China's revolutionary war: this is a problem that anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and must solve.
We are now engaged in war. Our war is a revolutionary war, and our revolutionary war is being waged in China, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Therefore we must study not only the laws of war in general, but also the laws of revolutionary war in particular, and, more particular still, the laws of China's revolutionary war.
Everyone understands that, whatever one is doing, if one does not understand the circumstances of the matter, its nature, and its connection with other matters, one will not know its laws, will not know how to go about it, and will not be able to do it well.
War, which has existed since the emergence of private property and of classes, is the highest form of struggle used to resolve, at a certain stage of their development, the contradictions between classes, between nations, between states, and between political groups. If one does not understand its circumstances, its nature, and its connection with other matters, one will not know the laws of war, will not know how to direct a war, and will not be able to win battles.
Revolutionary war, whether revolutionary class war or revolutionary national war, has its own special circumstances and nature in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, in addition to the general laws of war, it has some special laws of its own. If one does not understand these special circumstances and this special nature, and does not understand its special laws, one cannot direct revolutionary war and cannot win battles in revolutionary war.
China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged within China's special environment, and compared with war in general and with revolutionary war in general, it again has its own special circumstances and special nature. Therefore, in addition to the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has some special laws of its own. If one does not understand these, one cannot win battles in China's revolutionary war.
Hence we should study the laws of war in general; we should also study the laws of revolutionary war; and finally, we should study the laws of China's revolutionary war.
There is a view that is wrong, and we refuted it long ago. Its holders say that it is enough to study the laws of war in general or, to put it concretely, simply to follow the military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government or the reactionary Chinese military academies. They do not know that these manuals deal only with the laws of war in general and are copied entirely from abroad; if we copy and use them exactly as they are, without the slightest change in form or content, we shall be cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we shall lose battles. Their argument is: why should we reject what was acquired by the shedding of blood in the past? They do not know that, while we should certainly respect the experience gained by past bloodshed, we should also respect the experience gained by our own bloodshed.
There is another view that is also wrong, and we refuted it long ago too. Its holders say that it is enough to study the experience of the Russian revolutionary war or, to put it concretely, simply to follow the laws governing the Soviet civil war and the military manuals issued by the Soviet military organs. They do not know that the Soviet laws and manuals embody the specific features of the Soviet civil war and the Soviet Red Army; if we copy and use them exactly as they are, allowing no change, we shall likewise be cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we shall lose battles. These people argue: the Soviet war was a revolutionary war, ours is also a revolutionary war, and the Soviet Union won; so why should there be any room for selection? They do not know that, while we should certainly pay special respect to the war experience of the Soviet Union, because it is the experience of the most modern revolutionary war, gained under the direction of Lenin and Stalin, we should also respect the experience of China's revolutionary war, because the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army have many special features of their own.
There is yet another view that is also wrong, and we refuted it long ago as well. Its holders say that the experience of the Northern Expedition of 1926–27 was the best and that we should learn from it, or, to put it concretely, learn to advance rapidly over long distances and to seize big cities. They do not know that, while the experience of the Northern Expedition should be studied, it should not be copied rigidly, because the circumstances of our war today have changed. We should adopt only those things from the Northern Expedition that are still applicable under present circumstances, and we should work out our own on the basis of present circumstances.
It follows that differences in the circumstances of war determine differences in the laws directing war, which vary according to time, place and nature. As regards the condition of time, both war and the laws directing it develop; each historical stage has its own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics at each stage and cannot be mechanically transposed to different stages. As regards the nature of war, revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war each have their own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics in each case and cannot be mechanically transposed from one to the other. As regards the condition of place, every country and every nation, especially a big country or a big nation, has its own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics in each case and likewise cannot be mechanically transposed. In studying the laws directing wars that occur at different historical stages, differ in nature, and are waged in different places and by different nations, we must pay attention to their characteristics and to their development, and we must oppose mechanical treatment of problems of war.
There is more. For a commander, to be able at first to command only small units and later to command large ones is progress and development. Moreover, one place is not like many places: to be able at first to fight in some familiar locality and later to fight in many localities is again progress and development for a commander. Because the technique, tactics and strategy of both sides develop, the circumstances at the various stages of a war also differ. For a commander, to be able to command at the higher stage what he could command at the lower stage is progress and development of a still greater kind. To be adapted only to certain units, certain places and a certain stage in the development of a war is called lack of progress and lack of development. There are people who cling to a single skill and a narrow view and never advance; although such people may serve the revolution to some extent in one place at one time, they cannot play a big role. We want directors of war who can play a big role. All the laws directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is fixed and unchanging.
Section 2: The Aim of War Is to Abolish War
War, this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will in the end be eliminated by the development of human society, and eliminated in the not distant future. But there is only one way to eliminate it, namely, to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose class counter-revolutionary war with class revolutionary war. In history there are only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. The era of human warfare will be brought to an end by our own hands, and the war we are waging is, without doubt, part of the final war. But the war we face is also, without doubt, part of the biggest and most cruel of wars. The biggest and most cruel unjust, counter-revolutionary war is bearing down upon us, and if we do not raise the banner of just war, the great majority of mankind will suffer destruction. The banner of just war for mankind is the banner that saves mankind, and the banner of just war for China is the banner that saves China. The war waged by the great majority of mankind and by the great majority of the Chinese people is without doubt a just war; it is a cause of the highest glory, saving mankind and saving China, and it is the bridge by which the history of the whole world turns into a new era. When human society advances to the point where classes are abolished and the state is abolished, there will be no more wars of any kind, no counter-revolutionary wars and no revolutionary wars, no unjust wars and no just wars; that will be the era of eternal peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war starts from our aspiration to abolish all wars; this is the line of demarcation between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.
Section 3: Strategy Is the Study of the Laws Governing a War Situation as a Whole
Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The whole world may be one war situation, a single country may be one war situation, and an independent guerrilla area or a large independent operational front may also be one war situation. Whatever involves taking account of all the various aspects and stages of a war is a war situation as a whole.
The study of the laws directing a war situation as a whole is the task of strategy. The study of the laws directing a partial war situation is the task of campaign science and tactics.
Why is it necessary for campaign commanders and tactical commanders to understand some of the laws of strategy? Because an understanding of the whole makes it easier to handle the part, since the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical victories is wrong, because it overlooks the fact that the primary and main question in victory or defeat in war is whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are well taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking account of the situation as a whole and its various stages, the war is sure to be lost. When we say "One careless move loses the whole game", we mean a move that affects the whole, that is, a move of decisive importance for the whole, and not a move that affects only a part, that is, one of no decisive importance for the whole. This is so in chess, and it is so in war.
But a whole cannot stand independent of its parts; the whole is made up of all its parts. Sometimes some parts are damaged or lost, yet the whole is not seriously affected, simply because those parts were not decisive for the whole. Some tactical or campaign defeats or failures in a war often do not lead to a worsening of the war situation as a whole, simply because they were not decisive. But if the majority of the campaigns that make up the whole fail, or one or two decisive campaigns fail, the whole situation changes at once. The "majority of campaigns" and the "one or two campaigns" referred to here are the decisive ones. In the history of war there are cases where defeat in a single battle, following a string of victories, has wiped out all that had been achieved, and cases where a single victory, following many defeats, has opened up a new situation. The "string of victories" and the "many defeats" referred to here are partial matters that play no decisive role in the whole. The "single defeat" and the "single victory" are the decisive ones. All this explains the importance of taking account of the situation as a whole. The commander of a whole situation must above all concentrate his attention on taking account of the war situation as a whole. Basing himself on the circumstances, he must mainly take into account the composition of the troops and the large units, the relations between two campaigns, the relations between the various stages of operations, and the relations between all our activities and all the enemy's activities. These are the most taxing problems, and if he neglects them and busies himself with secondary problems, he will inevitably suffer for it.
What is true of the relation between whole and part is true not only of the relation between strategy and campaign but also of the relation between campaign and tactics. The relation between the actions of a division and those of its regiments and battalions, and between the actions of a company and those of its platoons and squads, are examples. A commander at any level should concentrate his attention on the problems or actions that are most important and decisive for the whole situation under his command, and not on other problems or actions.
What is important and decisive cannot be determined in terms of general or abstract circumstances, but must be determined in terms of concrete circumstances. In operations, the direction and point of attack are chosen according to the enemy situation, the terrain and our own strength at the time. Where supplies are plentiful, care must be taken not to let the soldiers eat too much, and where supplies are short, care must be taken that the soldiers do not go hungry. In the White areas, the leakage of a single piece of information can cause the failure of subsequent battles; in the Red areas, the leakage of information is often not the most important matter. In some campaigns it is necessary for the higher commander to take part in person, in others it is not. For a military academy, the most important problems are the choice of the principal and teachers and the determination of the educational policy. For a mass meeting, the main attention should be given to mobilizing the masses to attend and to putting forward suitable slogans. And so on. In short, the principle is to pay attention to the important links that bear on the whole situation.
To learn the laws directing a war situation as a whole, one must use one's mind and think. This is because what concerns the whole cannot be seen with the eyes; it can be understood only by thinking, and without thinking it cannot be understood. But the whole is made up of parts, and a man with experience of the parts, with experience of campaigns and tactics, can understand higher matters if he is willing to think. Problems of strategy, such as taking account of the relations between the enemy and ourselves, of the relations between the various campaigns or the various stages of operations, of those parts that bear on the whole and are decisive, of the special features of the situation as a whole, of the relations between front and rear, and of the following pairs: loss and replenishment, fighting and rest, concentration and dispersion, attack and defence, advance and retreat, concealment and exposure, the main attack and the supporting attack, the assault and the containing action, centralized command and decentralized command, protracted war and quick decision, positional warfare and mobile warfare, our own army and friendly armies, one arm and another, higher and lower levels, cadres and rank and file, old soldiers and new recruits, senior cadres and junior cadres, old cadres and new cadres, Red areas and White areas, old areas and new areas, central areas and border areas, hot weather and cold weather, victories and defeats, big units and small units, regular army and guerrilla units, destroying the enemy and winning over the masses, expanding the Red Army and consolidating the Red Army, military work and political work, past tasks and present tasks, present tasks and future tasks, tasks under one set of circumstances and tasks under another, fixed fronts and fluid fronts, civil war and national war, this historical stage and that historical stage, and so on: the differences and connections in all these problems are things that cannot be seen with the eyes, but if we use our minds we can understand them, grasp them and master them. That is to say, we can take all the important problems of war or operations and solve them on a higher level of principle. Achieving this is the task of studying strategic problems.
Section 4: The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning
Why organize the Red Army? In order to use it to defeat the enemy. Why study the laws of war? In order to apply them in war.
Learning is not easy, and applying is even harder. The science of war may be expounded in the lecture hall or in books, and many people can talk equally glibly about it, but when it comes to fighting, some win and some lose. The history of war and our own experience of war both prove this.
Where, then, does the key lie?
We cannot demand generals who are in fact always victorious; such generals have been very rare since ancient times. What we demand is brave and wise generals who in general win their battles in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom and courage. To achieve this combination of wisdom and courage there is a method to be learned, to be used when learning and also when applying what has been learned.
What method? It is to get to know the circumstances of both the enemy and ourselves in all their aspects, to find the laws governing their actions, and to apply these laws to our own actions.
The military manuals issued in many countries all point to the necessity of "applying principles flexibly according to the circumstances", and they all indicate how to deal with the situation after a defeat. The former is meant to keep commanders from making subjective mistakes by applying principles rigidly; the latter tells commanders how to deal with the situation when they have made a subjective mistake, or when objective circumstances have undergone unforeseen and irresistible changes.
Why do subjective mistakes occur? Because the dispositions and command of a war or a battle do not suit the circumstances of the time and place; subjective direction does not correspond to objective reality, does not fit it; in other words, the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. In everything people do, this is hard to avoid; the difference is only that some are comparatively good at it and others comparatively poor. What is required is to be comparatively good at it; in military terms that means winning comparatively more battles, or, to put it the other way round, losing comparatively few. The key here lies in getting the subjective and the objective to correspond well.
Take an example from tactics. If the point of attack is chosen on one flank of the enemy's position, and it is precisely there that the enemy is weak, so that the assault succeeds, this is called correspondence of the subjective and the objective; that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgment and decision correspond to the real situation of the enemy and his dispositions. If the point of attack is chosen on the other flank, or in the centre, and runs into a nail, so that the attack cannot get in, that is called non-correspondence. A well-chosen time of attack, the use of reserves neither too late nor too early, and all other battle dispositions and actions favouring us and not the enemy: this is the correspondence of subjective command with objective circumstances throughout a whole engagement. Complete correspondence is extremely rare in war or battle, because both sides are groups of armed living men who keep secrets from each other, which is very different from handling inanimate objects or everyday affairs. But as long as the command in general suits the circumstances, that is, suits them in the decisive parts, there is the basis for victory.
A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgments, and his correct judgments stem from thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from connected thinking about all the reconnaissance data. The commander uses every possible and necessary means of reconnaissance, and with the data on the enemy so obtained he discards the dross and selects the essential, eliminates the false and retains the true, proceeds from one thing to another and from the outside to the inside; then he adds the circumstances on his own side, studies the comparison and interrelations of the two sides, forms his judgment, makes up his mind and draws up his plan. This is the complete process of getting to know the situation that a military man goes through before drawing up each strategic, campaign or battle plan. The careless military man does not do so, and bases his plan on wishful thinking; such a plan is fanciful and does not correspond to reality. The rash military man who relies only on enthusiasm inevitably gets tricked by the enemy, is lured by the enemy's superficial or one-sided appearances, is egged on by the irresponsible suggestions of subordinates who have no true insight, and consequently runs his head into a wall; this is because he does not know, or does not want to know, that any military plan should be based on necessary reconnaissance and on careful thought about the circumstances of the enemy and ourselves and their interrelations.
The process of getting to know the situation exists not only before a military plan is drawn up but also after it. From the start of the execution of a plan until the end of the operation, there is another process of getting to know the situation, namely, the process of execution. At this point it is necessary to re-examine whether what resulted from the first process corresponds to the real situation. If the plan does not correspond, or does not entirely correspond, to the situation, then we must form a new judgment, make a new decision, and change the plan already made so that it suits the new circumstances. Partial changes occur in almost every operation, and complete changes also occur occasionally. The rash man does not know how to change, or is unwilling to change, and simply acts blindly, with the result that he again runs into a wall.
What has been said above refers to a strategic action, or to a campaign or battle. A military man with much experience, if he is a modest learner, becomes thoroughly familiar with the temperament of his own forces (the commanders, fighters, weapons, supplies and so on, and their totality), and also becomes thoroughly familiar with the temperament of the enemy's forces (likewise the commanders, fighters, weapons, supplies and so on, and their totality), and thoroughly familiar with all the other conditions related to war such as politics, economics, geography and climate. A military man of this kind directs a war or an operation with comparative assurance and is comparatively able to win. This is the result of getting to know the circumstances of both sides over a long period, finding the laws of action and resolving the contradiction between the subjective and the objective. This process of cognition is extremely important; without a long period of such experience it is difficult to understand and grasp the laws of the war as a whole. To become a truly capable senior commander is not something that can be achieved by a greenhorn or by someone who is merely good at "paper warfare"; it can be achieved only by learning in war.
All the military laws or military theories that are of the nature of principles are summings-up of past war experience made by people of former times or of our own. We should devote ourselves to studying the lessons paid for in blood that past wars have left us. That is one thing. But there is another thing, namely, to test these conclusions in our own experience, to assimilate what is useful, reject what is useless, and add what is specifically our own. This latter is very important, for if we do not do it we cannot direct a war.
Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and is the more important kind of learning. Learning warfare from warfare: this is our main method. A person who has no chance to go to a military school can still learn warfare, namely, by learning in war. A revolutionary war is the business of the masses; often it is not a case of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is learning. There is a distance between the ordinary citizen and the soldier, but it is not a Great Wall; it can be quickly eliminated, and making revolution and waging war is the way to eliminate it. To say that learning and applying are not easy is to say that it is not easy to learn thoroughly and apply with full mastery. To say that an ordinary citizen can quickly become a soldier is to say that the door is not hard to enter. Putting the two together, we can use an old Chinese saying: "Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it." Since entering the door is not hard, deeper attainment can also be achieved, provided one sets one's mind to it and is good at learning.
The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are the reflection of objective reality in our minds; everything outside our minds is objective reality. Therefore the objects of study and cognition include both sides, the enemy's and our own; both should be regarded as objects of study, and only our own minds (our thinking) are the subject of study. There are people who know themselves well but not the enemy, and others who know the enemy well but not themselves; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. The saying in the book of the great ancient Chinese military expert Sun Wu Tzu, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat", covers both the stage of learning and the stage of applying; it covers both recognizing the laws of development in objective reality and deciding our own action according to those laws in order to overcome the enemy we face. We should not take this saying lightly.
War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes and political groups, and all the laws of war are used by the nations, states, classes and political groups that wage war in order to win victory for themselves. There is no doubt that victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions of the two sides. But not by these alone; it is also determined by the subjective ability of the two sides in directing the war. A military man cannot seek victory in war beyond the limits allowed by the material conditions, but within those limits he can and must strive for victory. The stage on which military men perform is built upon objective material conditions, yet on this stage they can direct the performance of many a vivid and powerful drama. Therefore, on the basis of the given objective material conditions, namely the military, political, economic and natural conditions, the leaders of our Red Army must display our prowess and lead the whole army to overthrow the national and class enemies and change this bad world. Here our subjective ability in direction can and must be used. We do not permit any Red Army commander to become a rash man who blunders about; we must encourage every Red Army commander to become a brave and wise hero, who has not only an overwhelming courage but also the ability to master the changes and development of the whole war. The commander swims in the sea of war; he must not let himself sink, but must make sure that he reaches the opposite shore with firm decision and by definite steps. The laws directing war are the art of swimming in the sea of war. The above is our method.
Chapter II: The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War
China's revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed through two stages, namely, that of 1924–27 and that of 1927–36; the stage from now on is that of the national revolutionary war against Japan. In all three stages the revolutionary war has been led by the Chinese proletariat and its party, the Chinese Communist Party. The principal enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, because of its selfishness and its lack of political and economic independence it is unwilling and unable to lead China's revolutionary war onto the road of thorough victory. The masses of the Chinese peasantry and of the urban petty bourgeoisie are willing to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to see it achieve thorough victory. They are the main force of the revolutionary war; but the characteristics of small production limit their political outlook (and a section of the unemployed have anarchist ideas), so they cannot become the correct leaders of the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already stepped onto the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. At such a time, any revolutionary war that lacks, or goes against, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party is bound to fail. For among all the social strata and political groups in semi-colonial China, only the proletariat and the Communist Party are the least narrow-minded and selfish, have the broadest political vision and the highest degree of organization, and are also the most willing to learn with an open mind from the experience of the advanced proletariat and its parties throughout the world and apply it to their own cause. Therefore only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the Communist Party's policy is not erroneous) overcome the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie, and so lead the revolution and the war onto the road of victory.
The revolutionary war of 1924–27 was fundamentally carried on under the political influence of, and in political cooperation with, the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its party, on the part of the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its party. But at the critical juncture of the revolution and the war, this revolutionary war failed, first because of the betrayal by the big bourgeoisie and also because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily gave up the leadership.
The agrarian revolutionary war from 1927 to the present has been carried on under new circumstances. The enemy in this war is not only imperialism but also the alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords. The national bourgeoisie has become a tail of the big bourgeoisie. The only force that leads this revolutionary war is the Communist Party, which has established absolute leadership over the revolutionary war. This absolute leadership of the Communist Party is the most essential condition enabling the revolutionary war to persevere to the end. Without such absolute leadership by the Communist Party, it is inconceivable that the revolutionary war could have shown such perseverance.
The Chinese Communist Party has led China's revolutionary war with heroism and resolution. Over the long years of fifteen years, it has shown before the whole people that it is the friend of the people, and that every day it has stood in the front line of the revolutionary war to protect the people's interests and for the people's freedom and liberation.
By its record of arduous struggle, and by the blood and sacrifice of several hundred thousand heroic Party members and several tens of thousands of heroic cadres, the Chinese Communist Party has played a great educational role among the hundreds of millions of the whole nation. The great historical achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in the revolutionary struggle have given China, now at the critical juncture of invasion by a national enemy, the conditions for saving the nation from extinction, and these conditions consist in having a political leader trusted by the great majority of the people, tested by them over a long period and therefore chosen by them. What the Communist Party says today is more readily accepted by the people than what any other party says. Without the arduous struggle of the Chinese Communist Party over the past fifteen years, it would have been impossible to save the country from the new danger of subjugation.
In the revolutionary war the Chinese Communist Party, apart from the two mistakes of Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism and Li Li-san's "Left" opportunism, committed two further mistakes. The first was the "Left" opportunism of 1931–34, which caused extremely serious losses to the agrarian revolutionary war, with the result that in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" we failed to defeat the enemy and instead lost our base areas and weakened the Red Army. This mistake was corrected in January 1935 at the Tsunyi Meeting of the enlarged Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The second was Chang Kuo-tao's Right opportunism of 1935–36, which developed to the point of undermining the discipline of the Party and the Red Army and caused serious losses to part of the main force of the Red Army; but thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the political consciousness of the Party members, commanders and fighters in the Red Army, this mistake too was finally corrected. All these mistakes were of course harmful to our Party, our revolution and our war, but we finally overcame them, and our Party and our Red Army were tempered and made stronger through overcoming them.
The Chinese Communist Party has led, and continues to lead, a mighty, glorious and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation but also has international revolutionary significance. The eyes of the revolutionary people of the world are upon us. In the new stage of the national revolutionary war against Japan, we shall lead the Chinese revolution to completion, and we shall also exert a profound influence on the revolution in the East and in the world. The past revolutionary war has proved that we need not only a correct Marxist political line but also a correct Marxist military line. Fifteen years of revolution and war have tempered such a political and military line. In the new stage of the war ahead, we believe, this line will, in accordance with the new environment, be further developed, supplemented and enriched, so that the aim of defeating the national enemy is attained. History tells us that a correct political and military line does not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in struggle. On the one hand it has to struggle against "Left" opportunism, and on the other against Right opportunism. Without struggling against these harmful tendencies that endanger the revolution and the revolutionary war, and without thoroughly overcoming them, it is impossible to build a correct line and to win the revolutionary war. It is for this purpose that I frequently refer in this pamphlet to erroneous views.
Chapter III: The Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War
Section 1: The Importance of This Question
People who do not recognize, do not know, or do not want to know that China's revolutionary war has its own characteristics regard the Red Army's fighting against the Kuomintang forces as the same as war in general or as the Soviet civil war. The experience of the Soviet civil war led by Lenin and Stalin has world significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, take this experience, and Lenin's and Stalin's theoretical summing-up of it, as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically under our own conditions. China's revolutionary war has in many respects its own characteristics, which differ from those of the Soviet civil war. Not to take these characteristics into account, or to deny them, is of course wrong. This has been fully proved in our ten years of war.
Our enemy has also committed a similar mistake. He did not recognize that fighting the Red Army requires a strategy and tactics different from those of other fighting. Relying on his superiority in all fields, he despised us and stuck to his old ways of fighting. This was the situation up to and during the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933, and the result was a series of defeats for him. The first to put forward new views on this question within the Kuomintang forces was the reactionary Kuomintang general Liu Wei-yuan, and later Tai Yueh. In the end their views were adopted by Chiang Kai-shek. This is how Chiang Kai-shek's Lushan Officers' Training Corps and the reactionary new military principles applied in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign came about.
But just when the enemy was changing his military principles to suit fighting the Red Army, people appeared in our ranks who went back to the "old ways". They advocated going back to the general conditions, refused to understand any special conditions, refused the experience of the Red Army's history of bloody fighting, belittled the strength of imperialism and of the Kuomintang, belittled the strength of the Kuomintang forces, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. The result was the loss of all the revolutionary base areas except the Shensi-Kansu border area, the reduction of the Red Army from 300,000 men to a few tens of thousands, the reduction of the Chinese Communist Party from 300,000 members to a few tens of thousands, and the loss of almost all Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas. In short, we received an enormous historical punishment. They called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but in fact they had learned nothing of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said: the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. It is precisely this that these comrades of ours have forgotten.
From this we see that without understanding the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, one cannot direct it and cannot lead it onto the road of victory.
Section 2: What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War?
What, then, are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?
I think there are four main ones.
The first characteristic is that China is a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through the revolution of 1924–27.
This characteristic points to the possibility of the growth and victory of China's revolutionary war. When, in the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928, not long after guerrilla warfare began in China, some comrades in the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi, the Chingkangshan, raised the question "How long can the red flag be kept flying?", we pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area). Because this is a most basic question, we could not advance a single step without answering the question whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could exist and grow. The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 gave another answer to this question. From then on the Chinese revolutionary movement had a correct theoretical basis.
Let us now look at this question in its parts.
China is unevenly developed politically and economically: a feeble capitalist economy and a heavy semi-feudal economy exist side by side; a few modern industrial and commercial cities and the vast stagnant countryside exist side by side; several million industrial workers and several hundred million peasants and handicraftsmen under the old regime exist side by side; big warlords who control the central government and small warlords who control the provinces exist side by side; in the reactionary armies there are two kinds of forces, the so-called central army under Chiang Kai-shek and the so-called miscellaneous troops under the provincial warlords, existing side by side; and there are a few railways, steamship lines and motor roads, side by side with the many wheelbarrow roads, the paths that can be travelled only on foot and the paths that are hard to travel even on foot.
China is a semi-colonial country: the lack of unity among the imperialist powers is reflected in the lack of unity among China's ruling groups. A semi-colonial country dominated by several powers is different from a colony dominated by one power.
China is a big country: "When it is dark in the east it is light in the west, when it is dark in the south it is light in the north"; there is no worry about lack of room to manoeuvre.
China has gone through a great revolution: the seeds of the Red Army have been prepared, the leader of the Red Army, namely the Communist Party, has been prepared, and the masses who have taken part in a revolution have been prepared.
So we say that China is a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through one revolution. This is the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic basically determines not only our political strategy and tactics but also our military strategy and tactics.
The second characteristic is the great strength of the enemy.
What is the situation of the Kuomintang, the enemy of the Red Army? It is a party that has seized political power and has relatively stabilized its power. It has won the support of the main counter-revolutionary countries of the world. It has remodelled its army, so that it differs from the armies of any other period of Chinese history and is on the whole similar to the armies of the modern states of the world; its supply of arms and other military material is far richer than the Red Army's, and its army is larger than any army in any period of Chinese history and larger than the standing army of any country in the world. There is a world of difference between its army and the Red Army. It controls the key points or lifelines of the political, economic, communications and cultural life of the whole country, and its political power is nation-wide.
The Chinese Red Army is confronted by such a powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic makes the Red Army's operations differ in many ways from war in general, and from the Soviet civil war and the Northern Expedition.
The third characteristic is the weakness of the Red Army.
The Chinese Red Army came into being after the defeat of the first great revolution, and began as guerrilla units. It came into being not only in a period of reaction in China but in a period when the reactionary capitalist countries of the world were comparatively stable politically and economically.
Our political power is a scattered and isolated power in mountain or remote regions, and it has no outside help whatsoever. The economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward compared with those in the Kuomintang areas. The revolutionary base areas contain only villages and small towns. Their territory was at first very small and later was still not large. Moreover, the base areas are unstable; the Red Army has no really consolidated base areas.
The Red Army is small in numbers, its weapons are poor, and its supply of food, clothing and other material is extremely difficult.
