Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War

China Mao Zedong

1 December 1936

Context
Mao set out the strategic problems of China's revolutionary war in a work dated December 1936, covering the laws of war, Party leadership, the war's special characteristics, and lessons from the failed fifth encirclement campaign.
Main themes
Laws of China's revolutionary war, strategy and the war situation as a whole, learning warfare through war, abolition of war through just war, leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, characteristics of China's revolutionary war, Kuomintang encirclement and suppression campaigns, errors of Left and Right opportunism, mobile warfare, quick-decision campaigns within protracted war, war of annihilation, lessons of the Soviet civil war and the Northern Expedition
Duration
~230 min
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27,622
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Sentences
1,055
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Readability
44
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Grade
13.6
63rd percentile
Syntax
3.19
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Vocabulary
2.26
65th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

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  • Geopolitical 91%90%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
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1,055 sentences in 249 paragraphs

Chapter I: How to Study War

Section 1: The Laws of War Are Developmental

The laws of war: this is a problem that anyone directing a war must study and must solve.

The laws of revolutionary war: this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and must solve.

The laws of China's revolutionary war: this is a problem that anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and must solve.

We are now engaged in war. Our war is a revolutionary war, and our revolutionary war is being waged in China, a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Therefore we must study not only the laws of war in general, but also the laws of revolutionary war in particular, and, more particular still, the laws of China's revolutionary war.

Everyone understands that, whatever one is doing, if one does not understand the circumstances of the matter, its nature, and its connection with other matters, one will not know its laws, will not know how to go about it, and will not be able to do it well.

War, which has existed since the emergence of private property and of classes, is the highest form of struggle used to resolve, at a certain stage of their development, the contradictions between classes, between nations, between states, and between political groups. If one does not understand its circumstances, its nature, and its connection with other matters, one will not know the laws of war, will not know how to direct a war, and will not be able to win battles.

Revolutionary war, whether revolutionary class war or revolutionary national war, has its own special circumstances and nature in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, in addition to the general laws of war, it has some special laws of its own. If one does not understand these special circumstances and this special nature, and does not understand its special laws, one cannot direct revolutionary war and cannot win battles in revolutionary war.

China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged within China's special environment, and compared with war in general and with revolutionary war in general, it again has its own special circumstances and special nature. Therefore, in addition to the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has some special laws of its own. If one does not understand these, one cannot win battles in China's revolutionary war.

Hence we should study the laws of war in general; we should also study the laws of revolutionary war; and finally, we should study the laws of China's revolutionary war.

There is a view that is wrong, and we refuted it long ago. Its holders say that it is enough to study the laws of war in general or, to put it concretely, simply to follow the military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government or the reactionary Chinese military academies. They do not know that these manuals deal only with the laws of war in general and are copied entirely from abroad; if we copy and use them exactly as they are, without the slightest change in form or content, we shall be cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we shall lose battles. Their argument is: why should we reject what was acquired by the shedding of blood in the past? They do not know that, while we should certainly respect the experience gained by past bloodshed, we should also respect the experience gained by our own bloodshed.

There is another view that is also wrong, and we refuted it long ago too. Its holders say that it is enough to study the experience of the Russian revolutionary war or, to put it concretely, simply to follow the laws governing the Soviet civil war and the military manuals issued by the Soviet military organs. They do not know that the Soviet laws and manuals embody the specific features of the Soviet civil war and the Soviet Red Army; if we copy and use them exactly as they are, allowing no change, we shall likewise be cutting the feet to fit the shoes, and we shall lose battles. These people argue: the Soviet war was a revolutionary war, ours is also a revolutionary war, and the Soviet Union won; so why should there be any room for selection? They do not know that, while we should certainly pay special respect to the war experience of the Soviet Union, because it is the experience of the most modern revolutionary war, gained under the direction of Lenin and Stalin, we should also respect the experience of China's revolutionary war, because the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army have many special features of their own.

There is yet another view that is also wrong, and we refuted it long ago as well. Its holders say that the experience of the Northern Expedition of 1926–27 was the best and that we should learn from it, or, to put it concretely, learn to advance rapidly over long distances and to seize big cities. They do not know that, while the experience of the Northern Expedition should be studied, it should not be copied rigidly, because the circumstances of our war today have changed. We should adopt only those things from the Northern Expedition that are still applicable under present circumstances, and we should work out our own on the basis of present circumstances.

It follows that differences in the circumstances of war determine differences in the laws directing war, which vary according to time, place and nature. As regards the condition of time, both war and the laws directing it develop; each historical stage has its own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics at each stage and cannot be mechanically transposed to different stages. As regards the nature of war, revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war each have their own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics in each case and cannot be mechanically transposed from one to the other. As regards the condition of place, every country and every nation, especially a big country or a big nation, has its own characteristics, and therefore the laws of war have their own characteristics in each case and likewise cannot be mechanically transposed. In studying the laws directing wars that occur at different historical stages, differ in nature, and are waged in different places and by different nations, we must pay attention to their characteristics and to their development, and we must oppose mechanical treatment of problems of war.

There is more. For a commander, to be able at first to command only small units and later to command large ones is progress and development. Moreover, one place is not like many places: to be able at first to fight in some familiar locality and later to fight in many localities is again progress and development for a commander. Because the technique, tactics and strategy of both sides develop, the circumstances at the various stages of a war also differ. For a commander, to be able to command at the higher stage what he could command at the lower stage is progress and development of a still greater kind. To be adapted only to certain units, certain places and a certain stage in the development of a war is called lack of progress and lack of development. There are people who cling to a single skill and a narrow view and never advance; although such people may serve the revolution to some extent in one place at one time, they cannot play a big role. We want directors of war who can play a big role. All the laws directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is fixed and unchanging.

Section 2: The Aim of War Is to Abolish War

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will in the end be eliminated by the development of human society, and eliminated in the not distant future. But there is only one way to eliminate it, namely, to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose class counter-revolutionary war with class revolutionary war. In history there are only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. The era of human warfare will be brought to an end by our own hands, and the war we are waging is, without doubt, part of the final war. But the war we face is also, without doubt, part of the biggest and most cruel of wars. The biggest and most cruel unjust, counter-revolutionary war is bearing down upon us, and if we do not raise the banner of just war, the great majority of mankind will suffer destruction. The banner of just war for mankind is the banner that saves mankind, and the banner of just war for China is the banner that saves China. The war waged by the great majority of mankind and by the great majority of the Chinese people is without doubt a just war; it is a cause of the highest glory, saving mankind and saving China, and it is the bridge by which the history of the whole world turns into a new era. When human society advances to the point where classes are abolished and the state is abolished, there will be no more wars of any kind, no counter-revolutionary wars and no revolutionary wars, no unjust wars and no just wars; that will be the era of eternal peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war starts from our aspiration to abolish all wars; this is the line of demarcation between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.

Section 3: Strategy Is the Study of the Laws Governing a War Situation as a Whole

Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The whole world may be one war situation, a single country may be one war situation, and an independent guerrilla area or a large independent operational front may also be one war situation. Whatever involves taking account of all the various aspects and stages of a war is a war situation as a whole.

The study of the laws directing a war situation as a whole is the task of strategy. The study of the laws directing a partial war situation is the task of campaign science and tactics.

Why is it necessary for campaign commanders and tactical commanders to understand some of the laws of strategy? Because an understanding of the whole makes it easier to handle the part, since the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical victories is wrong, because it overlooks the fact that the primary and main question in victory or defeat in war is whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are well taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking account of the situation as a whole and its various stages, the war is sure to be lost. When we say "One careless move loses the whole game", we mean a move that affects the whole, that is, a move of decisive importance for the whole, and not a move that affects only a part, that is, one of no decisive importance for the whole. This is so in chess, and it is so in war.

But a whole cannot stand independent of its parts; the whole is made up of all its parts. Sometimes some parts are damaged or lost, yet the whole is not seriously affected, simply because those parts were not decisive for the whole. Some tactical or campaign defeats or failures in a war often do not lead to a worsening of the war situation as a whole, simply because they were not decisive. But if the majority of the campaigns that make up the whole fail, or one or two decisive campaigns fail, the whole situation changes at once. The "majority of campaigns" and the "one or two campaigns" referred to here are the decisive ones. In the history of war there are cases where defeat in a single battle, following a string of victories, has wiped out all that had been achieved, and cases where a single victory, following many defeats, has opened up a new situation. The "string of victories" and the "many defeats" referred to here are partial matters that play no decisive role in the whole. The "single defeat" and the "single victory" are the decisive ones. All this explains the importance of taking account of the situation as a whole. The commander of a whole situation must above all concentrate his attention on taking account of the war situation as a whole. Basing himself on the circumstances, he must mainly take into account the composition of the troops and the large units, the relations between two campaigns, the relations between the various stages of operations, and the relations between all our activities and all the enemy's activities. These are the most taxing problems, and if he neglects them and busies himself with secondary problems, he will inevitably suffer for it.