This characteristic is in sharp contrast to the preceding one. The strategy and tactics of the Red Army arise from this sharp contrast.
The fourth characteristic is the leadership of the Communist Party and the agrarian revolution.
This characteristic is the necessary result of the first. It gives rise to two aspects. On the one hand, although China's revolutionary war takes place in a period of reaction in China and in the capitalist world, it can win victory because it has the leadership of the Communist Party and the support of the peasantry. Although the base areas are small, they have great political power and stand firmly in opposition to the huge Kuomintang regime; militarily they create great difficulties for the Kuomintang's attacks, because we have the support of the peasantry. Although the Red Army is small, it has great fighting power, because the men of the Red Army under the leadership of the Communist Party arose out of the agrarian revolution and fight for their own interests, and because the commanders and fighters are politically united.
On the other hand, there is a sharp contrast with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang opposes the agrarian revolution and therefore has no support from the peasantry. Although its army is large, it cannot make the masses of soldiers, or the many junior officers who come from small producers, willingly risk their lives for the Kuomintang; the officers and men are politically divided, and this reduces its fighting power.
Section 3: Our Strategy and Tactics Arise from These Characteristics
A vast semi-colonial country, unevenly developed politically and economically, which has gone through a great revolution; a powerful enemy; a weak Red Army; the agrarian revolution: these are the four main characteristics of China's revolutionary war. They determine the guiding line of China's revolutionary war and many of its strategic and tactical principles. The first and fourth characteristics determine that the Chinese Red Army can grow and can defeat its enemy. The second and third characteristics determine that the Chinese Red Army cannot grow very rapidly and cannot defeat its enemy very quickly; that is, they determine that the war will be protracted and that, if it is handled badly, it may even be lost.
These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneously, that is to say, there are both favourable conditions and difficult conditions. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, and many other laws arise from it. The history of our ten years of war proves the correctness of this law. Whoever keeps his eyes shut to these laws of a fundamental nature cannot direct China's revolutionary war and cannot enable the Red Army to win battles.
It is quite clear that the following all demand correct solution: correctly determining the strategic direction; opposing adventurism in attack, conservatism in defence, and flightism in shifting; opposing guerrilla-ism in the Red Army while recognizing the guerrilla character of the Red Army; opposing protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, while recognizing protracted war as a strategy and quick decision as the principle of campaigns; opposing fixed operational lines and positional warfare, while recognizing fluid operational lines and mobile warfare; opposing the warfare of mere routing of the enemy, while recognizing the warfare of annihilation; opposing the "two fists" in strategic direction, while recognizing the "one fist"; opposing the system of a big rear area, while recognizing the system of a small rear area; opposing absolute centralized command, while recognizing relatively centralized command; opposing the purely military viewpoint and the roving-rebel outlook, while recognizing the Red Army as the propagandist and organizer of the Chinese revolution; opposing banditry, while recognizing strict political discipline; opposing warlordism, while recognizing a limited democratic life and authoritative military discipline; opposing an incorrect, sectarian cadre policy, while recognizing a correct cadre policy; opposing a policy of isolation, while recognizing the winning over of all possible allies; and finally, opposing keeping the Red Army at an old stage, while striving to develop the Red Army to a new stage. All these questions of principle demand correct solution. The strategic problems that we are going to discuss now are precisely for the purpose of explaining these questions well, on the basis of the experience of China's ten years of bloody revolutionary war.
Chapter IV: "Encirclement and Suppression" and Campaigns Against It: The Main Form of China's Civil War
For ten years, from the very first day guerrilla warfare began, around every independent Red guerrilla unit or Red Army, around every revolutionary base area, what has constantly been met with is enemy "encirclement and suppression". The enemy regards the Red Army as a foreign body and wants to seize it the moment it appears. The enemy always follows the Red Army, and always tries to encircle it. This form has not changed in the past ten years, and if national war had not replaced civil war, it would not change until the day when the enemy becomes weak and the Red Army becomes strong.
The activity of the Red Army has taken the form of campaigns against "encirclement and suppression". By victory we mainly mean victory in countering "encirclement and suppression", that is, strategic and campaign victory. Countering one "encirclement and suppression" is one campaign, often made up of several, or even several tens of, battles, large and small. Until an "encirclement and suppression" has been basically smashed, even if many battles have been won, one cannot say that strategic or campaign victory has been won. The ten years' history of Red Army warfare is a history of campaigns against "encirclement and suppression".
The enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and the Red Army's counter-campaigns involve the use by each side of the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, and in this there is no difference from wars in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad. But what is peculiar to China's civil war is the long-term repetition of both. In one "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy attacks against the Red Army's defence, and the Red Army defends against the enemy's attack: this is the first stage of the counter-campaign. The enemy defends against the Red Army's attack, and the Red Army attacks against the enemy's defence: this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every "encirclement and suppression" includes these two stages, and they are repeated over a long period.
By long-term repetition I mean the repetition of the forms of war and of fighting. This is a fact that anyone can see at a glance. "Encirclement and suppression" and the counter-campaigns against it constitute a repetition of the form of war. The first stage, in which the enemy attacks against our defence and we defend against his attack, and the second stage, in which the enemy defends against our attack and we attack against his defence, constitute a repetition of the forms of fighting in each "encirclement and suppression".
As for the content of the war and of the fighting, it is not simply repeated but is different each time. This too is a fact that anyone can see at a glance. The law here is that the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and our counter-campaigns grow bigger each time, the circumstances grow more complex each time, and the fighting grows fiercer each time.
But there have been ups and downs. After the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, because the Red Army had been greatly weakened, all the southern base areas had been lost, and the Red Army had moved to the northwest and was no longer in as important a position as in the south, threatening the enemy within the country, the scale, circumstances and fighting of the "encirclement and suppression" became comparatively smaller, simpler and less intense.
What is defeat for the Red Army? Strategically speaking, only a basic failure to counter an "encirclement and suppression" can be called defeat, and even then it can only be called a partial and temporary defeat. For the fundamental defeat in civil war would be the destruction of the whole Red Army, and there has been no such fact. The loss of extensive base areas and the shifting of the Red Army is a temporary and partial defeat, not an eternal and total one, although this part included ninety per cent of the Party, the army and the base areas. We call this fact a continuation of the defence, and call the enemy's pursuit a continuation of the offensive. That is to say, in the struggle of "encirclement and suppression" and counter-campaigns, we did not pass from the defensive to the offensive, but on the contrary our defence was broken by the enemy's offensive, our defence turned into retreat, and the enemy's offensive turned into pursuit. But when the Red Army arrived in a new region, as when we moved from Kiangsi and other places to Shensi, the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" appeared again. So we say that the Red Army's strategic retreat (the Long March) was a continuation of the Red Army's strategic defence, and the enemy's strategic pursuit was a continuation of the enemy's strategic offensive.
China's civil war, like any war ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, has only two basic forms of fighting, attack and defence. What is peculiar to China's civil war is the long-term repetition of "encirclement and suppression" and of the counter-campaigns, and the long-term repetition of the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, together with the inclusion in it of something like a great strategic shift of over ten thousand kilometres (the Long March).
The same is true of what is called the enemy's defeat. His strategic defeat consists in our smashing his "encirclement and suppression", our defence turning into attack, and the enemy being forced onto the defensive, so that he must reorganize before he can launch another "encirclement and suppression". The enemy has had nothing like our strategic shift of over ten thousand kilometres, because he is the ruler of the whole country and is much stronger than we are. But partial instances have occurred. In some base areas, enemy troops in White strongholds besieged by the Red Army have broken out and retreated into the White areas to reorganize and attack again; such things have happened. If the civil war is prolonged and the Red Army's victories spread more widely, such things will become more frequent. But their outcome cannot be compared with that of the Red Army, because they have no support from the people and there is disunity between officers and men. If they too tried long-distance shifts like the Red Army, they would certainly be destroyed.
During the Li Li-san line period in 1930, Comrade Li Li-san did not understand the protracted nature of China's civil war, and therefore could not see the law of long-term repetition in the development of China's civil war, "encirclement and suppression" again and again, smashing again and again (at that time there had already been three "encirclement and suppression" campaigns on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, two in Fukien, and so on); therefore, when the Red Army was still in its infancy, he ordered the Red Army to attack Wuhan and ordered armed uprisings throughout the country, in an attempt to bring quick victory to the revolution throughout the country. This was the mistake of "Left" opportunism.
The "Left" opportunism of 1931–34 likewise did not believe in the law of the repetition of "encirclement and suppression". In the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area base there was the so-called "side-army" theory: some leading comrades there held that the Kuomintang after the defeat of its third "encirclement and suppression" was no more than a side army, and that to attack the Red Army the imperialists would have to come out in person and serve as the main force. The strategic policy under this estimate was for the Red Army to attack Wuhan. This was identical in principle with the calls of some comrades in Kiangsi for the Red Army to attack Nanchang, their opposition to the work of linking the base areas into one whole, their opposition to the operational method of luring the enemy in deep, their placing victory in one province on the basis of seizing the provincial capital and central cities, and their view that "the fight against the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' is the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism", and so on. This "Left" opportunism sowed the seeds of the erroneous line in the struggle against the fourth "encirclement and suppression" in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area and against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the Central Area in Kiangsi, left the Red Army powerless in the face of the enemy's serious "encirclement and suppression", and brought great losses to the Chinese revolution.
Directly linked with the "Left" opportunism that denied the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" was the view that the Red Army should not adopt defensive means at all, which was also entirely incorrect.
"Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive": this statement is of course correct in its way. From the birth of revolution and revolutionary war to their growth, from small to large, from having no political power to seizing political power, from having no Red Army to creating a Red Army, from having no revolutionary base areas to creating them, one must always attack and cannot be conservative; the tendency towards conservatism should be opposed.
"Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive, but there are also defence and retreat": only this statement is entirely correct. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move sideways in order to move frontally, to take a roundabout route in order to take a direct one, are phenomena that cannot be avoided in the development of many things, let alone in military movements.
Of the two assertions above, the former may be right politically but is wrong when transferred to the military field. Even in politics it is right only in certain circumstances (when the revolution is advancing), and wrong when transferred to other circumstances (when the revolution is in retreat: in a general retreat, for example in Russia in 1906 and in China in 1927; in a partial retreat, for example in Russia in 1918 at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). Only the latter assertion is a truth that is correct in all respects. The "Left" opportunism of 1931–34, in mechanically opposing the use of military defence, was nothing but an extremely childish idea.
When will the form of the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" come to an end? In my view, if the civil war is prolonged, it will be when a fundamental change has occurred in the comparative strength of the enemy and ourselves. If the Red Army ever becomes stronger than its enemy, then this repetition will end. Then it will be we who encircle and suppress the enemy, while the enemy tries to counter our campaigns, but the political and military conditions will not allow the enemy to obtain the same position in countering campaigns as the Red Army had. Then, even if we cannot say that the form of repeated "encirclement and suppression" will have ended completely, it can be asserted that in general it will have ended.
Chapter V: Strategic Defence
In this chapter I want to explain the following questions: (1) active defence and passive defence; (2) preparations for countering "encirclement and suppression"; (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-offensive; (5) the question of starting the counter-offensive; (6) the question of concentrating forces; (7) mobile warfare; (8) quick-decision warfare; (9) war of annihilation.
Section 1: Active Defence and Passive Defence
Why start with defence? After the failure of China's first national united front in 1924–27, the revolution became an extremely profound and cruel class war. The enemy was the ruler of the whole country and we had only a few small units; therefore from the very beginning we have been fighting against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression". Our offensives are closely tied to smashing "encirclement and suppression", and the fate of our development depends entirely on whether we can smash it. The process of smashing "encirclement and suppression" is often roundabout and winding, not straight and smooth. The first and serious problem is how to preserve our strength and wait for the opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore the problem of strategic defence has become the most complicated and important problem in the Red Army's operations.
In our ten years of war, two deviations have often occurred on the problem of strategic defence: one is underestimating the enemy, and the other is being intimidated by the enemy.
Because of underestimating the enemy, many guerrilla units were defeated, and the Red Army failed to smash several of the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns.
When revolutionary guerrilla units first arise, their leaders often do not view the situation of the enemy and ourselves correctly. They see that they have won in one place by a sudden armed uprising, or have broken away from the White army by mutiny, and that the environment is for the moment very favourable; or there is a serious environment but they do not see it; and so they often underestimate the enemy. On the other hand, they do not understand their own weaknesses (lack of experience, small strength). That the enemy is strong and we are weak is an objectively existing phenomenon, but people are unwilling to think about it, and talk only of attack, not of defence and retreat; they have disarmed themselves mentally in respect of defence, and so lead their action in the wrong direction. Many guerrilla units were defeated for this reason.
Examples of the Red Army's failure to smash "encirclement and suppression" for the same reason are the defeat of the Red Army in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung in 1928, and the fact that in 1932 the Red Army in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, under the guidance of the so-called "side-army" theory about the Kuomintang, lost its ability to deal with the situation calmly in the fourth counter-campaign.
Examples of setbacks caused by being intimidated by the enemy are many.
In contrast to those who underestimate the enemy, people overrate the enemy and underrate themselves too much, and so adopt an unnecessary policy of retreat, and likewise disarm themselves mentally in respect of defence. The result is either the defeat of guerrilla units, or the defeat of the Red Army in certain campaigns, or the loss of base areas.
The most conspicuous example of the loss of a base area is the loss of the Central Base Area in Kiangsi in the counter-campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression". The mistake here arose from a Right viewpoint. The leaders feared the enemy as they would a tiger, set up defences everywhere and resisted at every step; they dared not launch an offensive towards the enemy's rear, which would have been advantageous, and dared not boldly and freely lure the enemy in deep and concentrate to annihilate him. The result was the loss of the whole base area and the Red Army's Long March of over twelve thousand kilometres. But this mistake was often preceded by a "Left" error of underestimating the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking central cities in 1932 was precisely the source of the passive-defence line adopted later in dealing with the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression".
An extreme example of being intimidated by the enemy is the retreatist "Chang Kuo-tao line". The defeat of the Western Column of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army west of the Yellow River was the final bankruptcy of this line.
Active defence is also called offensive defence, or defence with decisive engagements. Passive defence is also called purely defensive defence, or simple defence. Passive defence is in fact spurious defence, and only active defence is genuine defence, defence for the sake of counter-attack and offensive. As far as I know, no valuable military book and no reasonably intelligent military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, whether in strategy or tactics, fails to oppose passive defence. Only the most stupid or the most arrogant people treat passive defence as a magic talisman. Yet there are in the world such people who do such things. This is an error in war, an expression of conservatism in military affairs, and we must firmly oppose it.
Among the military men of the late-rising and swiftly developing imperialist countries, Germany and Japan, there are those who vigorously advocate the advantages of the strategic offensive and oppose strategic defence. This thinking is fundamentally unsuited to China's revolutionary war. The military men of German and Japanese imperialism point out that an important weakness of defence is that it cannot inspire the people but instead makes them waver. This refers to countries where class contradictions are acute and the benefits of war accrue only to the reactionary ruling strata or even to the reactionary party in power. Our situation is different. Under the slogans of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can unite the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the invaded. The Red Army in the Soviet civil war also defeated the enemy in the form of defence. Their war was fought under the slogan of defending the Soviets not only when the imperialist countries organized the White Guards to attack, but even in the period of preparation for the October uprising, when military mobilization was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In all just wars, defensive fighting not only has the effect of paralysing politically alien elements but can also mobilize the backward masses to join the war.
When Marx said that after the armed uprising not a moment should be lost in attacking, he meant that the masses who rise suddenly when the enemy is unprepared should give the reactionary rulers no chance to keep or restore their power, should take that moment to catch the reactionary ruling forces within the country off guard, and should not be satisfied with the victory already gained, underestimate the enemy, slacken the offensive against the enemy, or hold back and lose the opportunity to destroy the enemy, thereby inviting the failure of the revolution. This is correct. But it does not mean that when the two sides are already in military confrontation and the enemy is superior, the revolutionaries should not adopt defensive means when pressed by the enemy. Anyone who thinks so is a fool of the first order.
Our wars in the past, taken as a whole, were offensives against the Kuomintang, but militarily they took the form of smashing "encirclement and suppression".
Militarily speaking, our war is an alternating application of defence and offensive. For us, it can be said either that the offensive comes after the defence or that it comes before the defence, because the key lies in smashing "encirclement and suppression". Before "encirclement and suppression" is smashed it is defence, and once it is smashed the offensive begins; these are merely two stages of one thing, and one "encirclement and suppression" by the enemy is followed directly by another. Of these two stages, the defensive stage is more complicated and more important than the offensive stage. It involves many problems of how to smash "encirclement and suppression". The basic principle is to recognize active defence and oppose passive defence.
In civil war, if the strength of the Red Army surpasses that of the enemy, then in general there will be no need for strategic defence. The policy at that time will simply be the strategic offensive. This change depends on a general change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. By then, the only defensive means left will be partial ones.
Section 2: Preparations for Countering "Encirclement and Suppression"
If we have no necessary and adequate preparations against an enemy's planned "encirclement and suppression", we shall inevitably fall into a passive position. To meet it hastily and at the last minute leaves no assurance of victory. Therefore, while the enemy is preparing his "encirclement and suppression", it is absolutely necessary for us to make preparations for countering it. The views opposing preparation that have appeared in our ranks are childish and laughable.
Here there is a difficult problem that easily gives rise to dispute: when should we end our own offensive and go over to preparations for countering "encirclement and suppression"? When we are in the midst of a victorious offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, the enemy's preparations for "encirclement and suppression" are carried on in secret, and it is hard for us to know when he will launch his attack. If we start preparations for the counter-campaign too early, we inevitably reduce the benefits of our offensive and sometimes produce some bad effects on the Red Army and the people. For the main steps in the preparatory stage are the military preparation for retreat and the political mobilization for that retreat. Sometimes, if the preparations are too early, they turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy coming, we have to launch our own offensive afresh. Sometimes, just as our new offensive is starting, we run into the start of the enemy's offensive, and put ourselves in a difficult position. So the choice of the time to begin preparations becomes an important question. In determining this time we must look at the circumstances of both the enemy and ourselves and the relations between them. To understand the enemy's situation, we must collect data on the enemy's politics, military affairs, finance and public opinion. In analysing this data, we must give full weight to the enemy's total strength; we must not exaggerate the degree of the enemy's past defeats, but we must on no account fail to take into account the contradictions within the enemy camp, his financial difficulties, the effects of his past defeats, and so on. As regards our own side, we must not exaggerate the degree of our past victories, but we must on no account fail to give full weight to the effects of our past victories.
But on the question of when to begin preparations, generally speaking it is better to err on the side of being too early than on the side of being too late, because the loss from the former is smaller than from the latter, and the benefit is that preparedness averts disaster and puts us fundamentally in an invincible position.
The main questions in the preparatory stage are the Red Army's preparation for retreat, political mobilization, recruitment of new soldiers, preparation of finance and grain, and the handling of politically alien elements.
By the Red Army's preparation for retreat is meant not letting the Red Army face in a direction unfavourable for retreat, not letting it advance too far, and not letting it get too tired. This is the necessary arrangement for the main Red Army force on the eve of a large-scale enemy offensive. At this time the Red Army's attention should be mainly on creating the battlefield, collecting resources, and plans for expanding and training itself.
Political mobilization is the first important question in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression". That is to say, we must tell the personnel of the Red Army and the people of the base areas clearly, resolutely and fully about the inevitability and imminence of the enemy's offensive and the gravity of the harm it will do to the people, and at the same time about the enemy's weaknesses, the Red Army's superior conditions, our determination to win, the direction of our work and so on. We must call on the whole Red Army and all the people to fight against "encirclement and suppression" and defend the base areas. Except for military secrets, political mobilization must be open and must strive to reach everyone who can possibly support the interests of the revolution. The key link is to convince the cadres.
Recruitment of new soldiers must proceed from two sides: on the one hand it must take into account the degree of the people's political consciousness and the population situation; on the other it must take into account the situation of the Red Army at that time and the possible limit of the Red Army's losses in the whole counter-campaign.
The problems of finance and grain are, needless to say, of great significance in countering "encirclement and suppression". We must take into account the possible prolongation of the "encirclement and suppression". We should calculate the minimum material needs, mainly of the Red Army and secondly of the people of the revolutionary base areas, during the whole counter-campaign.
In dealing with politically alien elements, we must not be off our guard against them, but neither must we be too afraid of their betraying us and adopt excessive measures of vigilance. A distinction should be made among landlords, merchants and rich peasants; the main thing is to explain things to them politically, win their neutrality, and organize the masses to keep watch on them. Only against the very few most dangerous elements may severe measures, such as arrest, be used.
The degree of victory in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression" is closely tied to the degree to which the tasks of the preparatory stage are accomplished. Both slackness in preparation arising from underestimating the enemy and panic arising from being intimidated by the enemy's offensive are bad tendencies that must be firmly opposed. What we need is an ardent yet calm mood and tense but orderly work.
Section 3: Strategic Retreat
Strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior army in the face of the offensive of a superior army, when it takes into account that it cannot quickly smash that offensive, in order to preserve its strength and wait for an opportunity to defeat the enemy. But the military adventurists firmly oppose this step; their proposal is the so-called "meet the enemy outside the gates of the country".
Everyone knows that when two boxers confront each other, the clever one often gives way a step, while the fool rushes in fiercely and uses up all his skill at the first blow, and in the end is often knocked down by the one who gave way.
In the novel Shui Hu Chuan, Instructor Hung in Chai Chin's house wanted to fight Lin Chung, and called out "Come on! Come on! Come on!" several times; the result was that Lin Chung, who had given way, saw through Hung's weakness and with one kick sent Instructor Hung sprawling.
In the Spring and Autumn Period, when Lu fought Chi, Duke Chuang of Lu at first wanted to fight before the Chi army was tired, but he was stopped by Tsao Kuei, who adopted the policy "when the enemy is tired, we attack", defeated the Chi army, and created a famous example in Chinese military history of a weak army defeating a strong one. Let us look at the account by the historian Tso Chiu-ming:
"In the spring, the army of Chi attacked us. The Duke was about to fight. Tsao Kuei asked for an audience. A man of his village said: 'The meat-eaters will plan for it; why should you meddle?' Kuei said: 'The meat-eaters are shallow and cannot plan far ahead.' So he went in to see the Duke. He asked: 'On what will you fight?' The Duke said: 'Food and clothing that give comfort I dare not keep to myself; I always share them with others.' He replied: 'Small favours are not spread to all; the people will not follow you.' The Duke said: 'Sacrificial animals, jade and silk I dare not embellish; I always keep faith.' He replied: 'Small good faith is not yet trusted; the spirits will not bless you.' The Duke said: 'In cases large and small, though I cannot examine them all, I always decide according to the facts.' He replied: 'That is a kind of loyalty. You may fight one battle. When you fight, I ask to follow.' The Duke let him ride in his chariot. They fought at Changshao. The Duke was about to sound the drums. Kuei said: 'Not yet.' The men of Chi sounded the drums three times. Kuei said: 'Now.' The army of Chi was routed. The Duke was about to give chase. Kuei said: 'Not yet.' He got down and looked at their wheel tracks, climbed on the crossbar and gazed afar, and said: 'Now.' Then they pursued the army of Chi. After the victory, the Duke asked the reason. He replied: 'Battle is a matter of courage. The first drum rouses courage; the second weakens it; by the third it is exhausted. They were exhausted and we were full, hence we overcame them. A great state is hard to fathom; I feared an ambush. I saw their tracks were in disorder and their banners drooping, so I pursued them.'"
The situation at that time was a weak state resisting a strong one. The passage points to the political preparation before the battle, winning the trust of the people; it mentions the position favourable for going over to the counter-offensive, Changshao; it mentions the moment favourable for starting the counter-offensive, when the enemy is exhausted and we are full; and it mentions the moment for starting the pursuit, when the tracks are in disorder and the banners drooping. Although it was a small campaign, it speaks at the same time of the principles of strategic defence. There are very many instances in Chinese military history of victories won in accordance with this principle. The famous great battles, such as the Battle of Chengkao between Chu and Han, the Battle of Kunyang between Hsin and Han, the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan and Tsao, the Battle of Chihpi between Wu and Wei, the Battle of Yiling between Wu and Shu, and the Battle of the Fei River between Chin and Chin, were all battles in which the two sides were unequal in strength, and the weaker side yielded a step at first, then struck after the enemy had struck, and so won.
Our war began in the autumn of 1927, when we had absolutely no experience. The Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Uprising failed, the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border area also lost a few battles and shifted to the Chingkangshan area on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. In April of the next year, the troops preserved after the failure of the Nanchang Uprising also moved through southern Hunan to the Chingkangshan. But beginning in May 1928, the basic principles of guerrilla warfare, simple in character and suited to the circumstances of the time, had already emerged, namely, the sixteen-character formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This sixteen-character military principle was recognized by the Central Committee before the Li Li-san line. Later our principles of operation developed further. By the time of the first counter-campaign in the Kiangsi base area, the policy of "luring the enemy in deep" had been put forward and applied successfully. By the time the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" was defeated, the whole body of the Red Army's operational principles had taken shape. This was a new stage in the development of military principles; the content was greatly enriched and the form also changed in many ways, mainly in going beyond the earlier simplicity, but the basic principles remained that sixteen-character formula. The sixteen-character formula embraces the basic principles of countering "encirclement and suppression", embraces the two stages of strategic defence and strategic offensive, and within defence embraces the two stages of strategic retreat and strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only its development.
But beginning in January 1932, after the Party's resolution "Win victory first in one province or several provinces after the smashing of the three 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns", which contained a serious error of principle, was issued, the "Left" opportunists struggled against the correct principles and finally abolished a whole set of correct principles and set up another complete set opposed to them, the so-called "new principles" or "regular principles". From then on, the earlier things could not be called regular; they were "guerrilla-ism" that had to be repudiated. The atmosphere of opposing "guerrilla-ism" dominated for three whole years. Its first stage was military adventurism, its second stage turned into military conservatism, and finally its third stage became flightism. Only when the Party Central Committee held the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi in Kweichow in January 1935 was the bankruptcy of this erroneous line proclaimed and the correctness of the former line recognized again. What a great price was paid for this!
The comrades who so energetically opposed "guerrilla-ism" said: Luring the enemy in deep is wrong, because many places are abandoned. Although we won battles in the past, are things not different now from the past? And would it not be better still to defeat the enemy without giving up territory? Would it not be better to defeat the enemy in the enemy's area or on the border between our area and the enemy's? The old things had no regularity whatsoever; they were just the methods used by guerrilla units. Now our state has been established and our Red Army has become regular. Our fighting with Chiang Kai-shek is state against state and big army against big army. History should not repeat itself, and the things of "guerrilla-ism" should all be discarded. The new principles are "completely Marxist", while the old things arose with guerrilla units in the mountains, and in the mountains there is no Marxism. The new principles are the opposite: "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight courageously and resolutely, and pursue the victory straight on"; "strike out along the whole line"; "seize the central cities"; "strike with two fists". When the enemy attacks, the way to deal with him is to "meet the enemy outside the gates of the country", "gain the initiative by striking first", "not smash the pots and jars", "not give up an inch of territory", "divide the forces into six routes"; it is the "decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism"; it is short swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare, attrition warfare, and "protracted war"; it is the doctrine of the big rear area, absolute centralized command; and finally, it is large-scale removal. And anyone who does not accept these is punished and labelled an opportunist, and so on.
Undoubtedly this whole body of theory and practice was wrong. It was subjectivism. It was an expression of petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and revolutionary impatience when the environment was favourable; when the environment became difficult, it successively turned, according to the change in circumstances, into desperate-gambler-ism, conservatism and flightism. This was the theory and practice of rash men and outsiders, with not a whiff of Marxism in it, and was anti-Marxist.
Here I speak only of strategic retreat, which in Kiangsi was called "luring the enemy in deep" and in Szechuan "tightening the position". Military theorists and practitioners of former times all admitted that this is the policy a weak army must adopt at the beginning of a war when fighting a strong one. Foreign military men have said: "In operations of the strategic defensive, the general practice is first to avoid a decisive battle that is unfavourable and to seek a decisive battle only when the circumstances become favourable." This is completely correct, and we have nothing to add to it.
The aim of strategic retreat is to preserve strength and prepare the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary because, in the face of an offensive by a strong enemy, if one does not yield a step, the preservation of one's strength will certainly be endangered. In the past, however, many people firmly opposed retreat and regarded it as "the opportunist line of simple defence". Our history has proved that this opposition was completely wrong.
To prepare the counter-offensive, we must select and create a number of conditions that favour us and not the enemy, so as to change the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves, and then enter the counter-offensive stage.
According to our experience in the past, it is probably necessary to obtain at least two of the following conditions in the stage of retreat before the situation can be regarded as favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy, and before we can go over to the counter-offensive. These conditions are:
(1) The people actively support the Red Army;
(2) The terrain favours our operations;
(3) All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated;
(4) The enemy's weak spots are discovered;
(5) The enemy is made tired and demoralized;
(6) The enemy is induced to make mistakes.
The condition of the people is the most important condition for the Red Army. This is the condition of the base area. And because of this condition, the fourth, fifth, sixth and other conditions are also easily created or found. So when the enemy launches a large-scale attack on the Red Army, the Red Army always retreats from the White areas to the base area, because the people in the base area give the most active support to the Red Army against the White army. There is also a difference between the border areas and the central areas of a base area; in the matter of blockading information, reconnaissance, transport, participation in battle and so on, the people of the central areas are better than those of the border areas. So the "end point of retreat" was in the past chosen, in the counter-campaigns against the first, second and third "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, in areas where the conditions of the people were best or relatively good. This characteristic of the base area makes the Red Army's operations greatly different from operations in general, and it is also the main reason why the enemy was later forced to adopt blockhouse-ism.
A retreating army can choose the favourable positions it wants and force the attacking army to fall in with our terms; this is an excellent condition of operations on interior lines. A weak army that wants to defeat a strong one must attend to the condition of terrain. But this condition alone is not enough; other conditions must be combined with it. First is the condition of the people. Next is an enemy who is easy to beat, for example, when the enemy is tired, or has made a mistake, or when the enemy column advancing along a given route is comparatively lacking in fighting power. When these conditions are absent, even if there is an excellent position we must leave it alone and continue to retreat, so as to fall in with the conditions we want. There are excellent positions in the White areas, but not excellent conditions of the people. If the other conditions have also not yet been created or found, the Red Army has to retreat to the base area. The distinction between the border areas and the central areas of the base area is also roughly of this kind.
Apart from local forces and forces for containing action, the principle is that all striking forces be fully concentrated. When we attack an enemy who is on the strategic defensive, the Red Army is often dispersed. As soon as the enemy launches a large-scale attack on us, the Red Army carries out the so-called "centripetal retreat". The end point of the retreat is often chosen in the middle of the base area, but sometimes in the forward part and sometimes in the rear part, as determined by the circumstances. This centripetal retreat can bring all the main force of the Red Army together completely.
Another necessary condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to attack the weak part first. But when the enemy begins his offensive, we often do not know which of his columns advancing on separate routes is strongest, which next strongest, which weakest, which next weakest, and a process of reconnaissance is needed. It often takes much time to achieve this. This is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary.
If the attacking enemy far surpasses us in numbers and strength, and we want the balance between strong and weak to change, we can only wait until the enemy has penetrated deep into the base area and tasted all the bitterness of the base area, as a chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai-shek's brigades said in the third "encirclement and suppression", "the fat are dragged thin and the thin are dragged to death", or as Chen Ming-shu, commander-in-chief of the western route of the "encirclement and suppression" forces, said, "The National army is in darkness everywhere, the Red Army in light everywhere." At such a time, although the enemy forces are strong, they are greatly weakened; their troops are tired, their morale is low, and many weaknesses are exposed. Although the Red Army is weak, it has conserved its energy and built up its strength, and rests while waiting for the tired enemy. At this point the comparison between the two sides often reaches a certain degree of balance, or the enemy's absolute superiority changes into relative superiority, and our absolute inferiority into relative inferiority, and there are even cases where the enemy is inferior to us and we are superior to the enemy. In the counter-campaign against the third "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi the Red Army carried out an extreme form of retreat (the Red Army concentrated in the rear of the base area), but without it the enemy could not have been defeated, because the "encirclement and suppression" forces at that time outnumbered the Red Army more than ten to one. Sun Tzu's "Avoid the enemy's keen spirit, strike him when he is lazy and homeward-bound" refers to making the enemy tired and demoralized in order to reduce his superiority.
The last requirement of retreat is to create and discover the enemy's mistakes. It must be understood that no matter how able an enemy commander is, it is impossible for him not to make some mistake over a fairly long period, so the possibility that we can take advantage of an opening in the enemy always exists. The enemy will make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes err and sometimes give the enemy an opening to exploit. Moreover, we can create the enemy's mistakes artificially, for instance by what Sun Tzu called "making a show of form" (showing a form in the east while striking in the west, that is, feinting in the east and attacking in the west). To do this, the end point of the retreat cannot be restricted to a particular area. Sometimes, when we have retreated to that area and there is still no opening, we have to retreat a few more steps and wait until the enemy makes an exploitable "opening".
The favourable conditions sought in retreat are broadly as described above. But this does not mean that we must wait until these conditions are all present before launching the counter-offensive. It is impossible to have them all at once, and not necessary either. But, in the light of the enemy's present situation, to strive for certain necessary conditions is something to which an army fighting on interior lines, weak against strong, should pay attention; views opposing this are incorrect.
To decide where the end point of the retreat should be, we must take the whole situation as our point of departure. If the situation in one locality looks favourable for us to go over to the counter-offensive, but the situation as a whole does not at the same time look favourable to us, it is wrong to decide the end point of the retreat on that basis. For in starting the counter-offensive we must calculate the later changes, and our counter-offensive always begins from a part. Sometimes the end point of retreat should be chosen in the forward part of the base area, for example in the second and fourth counter-campaigns in Kiangsi and the third counter-campaign in Shensi-Kansu. Sometimes it should be in the middle of the base area, for example in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. Sometimes it should be in the rear of the base area, for example in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi. In all these cases it was decided by linking the partial situation with the situation as a whole. In the fifth counter-campaign in Kiangsi our army paid no attention to retreat at all; the reason was that no attention was paid either to the partial situation or to the situation as a whole, which was truly a reckless and slipshod way of doing things. Situations are created by conditions; in observing the connection between the partial situation and the situation as a whole, we should judge by whether the conditions held by both sides at that time, as they appear in the part and in the whole, favour our starting the counter-offensive within certain limits.
The end point of retreat within the base area can be roughly divided into three kinds: forward part, middle part, and rear part. But do we absolutely refuse to fight in the White areas? No. When we refuse to fight in the White areas, it refers only to dealing with the enemy's large-scale "encirclement and suppression". It is because the enemy and we are so greatly unequal in strength that, under the principle of preserving our strength and waiting for the opportunity to defeat the enemy, we advocate retreat into the base area and luring the enemy in deep, for only in this way can we create or find conditions favourable to the counter-offensive. If the situation is not so grave, or if it is so grave that the Red Army cannot launch a counter-offensive even in the base area, or if the counter-offensive is unfavourable and we need to retreat further to change the situation, then choosing the end point of retreat in the White areas should also be recognized, at least in theory, although we have had little such experience in the past.
The end point of retreat in the White areas can also be roughly divided into three kinds: first, in front of the base area; second, at the side of the base area; third, behind the base area. As an example of the first kind, in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the Red Army had not had internal disunity and the split in the local Party, that is, the two difficult problems of the Li Li-san line and the AB Corps, it would have been conceivable to concentrate forces for a counter-offensive among the three points of Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu. For at that time the strength of the enemy advancing from between the Kan and Fu rivers was not greatly superior to that of the Red Army (100,000 against 40,000). The conditions of the people were not as good as in the base area, but the conditions of terrain were present, and we could have defeated the enemy one column after another as they advanced on separate routes. As an example of the second kind, in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the scale of the enemy's offensive had not been so large, and if one enemy column advancing from Chienning, Likiang and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border had been of a strength suited to our attack, it would likewise have been conceivable for the Red Army to concentrate in the White area in western Fukien and first smash that column, without taking a roundabout route of a thousand li via Juichin to Hsingkuo. As an example of the third kind, again in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had advanced not westward but southward, we might have been forced to retreat to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), luring the enemy still further south, and then the Red Army would have struck from south to north into the interior of the base area, where the enemy forces in the north would not have been very numerous. But all these statements are hypothetical, with no experience behind them, and can be treated as special cases, not as general principles. For us, when the enemy launches a large-scale "encirclement and suppression", the general principle is to lure the enemy in deep and to retreat into the base area to fight, because this is the method by which we can smash the enemy's offensive with the greatest assurance.
Those who advocate "meeting the enemy outside the gates of the country" oppose strategic retreat on the grounds that retreat loses territory, harms the people (the so-called "smashing the pots and jars"), and also produces a bad effect abroad. In the fifth counter-campaign, they said that when we retreat a step the enemy's blockhouses advance a step, that the base area shrinks day by day and cannot be recovered. If luring the enemy in deep was useful before, they said, it is useless in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" with its blockhouse-ism. The fifth "encirclement and suppression" could be dealt with only by dividing forces to resist and by short swift thrusts.
It is easy to answer these views, and our history has already answered them. As for the loss of territory, it often happens that one can avoid loss only by suffering loss; this is the principle of "if you want to take, you must first give". If what we lose is territory and what we gain is the defeat of the enemy, plus the recovery of the territory, plus the expansion of territory, this is a profitable business. In market transactions, if the buyer does not lose money he cannot obtain goods, and if the seller does not lose goods he cannot obtain money. The loss caused by revolutionary movements is destruction, and what is gained is progressive construction. Sleep and rest lose time but gain the energy for tomorrow's work. If some fool, not understanding this, refuses to sleep, he will have no energy tomorrow; this is a losing business. Our losses in the period of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" were due precisely to this. Unwilling to lose part of the territory, we lost all of it. The hard fighting of Abyssinia also resulted in the loss of the whole country, although the cause of Abyssinia's defeat was not this alone.
The question of harming the people is the same. If we do not smash pots and jars in the homes of a part of the people for a while, we shall make the whole people smash pots and jars for a long time. To fear a bad political effect for a while is to pay for it with a long-term bad effect. After the October Revolution, if the Russian Bolsheviks, following the views of the "Left Communists", had refused the peace treaty with Germany, the newborn Soviets would have been in danger of dying young.
This kind of "Left" view, which looks revolutionary, arises from the revolutionary impatience of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and also from the partial conservatism of the peasant small producers. They look at problems only from the standpoint of one part, are incapable of surveying the whole, are unwilling to link today's interests with tomorrow's, or partial interests with the interests of the whole, and cling to something partial and momentary and will not let go even if it costs their lives. It is right that whatever, in the light of the concrete circumstances at the time, is beneficial to the whole situation and the whole period, and especially a part and a moment that are decisive, should be held on to and not let go; otherwise we would become drifters or laissez-faire-ists. This is the reason why retreat must have an end point. But this can by no means rely on the short-sightedness of the small producer. What we should learn is the wisdom of the Bolsheviks. Our eyesight is not sufficient, and we should use the help of the telescope and the microscope. The Marxist method is the telescope and microscope in politics and military affairs.
Of course, strategic retreat has its difficulties. The choice of the time to start the retreat, the choice of the end point of retreat, and the political persuasion of the cadres and the people are all difficult problems, and all must be solved.
The question of the time to start the retreat is of great importance. Our retreat in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi, had it not come exactly at that time, that is, if it had come later, would at least have affected the degree of our victory. Retreating too early or too late both of course involve loss. But generally speaking, the loss from being too late is greater than from being too early. A timely retreat puts us entirely in the initiative, which has a great effect, after reaching the end point of retreat, on reorganizing our dispositions and going over to the counter-offensive, resting while waiting for the tired enemy. In the campaigns that smashed the enemy's first, second and fourth "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi we dealt with the enemy unhurriedly. Only in the third campaign, because we did not expect that after so miserable a defeat in the second campaign the enemy's new offensive would come so quickly (we finished the operations of the second counter-campaign on May 31, 1931, and on July 1 Chiang Kai-shek began his third "encirclement and suppression"), the Red Army had to concentrate hurriedly by a roundabout route and was very tired. How to choose this time depends entirely on collecting the necessary data and judging from the general situation of both sides, by the same method as was said earlier for choosing the time to begin the preparatory stage.
As for strategic retreat, when cadres and people have as yet no experience, and when the authority of the military leadership has not yet reached the point where the power to decide strategic retreat is concentrated in the hands of the fewest people, or even one, and is accepted by the cadres, persuading the cadres and the people is a very difficult problem. Because the cadres lacked experience and did not believe in strategic retreat, great difficulties were met on this question in the early part of the first and fourth counter-campaigns and throughout the fifth. In the first counter-campaign, because of the influence of the Li Li-san line, the cadres' view before they were persuaded was not to retreat but to attack. In the fourth counter-campaign, because of the influence of military adventurism, the cadres' view was against preparation. In the fifth counter-campaign, the cadres' view at the beginning continued the military adventurist opposition to luring the enemy in deep, and later turned into military conservatism. The Chang Kuo-tao line, which did not believe that we could not build base areas in Tibetan and Moslem regions until it ran into a wall, is also an example. Experience is necessary for cadres, and failure is indeed the mother of success. But it is also necessary to accept other people's experience with an open mind; if everything must wait for one's own experience, or if one stubbornly insists on one's own views and refuses to accept others', that is the very "narrow empiricism". Our war has suffered not a little from this.
The people's disbelief in the necessity of strategic retreat, because of lack of experience, was greatest in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At that time the local Party organizations and the masses in Kian, Hsingkuo, Yungfeng and other counties all opposed the Red Army's retreat. But after that experience, in the later counter-campaigns this problem no longer arose at all. Everyone believed that the losses of the base area and the hardships of the people were temporary, and everyone had confidence that the Red Army could smash "encirclement and suppression". But whether the people trust or not is closely tied to whether the cadres trust or not, so the main and first task is to persuade the cadres.
The whole purpose of strategic retreat is to go over to the counter-offensive; strategic retreat is only the first stage of strategic defence. The decisive key to the whole strategy lies in whether the counter-offensive stage that follows can be won.
Section 4: Strategic Counter-Offensive
Defeating the offensive of an absolutely superior enemy depends on the situation created in the stage of strategic retreat, which favours us and not the enemy and has changed from what it was when the enemy began his offensive, and this situation is created by various conditions. This has been discussed above.
But the existence of conditions and a situation favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy does not yet mean the enemy's defeat. These conditions and this situation contain the possibility of deciding victory or defeat, but are not yet the reality of victory or defeat; they have not yet realized victory or defeat for the two armies. To realize this victory or defeat depends on the decisive battle between the two armies. Only a decisive battle can settle the question of which army wins and which loses. This is the whole task of the strategic counter-offensive stage. The counter-offensive is a long process; it is the most brilliant and lively stage of defensive war, and it is also the final stage of defensive war. What is called active defence mainly refers to this strategic counter-offensive of a decisive character.
Conditions and situations are created not only in the stage of strategic retreat but continue to be created in the counter-offensive stage. The conditions and situations at this time are not entirely of the same form and the same nature as those of the previous stage.
They may be of the same form and nature; for example, the greater tiredness and loss of numbers of the enemy forces at this time are merely a continuation of the tiredness and loss of the previous stage.
But entirely new conditions and situations also necessarily appear. For example, when the enemy has suffered one or several defeats, the conditions then favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy are not merely the enemy's tiredness and so on, but include the new condition of the enemy's defeat. The situation also undergoes new changes. The enemy's movements are hasty and confused and his actions improper, and the relative superiority of the two armies is no longer the same as before.
If one to several defeats belong not to the enemy but to our army, then whether conditions and situations are favourable also changes to the opposite. That is to say, the enemy's disadvantages diminish, our disadvantages begin to appear and even grow. This again is something entirely new and different from before.
Whichever side suffers defeat, it directly and rapidly gives rise on the losing side to a new effort, an effort to retrieve the critical situation, to extricate itself from the newly appearing conditions and situation unfavourable to itself and favourable to the enemy, and to create anew conditions and situations favourable to itself and unfavourable to the enemy in order to press upon the other side.
The effort of the winning side is the opposite: it strives to develop its victory, inflict greater damage on the enemy, increase or develop the conditions and situations favourable to itself, and make sure the other side does not succeed in extricating itself from the unfavourable position and retrieving the critical situation.
So, on whichever side, the struggle in the stage of decisive battle is the most intense, most complex and most changeable in the whole war or the whole campaign, and also the most difficult and most arduous; in terms of command, it is the time at which it is least easy.
In the counter-offensive stage there are many problems, the main ones being the question of starting the counter-offensive, the question of concentrating forces, the question of mobile warfare, the question of quick-decision warfare, the question of the war of annihilation, and so on.
The principles in these questions, whether for the counter-offensive or for the offensive, are in their basic nature not different. In this sense it can be said that the counter-offensive is an offensive.
But the counter-offensive is not entirely an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy attacks. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are again some differences.
For this reason, although here many questions of operations are all discussed under the counter-offensive section of strategic defence, and in the section on the strategic offensive only other questions are discussed, in order to avoid repetition, in applying them we must neither overlook their points of similarity nor overlook their points of difference.
Section 5: The Question of Starting the Counter-Offensive
The question of starting the counter-offensive is the question of the so-called "first battle" or "opening battle".
Many bourgeois military men advocate caution in the first battle, whether in strategic defence or strategic offensive, and especially in defence. In the past we also raised this question seriously. The operations against the enemy's first to fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns in Kiangsi gave us rich experience, and it is not without benefit to study this experience.
In the first "encirclement and suppression", the enemy attacked the Red base area from north to south, along the line from Kian to Chienning, with about 100,000 men in eight columns. The Red Army at that time numbered about 40,000 and was concentrated in the Huangpi and Hsiaopu area of Ningtu County, Kiangsi Province.
The situation at that time was as follows: (1) The "suppression" forces numbered no more than 100,000, and none of them were Chiang's own troops, so the overall situation was not very serious. (2) The enemy's Lo Lin division was defending Kian, separated on the west side of the Kan River. (3) The enemy's Kung Ping-fan, Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan divisions had advanced into the area of Futien, Tungku, Lungkang and Yuantou, southeast of Kian and northwest of Ningtu. Chang's division had its main force at Lungkang, and Tan's at Yuantou. Futien and Tungku, because the people there had been deceived by the AB Corps and for the moment did not trust the Red Army and were opposed to it, were not suitable as battlefields. (4) The enemy's Liu Ho-ting division was far away in Chienning in the White area of Fukien and would not necessarily cross into Kiangsi. (5) The enemy's Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ko-hsiang divisions had advanced to Toupi, Lokou and Tungshao between Kwangchang and Ningtu. Toupi was a White area, Lokou a guerrilla area, and Tungshao had the AB Corps and information easily leaked. Moreover, if we attacked Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ko-hsiang and then went on to attack westward, we feared that Chang Hui-tsan, Tan Tao-yuan and Kung Ping-fan in the west would concentrate, making a decision difficult and the problem not finally solved. (6) The Chang and Tan divisions were the main force of the "suppression" army and the own troops of Lu Ti-ping, Chairman of Kiangsi and commander-in-chief of the "encirclement and suppression" forces, and Chang was also the commander at the front. If these two divisions were destroyed, the "encirclement and suppression" would be basically smashed. Each division had about 14,000 men, and Chang's division was stationed in two places, so attacking one division at a time gave us absolute superiority. (7) The Lungkang and Yuantou area, where the main forces of the Chang and Tan divisions were, was close to our concentration area, and the conditions of the people were good, enabling us to approach under concealment. (8) Lungkang had an excellent position. Yuantou was not good for attacking. If the enemy attacked Hsiaopu and came to us, the position there was also good. (9) We could concentrate the greatest force in the direction of Lungkang. Hsingkuo, several tens of li southwest of Lungkang, also had an independent division of over a thousand men that could circle to the enemy's rear. (10) Our army carried out a breakthrough in the centre, and when a gap was opened in the enemy's line, the enemy's eastern and western columns were separated into two widely separated groups. On the basis of the above reasons, we decided to fight our first battle and did fight, destroying the two brigades of Chang Hui-tsan's main force and one divisional headquarters, capturing all nine thousand men including the division commander, without letting a single man or horse escape. One victory so frightened Tan's division that it ran towards Tungshao, and Hsu's division ran towards Toupi. Our army then pursued Tan's division and destroyed half of it. Two battles in five days (December 30, 1930, to January 3, 1931), and then the enemy at Futien, Tungku, Toupi and elsewhere, afraid of being attacked, withdrew one after another, and the first "encirclement and suppression" came to an end.
The situation in the second "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) The "suppression" forces numbered 200,000, with Ho Ying-chin as commander-in-chief, stationed in Nanchang. (2) As in the first "encirclement and suppression", all were non-Chiang troops. The Nineteenth Route Army under Tsai Ting-kai, the Twenty-sixth Route Army under Sun Lien-chung and the Sixth Route Army under Chu Shao-liang were the strongest or relatively strong, and the rest were relatively weak. (3) The AB Corps had been eliminated, and the people of the base area all supported the Red Army. (4) Wang Chin-yu's Fifth Route Army, newly arrived from the north, showed fear, and its left wing, the divisions of Kuo Hua-tsung and Hao Meng-ling, were much the same. (5) If our army began fighting from Futien and swept eastward, it could expand the base area in the Chienning, Likiang and Taining area on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, collect resources, and make it easier to smash the next "encirclement and suppression". If we fought from east to west, we would be limited by the Kan River, with no room for development after the campaign ended. If after fighting we turned east again, it would tire the troops and waste time. (6) Our army's numbers, though slightly reduced from the previous campaign (over 30,000), had four months of rest and conserved energy. On the basis of the above reasons, we decided to fight our first battle against Wang Chin-yu and Kung Ping-fan (eleven regiments altogether) in the Futien area. After the victory, we went on to attack Kuo, attack Sun, attack Chu, attack Liu. In fifteen days (May 16 to 31, 1931) we marched 700 li, fought five battles, captured over 20,000 rifles, and smashed the "encirclement and suppression" thoroughly. When we attacked Wang Chin-yu we were between the two enemy forces of Tsai Ting-kai and Kuo Hua-tsung, more than ten li from Kuo and more than forty li from Tsai; some said we were "boring into a bull's horn", but in the end we bored through. This was mainly because of the conditions of the base area, plus the disunity among the enemy's various forces. After Kuo's division was defeated, Hao's division fled back to Yungfeng during the night and so escaped disaster.
The situation in the third "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) Chiang Kai-shek himself took the field as commander-in-chief, under whom there were commanders-in-chief of the left, right and centre routes. The central route was under Ho Ying-chin, stationed with Chiang in Nanchang; the right route was under Chen Ming-shu, stationed in Kian; the left route was under Chu Shao-liang, stationed in Nanfeng. (2) The "suppression" forces numbered 300,000. The main force was five divisions of Chiang's own troops, those of Chen Cheng, Lo Cho-ying, Chao Kuan-tao, Wei Li-huang and Chiang Ting-wen, each of nine regiments, about 100,000 men altogether. Next were the three divisions of Tsai Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin, 40,000 men. Next was Sun Lien-chung's army, 20,000 men. The rest were non-Chiang troops and weaker. (3) The "suppression" strategy was "driving straight in", greatly different from the "consolidating step by step" of the second "encirclement and suppression", with the aim of pressing the Red Army against the Kan River and destroying it. (4) From the end of the second "encirclement and suppression" to the beginning of the third was only one month. The Red Army, after hard fighting, had had no rest and no replenishment (about 30,000 men), and had returned by a roundabout route of a thousand li to concentrate at Hsingkuo in the west of the base area in southern Kiangsi, when the enemy was already advancing in separate columns right in front of us. Under these circumstances, the first plan we decided on was to break through at Futien from Hsingkuo via Wanan, then sweep from west to east along the enemy's rear lines of communication, letting the enemy's main force penetrate deep into the base area in southern Kiangsi and be placed in a position where it could not be used; this was fixed as the first stage of operations. When the enemy turned back north, he would certainly be very tired, and we would take the opportunity to attack what could be attacked; this was the second stage. The core of this plan was to avoid the enemy's main force and strike at his weak points. But as our army was advancing towards Futien, it was discovered by the enemy, and the Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying divisions rushed up. We had to change the plan and return to Kaohsingwei in western Hsingkuo; at this time only this one market town and some dozens of square li around it allowed our army to concentrate. After concentrating for one day, we decided to thrust eastward towards Lientang in eastern Hsingkuo County, Liangtsun in southern Yungfeng County and Huangpi in northern Ningtu County. On the first day we passed by night through a gap of forty li between Chiang Ting-wen's division and the Chiang, Tsai and Han armies, and turned to Lientang. On the second day we made contact with the forward elements of Shangkuan Yun-hsiang's army (Shangkuan commanding his own division and Hao Meng-ling's division). On the third day we fought Shangkuan's division as the first battle, on the fourth day we fought Hao Meng-ling's division as the second battle, and then, after a three-day march, we fought Mao Ping-wen's division at Huangpi as the third battle. We won all three battles and captured over ten thousand rifles. By this time all the enemy's main forces advancing westward and southward had turned their banners eastward, focused their eyes on Huangpi, and advanced fiercely to look for our army to fight, approaching our army in a dense, large encircling posture. Our army then slipped through a gap of twenty li, through great mountains, between the Chiang, Tsai and Han armies and the Chen and Lo armies, and returned from the east to concentrate in the Hsingkuo area in the west. By the time the enemy discovered it and advanced westward again, we had already rested for half a month, while the enemy was hungry, tired and demoralized, and powerless, and resolved to retreat. We then took advantage of his retreat to attack Tsai Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai, Chiang Ting-wen and Han Teh-chin, destroying a brigade of Chiang Ting-wen's and a division of Han Teh-chin's. As for the divisions of Tsai Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, we fought them to a standoff and let them escape.
The situation in the fourth "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: The enemy advanced on Kwangchang in three routes, with his main force on the eastern route, while the two divisions on the western route were exposed in front of us and close to our concentration area. So we were able to attack the western route first in the southern part of Ihwang, and wiped out the two divisions of Li Ming and Chen Shih-chi in one stroke. When the enemy detached two divisions from his left route to join the central route in advancing again, we were again able to destroy one of his divisions in the southern part of Ihwang. In the two battles we captured over ten thousand rifles, and the "encirclement and suppression" was basically smashed.
In the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the enemy advanced with the new strategy of blockhouse-ism and first occupied Likiang. We, however, tried to recover Likiang and meet the enemy outside the base area, and attacked Hsiaoshih, north of Likiang, which was a consolidated enemy position and also a White area. We did not win in one battle, and we then attacked Tzuchiao, to its southeast, also a consolidated enemy position and a White area, and again did not win. After that we wandered about seeking battle between the enemy's main force and his blockhouses, and fell completely into a passive position. Throughout the whole year of the fifth counter-campaign, there was not the least semblance of independence and initiative. In the end we had to leave the Kiangsi base area.