What is true of the relation between whole and part is true not only of the relation between strategy and campaign but also of the relation between campaign and tactics. The relation between the actions of a division and those of its regiments and battalions, and between the actions of a company and those of its platoons and squads, are examples. A commander at any level should concentrate his attention on the problems or actions that are most important and decisive for the whole situation under his command, and not on other problems or actions.

What is important and decisive cannot be determined in terms of general or abstract circumstances, but must be determined in terms of concrete circumstances. In operations, the direction and point of attack are chosen according to the enemy situation, the terrain and our own strength at the time. Where supplies are plentiful, care must be taken not to let the soldiers eat too much, and where supplies are short, care must be taken that the soldiers do not go hungry. In the White areas, the leakage of a single piece of information can cause the failure of subsequent battles; in the Red areas, the leakage of information is often not the most important matter. In some campaigns it is necessary for the higher commander to take part in person, in others it is not. For a military academy, the most important problems are the choice of the principal and teachers and the determination of the educational policy. For a mass meeting, the main attention should be given to mobilizing the masses to attend and to putting forward suitable slogans. And so on. In short, the principle is to pay attention to the important links that bear on the whole situation.

To learn the laws directing a war situation as a whole, one must use one's mind and think. This is because what concerns the whole cannot be seen with the eyes; it can be understood only by thinking, and without thinking it cannot be understood. But the whole is made up of parts, and a man with experience of the parts, with experience of campaigns and tactics, can understand higher matters if he is willing to think. Problems of strategy, such as taking account of the relations between the enemy and ourselves, of the relations between the various campaigns or the various stages of operations, of those parts that bear on the whole and are decisive, of the special features of the situation as a whole, of the relations between front and rear, and of the following pairs: loss and replenishment, fighting and rest, concentration and dispersion, attack and defence, advance and retreat, concealment and exposure, the main attack and the supporting attack, the assault and the containing action, centralized command and decentralized command, protracted war and quick decision, positional warfare and mobile warfare, our own army and friendly armies, one arm and another, higher and lower levels, cadres and rank and file, old soldiers and new recruits, senior cadres and junior cadres, old cadres and new cadres, Red areas and White areas, old areas and new areas, central areas and border areas, hot weather and cold weather, victories and defeats, big units and small units, regular army and guerrilla units, destroying the enemy and winning over the masses, expanding the Red Army and consolidating the Red Army, military work and political work, past tasks and present tasks, present tasks and future tasks, tasks under one set of circumstances and tasks under another, fixed fronts and fluid fronts, civil war and national war, this historical stage and that historical stage, and so on: the differences and connections in all these problems are things that cannot be seen with the eyes, but if we use our minds we can understand them, grasp them and master them. That is to say, we can take all the important problems of war or operations and solve them on a higher level of principle. Achieving this is the task of studying strategic problems.

Section 4: The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning

Why organize the Red Army? In order to use it to defeat the enemy. Why study the laws of war? In order to apply them in war.

Learning is not easy, and applying is even harder. The science of war may be expounded in the lecture hall or in books, and many people can talk equally glibly about it, but when it comes to fighting, some win and some lose. The history of war and our own experience of war both prove this.

Where, then, does the key lie?

We cannot demand generals who are in fact always victorious; such generals have been very rare since ancient times. What we demand is brave and wise generals who in general win their battles in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom and courage. To achieve this combination of wisdom and courage there is a method to be learned, to be used when learning and also when applying what has been learned.

What method? It is to get to know the circumstances of both the enemy and ourselves in all their aspects, to find the laws governing their actions, and to apply these laws to our own actions.

The military manuals issued in many countries all point to the necessity of "applying principles flexibly according to the circumstances", and they all indicate how to deal with the situation after a defeat. The former is meant to keep commanders from making subjective mistakes by applying principles rigidly; the latter tells commanders how to deal with the situation when they have made a subjective mistake, or when objective circumstances have undergone unforeseen and irresistible changes.