The experience of our army's operations in the first to fifth counter-campaigns described above proves that for the Red Army on the defensive, in order to smash a strong "suppression" army, the first battle of the counter-offensive is of very great importance. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous influence on the whole situation, even right down to the last battle. We therefore draw the following conclusions:
First, we must win. We must act only when the enemy's situation, the terrain, the people and other conditions are all favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy and we have real assurance. Otherwise we would rather yield and wait cautiously for an opportunity. There are always opportunities; we must not rashly accept battle. In the first counter-campaign we first wanted to attack Tan Tao-yuan, but only because the enemy would not leave that commanding position at Yuantou, our army twice advanced and twice patiently withdrew, and after a few days found Chang Hui-tsan, who was easy to beat. In the second counter-campaign our army advanced to Tungku, and only because it was waiting for Wang Chin-yu to leave his consolidated position at Futien it preferred to risk the danger of leaked information, rejected all proposals for impatient quick action, stayed close to the enemy, and waited as long as twenty-five days, and finally achieved its aim. In the third counter-campaign, although the situation was one of such storm and haste, the return march of a thousand li, and the enemy discovering our plan to circle round his flank and rear, we still patiently turned back, changed to a breakthrough in the centre, and finally won the first good battle at Lientang. In the fourth counter-campaign, when we failed to take Nanfeng, we resolutely took the step of retreat, finally turned to the enemy's right flank, concentrated in the Tungshao area, and began the great victory in the southern part of Ihwang. Only in the fifth counter-campaign was the importance of the first battle not understood at all; startled by the loss of the one city of Likiang, with the intention of retrieving it, we went north to meet the enemy, and after the unexpected meeting-engagement victory at Hsunkou (in which we destroyed one enemy division), we did not regard this battle as the first battle, did not look at the changes it would inevitably bring about, and rashly attacked Hsiaoshih, where victory was by no means certain. Losing the initiative with the very first step was truly the stupidest and worst way of fighting.
Second, the plan for the first battle must be an organic prelude to the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign there can never be a truly good first battle. That is to say, even if we win the first battle, if this battle is not only not beneficial but harmful to the whole campaign, then although won, the battle can only count as lost (for example the Hsunkou battle in the fifth "encirclement and suppression"). Therefore before fighting the first battle we must think roughly how to fight the second, third, fourth and even the last battle; if our successive battles are won, what changes will occur in the enemy's whole situation; and if they are lost, what changes will occur. Although the result will not necessarily, or indeed will certainly not, be entirely as expected, we must think it out carefully and realistically on the basis of the whole situation on both sides. Without the whole situation in mind, one cannot truly place a good piece on the board.
Third, we must also think about the next strategic stage. If we think only of the counter-offensive and not of what to do after the counter-offensive succeeds, or after it fails, we have still not fully discharged the duty of a strategic director. When a strategic director is in one strategic stage, he should calculate several stages ahead, or at least the next stage. Although later changes are hard to foresee and the further we look the more vague it becomes, a rough calculation is possible, and estimating the long-term prospect is necessary. The way of directing by taking one step and then seeing the next is unfavourable in politics and also unfavourable in war. At each step we should look at the concrete changes of that step and, on that basis, modify or develop our strategic and campaign plans; if we do not, we shall make the error of rash plunging. But a long-term policy that runs through the whole strategic stage, or several strategic stages, and has been roughly thought through, is absolutely indispensable. If we do not have one, we shall make the error of hesitation and being stuck in a trap, and in practice will fit the enemy's strategic requirements and put ourselves in a passive position. It must be understood that the enemy's high command has a certain strategic vision. Only if we train ourselves to be a cut above him can we have the possibility of strategic victory. The reason the strategic direction of the "Left" opportunist line and of the Chang Kuo-tao line in the period of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" was wrong lay mainly in failure to do this. In short, in the stage of retreat we must calculate the stage of counter-offensive, in the stage of counter-offensive we must calculate the stage of offensive, and in the stage of offensive we must again calculate the stage of retreat. Without such calculation, to be bound by immediate gains and losses is the road to defeat.
We must win; we must take account of the plan for the whole campaign; we must take account of the next strategic stage: these are the three principles that must not be forgotten when starting the counter-offensive, that is, when fighting the first battle.
Section 6: The Question of Concentrating Forces
Concentrating forces seems easy but is quite difficult in practice. Everyone knows that the best method is to use the many to defeat the few, yet many people cannot do it and on the contrary often disperse their forces, because their directors lack strategic minds and are bewildered by a complex environment and thereby dominated by it, lose the capacity for independent initiative, and adopt a policy of muddling through.
No matter how complicated, serious or bitter the environment, what a military director first needs is to organize and use his own forces independently and on his own initiative. Being forced into a passive position by the enemy is something that often happens, and what is important is to regain the initiative quickly. If this position cannot be regained, what follows is defeat.
The position of initiative is not imaginary but concrete and material. The most important thing here is to preserve and assemble the largest force that has vitality.
Defensive war easily falls into a passive position, and is far from being able to display initiative as fully as offensive war. But defensive war can have active content in a passive form, and can pass from a passive stage in form to an active stage in both form and content. A completely planned strategic retreat is in form forced upon one, but in content it is preserving strength, waiting for an opportunity to defeat the enemy, luring the enemy in deep, and preparing the counter-offensive. Only refusing to retreat and rushing into battle (for example, the Hsiaoshih battle), though it seems on the surface to strive for initiative, is in fact passive. The strategic counter-offensive is active not only in content but also in form, abandoning the passive posture of the retreat period. For the enemy forces, the counter-offensive is our effort to force him to give up the initiative and at the same time to put him in a passive position.
To achieve this aim fully, concentration of forces, mobile warfare, quick-decision warfare and the war of annihilation are all necessary conditions. And concentration of forces is the first and main one.
Concentration of forces is necessary in order to change the situation between the enemy and ourselves. First, to change the situation of advance and retreat. Formerly the enemy advanced and we retreated; now we seek to achieve our advance and the enemy's retreat. If forces are concentrated and one battle is won, this aim is achieved in that battle and also influences the whole campaign.
Second, to change the situation of attack and defence. Retreating to the end point of retreat is basically the passive stage of defensive war, that is, the "defence" stage. The counter-offensive belongs to the active stage, that is, the "attack" stage. Although in the whole of strategic defence we have not departed from the nature of defence, nevertheless, compared with retreat, the counter-offensive is something that has changed, not only in form but also in content. The counter-offensive is a transitional thing between strategic defence and strategic offensive, with the character of the eve of the strategic offensive, and concentration of forces serves this end.
Third, to change the situation of interior and exterior lines. An army on interior lines strategically, especially a Red Army in the environment of "encirclement and suppression", suffers many disadvantages. But we can and fully should change this in campaigns or battles. We change the enemy's one big "encirclement and suppression" of our army into our many separate small encirclements and suppressions of the enemy. We change the enemy's strategic converging attack on our army into our converging attack on the enemy in campaigns or battles. We change the enemy's strategic superiority over our army into our superiority over the enemy in campaigns or battles. We make the enemy, who is in the position of the strong strategically, become the weak in campaigns or battles. At the same time, we change our own position of the weak strategically into the position of the strong in campaigns or battles. This is what is called exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement within "encirclement", blockade within blockade, offensive within defence, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity. To win victory out of strategic defence depends basically on the stroke of concentrating forces.
In the military history of the Chinese Red Army this question has often become an important subject of dispute. In the battle of Kian on October 4, 1930, we advanced and attacked without waiting for our forces to be fully concentrated; fortunately the enemy (Teng Ying's division) ran away of his own accord, and our attack itself had no effect.
From 1932 there was the slogan of "striking out along the whole line", demanding that we strike out on all four sides, east, west, south and north, of the base area. This is wrong not only in strategic defence but also in strategic offensive. As long as the overall balance between the enemy and ourselves has not fundamentally changed, both strategy and tactics have two aspects, defence and offence, containing action and assault, and in fact there is hardly ever any such thing as striking out along the whole line. The slogan of striking out along the whole line was military equalitarianism that accompanied military adventurism.
In 1933 the military equalitarians had the so-called "two fists" way of fighting, splitting the main force of the Red Army into two in an attempt to win victory simultaneously in two strategic directions. The result at that time was that one fist was left unused, the other fist was worn out with fighting, and the greatest victory that could have been obtained at that time was not obtained. In my opinion, where a strong enemy force exists, no matter how many troops one has, at any one time there should be only one main direction of use, not two. I am not against having two or more directions of operation, but the main direction at any one time should be only one. The Chinese Red Army appeared on the battlefield of the civil war as a weak force, and its record of repeatedly defeating strong enemies and astonishing the world depended very largely on the concentrated use of forces. Every one of the great victories proves this. "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred" is a strategic way of speaking, applied to the whole war and the whole balance between the enemy and ourselves; in this sense we really are so. It is not applied to campaigns and tactics; in this sense we must by no means be so. Whether in counter-offensive or offensive, we always assemble large forces to strike at a part of the enemy. The operation against Tan Tao-yuan in the Tungshao area of Ningtu County, Kiangsi, in January 1931, the operation against the Nineteenth Route Army in the Kaohsingwei area of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi, in September 1931, the operation against Chen Chi-tang in the Shuikouwei area of Nanhsiung County, Kwangtung, in July 1932, and the operation against Chen Cheng in the Tuantsun area of Likiang County, Kiangsi, in December 1933, all suffered from non-concentration of forces. Battles like those of Shuikouwei and Tuantsun were in general counted as victories, and even as great victories (in the former we routed twenty regiments of Chen Chi-tang, in the latter twelve regiments of Chen Cheng), but we have never welcomed such victories, and in a sense they can even be called defeats. For with no captures, or captures not exceeding our expenditure, we see little significance in them. Our strategy is "pit one against ten", and our tactics are "pit ten against one"; this is one of the fundamental rules by which we defeat the enemy.
Military equalitarianism reached its extreme in the fifth counter-campaign in 1934. "Dividing the forces into six routes" and "resisting along the whole line", in the belief that the enemy could be curbed this way, ended in our being curbed by the enemy, and the reason lay in the fear of losing territory. To concentrate the main force in one direction and leave only containing forces in the other directions naturally cannot avoid loss of territory. But this is a temporary and partial loss, and its price is victory in the direction of the assault. When the assault direction is victorious, the loss in the containing directions can be recovered. The enemy's first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns all caused us loss of territory, especially in the enemy's third campaign when the Red Army's base area in Kiangsi was almost entirely lost, but in the end we recovered all of our territory and even expanded it.
Because of failure to see the strength of the people in the base area, the mistaken psychology of fearing that the Red Army would go far from the base area often arose. This psychology appeared when the Red Army in Kiangsi went far afield in 1932 to attack Changchow in Fukien, and in 1933 when the Red Army turned to attack in Fukien after the victory of the fourth counter-campaign. In the former case there was fear that the whole base area would be occupied, in the latter that part of the base area would be occupied, and in both cases concentration of forces was opposed and dividing forces to guard was advocated; both proved wrong. In the enemy's eyes, on the one hand the base area makes him afraid to advance, on the other the Red Army that strikes into the White areas is his main danger. The attention of the enemy forces is always directed to where the main Red Army is; it is very rare for them to ignore the main Red Army and go solely against the base area. Even when the Red Army is on the defensive, the enemy's attention is still concentrated on the Red Army. The plan to reduce the base area is a part of the enemy's overall plan; but if the Red Army concentrates its main force and destroys one of his columns, the enemy's high command will have to turn its attention and its forces still more towards the Red Army. So the enemy's plan to reduce the base area can also be wrecked.
The statement "In the period of the blockhouse-ism of the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' we could not fight concentrated, and could only divide forces to defend and carry out short swift thrusts" is also incorrect. The enemy's blockhouse method of advancing three or five li at a time and pushing ten or eight li at a time was entirely brought about by the Red Army's own resistance step by step. If our army had given up the method of resisting step by step on interior lines and then, when necessary and possible, turned to strike at the enemy's interior, the situation would certainly have been quite different. The rule of concentration of forces is precisely the tool for defeating blockhouse-ism.
The concentration of forces that we advocate does not include giving up the people's guerrilla warfare. The Li Li-san line advocated abandoning small-scale guerrilla warfare, "even a single rifle should be concentrated in the Red Army", and this was proved wrong long ago. From the viewpoint of the whole revolutionary war, the people's guerrilla warfare and the main-force Red Army are each other's left and right hands; having only the main-force Red Army and no people's guerrilla warfare is like a one-armed general. The condition of the people in the base area, concretely speaking and especially in respect of operations, means having an armed people. The enemy's dread of the base area lies mainly in this.
It is also necessary to place detachments of the Red Army in secondary directions of operation; not everything is to be concentrated. The concentration of forces we advocate is based on the principle of ensuring absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. Against a strong enemy, or in battlefields of vital importance, we should confront him with forces of absolute superiority; for example in the first battle of the first counter-campaign on December 30, 1930, we concentrated 40,000 men to fight Chang Hui-tsan's 9,000. Against a weak enemy, or in battlefields not of vital importance, confronting him with forces of relative superiority is enough; for example in the last battle of the second counter-campaign on May 31, 1931, in attacking Liu Ho-ting's division of 7,000 men at Chienning the Red Army used only a little over 10,000.
Nor does it mean superior forces every time. Under certain circumstances we may also appear on the battlefield with relatively inferior or absolutely inferior forces. A case of relative inferiority is, for example, when in a certain area there is only one small Red Army unit (not that we have troops but fail to concentrate them), and in order to smash the offensive of a superior enemy, where conditions of the people, terrain, weather and so on give us great help, we contain his front and one flank with guerrilla units or small detachments, and the Red Army concentrates all its strength to make a sudden attack on a part of his other flank; this is of course necessary and can succeed. When we attack a part of one flank of the enemy, the principle of superiority over inferiority, the many defeating the few, still applies in the comparison of forces. A case of absolute inferiority is, for example, when a guerrilla unit attacks a big body of White troops and attacks only a small part of it; the same principle applies.
The argument that concentrating a big army on one battlefield is restricted by terrain, roads, supplies, billeting and so on should also be looked at according to circumstances. These restrictions differ in degree for the Red Army and the White army, because the Red Army can endure greater hardships than the White army.
We defeat the many with the few: this is what we say to the rulers of the whole of China. We defeat the few with the many: this is what we say to the individual enemy forces on the battlefield. This is no longer any secret; the enemy in general has got to know our temperament. But the enemy can neither cancel our victories nor avoid his losses, because he does not know when and where we shall do this. This we keep secret. The Red Army's operations are in general surprise attacks.
Section 7: Mobile Warfare
Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is: mobile warfare. Under conditions where there are no large forces, no replenishment of ammunition, and in each base area only a single Red Army unit fights back and forth, positional warfare is basically useless for us. For us, positional warfare is basically unusable not only in defence but also in attack.
One of the conspicuous characteristics of the Red Army's operations, arising from the enemy's strength and the Red Army's poverty in technique, is the absence of fixed operational lines.
The Red Army's operational lines are subject to the Red Army's operational direction. The operational direction is not fixed, and this affects the lack of fixity of operational lines. Although the main direction does not change for a period, the sub-directions within the main direction change at any time; when one direction is blocked we must turn to another. After a period, when the main direction too is blocked, even this main direction has to be changed.
In the period of revolutionary civil war, operational lines cannot be fixed, and even in the Soviet Union this has been so. The difference between the Soviet army and ours is that its lack of fixity was not as great as ours. No war can have absolutely fixed operational lines, since changes of victory and defeat, advance and retreat do not permit it. But relatively fixed operational lines are often seen in wars in general. Only an army like the Chinese Red Army at the present stage, where the enemy and we are so widely unequal in strength, is an exception.
The lack of fixity of operational lines affects the lack of fixity of the territory of the base areas. Expansion and shrinkage, extension and contraction are constant, and as one rises another falls, which often happens. This fluidity of territory comes entirely from the fluidity of the war.
The fluidity of war and of territory affects the fluidity of all kinds of construction work in the base areas. A construction plan of several years cannot be conceived. Frequent change of plans is everyday fare for us.
To recognize this characteristic is advantageous to us. Starting from this characteristic, we should fix our schedules: we must not dream of a war in which we only advance and never retreat, must not be startled by temporary fluidity of territory and of the military rear, and must not try to draw up long-term concrete plans. We should adapt our thinking and work to the circumstances, be prepared both to sit down and to walk, and not lose our dry-ration bags. Only by making an effort in the present fluid life can we strive for comparative non-fluidity in the future and for stability in the end.
The strategic policy of the so-called "regular war" that dominated the period of the fifth counter-campaign denied this fluidity and opposed what it called "guerrilla-ism". The comrades who opposed fluidity wanted to act as the rulers of a big country, and the result was an extraordinarily big fluidity, the Long March of 25,000 li.
Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a state, but today it is still an incomplete state. Today we are still in the period of strategic defence in the civil war; our political power is still far from a complete state form, our army is far behind the enemy in numbers and technique, our territory is still very small, and our enemy wants at every moment to destroy us before he can be happy. In deciding our policy from this, it is not a matter of opposing guerrilla-ism in general but of honestly recognizing the guerrilla character of the Red Army. To be shy about it is useless. On the contrary, guerrilla character is precisely our characteristic, precisely our strength, precisely our instrument for defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard guerrilla character, but today we cannot yet discard it. Guerrilla character will certainly be something to be ashamed of and to be discarded in the future, but today it is precious and must be upheld.
"Fight if you can win, move away if you cannot win": this is the popular explanation of our mobile warfare today. There is no military man in the world who recognizes only fighting and not moving away; the difference is only that we move away so much more. For us, the time spent walking is usually more than the time spent fighting, and to fight one big battle a month on average is counted good. All our "moving away" is for the sake of "fighting", and all our strategic and campaign policies are built on the one basic point of "fighting". But there are several circumstances in which it is hard for us to fight: first, when there are many enemies in front, it is hard to fight; second, when the enemy in front is not numerous but is very close to neighbouring enemy forces, it is sometimes hard to fight; third, generally speaking, enemies who are not isolated and who occupy very consolidated positions are all hard to fight; fourth, when fighting cannot bring the battle to a decision, it is hard to go on fighting. On all these occasions, we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is permitted and necessary. For we admit the necessity of moving away only on condition of first admitting the necessity of fighting. The basic characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare lies here.
Mobile warfare is basic, but this does not mean refusing necessary and possible positional warfare. In strategic defence, the holding of certain strong points on the containing front, and in strategic offensive, the encountering of an isolated and unsupported enemy, should be handled by positional warfare. We have already had a good deal of experience in defeating the enemy by such positional warfare in the past; many cities, blockhouses and stockades have been opened by us, and the enemy's field positions have been broken through to a certain degree. In future we shall increase our efforts in this respect and make up for our weakness here. We should fully advocate positional attack and positional defence where circumstances need and permit them. What we oppose is only the adoption of positional warfare in general today, or putting positional warfare on a par with mobile warfare; these are what cannot be permitted.
The guerrilla character of the Red Army, the absence of fixed operational lines, the fluidity of the base areas, and the fluidity of construction work in the base areas: have they not changed at all in the ten years of war? They have changed. The period from the Chingkangshan to before the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi was the first stage; in this stage guerrilla character and fluidity were very great, the Red Army was still in its infancy, and the base areas were still guerrilla areas. The period from the first to the third counter-campaign was the second stage; in this stage guerrilla character and fluidity were greatly reduced, front armies had been set up, and base areas containing several million people already existed. The period from after the third to the fifth counter-campaign was the third stage, in which guerrilla character and fluidity were reduced still more. The Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission were established. The Long March was the fourth stage. Because of the mistaken denial of small-scale guerrilla activity and small fluidity, there came a great guerrilla movement and great fluidity. The present is the fifth stage. Because we did not defeat the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and there was the great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas were greatly reduced, but we have already gained a foothold in the northwest and consolidated and developed the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border-area base. The three front armies, the main force of the Red Army, are already under unified command, which has never happened before.
According to the nature of strategy, it can also be said that the period from the Chingkangshan to the fourth counter-campaign was one stage, the period of the fifth counter-campaign another stage, and the period from the Long March to now a third stage. In the fifth counter-campaign people wrongly negated the earlier policy that had been correct; today we have rightly negated the wrong policy of the people of the fifth counter-campaign and revived the earlier correct policy. But we are not negating everything of the fifth counter-campaign, nor reviving everything of the earlier time. What is revived is the good things of the earlier time, and what is negated is the wrong things of the fifth counter-campaign.
Guerrilla-ism has two aspects. One aspect is irregularity, that is, lack of concentration, lack of unity, lax discipline, simplistic methods of work and so on. These things were brought along by the Red Army in its infancy, and some were precisely needed at that time. But when the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously get rid of them, and make the Red Army more concentrated, more united, more disciplined, and its work more painstaking; that is, make it more regular. In operational command too we should gradually and consciously reduce the guerrilla character that is unnecessary at the higher stage. To refuse to advance in this respect and obstinately remain at the old stage is not permitted, is harmful, and is unfavourable to large-scale operations.
The other aspect is the policy of mobile warfare, the guerrilla character of strategic and campaign operations that is still needed now, the fluidity of the base areas that cannot be stopped, the flexible changing of construction plans for the base areas, and the avoidance of premature and untimely regularization in building the Red Army. To refuse historical facts in this respect, to oppose keeping what is useful, to rashly leave the present stage and blindly run towards a so-called "new stage" that can be seen but not reached and has no practical meaning at present, is likewise not permitted, is harmful, and is unfavourable to present operations.
We are now on the eve of a new stage in the technique and organization of the Red Army. We should prepare to change over to the new stage. Not to make such preparation is wrong and is unfavourable to future wars. In the future, when the technical and organizational conditions of the Red Army have changed and Red Army building has advanced to the new stage, the operational directions and operational lines of the Red Army will appear relatively fixed; positional warfare will increase; the fluidity of war and the fluidity of territory and construction will be greatly reduced and in the end will be eliminated; and the things that restrict us now, such as the superior enemy and the consolidated positions he holds, will no longer be able to restrict us.
On the one hand we now oppose the mistaken methods of the period dominated by "Left" opportunism, and on the other hand we also oppose reviving the many irregularities of the Red Army's infancy that are not needed now. But we must firmly restore the many valuable principles of army building and the strategic and tactical principles by which the Red Army has won battles all along the way. We must sum up all the good things of the past into a systematic, further developed and richer military line, so as to strive to defeat the enemy today and to prepare to change over to the new stage in the future.
In the practice of mobile warfare there are many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgment, decision, battle dispositions, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, raiding, positional attack, positional defence, meeting engagements, retreat, night fighting, special kinds of fighting, avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, besieging a city to destroy the relieving forces, feint attacks, anti-aircraft defence, operating between several enemy forces, operating by bypassing the enemy, continuous operations, operating without a rear, the necessity of conserving energy and building up strength, and so on. These problems have shown many special features in the military history of the Red Army, should be systematically described in campaign science, and should be summed up; I shall not discuss them here.
Section 8: Quick-Decision Warfare
Protracted war strategically, quick decision in campaigns and battles: these are two sides of one thing, two principles of equal importance in civil war, and they can also be applied to war against imperialism.
Because the reactionary forces are strong and the revolutionary forces grow only gradually, the war is bound to be protracted. To be impatient on this is to suffer for it, and to advocate "quick decision" on this is incorrect. To have fought a revolutionary war for ten years may seem astonishing to other countries, but to us it is as if, in writing an eight-legged essay, we had only done the opening, the elaboration and the introduction, and many lively passages are still to come. The development ahead, under the influence of all internal and external conditions, will undoubtedly have the possibility of a greatly increased speed over the past. For the international and domestic environment has already changed and still greater changes will come; it can be said that we have already left the earlier situation of slow development and fighting alone. But we should not expect to succeed tomorrow. The spirit of "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is good, but a concrete plan to "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is not good. Because China's reactionary forces are supported by many imperialists, and until the revolutionary forces within the country have accumulated enough to break through the enemy's main positions at home and abroad, and until the international revolutionary forces have broken and contained the greater part of the international reactionary forces, our revolutionary war remains protracted. Setting our long-term strategic policy of war on this basis is one of the important policies of strategic direction.
The principles for campaigns and battles are the opposite: not protracted but quick decision. In campaigns and battles, striving for quick decision is the same in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad. In war, in all times and places, quick decision is demanded, and long-drawn-out war is always regarded as unfavourable. Only China's war must be treated with the greatest patience, must be treated as protracted war. In the period of the Li Li-san line some people ridiculed our way of doing things as "boxing tactics" (meaning fighting back and forth in order to capture big cities), and ridiculed our having to wait until our hair turned white before seeing the victory of the revolution. This mood of impatience was proved wrong long ago. But their criticism, if applied not to strategic problems but to problems of campaigns and battles, is quite right. The reasons are: first, the Red Army's weapons, and above all ammunition, have no source of supply; second, the White army has many units while the Red Army has only one, and to smash one "encirclement and suppression" we must prepare for rapid, continuous operations; third, although the White army columns advance separately, they are mostly rather close together, and if in attacking one of them we cannot quickly decide the battle, the rest will all come. For these reasons we cannot but carry out quick-decision warfare. For us it is the routine to decide a battle in a few hours, one day or two. Only under the policy of "besieging a city to destroy the relieving forces", where the aim is not to destroy the besieged enemy but the relieving enemy, are we prepared to make the operation against the besieged enemy fairly protracted, while against the relieving enemy it is still quick decision. In strategic defence, in holding strong points on the containing front, in strategic offensive in attacking isolated, unsupported enemies, and in destroying White strongholds within the base areas, we also often give campaigns or battles a protracted character. But these protracted operations only help, and do not hinder, the quick-decision warfare of the main Red Army force.
Quick decision cannot be achieved merely by wanting it in one's mind; many concrete conditions must be added. The main conditions are adequate preparation, not losing the opportunity, concentrating superior forces, tactics of encirclement and outflanking, good positions, attacking the enemy while he is on the move, or attacking the enemy while he has halted but his position is not yet firm. Without solving these conditions, to seek quick decision in campaigns or battles is impossible.
Smashing one "encirclement and suppression" belongs to a big campaign and still follows the principle of quick decision, not that of protraction. For the conditions of the base area in manpower, finance, military strength and so on do not permit protraction.
But under the general principle of quick decision, it is necessary to oppose improper impatience. The highest military and political leading organ of a revolutionary base area, taking into account these conditions of the base area, and taking into account the enemy's situation, must not be intimidated by the enemy's fierce posture, must not be dispirited by difficulties that can still be endured, and must not lose heart at certain setbacks, but must show the necessary patience and endurance. In Kiangsi, the first "encirclement and suppression" was smashed in only one week from the first battle to the end, the second in only half a month, the third dragged on for three months, the fourth took three weeks, and the fifth dragged on for a whole year. But when the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was not smashed and we were forced to break out, we showed an unwarranted haste. According to the circumstances we could still have held on for two or three months, using the time to rest and reorganize the army. If we had done so, and if the leadership after the breakout had been a little wiser, the situation would have been very different.