Why do subjective mistakes occur? Because the dispositions and command of a war or a battle do not suit the circumstances of the time and place; subjective direction does not correspond to objective reality, does not fit it; in other words, the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. In everything people do, this is hard to avoid; the difference is only that some are comparatively good at it and others comparatively poor. What is required is to be comparatively good at it; in military terms that means winning comparatively more battles, or, to put it the other way round, losing comparatively few. The key here lies in getting the subjective and the objective to correspond well.

Take an example from tactics. If the point of attack is chosen on one flank of the enemy's position, and it is precisely there that the enemy is weak, so that the assault succeeds, this is called correspondence of the subjective and the objective; that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgment and decision correspond to the real situation of the enemy and his dispositions. If the point of attack is chosen on the other flank, or in the centre, and runs into a nail, so that the attack cannot get in, that is called non-correspondence. A well-chosen time of attack, the use of reserves neither too late nor too early, and all other battle dispositions and actions favouring us and not the enemy: this is the correspondence of subjective command with objective circumstances throughout a whole engagement. Complete correspondence is extremely rare in war or battle, because both sides are groups of armed living men who keep secrets from each other, which is very different from handling inanimate objects or everyday affairs. But as long as the command in general suits the circumstances, that is, suits them in the decisive parts, there is the basis for victory.

A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgments, and his correct judgments stem from thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from connected thinking about all the reconnaissance data. The commander uses every possible and necessary means of reconnaissance, and with the data on the enemy so obtained he discards the dross and selects the essential, eliminates the false and retains the true, proceeds from one thing to another and from the outside to the inside; then he adds the circumstances on his own side, studies the comparison and interrelations of the two sides, forms his judgment, makes up his mind and draws up his plan. This is the complete process of getting to know the situation that a military man goes through before drawing up each strategic, campaign or battle plan. The careless military man does not do so, and bases his plan on wishful thinking; such a plan is fanciful and does not correspond to reality. The rash military man who relies only on enthusiasm inevitably gets tricked by the enemy, is lured by the enemy's superficial or one-sided appearances, is egged on by the irresponsible suggestions of subordinates who have no true insight, and consequently runs his head into a wall; this is because he does not know, or does not want to know, that any military plan should be based on necessary reconnaissance and on careful thought about the circumstances of the enemy and ourselves and their interrelations.

The process of getting to know the situation exists not only before a military plan is drawn up but also after it. From the start of the execution of a plan until the end of the operation, there is another process of getting to know the situation, namely, the process of execution. At this point it is necessary to re-examine whether what resulted from the first process corresponds to the real situation. If the plan does not correspond, or does not entirely correspond, to the situation, then we must form a new judgment, make a new decision, and change the plan already made so that it suits the new circumstances. Partial changes occur in almost every operation, and complete changes also occur occasionally. The rash man does not know how to change, or is unwilling to change, and simply acts blindly, with the result that he again runs into a wall.

What has been said above refers to a strategic action, or to a campaign or battle. A military man with much experience, if he is a modest learner, becomes thoroughly familiar with the temperament of his own forces (the commanders, fighters, weapons, supplies and so on, and their totality), and also becomes thoroughly familiar with the temperament of the enemy's forces (likewise the commanders, fighters, weapons, supplies and so on, and their totality), and thoroughly familiar with all the other conditions related to war such as politics, economics, geography and climate. A military man of this kind directs a war or an operation with comparative assurance and is comparatively able to win. This is the result of getting to know the circumstances of both sides over a long period, finding the laws of action and resolving the contradiction between the subjective and the objective. This process of cognition is extremely important; without a long period of such experience it is difficult to understand and grasp the laws of the war as a whole. To become a truly capable senior commander is not something that can be achieved by a greenhorn or by someone who is merely good at "paper warfare"; it can be achieved only by learning in war.

All the military laws or military theories that are of the nature of principles are summings-up of past war experience made by people of former times or of our own. We should devote ourselves to studying the lessons paid for in blood that past wars have left us. That is one thing. But there is another thing, namely, to test these conclusions in our own experience, to assimilate what is useful, reject what is useless, and add what is specifically our own. This latter is very important, for if we do not do it we cannot direct a war.

Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and is the more important kind of learning. Learning warfare from warfare: this is our main method. A person who has no chance to go to a military school can still learn warfare, namely, by learning in war. A revolutionary war is the business of the masses; often it is not a case of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is learning. There is a distance between the ordinary citizen and the soldier, but it is not a Great Wall; it can be quickly eliminated, and making revolution and waging war is the way to eliminate it. To say that learning and applying are not easy is to say that it is not easy to learn thoroughly and apply with full mastery. To say that an ordinary citizen can quickly become a soldier is to say that the door is not hard to enter. Putting the two together, we can use an old Chinese saying: "Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it." Since entering the door is not hard, deeper attainment can also be achieved, provided one sets one's mind to it and is good at learning.

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are the reflection of objective reality in our minds; everything outside our minds is objective reality. Therefore the objects of study and cognition include both sides, the enemy's and our own; both should be regarded as objects of study, and only our own minds (our thinking) are the subject of study. There are people who know themselves well but not the enemy, and others who know the enemy well but not themselves; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. The saying in the book of the great ancient Chinese military expert Sun Wu Tzu, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat", covers both the stage of learning and the stage of applying; it covers both recognizing the laws of development in objective reality and deciding our own action according to those laws in order to overcome the enemy we face. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes and political groups, and all the laws of war are used by the nations, states, classes and political groups that wage war in order to win victory for themselves. There is no doubt that victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions of the two sides. But not by these alone; it is also determined by the subjective ability of the two sides in directing the war. A military man cannot seek victory in war beyond the limits allowed by the material conditions, but within those limits he can and must strive for victory. The stage on which military men perform is built upon objective material conditions, yet on this stage they can direct the performance of many a vivid and powerful drama. Therefore, on the basis of the given objective material conditions, namely the military, political, economic and natural conditions, the leaders of our Red Army must display our prowess and lead the whole army to overthrow the national and class enemies and change this bad world. Here our subjective ability in direction can and must be used. We do not permit any Red Army commander to become a rash man who blunders about; we must encourage every Red Army commander to become a brave and wise hero, who has not only an overwhelming courage but also the ability to master the changes and development of the whole war. The commander swims in the sea of war; he must not let himself sink, but must make sure that he reaches the opposite shore with firm decision and by definite steps. The laws directing war are the art of swimming in the sea of war. The above is our method.

Chapter II: The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War

China's revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed through two stages, namely, that of 1924–27 and that of 1927–36; the stage from now on is that of the national revolutionary war against Japan. In all three stages the revolutionary war has been led by the Chinese proletariat and its party, the Chinese Communist Party. The principal enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, because of its selfishness and its lack of political and economic independence it is unwilling and unable to lead China's revolutionary war onto the road of thorough victory. The masses of the Chinese peasantry and of the urban petty bourgeoisie are willing to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to see it achieve thorough victory. They are the main force of the revolutionary war; but the characteristics of small production limit their political outlook (and a section of the unemployed have anarchist ideas), so they cannot become the correct leaders of the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already stepped onto the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. At such a time, any revolutionary war that lacks, or goes against, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party is bound to fail. For among all the social strata and political groups in semi-colonial China, only the proletariat and the Communist Party are the least narrow-minded and selfish, have the broadest political vision and the highest degree of organization, and are also the most willing to learn with an open mind from the experience of the advanced proletariat and its parties throughout the world and apply it to their own cause. Therefore only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the Communist Party's policy is not erroneous) overcome the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie, and so lead the revolution and the war onto the road of victory.

The revolutionary war of 1924–27 was fundamentally carried on under the political influence of, and in political cooperation with, the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its party, on the part of the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its party. But at the critical juncture of the revolution and the war, this revolutionary war failed, first because of the betrayal by the big bourgeoisie and also because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily gave up the leadership.

The agrarian revolutionary war from 1927 to the present has been carried on under new circumstances. The enemy in this war is not only imperialism but also the alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords. The national bourgeoisie has become a tail of the big bourgeoisie. The only force that leads this revolutionary war is the Communist Party, which has established absolute leadership over the revolutionary war. This absolute leadership of the Communist Party is the most essential condition enabling the revolutionary war to persevere to the end. Without such absolute leadership by the Communist Party, it is inconceivable that the revolutionary war could have shown such perseverance.