Even so, this does not violate the principle we spoke of, of striving to shorten the time of the whole campaign. In addition to the conditions of striving for concentration of forces and mobile warfare in campaign and battle plans, of making sure to destroy the enemy's effective strength on interior lines (in the base area) and quickly settling the "encirclement and suppression", when the "encirclement and suppression" has proved to be impossible to settle on interior lines, we should use the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's line of encirclement and go over to our exterior lines, that is, the enemy's interior lines, to settle the problem. Now that blockhouse-ism is highly developed, this method will become a regular method of operation. Two months after the fifth counter-campaign began, when the Fukien Incident occurred, the main force of the Red Army should without doubt have broken into the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsi area centred on Chekiang, ranged freely between Hangchow, Soochow, Nanking, Wuhu, Nanchang and Foochow, changed the strategic defence into a strategic offensive, threatened the enemy's vital areas, and sought battle in the vast area without blockhouses. By this method we could have forced the enemy attacking southern Kiangsi and western Fukien to turn back to relieve his vital areas, smashed his offensive against the Kiangsi base area, and supported the Fukien People's Government; this method would definitely have supported it. This plan was not used, so the fifth "encirclement and suppression" could not be smashed, and the Fukien People's Government could only collapse. When a whole year had been spent in fighting, although it was no longer favourable to go to Chekiang, we could still have switched to a strategic offensive in another direction, that is, advanced with the main force into Hunan, not going through Hunan to Kweichow but advancing into central Hunan, drawing the enemy in Kiangsi into Hunan and destroying him there. This plan too was not used, and the hope of smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was finally cut off, leaving only the road of the Long March.
Section 9: War of Annihilation
The proposal of "contest of attrition" is untimely for the Chinese Red Army. A "contest of treasures" is not a Dragon King against a Dragon King but a beggar against a Dragon King, which is rather comical. For the Red Army, which gets almost everything from the enemy, the basic policy is the war of annihilation. Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash "encirclement and suppression" and expand the revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties on the enemy is adopted as a means of annihilating him; otherwise it has no meaning. Casualties inflicted on the enemy cost us losses, while annihilation of the enemy gives us replenishment, so that not only are our losses made good but our strength is increased. Routing the enemy is not basically decisive of victory or defeat against a strong enemy. The war of annihilation has an immediate and great effect on any enemy. For a man, it is better to cut off one finger than to injure all ten; for the enemy, it is better to annihilate one of his divisions than to rout ten.
In the first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, our policy was the war of annihilation. What we annihilated each time was only a part of the whole enemy, yet the "encirclement and suppression" was smashed. In the fifth counter-campaign, the opposite policy was adopted, and in effect helped the enemy to achieve his aims.
The war of annihilation has the same meaning as concentrating superior forces and adopting tactics of encirclement and outflanking. Without the latter there is no former. The support of the people, good positions, an enemy easy to beat, taking the enemy by surprise and other conditions are all indispensable for achieving annihilation.
Routing the enemy has meaning, and even letting the enemy escape has meaning, only in relation to the annihilating operations carried out by the main force of our army against a definite enemy in the whole battle or the whole campaign; otherwise they have no meaning. This again is a case where meaning lies in a loss set against a gain.
In establishing our military industry, we must see that it does not foster dependence. Our basic policy is to depend on the military industry of the imperialists and of our enemies within the country. We have a claim on the arsenals in London and Hanyang, and they are delivered to us by the enemy's transport corps. This is the truth, and it is not a joke.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
第一章 如何研究战争
第一节 战争规律是发展的
战争的规律——这是任何指导战争的人不能不研究和不能不解决的问题。
革命战争的规律——这是任何指导革命战争的人不能不研究和不能不解决的问题。
中国革命战争的规律——这是任何指导中国革命战争的人不能不研究和不能不解决的问题。
我们现在是从事战争,我们的战争是革命战争,我们的革命战争是在中国这个半殖民地的半封建的国度里进行的。因此,我们不但要研究一般战争的规律,还要研究特殊的革命战争的规律,还要研究更加特殊的中国革命战争的规律。
大家明白,不论做什么事,不懂得那件事的情形,它的性质,它和它以外的事情的关联,就不知道那件事的规律,就不知道如何去做,就不能做好那件事。
战争——从有私有财产和有阶级以来就开始了的、用以解决阶级和阶级、民族和民族、国家和国家、政治集团和政治集团之间、在一定发展阶段上的矛盾的一种最高的斗争形式。不懂得它的情形,它的性质,它和它以外事情的关联,就不知道战争的规律,就不知道如何指导战争,就不能打胜仗。
革命战争——革命的阶级战争和革命的民族战争,在一般战争的情形和性质之外,有它的特殊的情形和性质。因此,在一般的战争规律之外,有它的一些特殊的规律。不懂得这些特殊的情形和性质,不懂得它的特殊的规律,就不能指导革命战争,就不能在革命战争中打胜仗。
中国革命战争——不论是国内战争或民族战争,是在中国的特殊环境之内进行的,比较一般的战争,一般的革命战争,又有它的特殊的情形和特殊的性质。因此,在一般战争和一般革命战争的规律之外,又有它的一些特殊的规律。如果不懂得这些,就不能在中国革命战争中打胜仗。
所以,我们应该研究一般战争的规律;也应该研究革命战争的规律;最后,我们还应该研究中国革命战争的规律。
有一种人的意见是不对的,我们早已批驳了这种意见了;他们说:只要研究一般战争的规律就得了,具体地说,只要照着反动的中国政府或反动的中国军事学校出版的那些军事条令去做就得了。他们不知道:这些条令仅仅是一般战争的规律,并且全是抄了外国的,如果我们一模一样地照抄来用,丝毫也不变更其形式和内容,就一定是削足适履,要打败仗。他们的理由是:过去流过血得来的东西,为什么要不得?他们不知道:我们固然应该尊重过去流血的经验,但是还应该尊重自己流血的经验。
又有一种人的意见也是不对的,我们也早已批驳了这种意见了;他们说:只要研究俄国革命战争的经验就得了,具体地说,只要照着苏联内战的指导规律和苏联军事机关颁布的军事条令去做就得了。他们不知道:苏联的规律和条令,包含着苏联内战和苏联红军的特殊性,如果我们一模一样地抄了来用,不允许任何的变更,也同样是削足适履,要打败仗。这些人的理由是:苏联的战争是革命的战争,我们的战争也是革命的战争,而且苏联是胜利了,为什么还有取舍的余地?他们不知道:我们固然应该特别尊重苏联的战争经验,因为它是最近代的革命战争的经验,是在列宁、斯大林指导之下获得的;但是我们还应该尊重中国革命战争的经验,因为中国革命和中国红军又有许多特殊的情况。
再有一种人的意见也是不对的,我们也早就批驳了这种意见了;他们说:一九二六年至一九二七年的北伐战争的经验是最好的,我们应该学习它,具体地说,学北伐战争的长驱直进和夺取大城市。他们不知道:北伐战争的经验是应该学习的,但是不应该刻板地抄用,因为我们现时战争的情况已经变化了。我们只应该采用北伐战争中那些在现时情况下还能适用的东西,我们应该按照现时情况规定我们自己的东西。
由此看来,战争情况的不同,决定着不同的战争指导规律,有时间、地域和性质的差别。从时间的条件说,战争和战争指导规律都是发展的,各个历史阶段有各个历史阶段的特点,因而战争规律也各有其特点,不能呆板地移用于不同的阶段。从战争的性质看,革命战争和反革命战争,各有其不同的特点,因而战争规律也各有其特点,不能呆板地互相移用。从地域的条件看,各个国家各个民族特别是大国家大民族均有其特点,因而战争规律也各有其特点,同样不能呆板地移用。我们研究在各个不同历史阶段、各个不同性质、不同地域和民族的战争的指导规律,应该着眼其特点和着眼其发展,反对战争问题上的机械论。
还不止此。对于一个指挥员来说,起初会指挥小兵团,后来又会指挥大兵团,这对于他是进步了,发展了。一个地方和许多地方也不相同。起初会在某一熟悉的地方作战,后来在许多地方也会作战,这对于一个指挥员又是进步了,发展了。因为敌我双方的技术、战术、战略的发展,一个战争中各阶段的情形也不相同。在低级阶段会指挥的,到了高级阶段也会指挥,这对于一个指挥员更是进步和发展了。只能适应于一定兵团、一定地方和战争发展的一定阶段,这叫做没有进步和没有发展。有一种人,抱着一技之长和一孔之见,再也没有进步,这对革命虽则在一地一时有些作用,但是没有大的作用。我们要求有大的作用的战争指导者。一切战争指导规律,依照历史的发展而发展,依照战争的发展而发展;一成不变的东西是没有的。
第二节 战争的目的在于消灭战争
战争——这个人类互相残杀的怪物,人类社会的发展终久要把它消灭的,而且就在不远的将来会要把它消灭的。但是消灭它的方法只有一个,就是用战争反对战争,用革命战争反对反革命战争,用民族革命战争反对民族反革命战争,用阶级革命战争反对阶级反革命战争。历史上的战争,只有正义的和非正义的两类。我们是拥护正义战争反对非正义战争的。一切反革命战争都是非正义的,一切革命战争都是正义的。人类的战争生活时代将要由我们之手而结束,我们所进行的战争,毫无疑义地是属于最后战争的一部分。但是我们所面临的战争,毫无疑义又是最大的和最残酷的战争的一部分。最大的和最残酷的非正义的反革命的战争,迫临在我们的头上,我们如果不打起正义战争的旗帜,人类的大多数就要遭受摧残。人类正义战争的旗帜是拯救人类的旗帜,中国正义战争的旗帜是拯救中国的旗帜。人类的大多数和中国人的大多数所举行的战争,毫无疑义地是正义的战争,是拯救人类拯救中国的至高无上的荣誉的事业,是把全世界历史转到新时代的桥梁。人类社会进步到消灭了阶级,消灭了国家,到了那时,什么战争也没有了,反革命战争没有了,革命战争也没有了,非正义战争没有了,正义战争也没有了,这就是人类的永久和平的时代。我们研究革命战争的规律,出发于我们要求消灭一切战争的志愿,这是区别我们共产党人和一切剥削阶级的界线。
第三节 战略问题是研究战争全局的规律的东西
只要有战争,就有战争的全局。世界可以是战争的一全局,一国可以是战争的一全局,一个独立的游击区、一个大的独立的作战方面,也可以是战争的一全局。凡属带有要照顾各方面和各阶段的性质的,都是战争的全局。
研究带全局性的战争指导规律,是战略学的任务。研究带局部性的战争指导规律,是战役学和战术学的任务。
要求战役指挥员和战术指挥员了解某种程度的战略上的规律,何以成为必要呢?因为懂得了全局性的东西,就更会使用局部性的东西,因为局部性的东西是隶属于全局性的东西的。说战略胜利取决于战术胜利的这种意见是错误的,因为这种意见没有看见战争的胜败的主要和首先的问题,是对于全局和各阶段的关照得好或关照得不好。如果全局和各阶段的关照有了重要的缺点或错误,那个战争是一定要失败的。说“一着不慎,满盘皆输”,乃是说的带全局性的,即对全局有决定意义的一着,而不是那种带局部性的即对全局无决定意义的一着。下棋如此,战争也是如此。
然而全局性的东西,不能脱离局部而独立,全局是由它的一切局部构成的。有的时候,有些局部破坏了或失败了,全局可以不起重大的影响,就是因为这些局部不是对于全局有决定意义的东西。战争中有些战术上或战役上的失败或不成功,常常不至于引起战争全局的变坏,就是因为这些失败不是有决定意义的东西。但若组成战争全局的多数战役失败了,或有决定意义的某一二个战役失败了,全局就立即起变化。这里说的多数战役和某一二个战役,就都是决定的东西了。战争历史中有在连战皆捷之后吃了一个败仗以至全功尽弃的,有在吃了许多败仗之后打了一个胜仗因而开展了新局面的。这里说的“连战皆捷”和“许多败仗”,都是局部性的,对于全局不起决定作用的东西。这里说的“一个败仗”和“一个胜仗”,就都是决定的东西了。所有这些,都在说明关照全局的重要性。指挥全局的人,最要紧的,是把自己的注意力摆在照顾战争的全局上面。主要地是依据情况,照顾部队和兵团的组成问题,照顾两个战役之间的关系问题,照顾各个作战阶段之间的关系问题,照顾我方全部活动和敌方全部活动之间的关系问题,这些都是最吃力的地方,如果丢了这个去忙一些次要的问题,那就难免要吃亏了。
说到全局和局部的关系,不但战略和战役的关系是如此,战役和战术的关系也是如此。师的动作和团营动作的关系,连的动作和排班动作的关系,就是实例。任何一级的首长,应当把自己注意的重心,放在那些对于他所指挥的全局说来最重要最有决定意义的问题或动作上,而不应当放在其它的问题或动作上。
说重要,说有决定意义,不能按照一般的或抽象的情况去规定,必须按照具体的情况去规定。作战时选择突击方向和突击点,要按照当前的敌情、地形和自己兵力的情况去规定。在给养丰富的地方要注意不使战士吃得太饱,在给养不足的地方却要注意不使战士饿肚。在白色区域,可以因为仅仅一个消息的走漏而使尔后的战斗失败;在红色区域,则走漏消息的问题常常不是最重要的。某些战役,高级指挥员有亲自参加之必要,其它则无此必要。一个军事学校,最重要的问题,是选择校长教员和规定教育方针。一个民众大会,主要应注意动员民众到会和提出恰当的口号。如此等等。总之,一个原则,就是注意于那些有关全局的重要的关节。
学习战争全局的指导规律,是要用心去想一想才行的。因为这种全局性的东西,眼睛看不见,只能用心思去想一想才能懂得,不用心思去想,就不会懂得。但是全局是由局部构成的,有局部经验的人,有战役战术经验的人,如肯用心去想一想,就能够明白那些更高级的东西。战略问题,如所谓照顾敌我之间的关系,照顾各个战役之间或各个作战阶段之间的关系,照顾有关全局的(有决定意义的)某些部分,照顾全盘情况中的特点,照顾前后方之间的关系,照顾消耗和补充,作战和休息,集中和分散,攻击和防御,前进和后退,荫蔽和暴露,主攻方面和助攻方面,突击方面和钳制方面,集中指挥和分散指挥,持久战和速决战,阵地战和运动战,本军和友军,这些兵种和那些兵种,上级和下级,干部和兵员,老兵和新兵,高级干部和下级干部,老干部和新干部,红色区域和白色区域,老区和新区,中心区和边缘区,热天和冷天,胜仗和败仗,大兵团和小兵团,正规军和游击队,消灭敌人和争取群众,扩大红军和巩固红军,军事工作和政治工作,过去的任务和现在的任务,现在的任务和将来的任务,那种情况下的任务和这种情况下的任务,固定战线和非固定战线,国内战争和民族战争,这一历史阶段和那一历史阶段,等等问题的区别和联系,都是眼睛看不见的东西,但若用心去想一想,也就都可以了解,都可以捉住,都可以精通。这就是说,能够把战争或作战的一切重要的问题,都提到较高的原则性上去解决。达到这个目的,就是研究战略问题的任务。
第四节 重要的问题在善于学习
为什么要组织红军?因为要使用它去战胜敌人。为什么要学习战争规律?因为要使用这些规律于战争。
学习不是容易的事情,使用更加不容易。战争的学问拿在讲堂上,或在书本中,很多人尽管讲得一样头头是道,打起仗来却有胜负之分。战争史和我们自己的战争生活,都证明了这一点。
那末,关键在哪里呢?
我们不能要求事实上的常胜将军,这是从古以来就很少的。我们要求在战争过程中一般地打胜仗的勇敢而明智的将军——智勇双全的将军。要达到智勇双全这一点,有一种方法是要学的,学习的时候要用这种方法,使用的时候也要用这种方法。
什么方法呢?那就是熟识敌我双方各方面的情况,找出其行动的规律,并且应用这些规律于自己的行动。
许多国家颁布的军事条令书上,都指示了“按照情况活用原则”的必要,又都指示了打败仗时的处置方法。前者是不要指挥员因死用原则而主观地犯错误;后者是当着指挥员主观地犯了错误,或客观情况起了非所预料的和不可抗的变化时,告诉指挥员怎样去处置。
为什么主观上会犯错误呢?就是因为战争或战斗的部署和指挥不适合当时当地的情况,主观的指导和客观的实在情况不相符合,不对头,或者叫做没有解决主观和客观之间的矛盾。人办一切事情都难免这种情形,有比较地会办和比较地不会办之分罢了。事情要求比较地会办,军事上就要求比较地多打胜仗,反面地说,要求比较地少打败仗。这里的关键,就在于把主观和客观二者之间好好地符合起来。
举战术的例子来说。攻击点选在敌人阵地的某一翼,而那里正是敌人的薄弱部,突击因而成功,这叫做主观和客观相符合,也就是指挥员的侦察、判断和决心,和敌人及其配置的实在情形相符合。如果攻击点选在另一翼,或中央,结果正碰在敌人的钉子上,攻不进去,就叫做不相符合。攻击时机的适当,预备队使用的不迟不早,以及各种战斗处置和战斗动作都利于我不利于敌,便是整个战斗中主观指挥和客观情况统统相符合。统统相符合的事,在战争或战斗中是极其少有的,这是因为战争或战斗的双方是成群的武装着的活人,而又互相保持秘密的缘故,这和处置静物或日常事件是大不相同的。然而只要做到指挥大体上适合情况,即在有决定意义的部分适合情况,那就是胜利的基础了。
指挥员的正确的部署来源于正确的决心,正确的决心来源于正确的判断,正确的判断来源于周到的和必要的侦察,和对于各种侦察材料的联贯起来的思索。指挥员使用一切可能的和必要的侦察手段,将侦察得来的敌方情况的各种材料加以去粗取精、去伪存真、由此及彼、由表及里的思索,然后将自己方面的情况加上去,研究双方的对比和相互的关系,因而构成判断,定下决心,作出计划,——这是军事家在作出每一个战略、战役或战斗的计划之前的一个整个的认识情况的过程。粗心大意的军事家,不去这样做,把军事计划建立在一相情愿的基础之上,这种计划是空想的,不符合于实际的。鲁莽的专凭热情的军事家之所以不免于受敌人的欺骗,受敌人表面的或片面的情况的引诱,受自己部下不负责任的无真知灼见的建议的鼓动,因而不免于碰壁,就是因为他们不知道或不愿意知道任何军事计划,是应该建立于必要的侦察和敌我情况及其相互关系的周密思索的基础之上的缘故。
认识情况的过程,不但存在于军事计划建立之前,而且存在于军事计划建立之后。当执行某一计划时,从开始执行起,到战局终结止,这是又一个认识情况的过程,即实行的过程。此时,第一个过程中的东西是否符合于实况,需要重新加以检查。如果计划和情况不符合,或者不完全符合,就必须依照新的认识,构成新的判断,定下新的决心,把已定计划加以改变,使之适合于新的情况。部分地改变的事差不多每一作战都是有的,全部地改变的事也是间或有的。鲁莽家不知改变,或不愿改变,只是一味盲干,结果又非碰壁不可。
上面说的是一个战略的行动,或一个战役和战斗的行动。经验多的军人,假使他是虚心学习的,他摸熟了自己的部队(指挥员、战斗员、武器、给养等等及其总体)的脾气,又摸熟了敌人的部队(同样,指挥员、战斗员、武器、给养等等及其总体)的脾气,摸熟了一切和战争有关的其它的条件如政治、经济、地理、气候等等,这样的军人指导战争或作战,就比较地有把握,比较地能打胜仗。这是在长时间内认识了敌我双方的情况,找出了行动的规律,解决了主观和客观的矛盾的结果。这一认识过程是非常重要的,没有这一种长时间的经验,要了解和把握整个战争的规律是困难的。做一个真正能干的高级指挥员,不是初出茅庐或仅仅善于在纸上谈兵的角色所能办到的,必须在战争中学习才能办得到。
一切带原则性的军事规律,或军事理论,都是前人或今人做的关于过去战争经验的总结。这些过去的战争所留给我们的血的教训,应该着重地学习它。这是一件事。然而还有一件事,即是从自己经验中考证这些结论,吸收那些用得着的东西,拒绝那些用不着的东西,增加那些自己所特有的东西。这后一件事是十分重要的,不这样做,我们就不能指导战争。
读书是学习,使用也是学习,而且是更重要的学习。从战争学习战争——这是我们的主要方法。没有进学校机会的人,仍然可以学习战争,就是从战争中学习。革命战争是民众的事,常常不是先学好了再干,而是干起来再学习,干就是学习。从“老百姓”到军人之间有一个距离,但不是万里长城,而是可以迅速地消灭的,干革命,干战争,就是消灭这个距离的方法。说学习和使用不容易,是说学得彻底,用得纯熟不容易。说老百姓很快可以变成军人,是说此门并不难入。把二者总合起来,用得着中国一句老话:“世上无难事,只怕有心人。”入门既不难,深造也是办得到的,只要有心,只要善于学习罢了。
军事的规律,和其它事物的规律一样,是客观实际在我们头脑中的反映,除了我们的头脑以外,一切都是客观实际的东西。因此,学习和认识的对象,包括敌我两方面,这两方面都应该看成研究的对象,只有我们的头脑(思想)才是研究的主体。有一种人,明于知己,暗于知彼,又有一种人,明于知彼,暗于知己,他们都是不能解决战争规律的学习和使用的问题的。中国古代大军事学家孙武子书上“知彼知己,百战不殆”这句话,是包括学习和使用两个阶段而说的,包括从认识客观实际中的发展规律,并按照这些规律去决定自己行动克服当前敌人而说的;我们不要看轻这句话。
战争是民族和民族、国家和国家、阶级和阶级、政治集团和政治集团之间互相斗争的最高形式;一切关于战争的规律,都是进行战争的民族、国家、阶级、政治集团为了争取自己的胜利而使用的。战争的胜负,主要地决定于作战双方的军事、政治、经济、自然诸条件,这是没有问题的。然而不仅仅如此,还决定于作战双方主观指导的能力。军事家不能超过物质条件许可的范围外企图战争的胜利,然而军事家可以而且必须在物质条件许可的范围内争取战争的胜利。军事家活动的舞台建筑在客观物质条件的上面,然而军事家凭着这个舞台,却可以导演出许多有声有色威武雄壮的活剧来。因此,我们红军的指导者,在既定的客观物质基础即军事、政治、经济、自然诸条件之上,就必须发挥我们的威力,提挈全军,去打倒那些民族的和阶级的敌人,改变这个不好的世界。这里就用得着而且必须用我们的主观指导的能力。我们不许可任何一个红军指挥员变为乱撞乱碰的鲁莽家;我们必须提倡每个红军指挥员变为勇敢而明智的英雄,不但有压倒一切的勇气,而且有驾驭整个战争变化发展的能力。指挥员在战争的大海中游泳,他们不使自己沉没,而要使自己决定地有步骤地达到彼岸。指导战争的规律,就是战争的游泳术。以上是我们的方法。
第二章 中国共产党和中国革命战争
自一九二四年开始的中国革命战争,已经过去了两个阶段,即一九二四年至一九二七年的阶段和一九二七年至一九三六年的阶段;今后则是抗日民族革命战争的阶段。这三个阶段的革命战争,都是中国无产阶级及其政党中国共产党所领导的。中国革命战争的主要敌人,是帝国主义和封建势力。中国资产阶级虽然在某种历史时机可以参加革命战争,然而由于它的自私自利性和政治上经济上的缺乏独立性,不愿意也不能领导中国革命战争走上彻底胜利的道路。中国农民群众和城市小资产阶级群众,是愿意积极地参加革命战争,并愿意使战争得到彻底胜利的。他们是革命战争的主力军;然而他们的小生产的特点,使他们的政治眼光受到限制(一部分失业群众则具有无政府思想),所以他们不能成为战争的正确的领导者。因此,在无产阶级已经走上政治舞台的时代,中国革命战争的领导责任,就不得不落到中国共产党的肩上。在这种时候,任何的革命战争如果没有或违背无产阶级和共产党的领导,那个战争是一定要失败的。因为半殖民地的中国的社会各阶层和各种政治集团中,只有无产阶级和共产党,才最没有狭隘性和自私自利性,最有远大的政治眼光和最有组织性,而且也最能虚心地接受世界上先进的无产阶级及其政党的经验而用之于自己的事业。因此,只有无产阶级和共产党能够领导农民、城市小资产阶级和资产阶级,克服农民和小资产阶级的狭隘性,克服失业者群的破坏性,并且还能够克服资产阶级的动摇和不彻底性(如果共产党的政策不犯错误的话),而使革命和战争走上胜利的道路。
一九二四年至一九二七年的革命战争,基本地说,是在国际无产阶级和中国无产阶级及其政党对于中国民族资产阶级及其政党的政治影响和政治合作之下进行的。然而当着革命和战争的紧急关头,首先由于大资产阶级的叛变,同时也由于革命队伍中机会主义者的自动地放弃革命领导权,这次革命战争就失败了。
一九二七年至现在的土地革命战争,是在新的情况之下进行的。战争的敌人不但是帝国主义,而且是大资产阶级和大地主的联盟。民族资产阶级则做了大资产阶级的尾巴。领导这个革命战争的惟有共产党,共产党已经形成了对于革命战争的绝对的领导权。共产党的这种绝对的领导权,是使革命战争坚持到底的最主要的条件。没有共产党的这种绝对的领导,是不能设想革命战争能有这样的坚持性的。
中国共产党是英勇坚决地领导了中国的革命战争,在十五年的漫长岁月中,在全国人民面前,表示了自己是人民的朋友,每一天都是为了保护人民的利益,为了人民的自由解放,站在革命战争的最前线。
中国共产党以自己艰苦奋斗的经历,以几十万英勇党员和几万英勇干部的流血牺牲,在全民族几万万人中间起了伟大的教育作用。中国共产党在革命斗争中的伟大的历史成就,使得今天处在民族敌人侵入的紧急关头的中国有了救亡图存的条件,这个条件就是有了一个为大多数人民所信任的、被人民在长时间内考验过因此选中了的政治领导者。现在共产党说的话,比其它任何政党说的话,都易于为人民所接受。没有中国共产党在过去十五年间的艰苦奋斗,挽救新的亡国危险是不可能的。
中国共产党在革命战争中,除了犯过陈独秀右倾机会主义和李立三“左”倾机会主义两个错误之外,还犯过了下述的两个错误:其一,是在一九三一年至一九三四年的“左”倾机会主义,这个错误使得土地革命战争受到了极端严重的损失,得到了在第五次反“围剿”中不能战胜敌人反而丧失了根据地削弱了红军的结果。这个错误是在一九三五年一月扩大的中央政治局的遵义会议时纠正过来了。其二,是在一九三五年至一九三六年的张国焘右倾机会主义,这个错误发展到破坏了党和红军的纪律,使一部分红军主力遭受了严重的损失;然而由于中央的正确领导,红军中党员和指挥员战斗员的觉悟,终于也把这个错误纠正过来了。所有这些错误,对于我们的党,我们的革命和战争,当然是不利的,然而终于被我们克服,我们的党和我们的红军是从这些错误的克服中锻炼得更加坚强了。
中国共产党领导了、而且继续领导着轰轰烈烈的光荣的胜利的革命战争。这个战争不但是解放中国的旗帜,而且是具有国际的革命意义的。世界的革命人民的眼睛都望着我们。在新的抗日民族革命战争的阶段上,我们将引导中国革命走向完成,也将给东方和世界的革命以深刻的影响。过去的革命战争证明,我们不但需要一个马克思主义的正确的政治路线,而且需要一个马克思主义的正确的军事路线。十五年的革命和战争,已经锻炼出来这样一条政治的和军事的路线了。今后战争的新阶段,我们相信,将使这样的路线,根据新的环境,更加发展、充实和丰富起来,达到战胜民族敌人之目的。历史告诉我们,正确的政治的和军事的路线,不是自然地平安地产生和发展起来的,而是从斗争中产生和发展起来的。一方面,它要同“左”倾机会主义作斗争,另一方面,它又要同右倾机会主义作斗争。不同这些危害革命和革命战争的有害的倾向作斗争,并且彻底地克服它们,正确路线的建设和革命战争的胜利,是不可能的。我在这本小册子中时常提到错误方面的意见,就是为了这个目的。
第三章 中国革命战争的特点
第一节 这个问题的重要性
不承认、不知道、或不愿意知道中国革命战争有其特点的人,把红军对国民党军队的作战,看做和一般战争相同,或和苏联内战相同。列宁斯大林领导的苏联内战的经验是有世界的意义的。所有的共产党,中国共产党也同样,都是以这个经验和列宁斯大林对这个经验的理论综合作为指南的。但这并不是说,我们应该在我们的条件下机械地运用这个经验。中国革命战争的许多方面都有其自己的不同于苏联内战的特点。不估计到这种特点,或否认这种特点,当然是错误的。这点在我们的十年战争中已经完全证明了。
我们的敌人也曾犯过类似的错误。他们不承认和红军作战需要有和其它作战不同的战略和战术。他们依仗其各方面的优势,轻视我们,固守其老一套的战法。这是一九三三年敌人的第四次“围剿”时期及其以前的情形,其结果就是招致了他们的历次的失败。首先在国民党军队中提出在这个问题上的新意见的是国民党的反动将军柳维垣,后来有戴岳。最后他们的意见被蒋介石采纳了。这就是蒋介石庐山军官训练团及其在第五次“围剿”中施行的反动的新军事原则产生的过程。
然而当着敌人改变其军事原则使之适合于同红军作战的情况的时候,我们队伍中却出现了回到“老套”的人们。他们主张回到一般情况的方面去,拒绝了解任何的特殊情况,拒绝红军血战史的经验,轻视帝国主义和国民党的力量,轻视国民党军队的力量,对敌人采用的反动的新原则视若无睹。结果,是丧失了除了陕甘边区以外的一切革命根据地,使红军由三十万人降到了几万人,使中国共产党由三十万党员降到了几万党员,而在国民党区域的党组织几乎全部丧失。总之,是受了一次极大的历史性的惩罚。他们自称为马克思列宁主义者,其实一点马克思列宁主义也没有学到。列宁说:马克思主义的最本质的东西,马克思主义的活的灵魂,就在于具体地分析具体的情况。我们的这些同志恰是忘记了这一点。
由此可知,不了解中国革命战争的特点,就不能指导中国革命战争,就不能引导中国革命战争走上胜利的途径。
第二节 中国革命战争的特点是什么
那末,中国革命战争的特点是什么呢?
我以为有四个主要的特点。
第一个特点,中国是一个政治经济发展不平衡的半殖民地的大国,而又经过了一九二四年至一九二七年的革命。
这个特点,指出中国革命战争有发展和胜利的可能性。当着一九二七年冬天至一九二八年春天,中国游击战争发生不久,湖南江西两省边界区域——井冈山的同志们中有些人提出“红旗到底打得多久”这个疑问的时候,我们就把它指出来了(湘赣边界党的第一次代表大会)。因为这是一个最基本的问题,不答复中国革命根据地和中国红军能否存在和发展的问题,我们就不能前进一步。一九二八年中国共产党第六次全国代表大会,把这个问题又作了一次答复。中国革命运动,从此就有了正确的理论基础。
现在把这个问题分开来看一看:
中国政治经济发展不平衡——微弱的资本主义经济和严重的半封建经济同时存在,近代式的若干工商业都市和停滞着的广大农村同时存在,几百万产业工人和几万万旧制度统治下的农民和手工业工人同时存在,管理中央政府的大军阀和管理各省的小军阀同时存在,反动军队中有隶属蒋介石的所谓中央军和隶属各省军阀的所谓杂牌军这样两部分军队同时存在,若干的铁路航路汽车路和普遍的独轮车路、只能用脚走的路和用脚还不好走的路同时存在。
中国是一个半殖民地国家——帝国主义的不统一,影响到中国统治集团间的不统一。数国支配的半殖民地国家和一国支配的殖民地是有区别的。
中国是一个大国——“东方不亮西方亮,黑了南方有北方”,不愁没有回旋的余地。
中国是经过了一次大革命的——准备好了红军的种子,准备好了红军的领导者即共产党,又准备好了参加过一次革命的民众。
所以我们说,中国是一个经过了一次革命的、政治经济发展不平衡的、半殖民地的大国,这是中国革命战争的第一个特点。这个特点,不但基本地规定了我们政治上的战略和战术,而且也基本地规定了我们军事上的战略和战术。
第二个特点是敌人的强大。
红军的敌人国民党,它的情况是怎样呢?它是夺取了政权而且相对地稳定了它的政权的党。它得到了全世界主要反革命国家的援助。它已改造了它的军队——改造得和中国任何一个历史时代的军队都不相同,而和世界现代国家的军队却大体相同,武器和其它军事物资的供给比起红军来雄厚得多,而且其军队数量之多超过中国任何一个历史时代的军队,超过世界任何一个国家的常备军。它的军队和红军比较起来真有天壤之别。它控制了全中国的政治、经济、交通、文化的枢纽或命脉,它的政权是全国性的政权。
中国红军是处在这样强大的敌人的面前。这是中国革命战争的第二个特点。这个特点,使红军的作战不能不和一般战争以及苏联内战、北伐战争都有许多的不同。
第三个特点是红军的弱小。
中国红军是产生于第一次大革命失败之后,从游击队开始。不但处在中国的反动时期,而且处在世界上反动的资本主义国家在政治上经济上比较稳定的时期。
我们的政权是分散而又孤立的山地或僻地的政权,没有任何的外间援助。革命根据地的经济条件和文化条件同国民党区域比较是落后的。革命根据地只有乡村和小城市。其区域开始是非常之小,后来也并不很大。而且根据地是流动不定的;红军没有真正巩固的根据地。
红军的数量是少的,红军的武器是差的,红军的粮食被服等物质供给是非常困难的。
这个特点和前一个特点是尖锐的对比。红军的战略战术,是在这种尖锐的对比上发生的。
第四个特点是共产党的领导和土地革命。
这个特点是第一个特点的必然结果。这个特点产生了两方面的情形。在一方面,中国革命战争虽然是处在中国和资本主义世界的反动时期,然而是能够胜利的,因为它有共产党的领导和农民的援助。根据地虽小却有很大的政治上的威力,屹然和庞大的国民党政权相对立,军事上给国民党的进攻以很大的困难,因为我们有农民的援助。红军虽小却有强大的战斗力,因为在共产党领导下的红军人员是从土地革命中产生,为着自己的利益而战斗的,而且指挥员和战斗员之间在政治上是一致的。
另一方面,则和国民党成了尖锐的对比。国民党是反对土地革命的,因此没有农民的援助。其军队虽多,却不能使兵士群众和许多小生产者出身的下级干部自觉地为国民党拚命,官兵之间在政治上是分歧的,这就减少了它的战斗力。
第三节 由此产生我们的战略战术
经过了一次大革命的政治经济不平衡的半殖民地的大国,强大的敌人,弱小的红军,土地革命——这是中国革命战争四个主要的特点。这些特点,规定了中国革命战争的指导路线及其许多战略战术的原则。第一个特点和第四个特点,规定了中国红军的可能发展和可能战胜其敌人。第二个特点和第三个特点,规定了中国红军的不可能很快发展和不可能很快战胜其敌人,即是规定了战争的持久,而且如果弄得不好的话,还可能失败。
这就是中国革命战争的两方面。这两方面同时存在着,即是说,既有顺利的条件,又有困难的条件。这是中国革命战争的根本规律,许多规律都是从这个根本的规律发生出来的。我们的十年战争史证明了这个规律的正确性。谁要是睁眼看不见这些根本性质的规律,谁就不能指导中国的革命战争,谁就不能使红军打胜仗。
很明显的,正确地规定战略方向,进攻时反对冒险主义,防御时反对保守主义,转移时反对逃跑主义;反对红军的游击主义,却又承认红军的游击性;反对战役的持久战和战略的速决战,承认战略的持久战和战役的速决战;反对固定的作战线和阵地战,承认非固定的作战线和运动战;反对击溃战,承认歼灭战;反对战略方向的两个拳头主义,承认一个拳头主义;反对大后方制度,承认小后方制度;反对绝对的集中指挥,承认相对的集中指挥;反对单纯军事观点和流寇主义,承认红军是中国革命的宣传者和组织者;反对土匪主义,承认严肃的政治纪律;反对军阀主义,承认有限制的民主生活和有威权的军事纪律;反对不正确的宗派主义的干部政策,承认正确的干部政策;反对孤立政策,承认争取一切可能的同盟者;最后,反对把红军停顿于旧阶段,争取红军发展到新阶段——所有这些原则问题,都要求正确的解决。我们现在要讲的战略问题,就是要就中国革命战争的十年血战史的经验,好好地说明这些问题。
第四章 “围剿”和反“围剿”——中国内战的主要形式
十年以来,从游击战争开始的一天起,任何一个独立的红色游击队或红军的周围,任何一个革命根据地的周围,经常遇到的是敌人的“围剿”。敌人把红军看作异物,一出现就想把它捕获。敌人总是跟着红军,而且总是把它围起来。这种形式,过去十年是没有变化的,如果没有民族战争代替国内战争,那末,直到敌人变成弱小者、红军变成强大者那一天为止,这种形式也是不会变化的。
红军的活动,采取了反“围剿”的形式。所谓胜利,主要地是说反“围剿”的胜利,这就是战略和战役的胜利。反对一次“围剿”是一个战役,常常由大小数个以至数十个战斗组织而成。在一次“围剿”没有基本地打破以前,即使得到了许多战斗的胜利,还不能说战略上或整个战役上已经胜利了。十年的红军战争史,就是一部反“围剿”史。
敌人的“围剿”和红军的反“围剿”,互相采用进攻和防御这两种战斗的形式,这是和古今中外的战争没有两样的。然而中国内战的特点,则在二者的长期的反复。在一次“围剿”中,敌人以进攻反对红军的防御,红军以防御反对敌人的进攻,这是反“围剿”战役的第一个阶段。敌人以防御反对红军的进攻,红军以进攻反对敌人的防御,这是反“围剿”战役的第二个阶段。任何的“围剿”,都是包括这两个阶段的,而且是长期地反复的。
说长期反复,是说战争和战斗形式的反复。这是事实,任何人一看就知的。“围剿”和反“围剿”,是战争形式的反复。敌以进攻对我防御、我以防御对敌进攻的第一阶段,和敌以防御对我进攻、我以进攻对敌防御的第二阶段,是每一次“围剿”中战斗形式的反复。
至于战争和战斗的内容,则不是简单地反复的,而是每次不同的。这也是事实,任何人一看就知的。这里的规律,是“围剿”和反“围剿”的规模一次比一次大,情况一次比一次复杂,战斗一次比一次激烈。
然而不是没有起落的。第五次“围剿”之后,因为红军极大地削弱了,南方根据地全部丧失,红军移到了西北,不是如同在南方那样处在威胁国内敌人的最重要的地位了,“围剿”的规模、情况和战斗,就比较小些,简单些,缓和些了。
红军的失败是什么呢?在战略上说,只有反“围剿”根本没有成功,才叫做失败,而且也只能叫做局部的和暂时的失败。因为国内战争的根本的失败,就是整个红军的覆灭,然而这样的事实是没有的。广大根据地的丧失和红军的转移,这是暂时的和局部的失败,不是永远的和全部的失败,虽然这个局部是包括了党和军队和根据地的百分之九十。这种事实,我们把它叫做防御的继续,而把敌人的追击叫做进攻的继续。这就是说,在“围剿”和反“围剿”的斗争中,我们没有由防御转到进攻,反而被敌人的进攻打破了我们的防御,我们的防御就变成了退却,敌人的进攻就变成了追击。然而等到红军到达一个新的地区时,例如我们由江西等地移到了陕西,“围剿”的反复又出现了。所以我们说,红军的战略退却(长征)是红军的战略防御的继续,敌人的战略追击是敌人的战略进攻的继续。
中国国内战争和任何古今中外的战争一样,基本的战斗形式只有攻防两种。中国内战的特点,是“围剿”和反“围剿”的长期地反复和攻防两种战斗形式的长期地反复,并且包括着一次一万多公里的伟大的战略转移(长征)这样一种东西在里面。
所谓敌人的失败,也是如此。他们的战略失败,就是他们的“围剿”被我们打破,我们的防御变成了进攻,敌人转到防御地位,必须重新组织才有再一次的“围剿”。敌人没有如同我们所谓一万多公里的战略转移的那种情形,这是因为他们是全国性的统治者,他们比我们强大得多的缘故。然而部分的事情是有过的。若干根据地中被红军围攻的白色据点内的敌人突围而出,退却到白区里去重新组织进攻,这样的事是发生过的。如果内战延长,红军胜利的范围更广大时,这种事情会多起来。但是他们的结果不能和红军相比,因为他们没有人民的援助,官兵之间又不一致。他们如果也学红军的长途转移,那是一定会被消灭的。
在一九三〇年的立三路线时期,李立三同志不懂得中国内战的持久性,因此看不出中国内战发展中“围剿”又“围剿”、打破又打破的这种长期反复的规律(那时已有湘赣边界的三次“围剿”,福建的两次“围剿”等),因此在红军还幼小的时代就命令红军去打武汉,命令全国举行武装起义,企图使全国革命迅速胜利。这就犯了“左”倾机会主义的错误。
一九三一年至一九三四年的“左”倾机会主义,也不相信“围剿”反复这一规律。在鄂豫皖边区根据地则有所谓“偏师”说,那里的一些领导同志认为第三次“围剿”失败后的国民党不过是偏师了,要进攻红军,就得由帝国主义亲身出马担当主力军。在这个估计之下的战略方针,就是红军打武汉。这和江西的一些同志号召红军打南昌,反对进行使各根据地联成一片的工作,反对诱敌深入的作战,把一省胜利放在夺取省城和中心城市的基点上,以及认为“反对五次‘围剿’是革命道路和殖民地道路的决战”等等,是在原则上一致的。这个“左”倾机会主义,种下了鄂豫皖边区反对第四次“围剿”、江西中央区反对第五次“围剿”斗争中的错误路线的根苗,使红军在敌人的严重的“围剿”面前不得不处于无能的地位,给了中国革命以很大的损失。
跟否认“围剿”反复的“左”倾机会主义直接联系,而说红军根本不应该采取防御手段的一种意见,也是完全不正确的。
革命和革命战争是进攻的——这种说法当然有它的正确性。革命和革命战争从发生到发展,从小到大,从没有政权到夺取政权,从没有红军到创造红军,从没有革命根据地到创造革命根据地,总是要进攻的,是不能保守的,保守主义的倾向是应该反对的。
革命和革命战争是进攻的,但是也有防御和后退——这种说法才是完全正确的。为了进攻而防御,为了前进而后退,为了向正面而向侧面,为了走直路而走弯路,是许多事物在发展过程中所不可避免的现象,何况军事运动。
上述两个论断中的前一论断,在政治上说来可以是对的,移到军事上就不对了。在政治上,也只是在某一种情况说来(革命前进时)是对的,移到另一种情况(革命退却时:全部退却,例如俄国在一九〇六年、中国在一九二七年;局部退却,例如俄国在一九一八年的布雷斯特条约时)也就不对了。只有后一论断,才是全部地正确的真理。一九三一年至一九三四年的“左”倾机会主义,机械地反对使用军事防御的手段,不过是一种非常幼稚的思想。
“围剿”反复的形式何时结束?据我看来,如果内战延长的话,那是在敌我强弱对比起了根本变化之时。如果红军一旦改变到比自己的敌人更为强大时,那末,这个反复就结束了。那时是我们围剿敌人,敌人则企图反围剿,但是政治和军事的条件将不允许敌人获得如同红军一样的反“围剿”的地位。那时,“围剿”反复这种形式,即使不说完全结束,但是一般的结束是可以断言的。
第五章 战略防御
这个题目中,我想说明下列各问题:(一)积极防御和消极防御;(二)反“围剿”的准备;(三)战略退却;(四)战略反攻;(五)反攻开始问题;(六)集中兵力问题;(七)运动战;(八)速决战;(九)歼灭战。
第一节 积极防御和消极防御
为什么从防御说起呢?一九二四年至一九二七年的中国第一次民族统一战线失败后,革命成了极深刻极残酷的阶级战争。敌人是全国的统治者,我们只有一点小部队,因此,我们一开始就是和敌人的“围剿”奋斗。我们的进攻是密切地联系于打破“围剿”的,我们发展的命运全看我们能不能打破“围剿”。打破“围剿”的过程往往是迂回曲折的,不是径情直遂的。首先而且严重的问题,是如何保存力量,待机破敌。所以,战略防御问题成为红军作战中最复杂和最重要的问题。
在我们的十年战争中,对于战略防御问题,常常发生两种偏向,一种是轻视敌人,又一种是为敌人所吓倒。
由于轻视敌人,许多游击队失败了,红军对若干次敌人的“围剿”不能打破。
革命的游击队初起,领导者对于敌我形势往往看得不正确。他们看见自己在一个地方用突然的武装起义胜利了,或从白军中哗变出来了,一时的环境很顺利,或者虽有严重的环境而看不到,因此往往轻视敌人。另一方面,对自己的弱点(没有经验,力量弱小),也不了解。敌强我弱,原是客观地存在的现象,可是人们不愿意想一想,一味只讲进攻,不讲防御和退却,在精神上解除了防御的武装,因而把行动引到错误的方向。许多游击队因此失败了。
红军因为和这同样的原因不能打破“围剿”的例子,则有一九二八年广东海陆丰区域的红军的失败,以及一九三二年鄂豫皖边区的红军,在所谓国民党偏师说的指导之下,使得反对第四次“围剿”丧失了措置裕如的能力的事实。
为敌人吓倒而受挫折的例子,是很多的。
和轻敌者相反,人们太看重了敌人,太看轻了自己,因而采取了非必要的退却方针,精神上同样地解除了防御的武装。其结果或者是游击队失败,或者是红军的某些战役失败,或者是根据地丧失。
丧失根据地的最显着的例子,是在反对第五次“围剿”中丧失了江西中央根据地。这里的错误是从右倾的观点产生的。领导者们畏敌如虎,处处设防,节节抵御,不敢举行本来有利的向敌人后方打去的进攻,也不敢大胆放手诱敌深入,聚而歼之,结果丧失了整个根据地,使红军做了一万二千多公里的长征。然而这种错误,往往有一种“左”倾轻敌的错误为之先行。一九三二年进攻中心城市的军事冒险主义,正是后来在对付敌人第五次“围剿”中采取消极防御路线的根源。
为敌人吓倒的极端的例子,是退却主义的“张国焘路线”。红军第四方面军的西路军在黄河以西的失败,是这个路线的最后的破产。
积极防御,又叫攻势防御,又叫决战防御。消极防御,又叫专守防御,又叫单纯防御。消极防御实际上是假防御,只有积极防御才是真防御,才是为了反攻和进攻的防御。据我所知,任何一本有价值的军事书,任何一个比较聪明的军事家,而且无论古今中外,无论战略战术,没有不反对消极防御的。只有最愚蠢的人,或者最狂妄的人,才捧了消极防御当法宝。然而世上偏有这样的人,做出这样的事。这是战争中的过失,是保守主义在军事上的表现,我们应该坚决地反对它。
后起而且发展得很快的帝国主义国家,即德日两国的军事家中,积极地鼓吹战略进攻的利益,反对战略防御。这种思想,是根本不合于中国革命战争的。德日帝国主义的军事家们指出防御的一个重要的弱点是不能振奋人心,反而使人心动摇。这是说的阶级矛盾剧烈,而战争的利益仅仅属于反动的统治阶层乃至反动的当权政派的那种国家。我们的情况不同。在保卫革命根据地和保卫中国的口号下,我们能够团结最大多数人民万众一心地作战,因为我们是被压迫者和被侵略者。苏联内战时期的红军也是在防御形式之下战胜敌人的。他们的战争不但在帝国主义各国组织白党进攻时,是在保卫苏维埃的口号下进行的,就是在十月起义的准备时期,也是在保卫首都的口号下进行军事动员的。一切正义战争的防御战,不但有麻痹政治上异己分子的作用,而且可以动员落后的人民群众加入到战争中来。
马克思说的武装起义之后一刻也不应该停止进攻,这是说乘敌不备而突然起义的群众,应该不让反动的统治者有保守政权或恢复政权的机会,趁此一瞬间把国内反动的统治势力打个措手不及,而不要满足于已得的胜利,轻视敌人,放松对于敌人的进攻,或者畏缩不前,坐失消灭敌人的时机,招致革命的失败。这是正确的。然而不是说,敌我双方已在军事对抗中,而且敌人是优势,当受敌人压迫时,革命党人也不应该采取防御手段。如果这样想,那就是第一号的傻子。
我们过去的战争,整个地说来是向国民党进攻,然而在军事上采取了打破“围剿”的形式。
在军事上说来,我们的战争是防御和进攻的交替的应用。对于我们,说进攻是在防御之后,或说进攻是在防御之前都是可以的,因为关键在于打破“围剿”。“围剿”没有打破以前是防御,“围剿”一经打破就开始了进攻,仅仅是一件事情的两个阶段,而敌人的一次“围剿”和它的又一次“围剿”是衔接着的。这两个阶段中,防御的阶段比进攻的阶段更为复杂,更为重要。这个阶段包含着怎样打破“围剿”的许多问题。基本的原则是承认积极防御,反对消极防御。
从国内战争说,假如红军的力量超过了敌人时,那末,一般地就用不着战略防御了。那时的方针只是战略的进攻。这种改变,依靠于敌我力量的总的变动。到了那时,剩下的防御手段,只是局部的东西了。
第二节 反“围剿”的准备
对于敌人的一次有计划的“围剿”,如果我们没有必要的和充分的准备,必然陷入被动地位。临时仓卒应战,胜利的把握是没有的。因此,在和敌人准备“围剿”同时,进行我们的反“围剿”的准备,实有完全的必要。我们队伍中曾经发生过的反对准备的意见是幼稚可笑的。
这里有一个困难问题,容易发生争论。就是,何时结束自己的进攻,转入反“围剿”的准备阶段呢?因为当自己处在胜利的进攻中,敌人处在防御地位时,敌人的“围剿”准备是在秘密地进行的,我们难于知道他们将在何时开始进攻。我们准备反“围剿”的工作开始早了,不免减少进攻的利益,而且有时会给予红军和人民以若干不良的影响。因为准备阶段中的主要步骤,就是军事上的准备退却,和为着准备退却的政治上的动员。有时准备过早,会变为等待敌人;等了好久而敌人未来,不得不重新发动自己的进攻。有时我们的重新进攻刚在开始,又恰好遇到了敌人进攻的开始,把自己处在困难地位。所以开始准备的时机的选择,成为一个重要问题。断定这种时机,要从敌我双方情况和二者间的关系着眼。为着了解敌人的情况,须从敌人方面的政治、军事、财政和社会舆论等方面搜集材料。分析这些材料的时候,要足够地估计敌人的整个力量,不可夸大敌人过去失败的程度,但也决不可不估计到敌人内部的矛盾,财政的困难,过去失败的影响等等。对自己方面,不可夸大过去胜利的程度,但也决不可不足够地估计到过去胜利的影响。
但是开始准备的时机问题,一般地说来,与其失之过迟,不如失之过早。因为后者的损失较之前者为小,而其利益,则是有备无患,根本上立于不败之地。
准备阶段中的主要的问题,是红军的准备退却,政治动员,征集新兵,财政和粮食的准备,政治异己分子的处置等。
所谓红军的准备退却,就是说不要使红军向着不利于退却的方向,不要进攻得太远了,不要使红军过于疲劳。这是在敌人大举进攻的前夜主力红军的必要的处置。这时红军的注意力,主要地要放在创造战场,征集资材,扩大自己和训练自己的计划上。
政治动员是反“围剿”斗争中第一个重要问题。这即是说,明确、坚决而充分地告诉红军人员和根据地的人民,关于敌人进攻的必然性和迫切性,敌人进攻危害人民的严重性,同时,关于敌人的弱点,红军的优良条件,我们一定要胜利的志愿,我们工作的方向等。号召红军和人民全体为反对“围剿”、保卫根据地而斗争。除开军事秘密外,政治动员是必须公开的,而且力求普及于每一个可能拥护革命利益的人员。重要的关节是说服干部。
征集新兵须从两方面出发:一方面顾到人民的政治觉悟程度和人口情况;又一方面顾到当时红军的情况和整个反“围剿”战役中红军消耗的可能限度。
财政和粮食问题,不待说对于反对“围剿”是有重大意义的。要顾及“围剿”时间的可能延长。应当计算,主要的是红军,再则革命根据地的人民,在整个反“围剿”斗争中物资需要的最低限度。
对待政治异己分子,不可对他们不警戒;但也不可过于恐惧他们的叛变,而采取过分的警戒手段。对地主、商人、富农之间是应该有分别的,主要地是政治上向他们说明,争取他们中立,并且组织民众监视他们。只有对极少数最带危险性的分子,才可以采用严峻手段,例如逮捕等。
反“围剿”斗争胜利的程度,是和准备阶段中任务完成的程度密切地联系着的。由轻敌而发生的对于准备的放松,和由被敌人进攻所吓倒而发生的惊惶失措,都是应该坚决反对的不良倾向。我们需要的是热烈而镇定的情绪,紧张而有秩序的工作。
第三节 战略退却
战略退却,是劣势军队处在优势军队进攻面前,因为顾到不能迅速地击破其进攻,为了保存军力,待机破敌,而采取的一个有计划的战略步骤。可是,军事冒险主义者则坚决反对此种步骤,他们的主张是所谓“御敌于国门之外”。
谁人不知,两个拳师放对,聪明的拳师往往退让一步,而蠢人则其势汹汹,辟头就使出全副本领,结果却往往被退让者打倒。
《水浒传》上的洪教头,在柴进家中要打林冲,连唤几个“来”“来”“来”,结果是退让的林冲看出洪教头的破绽,一脚踢翻了洪教头。
春秋时候,鲁与齐战,鲁庄公起初不待齐军疲惫就要出战,后来被曹刿阻止了,采取了“敌疲我打”的方针,打胜了齐军,造成了中国战史中弱军战胜强军的有名的战例。请看历史家左丘明的叙述:
quote “春,齐师伐我。公将战。曹刿请见。其乡人曰:肉食者谋之,又何间焉?刿曰:肉食者鄙,未能远谋。乃入见。问:何以战?公曰:衣食所安,弗敢专也,必以分人。对曰:小惠未遍,民弗从也。公曰:牺牲玉帛,弗敢加也,必以信。对曰:小信未孚,神弗福也。公曰:小大之狱,虽不能察,必以情。对曰:忠之属也。可以一战。战则请从。公与之乘。战于长勺。公将鼓之。刿曰:未可。齐人三鼓。刿曰:可矣。齐师败绩。公将驰之。刿曰:未可。下视其辙,登轼而望之,曰:可矣。遂逐齐师。既克,公问其故。对曰:夫战,勇气也。一鼓作气,再而衰,三而竭。彼竭我盈,故克之。夫大国难测也,惧有伏焉。吾视其辙乱,望其旗靡,故逐之。” quote
当时的情况是弱国抵抗强国。文中指出了战前的政治准备——取信于民,叙述了利于转入反攻的阵地——长勺,叙述了利于开始反攻的时机——彼竭我盈之时,叙述了追击开始的时机——辙乱旗靡之时。虽然是一个不大的战役,却同时是说的战略防御的原则。中国战史中合此原则而取胜的实例是非常之多的。楚汉成皋之战、新汉昆阳之战、袁曹官渡之战、吴魏赤壁之战、吴蜀彝陵之战、秦晋淝水之战等等有名的大战,都是双方强弱不同,弱者先让一步,后发制人,因而战胜的。
我们的战争是从一九二七年秋天开始的,当时根本没有经验。南昌起义、广州起义是失败了,秋收起义在湘鄂赣边界地区的部队,也打了几个败仗,转移到湘赣边界的井冈山地区。第二年四月,南昌起义失败后保存的部队,经过湘南也转到了井冈山。然而从一九二八年五月开始,适应当时情况的带着朴素性质的游击战争基本原则,已经产生出来了,那就是所谓“敌进我退,敌驻我扰,敌疲我打,敌退我追”的十六字诀。这个十六字诀的军事原则,立三路线以前的中央是承认了的。后来我们的作战原则有了进一步的发展。到了江西根据地第一次反“围剿”时,“诱敌深入”的方针提出来了,而且应用成功了。等到战胜敌人的第三次“围剿”,于是全部红军作战的原则就形成了。这时是军事原则的新发展阶段,内容大大丰富起来,形式也有了许多改变,主要地是超越了从前的朴素性,然而基本的原则,仍然是那个十六字诀。十六字诀包举了反“围剿”的基本原则,包举了战略防御和战略进攻的两个阶段,在防御时又包举了战略退却和战略反攻的两个阶段。后来的东西只是它的发展罢了。
然而从一九三二年一月开始,在党的“三次‘围剿’被粉碎后争取一省数省首先胜利”那个包含着严重原则错误的决议发布之后,“左”倾机会主义者就向着正确的原则作斗争,最后是撤消了一套正确原则,成立了另一整套和这相反的所谓“新原则”,或“正规原则”。从此以后,从前的东西不能叫做正规的了,那是应该否定的“游击主义”。反“游击主义”的空气,统治了整整的三个年头。其第一阶段是军事冒险主义,第二阶段转到军事保守主义,最后,第三阶段,变成了逃跑主义。直到党中央一九三五年一月在贵州的遵义召开扩大的政治局会议的时候,才宣告这个错误路线的破产,重新承认过去路线的正确性。这是费了何等大的代价才得来的啊!