The Chinese Communist Party has led China's revolutionary war with heroism and resolution. Over the long years of fifteen years, it has shown before the whole people that it is the friend of the people, and that every day it has stood in the front line of the revolutionary war to protect the people's interests and for the people's freedom and liberation.

By its record of arduous struggle, and by the blood and sacrifice of several hundred thousand heroic Party members and several tens of thousands of heroic cadres, the Chinese Communist Party has played a great educational role among the hundreds of millions of the whole nation. The great historical achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in the revolutionary struggle have given China, now at the critical juncture of invasion by a national enemy, the conditions for saving the nation from extinction, and these conditions consist in having a political leader trusted by the great majority of the people, tested by them over a long period and therefore chosen by them. What the Communist Party says today is more readily accepted by the people than what any other party says. Without the arduous struggle of the Chinese Communist Party over the past fifteen years, it would have been impossible to save the country from the new danger of subjugation.

In the revolutionary war the Chinese Communist Party, apart from the two mistakes of Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism and Li Li-san's "Left" opportunism, committed two further mistakes. The first was the "Left" opportunism of 1931–34, which caused extremely serious losses to the agrarian revolutionary war, with the result that in the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" we failed to defeat the enemy and instead lost our base areas and weakened the Red Army. This mistake was corrected in January 1935 at the Tsunyi Meeting of the enlarged Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The second was Chang Kuo-tao's Right opportunism of 1935–36, which developed to the point of undermining the discipline of the Party and the Red Army and caused serious losses to part of the main force of the Red Army; but thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the political consciousness of the Party members, commanders and fighters in the Red Army, this mistake too was finally corrected. All these mistakes were of course harmful to our Party, our revolution and our war, but we finally overcame them, and our Party and our Red Army were tempered and made stronger through overcoming them.

The Chinese Communist Party has led, and continues to lead, a mighty, glorious and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation but also has international revolutionary significance. The eyes of the revolutionary people of the world are upon us. In the new stage of the national revolutionary war against Japan, we shall lead the Chinese revolution to completion, and we shall also exert a profound influence on the revolution in the East and in the world. The past revolutionary war has proved that we need not only a correct Marxist political line but also a correct Marxist military line. Fifteen years of revolution and war have tempered such a political and military line. In the new stage of the war ahead, we believe, this line will, in accordance with the new environment, be further developed, supplemented and enriched, so that the aim of defeating the national enemy is attained. History tells us that a correct political and military line does not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in struggle. On the one hand it has to struggle against "Left" opportunism, and on the other against Right opportunism. Without struggling against these harmful tendencies that endanger the revolution and the revolutionary war, and without thoroughly overcoming them, it is impossible to build a correct line and to win the revolutionary war. It is for this purpose that I frequently refer in this pamphlet to erroneous views.

Chapter III: The Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War

Section 1: The Importance of This Question

People who do not recognize, do not know, or do not want to know that China's revolutionary war has its own characteristics regard the Red Army's fighting against the Kuomintang forces as the same as war in general or as the Soviet civil war. The experience of the Soviet civil war led by Lenin and Stalin has world significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, take this experience, and Lenin's and Stalin's theoretical summing-up of it, as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically under our own conditions. China's revolutionary war has in many respects its own characteristics, which differ from those of the Soviet civil war. Not to take these characteristics into account, or to deny them, is of course wrong. This has been fully proved in our ten years of war.

Our enemy has also committed a similar mistake. He did not recognize that fighting the Red Army requires a strategy and tactics different from those of other fighting. Relying on his superiority in all fields, he despised us and stuck to his old ways of fighting. This was the situation up to and during the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in 1933, and the result was a series of defeats for him. The first to put forward new views on this question within the Kuomintang forces was the reactionary Kuomintang general Liu Wei-yuan, and later Tai Yueh. In the end their views were adopted by Chiang Kai-shek. This is how Chiang Kai-shek's Lushan Officers' Training Corps and the reactionary new military principles applied in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign came about.

But just when the enemy was changing his military principles to suit fighting the Red Army, people appeared in our ranks who went back to the "old ways". They advocated going back to the general conditions, refused to understand any special conditions, refused the experience of the Red Army's history of bloody fighting, belittled the strength of imperialism and of the Kuomintang, belittled the strength of the Kuomintang forces, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. The result was the loss of all the revolutionary base areas except the Shensi-Kansu border area, the reduction of the Red Army from 300,000 men to a few tens of thousands, the reduction of the Chinese Communist Party from 300,000 members to a few tens of thousands, and the loss of almost all Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas. In short, we received an enormous historical punishment. They called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but in fact they had learned nothing of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said: the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. It is precisely this that these comrades of ours have forgotten.