起劲地反对“游击主义”的同志们说:诱敌深入是不对的,放弃了许多地方。过去虽然打过胜仗,然而现在不是已经和过去不同了吗?并且不放弃土地又能打胜敌人不是更好些吗?在敌区或在我区敌区交界地方去打胜敌人不是更好些吗?过去的东西没有任何的正规性,只是游击队使用的办法。现在我们的国家已成立了,我们的红军已正规化了。我们和蒋介石作战是国家和国家作战,大军和大军作战。历史不应重复,“游击主义”的东西是应该全部抛弃的了。新的原则是“完全马克思主义”的,过去的东西是游击队在山里产生的,而山里是没有马克思主义的。新原则和这相反:“以一当十,以十当百,勇猛果敢,乘胜直追”,“全线出击”,“夺取中心城市”,“两个拳头打人”。敌人进攻时,对付的办法是“御敌于国门之外”,“先发制人”,“不打烂坛坛罐罐”,“不丧失寸土”,“六路分兵”;是“革命道路和殖民地道路的决战”;是短促突击,是堡垒战,是消耗战,是“持久战”;是大后方主义,是绝对的集中指挥;最后,则是大规模搬家。并且谁不承认这些,就给以惩办,加之以机会主义的头衔,如此等等。
无疑地,这全部的理论和实际都是错了的。这是主观主义。这是环境顺利时小资产阶级的革命狂热和革命急性病的表现;环境困难时,则依照情况的变化以次变为拚命主义、保守主义和逃跑主义。这是鲁莽家和门外汉的理论和实际,是丝毫也没有马克思主义气味的东西,是反马克思主义的东西。
这里单说战略退却,江西叫做“诱敌深入”,四川叫做“收紧阵地”。从前的军事理论家和实际家也无不承认这是弱军对强军作战时在战争开始阶段必须采取的方针。外国的军事家就曾这样说:“战略守势的作战,大都先避不利的决战,使至有利的情况始求决战。”这是完全正确的,我们对此也没有任何的增加。
战略退却的目的是为了保存军力,准备反攻。退却之所以必要,是因为处在强敌的进攻面前,若不退让一步,则必危及军力的保存。过去却有许多人坚决地反对退却,认为这是“机会主义的单纯防御路线”。我们的历史已经证明这个反对是完全错误的了。
准备反攻,须选择和造成有利于我不利于敌的若干条件,使敌我力量对比发生变化,然后进入反攻阶段。
依我们的过去情形说来,大概须在退却阶段中取得下列诸种条件中至少二种以上,才算是有利于我不利于敌,才好使自己转入反攻。这些条件是:
(一)积极援助红军的人民;
(二)有利作战的阵地;
(三)红军主力的全部集中;
(四)发现敌人的薄弱部分;
(五)使敌人疲劳沮丧;
(六)使敌人发生过失。
人民这个条件,对于红军是最重要的条件。这就是根据地的条件。并且由于这个条件,第四、第五、第六等条件也容易造成或发现。所以当敌人大举进攻红军时,红军总是从白区退却到根据地来,因为根据地的人民是最积极地援助红军反对白军的。根据地的边缘区和中心区,也有区别;对于封锁消息、侦察、运输、参战等事,中心区的人民比较边缘区为好。所以“退却终点”,在过去江西反对第一、二、三次“围剿”时,都选在人民条件最好或较好的地区。根据地这个特点,使红军的作战比较一般的作战起了很大的变化,也是使后来敌人不得不采取堡垒主义的主要原因。
退却的军队能够选择自己所欲的有利阵地,使进攻的军队不得不就我范围,这是内线作战的一个优良条件。弱军要战胜强军,是不能不讲求阵地这个条件的。但是单有这个条件还不够,还要求别的条件和它配合。首先是人民的条件。再则还要求好打的敌人,例如敌人疲劳了,或者发生了过失,或者该路前进的敌人比较地缺乏战斗力。这些条件不具备时,虽有优良阵地,也只得置之不顾,继续退却,以就自己所欲的条件。白区未尝无优良的阵地,但无优良的人民条件。如果其它条件也还未造成或未发现时,红军便不得不向根据地退却。根据地的边缘区和中心区的分别,也大体是如此。
除地方部队和钳制兵力外,一切突击兵力以全部集中为原则。当着我们向战略上取守势的敌人进攻时,红军往往是分散的。一旦敌人大举向我进攻,红军就实行所谓“求心退却”。退却的终点,往往选在根据地中部;但有时也在前部,有时则在后部,依照情况来决定。这种求心退却,能够使全部红军主力完全集中起来。
弱军对于强军作战的再一个必要条件,就是拣弱的打。然而当敌人开始进攻时,我们往往不知敌之分进各军何部最强,何部次强,何部最弱,何部次弱,需要一个侦察的过程。往往需要许多时间,才能达此目的。战略退却的所以必要,这也是一个理由。
如果进攻之敌在数量和强度上都超过我军甚远,我们要求强弱的对比发生变化,便只有等到敌人深入根据地,吃尽根据地的苦楚,如同第三次“围剿”时蒋介石某旅参谋长所说的“肥的拖瘦,瘦的拖死”,又如“围剿”军西路总司令陈铭枢所说的“国军处处黑暗,红军处处明亮”之时,才能达到目的。这种时候,敌军虽强,也大大减弱了;兵力疲劳,士气沮丧,许多弱点都暴露出来。红军虽弱,却养精蓄锐,以逸待劳。此时双方对比,往往能达到某种程度的均衡,或者敌军的绝对优势改变到相对优势,我军的绝对劣势改变到相对劣势,甚至有敌军劣于我军,而我军反优于敌军的事情。江西反对第三次“围剿”时,红军实行了一种极端的退却(红军集中于根据地后部),然而非此是不能战胜敌人的,因为当时的“围剿”军超过红军十倍以上。孙子说的“避其锐气,击其惰归”,就是指的使敌疲劳沮丧,以求减杀其优势。
退却的最后一个要求,是造成和发现敌人的过失。须知任何高明的敌军指挥员,在相当长时间中,要不发生一点过失,是不可能的,因此我们乘敌之隙的可能性,总是存在的。敌人会犯错误,正如我们自己有时也弄错,有时也授敌以可乘之隙一样。而且我们可以人工地造成敌军的过失,例如孙子所谓“示形”之类(示形于东而击于西,即所谓声东击西)。要这样做,退却的终点,就不能限定于某一地区。有时退到该地区还无隙可乘,便不得不再退几步,待敌发生可乘之“隙”。
退却所求的有利条件,大致如上所述。然而不是说,须待这些条件完全具备方能举行反攻。要同时具备这些条件是不可能的,而且也不必要。但依据敌人当前情势,争取若干必要条件,是以弱敌强的内线作战军队所应该注意的,在这上面的反对的意见是不正确的。
决定退却终点究在何处,须以整个形势作出发点。在局部形势看来有利于我转入反攻,如果不是同时在全体形势看来也对我有利时,则据此决定退却终点,就是不正确的。因为反攻的开始,必须计算到以后的变化,而我们的反攻总是从局部开始的。有时退却终点应该选在根据地的前部,例如江西第二次、第四次反“围剿”,陕甘第三次反“围剿”时。有时须在根据地的中部,例如江西第一次反“围剿”时。有时则在根据地的后部,例如江西第三次反“围剿”时。这些都是将局部形势联系到整个形势来决定的。江西第五次反“围剿”,我军全然不讲退却,原因在于对局部形势和整个形势都不注意,实在是一种鲁莽灭裂的干法。形势是由条件造成的;观察局部形势和整个形势的联系,应从当时敌我双方所具条件之见于局部的和见于全体的,是否在一定的限度上利于我之开始反攻以为断。
退却终点,在根据地可以大体上分为前部、中部、后部三种。然而是不是根本拒绝在白区作战呢?不是的。我们拒绝在白区作战,仅仅指的对付敌军大规模“围剿”。敌我强弱悬殊,我们在保存军力待机破敌的原则下,才主张向根据地退却,主张诱敌深入,因为只有这样做才能造成或发现利于反攻的条件。如果情况并不这样严重,或者情况的严重性简直使红军连在根据地也无法开始反攻,或者反攻不利需要再退以求局势之变化时,那末,把退却终点选在白区也是应该承认的,至少在理论上是应该承认的,虽然我们过去很少这种经验。
白区退却终点大体上也可分为三种:第一是在根据地前面,第二在根据地侧面,第三在根据地后面。第一种终点,例如江西第一次反“围剿”时,如果红军没有内部不统一和地方党的分裂,即立三路线和AB团两个困难问题存在,是可以设想在吉安、南丰、樟树三点之间集中兵力举行反攻的。因为当时从赣抚两河间前进的敌人军力,比起红军来优势并不很大(十万对四万)。人民条件虽不如根据地,但阵地条件是有的,而且是可以乘敌分路前进时各个把他击破的。第二种终点,例如江西第三次反“围剿”时,假如当时敌人进攻的规模没有那样大,而敌有一路从闽赣交界的建宁、黎川、泰宁前进,这一路的力量又适合于我们的攻击时,也可以设想红军就在福建西部的白区集中,首先打破此敌,不必绕道千里走瑞金到兴国。第三种终点,同样例如上述江西第三次反“围剿”时,假如敌之主力不是向西而是向南,我们也许被迫着退到会昌、寻乌、安远地区(那里是白色区域),引敌更向南进,然后红军由南而北向根据地内部打去,这时北面根据地内部的敌军当不是很多的了。但以上这些说明都是假定,没有经验,可以作为特殊的东西看待,不可作一般原则看待。对于我们,当敌举行大规模“围剿”时,一般的原则是诱敌深入,是退却到根据地作战,因为这是使我们最有把握地打破敌人进攻的办法。
主张“御敌于国门之外”的人们,反对战略退却,理由是退却丧失土地,危害人民(所谓“打烂坛坛罐罐”),对外也产生不良影响。在第五次反“围剿”中,则谓我退一步,敌之堡垒推进一步,根据地日蹙而无法恢复。如果说诱敌深入在以前是有用的,那末在堡垒主义的第五次“围剿”是无用的。对付第五次“围剿”,只能用分兵抵御和短促突击的方法。
回答这些意见是容易的,我们的历史已经回答了。关于丧失土地的问题,常有这样的情形,就是只有丧失才能不丧失,这是“将欲取之必先与之”的原则。如果我们丧失的是土地,而取得的是战胜敌人,加恢复土地,再加扩大土地,这是赚钱生意。市场交易,买者如果不丧失金钱,就不能取得货物;卖者如果不丧失货物,也不能取得金钱。革命运动所造成的丧失是破坏,而其取得是进步的建设。睡眠和休息丧失了时间,却取得了明天工作的精力。如果有什么蠢人,不知此理,拒绝睡觉,他明天就没有精神了,这是蚀本生意。我们在敌人第五次“围剿”时期的蚀本正因为这一点。不愿意丧失一部分土地,结果丧失了全部土地。阿比西尼亚的打硬仗,也得到丧失全国的结果,虽然阿国失败的原因不仅仅这一点。
危害人民的问题同此道理。不在一部分人民家中一时地打烂些坛坛罐罐,就要使全体人民长期地打烂坛坛罐罐。惧怕一时的不良的政治影响,就要以长期的不良影响做代价。十月革命后,俄国布尔什维克如果依照“左派共产主义者”的意见拒绝对德和约时,新生的苏维埃就有夭折的危险。
这种看起来好像革命的“左”倾意见,来源于小资产阶级知识分子的革命急躁病,同时也来源于农民小生产者的局部保守性。他们看问题仅从一局部出发,没有能力通观全局,不愿把今天的利益和明天的利益相联结,把部分利益和全体利益相联结,捉住一局部一时间的东西死也不放。对的,一切依照当时具体情况看来对于当时的全局和全时期有利益的、尤其是有决定意义的一局部和一时间,是应该捉住不放的,不然我们就变成自流主义,或放任主义。退却要有终点,就是这个道理。然而这绝不能依靠小生产者的近视。我们应该学习的是布尔什维克的聪明。我们的眼力不够,应该借助于望远镜和显微镜。马克思主义的方法就是政治上军事上的望远镜和显微镜。
当然,战略退却是有困难的。退却开始时机的选择,退却终点的选择,政治上对干部和人民的说服,都是困难问题,都必须给予解决。
退却开始时机的问题是具有重要意义的。我们在江西第一次反“围剿”时的退却,如果不恰在那种时机,即是说如果再迟,那至少我们胜利的程度是要受到影响的。退却过早和过迟,当然都有损失。但是一般地说来,过迟的损失较之过早为大。及时退却,使自己完全立于主动地位,这对于到达退却终点以后,整顿队势,以逸待劳地转入反攻,有极大的影响。江西粉碎敌人第一次、第二次、第四次“围剿”的战役,都从容不迫地对付了敌人。惟独第三次战役,因为不料敌人经过第二次战役那么惨败之后,新的进攻来得那么快(一九三一年五月三十一日我们结束第二次反“围剿”的作战,七月一日蒋介石就开始了他们的第三次“围剿”),红军仓卒地绕道集中,就弄得十分疲劳。如何选择这个时机,全靠收集必要的材料,从敌我双方大势上去判断,和前面说过的选择准备阶段的开始时机所用的方法一样。
战略退却,在干部和人民还没有经验时,在军事领导的权威还没有达到把战略退却的决定权集中到最少数人乃至一个人的手里而为干部所信服的地步时,说服干部和人民的问题是一个十分困难的问题。由于干部没有经验,对于战略退却不相信,在第一次和第四次反“围剿”的初期,第五次反“围剿”的整期,在这个问题上都遭遇了很大的困难。第一次反“围剿”时,由于立三路线的影响,干部的意见,在没有被说服以前,不是退却而是进攻。第四次反“围剿”时,由于军事冒险主义的影响,干部的意见是反对准备。第五次反“围剿”时,干部的意见开头是继续军事冒险主义反对诱敌深入的观点,后来是变成了军事保守主义。张国焘路线不相信在藏人和回人地区不能建立我们的根据地,直待碰壁以后方才相信,也是实例。经验对于干部是必需的,失败确是成功之母。但是虚心接受别人的经验也属必需,如果样样要待自己经验,否则固执己见拒不接受,这就是十足的“狭隘经验论”。我们的战争吃这种亏是不少的。
人民由于没有经验而不相信战略退却的必要,莫过于江西第一次反对“围剿”的时候。当时吉安、兴国、永丰等县的地方党组织和人民群众无不反对红军的退却。但是在有了这一次经验之后,在后来的几次反对“围剿”时,就完全没有这个问题了。大家相信,根据地的损失,人民的吃苦,是暂时的,大家都有了红军能够打破“围剿”的信心。然而人民的信任与否,密切地联系于干部的信任与否,因此主要的和首先的任务,是说服干部。
战略退却的全部的作用,在于转入反攻,战略退却仅是战略防御的第一阶段。全战略的决定关键,在于随之而来的反攻阶段之能不能取胜。
第四节 战略反攻
战胜绝对优势敌人的进攻,依靠于在战略退却阶段中所造成的、有利于我不利于敌的、比较敌人开始进攻时起了变化的形势,而这种形势是由各种条件造成的。这在前面已经说过了。
然而有利于我不利于敌的条件和形势的存在,还没有使敌人失败。这种条件和形势,具备着决定胜败的可能性,但还不是胜败的现实性,还没有实现两军的胜负。实现这个胜负,依靠两军的决战。只有决战,才能解决两军之间谁胜谁败的问题。这就是战略反攻阶段的全任务。反攻是一个长过程,是防御战的最精彩最活跃的阶段,也就是防御战的最后阶段。所谓积极防御,主要地就是指的这种带决战性的战略的反攻。
条件和形势,不仅仅在战略退却阶段中造成,在反攻阶段中继续地造成着。这时的条件和形势,不完全和前一阶段中的条件和形势属于同一形式和同一性质。
可以是属于同一形式和同一性质的,例如,此时敌军的更加疲劳和减员,不过是前一阶段中疲劳和减员的继续。
但又必然地有完全新的条件和形势出现。例如,敌军打了一个或几个败仗,这时的有利于我不利于敌的条件,就不仅敌军疲劳等等,而是增加了敌军打败仗这个新的条件了。形势也起了新的变化。敌军调动忙乱,举措失当,两军优劣之势,也就不同于前了。
假使一个到几个败仗不是属于敌军,而是属于我军,那末,条件和形势的有利与否,也变到相反的方面。就是说,敌之不利减少,我之不利开始发生,以至扩大起来。这又是完全新的不同于前的东西。
无论何方失败,都直接地、迅速地引起失败者方面的一种新的努力,就是企图挽救危局的努力,使自己脱出这种新出现的不利于我有利于敌的条件和形势,而重新创造出有利于我不利于敌的条件和形势去压迫对方。
胜利者方面的努力和这相反,力图发展自己的胜利,给敌人更大的损害,务求增加或发展有利于我的条件和形势,而务求不让对方完成其脱出不利和挽回危局的企图。
所以,不论在何方说来,决战阶段的斗争,是全战争或全战役中最激烈、最复杂、最变化多端的,也是最困难、最艰苦的,在指挥上说来,是最不容易的时节。
反攻阶段中,问题是很多的,主要的如反攻开始问题、集中兵力问题、运动战问题、速决战问题、歼灭战问题等。
这些问题的原则,不论对于反攻说来,或对于进攻说来,在其基本性质上,是没有区别的。在这个意义上,可以说反攻就是进攻。
然而反攻不完全是进攻。反攻原则,是在敌人进攻时应用的。进攻原则,是在敌人防御时应用的。在这个意义上,又都有若干的区别了。
因为这个理由,虽然这里把作战的许多问题统统说在战略防御的反攻部门中,而在战略进攻部门中只说些另外的问题,以避重复,但我们应用时,却不可忽略其相同点,也不可忽略其差异点。
第五节 反攻开始问题
反攻开始问题,即所谓“初战”或“序战”问题。
许多资产阶级军事家都主张慎重初战,不论在战略防御或战略进攻皆然,而以防御为尤甚。我们过去,也曾经严重地提出了这个问题。江西反对敌人第一次至第五次“围剿”的作战给了我们以丰富的经验,研究一下这些经验不是没有益处的。
第一次“围剿”时,敌人以约十万人之众,由北向南,从吉安、建宁之线,分八个纵队向红军根据地进攻。当时的红军约四万人,集中于江西省宁都县的黄陂、小布地区。
当时的情况是:(一)“进剿”军不过十万人,且均非蒋之嫡系,总的形势不十分严重。(二)敌军罗霖师防卫吉安,隔在赣江之西。(三)敌军公秉藩、张辉瓒、谭道源三师进占吉安东南、宁都西北的富田、东固、龙冈、源头一带。张师主力在龙冈,谭师主力在源头。富田、东固两地因人民受AB团欺骗一时不信任红军,并和红军对立,不宜选作战场。(四)敌军刘和鼎师远在福建白区的建宁,不一定越入江西。(五)敌军毛炳文、许克祥两师进至广昌宁都之间的头陂、洛口、东韶一带。头陂是白区,洛口是游击区,东韶有AB团,易走漏消息。且打了毛炳文许克祥再向西打,恐西面张辉瓒、谭道源、公秉藩三师集中,不易决胜,不能最后解决问题。(六)张、谭两师是“围剿”主力军,“围剿”军总司令江西主席鲁涤平的嫡系部队,张又是前线总指挥。消灭此两师,“围剿”就基本上打破了。两师各约一万四千人,张师又分置两处,我一次打一个师是绝对优势。(七)张、谭两师主力所在的龙冈、源头一带接近我之集中地,且人民条件好,能荫蔽接近。(八)龙冈有优良阵地。源头不好打。如敌攻小布就我,则阵地亦好。(九)我在龙冈方向能集中最大兵力。龙冈西南数十里之兴国,尚有一个千余人的独立师,亦可迂回于敌后。(一〇)我军实行中间突破,将敌人的阵线打开一缺口后,敌之东西诸纵队便被分离为远距之两群。基于以上理由,我们的第一仗就决定打而且打着了张辉瓒的主力两个旅和一个师部,连师长在内九千人全部俘获,不漏一人一马。一战胜利,吓得谭师向东韶跑,许师向头陂跑。我军又追击谭师消灭它一半。五天内打两仗(一九三〇年十二月三十日至一九三一年一月三日),于是富田、东固、头陂诸敌畏打纷纷撤退,第一次“围剿”就结束了。
第二次“围剿”时的情况是:(一)“进剿”军二十万人,何应钦为总司令,驻南昌。(二)和第一次“围剿”时一样,全部是蒋之非嫡系部队。以蔡廷锴的第十九路军、孙连仲的第二十六路军、朱绍良的第六路军为最强或较强,其余均较弱。(三)AB团肃清,根据地人民全部拥护红军。(四)王金钰的第五路军从北方新到,表示恐惧,其左翼郭华宗、郝梦龄两师,大体相同。(五)我军从富田打起,向东横扫,可在闽赣交界之建宁、黎川、泰宁地区扩大根据地,征集资材,便于打破下一次“围剿”。若由东向西打去,则限于赣江,战局结束后无发展余地。若打完再东转,又劳师费时。(六)我军人数较上次战役时虽略减(三万余),然有四个月的养精蓄锐。基于以上理由,乃决找富田地区的王金钰、公秉藩(共十一个团)打第一仗。胜利后,接着打郭、打孙、打朱、打刘。十五天中(一九三一年五月十六日至三十一日),走七百里,打五个仗,缴枪二万余,痛快淋漓地打破了“围剿”。当打王金钰时,处于蔡廷锴、郭华宗两敌之间,距郭十余里,距蔡四十余里,有人谓我们“钻牛角”,但终究钻通了。主要因为根据地条件,再加敌军各部之不统一。郭师败后,郝师星夜逃回永丰,得免于难。
第三次“围剿”时的情况是:(一)蒋介石亲身出马任总司令,下分左右中三路总司令。中路何应钦,与蒋同驻南昌;右路陈铭枢,驻吉安;左路朱绍良,驻南丰。(二)“进剿”军三十万人。主力军是蒋嫡系之陈诚、罗卓英、赵观涛、卫立煌、蒋鼎文等五个师,每师九团,共约十万人。次是蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴、韩德勤三师,四万人。次是孙连仲军,二万人。余均非蒋嫡系,较弱。(三)“进剿”战略是“长驱直入”,大不同于第二次“围剿”之“步步为营”,企图压迫红军于赣江而消灭之。(四)第二次“围剿”结束至第三次“围剿”开始,为时仅一个月。红军苦战后未休息,也未补充(三万人左右),又绕道千里回到赣南根据地西部之兴国集中,时敌已分路直迫面前。在上述情况下,我们决定的第一个方针,是由兴国经万安突破富田一点,然后由西而东,向敌之后方联络线上横扫过去,让敌主力深入赣南根据地置于无用之地,定此为作战之第一阶段。及敌回头北向,必甚疲劳,乘隙打其可打者,为第二阶段。此方针之中心是避敌主力,打其虚弱。但我军向富田开进之际,被敌发觉,陈诚、罗卓英两师赶至。我不得不改变计划,回到兴国西部之高兴圩,此时仅剩此一个圩场及其附近地区几十个方里容许我军集中。集中一天后,乃决计向东面兴国县东部之莲塘、永丰县南部之良村、宁都县北部之黄陂方向突进。第一天乘夜通过了蒋鼎文师和蒋、蔡、韩军间之四十华里空隙地带,转到莲塘。第二天和上官云相军(上官指挥他自己的一个师及郝梦龄师)前哨接触。第三天打上官师为第一仗,第四天打郝梦龄师为第二仗,尔后以三天行程到黄陂打毛炳文师为第三仗。三战皆胜,缴枪逾万。此时所有向西向南之敌军主力,皆转旗向东,集中视线于黄陂,猛力并进,找我作战,取密集的大包围姿势接近了我军。我军乃于蒋、蔡、韩军和陈、罗军之间一个二十华里间隙的大山中偷越过去,由东面回到西面之兴国境内集中。及至敌发觉再向西进时,我已休息了半个月,敌则饥疲沮丧,无能为力,下决心退却了。我又乘其退却打了蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴、蒋鼎文、韩德勤,消灭蒋鼎文一个旅、韩德勤一个师。对蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴两师,则打成对峙,让其逃去了。
第四次“围剿”时的情况是:敌分三路向广昌进,主力在东路,西路两师暴露于我面前,且迫近我之集中地。因此我得以先打其西路于宜黄南部地区,一举消灭李明、陈时骥两个师。敌从左路分出两个师配合中路再进,我又得消灭其一个师于宜黄南部地区。两役缴枪万余,这个“围剿”就基本地打破了。
第五次“围剿”,敌以堡垒主义的新战略前进,首先占领了黎川。我却企图恢复黎川,御敌于根据地之外,去打黎川以北敌之巩固阵地兼是白区之硝石。一战不胜,又打其东南之资溪桥,也是敌之巩固阵地和白区,又不胜。尔后辗转寻战于敌之主力和堡垒之间,完全陷入被动地位。终第五次反“围剿”战争一年之久,绝无自主活跃之概。最后不得不退出江西根据地。
上述第一次至第五次反“围剿”时期我军作战的经验,证明处在防御地位的红军,欲打破强大的“进剿”军,反攻的第一个战斗,关系非常之大。第一个战斗的胜败给予极大的影响于全局,乃至一直影响到最后的一个战斗。因此得出下述的结论:
第一,必须打胜。必须敌情、地形、人民等条件,都利于我,不利于敌,确有把握而后动手。否则宁可退让,持重待机。机会总是有的,不可率尔应战。第一次反“围剿”时先想打谭道源,仅因敌不脱离源头那个居高临下的阵地,我军两度开进,却两度忍耐撤回,过了几天找到了好打的张辉瓒。第二次反“围剿”时,我军开进到东固,仅因等待王金钰脱离其富田巩固阵地,宁可冒犯走漏消息的危险,拒绝一切性急快打的建议,迫敌而居,等了二十五天之久,终于达到了要求。第三次反“围剿”虽是那样急风暴雨的局面,千里回师,又被敌人发觉了我们迂回其侧后的计划,但我们仍忍耐折回,改用中间突破,终于在莲塘打着第一个好仗。第四次反“围剿”时攻南丰不克,毅然采取了退却步骤,终于转到敌之右翼,集中东韶地区,开始了宜黄南部的大胜仗。只有第五次反“围剿”时全不知初战关系之大,震惊于黎川一城之失,从挽救的企图出发,北上就敌,于洵口不预期遭遇战胜利(消灭敌一个师)之后,却不把此战看作第一战,不看此战所必然引起的变化,而贸然进攻不可必胜的硝石。开脚一步就丧失了主动权,真是最蠢最坏的打法。