From this we see that without understanding the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, one cannot direct it and cannot lead it onto the road of victory.

Section 2: What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War?

What, then, are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?

I think there are four main ones.

The first characteristic is that China is a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through the revolution of 1924–27.

This characteristic points to the possibility of the growth and victory of China's revolutionary war. When, in the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928, not long after guerrilla warfare began in China, some comrades in the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi, the Chingkangshan, raised the question "How long can the red flag be kept flying?", we pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area). Because this is a most basic question, we could not advance a single step without answering the question whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could exist and grow. The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 gave another answer to this question. From then on the Chinese revolutionary movement had a correct theoretical basis.

Let us now look at this question in its parts.

China is unevenly developed politically and economically: a feeble capitalist economy and a heavy semi-feudal economy exist side by side; a few modern industrial and commercial cities and the vast stagnant countryside exist side by side; several million industrial workers and several hundred million peasants and handicraftsmen under the old regime exist side by side; big warlords who control the central government and small warlords who control the provinces exist side by side; in the reactionary armies there are two kinds of forces, the so-called central army under Chiang Kai-shek and the so-called miscellaneous troops under the provincial warlords, existing side by side; and there are a few railways, steamship lines and motor roads, side by side with the many wheelbarrow roads, the paths that can be travelled only on foot and the paths that are hard to travel even on foot.

China is a semi-colonial country: the lack of unity among the imperialist powers is reflected in the lack of unity among China's ruling groups. A semi-colonial country dominated by several powers is different from a colony dominated by one power.

China is a big country: "When it is dark in the east it is light in the west, when it is dark in the south it is light in the north"; there is no worry about lack of room to manoeuvre.

China has gone through a great revolution: the seeds of the Red Army have been prepared, the leader of the Red Army, namely the Communist Party, has been prepared, and the masses who have taken part in a revolution have been prepared.

So we say that China is a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through one revolution. This is the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic basically determines not only our political strategy and tactics but also our military strategy and tactics.

The second characteristic is the great strength of the enemy.

What is the situation of the Kuomintang, the enemy of the Red Army? It is a party that has seized political power and has relatively stabilized its power. It has won the support of the main counter-revolutionary countries of the world. It has remodelled its army, so that it differs from the armies of any other period of Chinese history and is on the whole similar to the armies of the modern states of the world; its supply of arms and other military material is far richer than the Red Army's, and its army is larger than any army in any period of Chinese history and larger than the standing army of any country in the world. There is a world of difference between its army and the Red Army. It controls the key points or lifelines of the political, economic, communications and cultural life of the whole country, and its political power is nation-wide.

The Chinese Red Army is confronted by such a powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. This characteristic makes the Red Army's operations differ in many ways from war in general, and from the Soviet civil war and the Northern Expedition.

The third characteristic is the weakness of the Red Army.

The Chinese Red Army came into being after the defeat of the first great revolution, and began as guerrilla units. It came into being not only in a period of reaction in China but in a period when the reactionary capitalist countries of the world were comparatively stable politically and economically.

Our political power is a scattered and isolated power in mountain or remote regions, and it has no outside help whatsoever. The economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward compared with those in the Kuomintang areas. The revolutionary base areas contain only villages and small towns. Their territory was at first very small and later was still not large. Moreover, the base areas are unstable; the Red Army has no really consolidated base areas.

The Red Army is small in numbers, its weapons are poor, and its supply of food, clothing and other material is extremely difficult.

This characteristic is in sharp contrast to the preceding one. The strategy and tactics of the Red Army arise from this sharp contrast.

The fourth characteristic is the leadership of the Communist Party and the agrarian revolution.

This characteristic is the necessary result of the first. It gives rise to two aspects. On the one hand, although China's revolutionary war takes place in a period of reaction in China and in the capitalist world, it can win victory because it has the leadership of the Communist Party and the support of the peasantry. Although the base areas are small, they have great political power and stand firmly in opposition to the huge Kuomintang regime; militarily they create great difficulties for the Kuomintang's attacks, because we have the support of the peasantry. Although the Red Army is small, it has great fighting power, because the men of the Red Army under the leadership of the Communist Party arose out of the agrarian revolution and fight for their own interests, and because the commanders and fighters are politically united.