第二,初战的计划必须是全战役计划的有机的序幕。没有好的全战役计划,绝不能有真正好的第一仗。这就是说,即使初战打了一个胜仗,若这个仗不但不于全战役有利,反而有害时,则这个仗虽胜也只算败了(例如第五次“围剿”时的洵口战斗)。因此在打第一仗之先,必须想到第二、第三、第四以至最后一仗大体上如何打法,我挨次的一仗胜了,敌军全局将起如何变化,假若败了,又将起如何变化。虽结果不见得乃至决不会尽如所期,然而必须依据双方全局,仔细地切实地想明白。没有全局在胸,是不会真的投下一着好棋子的。
第三,还要想到下一战略阶段的文章。若只顾反攻,不顾反攻胜利后,或万一反攻失败后,下文如何做法,依然未尽得战略指导者的责任。战略指导者当其处在一个战略阶段时,应该计算到往后多数阶段,至少也应计算到下一个阶段。尽管往后变化难测,愈远看愈渺茫,然而大体的计算是可能的,估计前途的远景是必要的。那种走一步看一步的指导方式,对于政治是不利的,对于战争也是不利的。走一步应该看那一步的具体变化,据此以修改或发展自己战略战役计划,不这样做,就会弄出冒险直冲的错误。然而贯通全战略阶段乃至几个战略阶段的、大体上想通了的、一个长时期的方针,是决不可少的。不这样做,就会弄出迟疑坐困的错误,实际上适合了敌人的战略要求,陷自己于被动地位。须知敌人的统帅部,是具有某种战略眼光的。我们只有使自己操练得高人一等,才有战略胜利的可能。在敌人第五次“围剿”时期“左”倾机会主义路线和张国焘路线的战略指导之所以错误,主要地就在于没有作到这一点。总之,退却阶段时必须计算到反攻阶段,反攻阶段时必须计算到进攻阶段,进攻阶段时又须计算到退却阶段。没有这种计算,束缚于眼前的利害,就是失败之道。
必须打胜;必须照顾全战役计划;必须照顾下一战略阶段:这是反攻开始,即打第一仗时,不可忘记的三个原则。
第六节 集中兵力问题
集中兵力看来容易,实行颇难。人人皆知以多胜少是最好的办法,然而很多人不能做,相反地每每分散兵力,原因就在于指导者缺乏战略头脑,为复杂的环境所迷惑,因而被环境所支配,失掉自主能力,采取了应付主义。
无论处于怎样复杂、严重、惨苦的环境,军事指导者首先需要的是独立自主地组织和使用自己的力量。被敌逼迫到被动地位的事是常有的,重要的是要迅速地恢复主动地位。如果不能恢复到这种地位,下文就是失败。
主动地位不是空想的,而是具体的,物质的。这里最重要的,是保存并集结最大而有活力的军队。
防御战本来容易陷入被动地位,防御战大不如进攻战之能够充分地发挥主动权。然而防御战是能够在被动的形式中具有主动的内容的,是能够由形式上的被动阶段转入形式上内容上的主动阶段的。完全有计划的战略退却,在形式上是被逼出此的,在内容上是保存军力,待机破敌,是诱敌深入,准备反攻。只有不肯退却,仓卒应战(例如硝石战斗),表面上似乎在力争主动,实际上是被动的。战略反攻,则不但内容是主动的,形式上也放弃了退却时的被动姿态。对于敌军说来,反攻是我军强迫它放弃主动权,同时即给以被动地位的努力。
要完全达到这种目的,集中兵力、运动战、速决战、歼灭战,都是必要的条件。而集中兵力,是首先的和主要的。
集中兵力之所以必要,是为了改变敌我的形势。第一,是为了改变进退的形势。过去是敌进我退,现在是企图达到我进敌退之目的。集中兵力一战而胜,这个目的在本战斗就达到了,也给予影响于全战役。
第二,是为了改变攻守的形势。退却到退却终点,在防御战中基本上属于消极阶段,即“守”的阶段。反攻则属于积极阶段,即“攻”的阶段。虽然在整个战略防御中并没有脱离防御性质,然而反攻和退却相较,不但形式上,而且内容上,是起了变化的东西。反攻是战略防御和战略进攻之间的过渡的东西,带着战略进攻前夜的性质,集中兵力就为达此目的。
第三,是为了改变内外线的形势。处于战略上内线作战的军队,特别是处于被“围剿”环境的红军,蒙受着许多的不利。但我们可以而且完全应该在战役或战斗上,把它改变过来。将敌军对我军的一个大“围剿”,改为我军对敌军的许多各别的小围剿。将敌军对我军的战略上的分进合击,改为我军对敌军的战役或战斗上的分进合击。将敌军对我军的战略上的优势,改为我军对敌军的战役或战斗上的优势。将战略上处于强者地位的敌军,使之在战役或战斗上处于弱者的地位。同时,将自己战略上的弱者地位,使之改变为战役上或战斗上的强者的地位。这即是所谓内线作战中的外线作战,“围剿”中的围剿,封锁中的封锁,防御中的进攻,劣势中的优势,弱者中的强者,不利中的有利,被动中的主动。从战略防御中争取胜利,基本上靠了集中兵力的一着。
在中国红军的战史中,这个问题常常成为重要的争论问题。一九三〇年十月四日吉安之役,不待兵力完全集中就实行开进和攻击,幸而敌人(邓英师)自己逃走了,我们的攻击本身并没有奏效。
从一九三二年开始,有所谓“全线出击”的口号,要求从根据地的东西南北四面出击。这不但在战略防御时不对,就是在战略进攻时也是不对的。在整个敌我对比的形势没有根本改变的时候,无论战略或战术,都有防御和进攻、钳制和突击的两方面,事实上绝少所谓全线出击。全线出击的口号,是伴随军事冒险主义而来的军事平均主义。
军事平均主义者到一九三三年,有所谓“两个拳头打人”的说法,把红军主力分割为二,企图在两个战略方向同时求胜。那时的结果是一个拳头置于无用,一个拳头打得很疲劳,而且没有当时可能取得的最大胜利。照我的意见,在有强大敌军存在的条件下,无论自己有多少军队,在一个时间内,主要的使用方向只应有一个,不应有两个。我不反对作战方向有两个或两个以上,但主要的方向,在同一个时间内,只应有一个。中国红军以弱小者的姿态出现于内战的战场,其迭挫强敌震惊世界的战绩,依赖于兵力集中使用者甚大。无论哪一个大胜仗,都可以证明这一点。“以一当十,以十当百”,是战略的说法,是对整个战争整个敌我对比而言的;在这个意义上,我们确实是如此。不是对战役和战术而言的;在这个意义上,我们决不应如此。无论在反攻或进攻,我们总是集结大力打敌一部。一九三一年一月的江西宁都县东韶地区打谭道源的作战,一九三一年九月的江西兴国县高兴圩地区打十九路军的作战,一九三二年七月广东南雄县水口圩地区打陈济棠的作战,一九三三年十二月江西黎川县团村地区打陈诚的作战,都吃了兵力不集中的亏。如像水口圩和团村这一类的仗,本来一般算作胜仗,而且还算作大胜仗的(前者击溃陈济棠二十个团,后者击溃陈诚十二个团),然而我们历来就不欢迎这种胜仗,在某种意义上简直还可以说它是败仗。因为没有缴获或缴获不超过消耗,在我们看来是很少意义的。我们的战略是“以一当十”,我们的战术是“以十当一”,这是我们制胜敌人的根本法则之一。
军事平均主义,到一九三四年第五次反“围剿”时,发展到了极点。“六路分兵”,“全线抵御”,以为可以制敌,结果为敌所制,原因在于惧怕丧失土地。集中主力于一个方向,其它方向剩下了钳制力量,自然不免使土地受到损失。然而这是暂时的局部的损失,其代价是突击方向取得了胜利。突击方向胜利了,钳制方向的损失就可以恢复了。敌人的第一、二、三、四次“围剿”都使我们遭受了土地的损失,特别是在敌人第三次“围剿”时江西红军根据地几乎全部丧失了,然而结果我们的土地不但都恢复了,而且还扩大了。
由于看不见根据地人民的力量,常常发生惧怕红军远离根据地的错误心理。这种心理在一九三二年江西红军远出打福建的漳州时,一九三三年第四次反“围剿”战役胜利后红军转向福建进攻时,都曾发生过。前者惧怕整个根据地被占,后者惧怕根据地的一部被占,而反对集中兵力,主张分兵把守,结果都证明不对。在敌人看来,一方面根据地使他们畏进,一方面打到白区去的红军是他们的主要的危险物。敌军的注意力总是向着主力红军所在地,抛开主力红军不顾而专向根据地,是很少这种事情的。在红军实行防御时,敌人的注意力也还是集中于红军。缩小根据地的计划是敌人整个计划的一部分;但是如果红军集中主力消灭其一路,敌军统帅部就不得不把他们的注意力和他们的军力更大地向着红军。所以,敌人缩小根据地的计划,也是能够破坏的。
“堡垒主义的五次‘围剿’时期我们不能集中作战,只能分兵防御从事短促突击”,这种说法也是不对的。敌人三里五里一进、十里八里一推的堡垒主义作战法,完全是红军自己的节节抗御促成的。如果我军在内线放弃节节抗御的战法,再在必要和可能时转向敌人的内线打去,局面必然是另外一种。集中兵力的法则,正是战胜堡垒主义的工具。
我们主张的集中兵力,并不包括放弃人民的游击战争在内。立三路线主张废弃小的游击战争,“一枝枪也集中到红军中去”,早已证明是不对的了。人民的游击战争,从整个革命战争的观点看来,和主力红军是互为左右手,只有主力红军而无人民的游击战争,就像一个独臂将军。根据地的人民条件,具体地说来,特别是对于作战说来,就是有武装起来了的人民。敌人视为畏途,主要地也在这一点。
置红军的支队于次要的作战方向也是必要的,不是一切都要集中。我们主张的集中兵力,是建立在保证对于战场作战的绝对或相对优势的原则上。对于强敌,或关系紧要的战场作战,应以绝对优势的兵力临之,例如一九三〇年十二月三十日第一次反“围剿”的第一仗,集中四万人打张辉瓒的九千人。对于弱敌或不关紧要的战场作战,临之以相对优势的兵力也就够了,例如一九三一年五月三十一日第二次反“围剿”的最后一战,向建宁打七千人的刘和鼎师,红军只用了一万多人。
也不是说每次都要优势兵力。在某种情况下,也可以用相对劣势或绝对劣势兵力出现于战场。相对劣势,例如某一区域仅仅有一支不大的红军(不是有兵而不集中),为着打破某一优势敌人的进攻,在人民、地形或天候等条件能给我们以大的援助时,以游击队或小支队钳制其正面及一翼,红军集中全力突然袭击其另一翼的一部分,当然也是必要的,并且是可以胜利的。当我袭击其一翼的一部分时,兵力的对比仍适用以优势对劣势、以多胜少的原则。绝对劣势,例如游击队袭击白军大队伍,仅仅是袭击其一小部分,同样适用上述的原则。
集中大军于一个战场作战,受限制于地形、道路、给养、驻处等的说法,也应分别情形去看。这些限制,对于红军和白军是有程度上的区别的,因为红军较之白军能够忍受更大的困难。
我们是以少胜多的——我们向整个中国统治者这样说。我们又是以多胜少的——我们向战场上作战的各个局部的敌人这样说。这件事情已经不是什么秘密,敌人一般地都摸熟我们的脾气了。然而敌人不能取消我们的胜利,也不能避免他们的损失,因为何时何地我们这样做,他们不晓得。这一点我们是保守秘密的。红军的作战一般是奇袭。
第七节 运动战
运动战,还是阵地战?我们的答复是:运动战。在没有广大兵力,没有弹药补充,每一个根据地打来打去仅只有一支红军的条件下,阵地战对于我们是基本上无用的。阵地战,对于我们,不但防御时基本地不能用它,就是进攻时也同样不能用。
由于敌人强大和红军技术贫弱所发生的红军作战的显着特点之一,就是没有固定的作战线。
红军的作战线,服从于红军的作战方向。作战方向不固定,影响到作战线不固定。大方向虽在一个时期中是不变更的,然而大方向内的小方向则是随时变更的,一个方向受了限制,就得转到另一个方向去。一个时期之后大方向也受了限制,就连这种大方向也得变更了。
革命的内战时期,作战线不能固定,就在苏联也有过这种情形。苏联军队和我们的军队不同的地方,在于其不固定的程度不如我们之甚。一切战争也不能有绝对固定的作战线,胜负进退的变化不许可如此。但是相对固定的作战线往往见之于一般的战争。惟独敌我强弱悬殊像处在目前阶段的中国红军这样的军队,则是例外。
作战线的不固定,影响到根据地领土的不固定。时大时小时缩时伸是经常的,此起彼落也往往发生。这种领土的流动性,完全是来源于战争的流动性。
战争和领土的流动性,影响到根据地各种建设工作也发生流动性。若干年月的建设计划是不能设想的。计划改变的频繁,是我们家常便饭的事情。
承认这种特点,对于我们是有利益的。从这个特点出发,规定我们的日程,不要幻想有进无退的战争,不要震惊于领土和军事后方的暂时的流动,不要企图建立长时期的具体计划。把我们的思想、工作适应于情况,准备坐下,又准备走路,不要把干粮袋丢掉了。只有在现在的流动生活中努力,才能争取将来的比较地不流动,才能争取最后的稳定。
统治着第五次反“围剿”时期的所谓“正规战争”的战略方针,否认这种流动性,反对所谓“游击主义”。反对流动的同志们要装作一个大国家的统治者来办事,结果是得到了一个异乎寻常的大流动——二万五千华里的长征。
我们的工农民主共和国是一个国家,但是今天还是一个不完全的国家。今天我们还处在内战的战略防御时期,我们的政权距离一个完全的国家形态还很远,我们军队的数量和技术较之敌人还差得远,我们的领土还很小,我们的敌人时时刻刻想要消灭我们才快活。从这个上面规定我们的方针,不是一般地反对游击主义,而是老老实实地承认红军的游击性。在这里怕羞是没有用的。相反,游击性正是我们的特点,正是我们的长处,正是我们战胜敌人的工具。我们应该准备抛弃游击性,但是今天还不能抛弃。游击性在将来一定是可羞的和必须抛弃的东西,但在今天却是宝贵的和必须坚持的东西。
“打得赢就打,打不赢就走”,这就是今天我们的运动战的通俗的解释。天下也没有只承认打不承认走的军事家,不过不如我们走得这么厉害罢了。对于我们,走路的时间通常多于作战的时间,平均每月打得一个大仗就算是好的。一切的“走”都是为着“打”,我们的一切战略战役方针都是建立在“打”的一个基本点上。然而在我们面前有几种不好打的情形:第一是当面的敌人多了不好打;第二是当面敌人虽不多,但它和邻近敌人十分密接,也有时不好打;第三,一般地说来,凡不孤立而占有十分巩固阵地之敌都不好打;第四是打而不能解决战斗时,不好再继续打。以上这些时候,我们都是准备走的。这样的走是许可的,是必须的。因为我们承认必须的走,是在首先承认必须的打的条件之下。红军的运动战的基本特点,就在这里。
基本的是运动战,并不是拒绝必要的和可能的阵地战。战略防御时,我们钳制方面某些支点的固守,战略进攻时遇着孤立无援之敌,都是应该承认用阵地战去对付的。采取这样的阵地战制胜敌人的经验,我们过去已经不少;很多的城市、堡垒、寨子,被我们打开,某种程度的敌人野战阵地被我们突破。以后还要增加这一方面的努力,补足我们这一方面的弱点。我们完全应该提倡那种在情况需要而且许可下的阵地攻击和阵地防御。我们所反对的,仅仅是在今天采取一般的阵地战,或者把阵地战和运动战平等看待,这些才是不能许可的。
红军的游击性,没有固定作战线,根据地的流动性,根据地建设工作的流动性,十年战争中一点也没有变化吗?有变化的。从井冈山到江西第一次反“围剿”前为第一个阶段,这个阶段中游击性和流动性是很大的,红军还在幼年时代,根据地还是游击区。从第一次反“围剿”到第三次反“围剿”为第二个阶段,这个阶段中游击性和流动性就缩小了许多,方面军已经建立,包含几百万人口的根据地已经存在。从第三次反“围剿”后至第五次反“围剿”为第三个阶段,游击性流动性更缩小了。中央政府与革命军事委员会已经建立。长征是第四个阶段。由于错误地否认小游击和小流动,就来了一个大游击和大流动。目前是第五个阶段。由于没有战胜第五次“围剿”和大流动,红军和根据地都大大地缩小了,但又已经在西北立住了脚根,巩固了并发展了陕甘宁边区根据地。红军主力三个方面军已经统一指挥,此事为前此所未有。
依战略的性质说,也可以说井冈山时期至第四次反“围剿”时期为一阶段,第五次反“围剿”时期为又一阶段,长征至今为第三阶段。第五次反“围剿”时人们错误地否定了以前本来是正确的方针,我们今天又正确地否定了第五次反“围剿”时人们的错误方针,复活了从前的正确方针。然而不是否定第五次反“围剿”时的一切,也不是复活从前的一切。复活的是从前优良的东西,否定的是第五次反“围剿”时的错误的东西。
游击主义有两方面。一方面是非正规性,就是不集中、不统一、纪律不严、工作方法简单化等。这些东西是红军幼年时代本身带来的,有些在当时还正是需要的。然而到了红军的高级阶段,必须逐渐地自觉地去掉它们,使红军更集中些,更统一些,更有纪律些,工作更周密些,就是说使之更带正规性。在作战指挥上,也应逐渐地自觉地减少那些在高级阶段所不必要的游击性。在这一方面拒绝前进,固执地停顿于旧阶段,是不许可的,是有害的,是不利于大规模作战的。
另一方面是运动战的方针,是现在还需要的战略和战役作战的游击性,是无法阻止的根据地的流动性,是根据地建设计划的灵活变更性,是在红军建设上的不要不适时宜的正规化。在这一方面拒绝历史事实,反对保留有用的东西,贸然地脱离现阶段,盲目地跑向可望不可即的、在当前没有现实意义的所谓“新阶段”,同样是不许可的,是有害的,是不利于当前作战的。
我们现在是处在红军技术和组织的下一新阶段的前夜。我们应该准备转变到新阶段去。不作这种准备是不对的,是不利于将来的战争的。在将来,红军的技术和组织条件改变了,红军建设进到了新阶段,红军的作战方向和作战线的比较固定就出现了;阵地战增加了;战争的流动性、领土和建设的流动性,大大减少了,到最后,也就会消灭了;现在限制着我们的东西,如像优势的敌人及其据守的巩固阵地,就不能限制我们了。
我们现在一方面反对“左”倾机会主义统治时期的错误的办法,另一方面也反对复活红军幼年时代的许多在现时不需要的非正规性。但是我们要坚决地恢复红军一路来用以打胜仗的许多可宝贵的建军原则和战略战术原则。我们要把所有一切过去的优良的东西都总结起来,成为有系统的更发展的更丰富的军事路线,以便争取在今天战胜敌人,并且准备在将来转变到新阶段去。
运动战的实行方面,问题是很多的,例如侦察、判断、决心、战斗部署、指挥、荫蔽、集中、开进、展开、攻击、追击、袭击、阵地攻击、阵地防御、遭遇战、退却、夜战、特种战斗、避强打弱、围城打援、佯攻、防空、处在几个敌人之间、超越敌人作战、连续作战、无后方作战、养精蓄锐之必要等等。这些问题在红军战史中都表现了许多的特点,战役学中应当有条理地叙述到,应当给以总结,我在这里就不说了。
第八节 速决战
战略的持久战,战役和战斗的速决战,这是一件事的两方面,这是国内战争的两个同时并重的原则,也可以适用于反对帝国主义的战争。
因为反动势力的雄厚,革命势力是逐渐地生长的,这就规定了战争的持久性。在这上面性急是要吃亏的,在这上面提倡“速决”是不正确的。干了十年的革命战争,对于别的国家也许是值得惊奇的,对于我们却好似八股文章还只作了破题、承题和起讲,许多热闹文章都还在后面。往后的发展,在一切内外条件的影响下,无疑地将比过去有大大地增高速度的可能。因为国际和国内的环境已经起了变化,而且会有更大的变化要到来,可以说我们已经脱离了过去的那种慢慢发展的孤军作战的景况。然而不应该打算明天就会成功。“灭此朝食”的气概是好的,“灭此朝食”的具体计划是不好的。因为中国的反动势力,是许多帝国主义支持的,国内革命势力没有聚积到足以突破内外敌人的主要阵地以前,国际革命势力没有打破和钳制大部分国际反动势力以前,我们的革命战争依然是持久的。从这一点出发,规定我们长期作战的战略方针,是战略指导的重要方针之一。
战役和战斗的原则与此相反,不是持久而是速决。在战役和战斗上面争取速决,古今中外都是相同的。在战争问题上,古今中外也都无不要求速决,旷日持久总是认为不利。惟独中国的战争不能不以最大的忍耐性对待之,不能不以持久战对待之。有人在立三路线时期讥笑我们的做法为“打拳战术”(说的是打过来打过去才能夺取大城市),讥笑我们要待头发白了才能看见革命的胜利。这种表现急性病的情绪,早已证明是不对了。但是他们的批评意见如果不是放在战略问题上而是放在战役和战斗的问题上,则是非常之对的。原因在于:第一,红军的武器尤其是弹药没有来源;第二,白军有很多支部队,红军只一支部队,打破一次“围剿”要准备迅速的连续的作战;第三,白军各个虽然分进,但多是比较地密集,打它们中间的一个如果不能迅速地解决战斗,其余各个就都来了。为了这些理由,不能不实行速决战。对于我们,几小时,一天或两天解决一个战斗是经常的。只有在“围城打援”的方针下,目的不在打围敌,而在打援敌,对围敌作战是准备着相当地持久的,但对援敌仍然是速决。战略防御时固守钳制方面的据点,战略进攻时打孤立无援之敌,消灭根据地中的白色据点,这些时候也常常给予战役或战斗以持久方针。然而这些持久战,只是帮助而并不妨碍主力红军的速决战。
速决战不是心里想要如此做就做得成功的,还须加上许多具体的条件。主要的条件是准备充足,不失时机,集中优势兵力,包围迂回战术,良好阵地,打运动中之敌,或打驻止而阵地尚不巩固之敌。不解决这些条件,而求战役或战斗的速决,是不可能的。
打破一次“围剿”属于一个大战役,依然适用速决原则,而不是持久原则。因为根据地的人力、财力、军力等项条件都不许可持久。
但在一般的速决原则之下,反对不正当的急躁性是必要的。一个革命根据地的最高军事政治领导机关,估计到根据地的这些条件,估计到敌方情况,不为敌之其势汹汹所吓倒,不为尚能忍耐的困难所沮丧,不为某些挫折而灰心,给予必要的耐心和持久,是完全必要的。江西打破第一次“围剿”,从初战到结束只有一星期,打破第二次“围剿”只有半个月,打破第三次“围剿”就熬上了三个月,第四次是三星期,第五次就熬了整整的一年。但是第五次没有打破“围剿”而被迫突围时,还表现了不应有的仓卒从事。依情况还可以熬上两三个月,用以休整军队。假如这样,又假如突围后的领导稍为聪明一点,情况便将有很大的不同。
虽然如此,仍然不破坏我们所说的力争缩短全战役时间的原则。除了战役战斗计划力争集中兵力和运动战等等条件、务期在内线(在根据地)消灭敌之有生力量、迅速解决“围剿”以外,当“围剿”已经证明无法在内线解决时,应该使用红军主力突破敌之围攻线,转入我之外线即敌之内线去解决这个问题。堡垒主义发达的今日,这种手段将要成为经常的作战手段。第五次反“围剿”进行两个月之后,当福建事变出现之时,红军主力无疑地应该突进到以浙江为中心的苏浙皖赣地区去,纵横驰骋于杭州、苏州、南京、芜湖、南昌、福州之间,将战略防御转变为战略进攻,威胁敌之根本重地,向广大无堡垒地带寻求作战。用这种方法,就能迫使进攻江西南部福建西部地区之敌回援其根本重地,粉碎其向江西根据地的进攻,并援助福建人民政府,——这种方法是必能确定地援助它的。此计不用,第五次“围剿”就不能打破,福建人民政府也只好倒台。到打了一年之久的时候,虽已不利于出浙江,但还可以向另一方向改取战略进攻,即以主力向湖南前进,不是经湖南向贵州,而是向湖南中部前进,调动江西敌人至湖南而消灭之。此计又不用,打破第五次“围剿”的希望就最后断绝,剩下长征一条路了。
第九节 歼灭战
“拚消耗”的主张,对于中国红军来说是不适时宜的。“比宝”不是龙王向龙王比,而是乞丐向龙王比,未免滑稽。对于几乎一切都取给于敌方的红军,基本的方针是歼灭战。只有歼灭敌人的有生力量才能打破“围剿”和发展革命根据地。给敌以杀伤,是作为给敌以歼灭的手段而采取的,否则便没有意义。因给敌以杀伤而给我以消耗,又因给敌以歼灭而给我以补充,这样就不但抵偿了我军的消耗,而且增加了我军的力量。击溃战,对于雄厚之敌不是基本上决定胜负的东西。歼灭战,则对任何敌人都立即起了重大的影响。对于人,伤其十指不如断其一指;对于敌,击溃其十个师不如歼灭其一个师。
对于第一、二、三、四次“围剿”,我们的方针都是歼灭战。每次歼灭的敌人对于全敌不过是一部分,然而“围剿”是打破了。第五次反“围剿”时,采取了相反的方针,实际上是帮助敌人达到了他们的目的。
歼灭战和集中优势兵力、采取包围迂回战术,同一意义。没有后者,就没有前者。人民赞助、良好阵地、好打之敌、出其不意等条件,都是达到歼灭目的所不可缺少的。
击溃有意义,乃至让敌逃去有意义,只是对于全战斗或全战役中我军主力对确定之敌举行歼灭性的作战而说的,否则便没有什么意义。这又是一种有所失对有所得而有意义的场合。
我们建立军事工业,须使之不助长依赖性。我们的基本方针是依赖帝国主义和国内敌人的军事工业。伦敦和汉阳的兵工厂,我们是有权利的,并且经过敌人的运输队送来。这是真理,并不是笑话。