On the other hand, there is a sharp contrast with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang opposes the agrarian revolution and therefore has no support from the peasantry. Although its army is large, it cannot make the masses of soldiers, or the many junior officers who come from small producers, willingly risk their lives for the Kuomintang; the officers and men are politically divided, and this reduces its fighting power.

Section 3: Our Strategy and Tactics Arise from These Characteristics

A vast semi-colonial country, unevenly developed politically and economically, which has gone through a great revolution; a powerful enemy; a weak Red Army; the agrarian revolution: these are the four main characteristics of China's revolutionary war. They determine the guiding line of China's revolutionary war and many of its strategic and tactical principles. The first and fourth characteristics determine that the Chinese Red Army can grow and can defeat its enemy. The second and third characteristics determine that the Chinese Red Army cannot grow very rapidly and cannot defeat its enemy very quickly; that is, they determine that the war will be protracted and that, if it is handled badly, it may even be lost.

These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneously, that is to say, there are both favourable conditions and difficult conditions. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, and many other laws arise from it. The history of our ten years of war proves the correctness of this law. Whoever keeps his eyes shut to these laws of a fundamental nature cannot direct China's revolutionary war and cannot enable the Red Army to win battles.

It is quite clear that the following all demand correct solution: correctly determining the strategic direction; opposing adventurism in attack, conservatism in defence, and flightism in shifting; opposing guerrilla-ism in the Red Army while recognizing the guerrilla character of the Red Army; opposing protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, while recognizing protracted war as a strategy and quick decision as the principle of campaigns; opposing fixed operational lines and positional warfare, while recognizing fluid operational lines and mobile warfare; opposing the warfare of mere routing of the enemy, while recognizing the warfare of annihilation; opposing the "two fists" in strategic direction, while recognizing the "one fist"; opposing the system of a big rear area, while recognizing the system of a small rear area; opposing absolute centralized command, while recognizing relatively centralized command; opposing the purely military viewpoint and the roving-rebel outlook, while recognizing the Red Army as the propagandist and organizer of the Chinese revolution; opposing banditry, while recognizing strict political discipline; opposing warlordism, while recognizing a limited democratic life and authoritative military discipline; opposing an incorrect, sectarian cadre policy, while recognizing a correct cadre policy; opposing a policy of isolation, while recognizing the winning over of all possible allies; and finally, opposing keeping the Red Army at an old stage, while striving to develop the Red Army to a new stage. All these questions of principle demand correct solution. The strategic problems that we are going to discuss now are precisely for the purpose of explaining these questions well, on the basis of the experience of China's ten years of bloody revolutionary war.

Chapter IV: "Encirclement and Suppression" and Campaigns Against It: The Main Form of China's Civil War

For ten years, from the very first day guerrilla warfare began, around every independent Red guerrilla unit or Red Army, around every revolutionary base area, what has constantly been met with is enemy "encirclement and suppression". The enemy regards the Red Army as a foreign body and wants to seize it the moment it appears. The enemy always follows the Red Army, and always tries to encircle it. This form has not changed in the past ten years, and if national war had not replaced civil war, it would not change until the day when the enemy becomes weak and the Red Army becomes strong.

The activity of the Red Army has taken the form of campaigns against "encirclement and suppression". By victory we mainly mean victory in countering "encirclement and suppression", that is, strategic and campaign victory. Countering one "encirclement and suppression" is one campaign, often made up of several, or even several tens of, battles, large and small. Until an "encirclement and suppression" has been basically smashed, even if many battles have been won, one cannot say that strategic or campaign victory has been won. The ten years' history of Red Army warfare is a history of campaigns against "encirclement and suppression".

The enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and the Red Army's counter-campaigns involve the use by each side of the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, and in this there is no difference from wars in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad. But what is peculiar to China's civil war is the long-term repetition of both. In one "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy attacks against the Red Army's defence, and the Red Army defends against the enemy's attack: this is the first stage of the counter-campaign. The enemy defends against the Red Army's attack, and the Red Army attacks against the enemy's defence: this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every "encirclement and suppression" includes these two stages, and they are repeated over a long period.

By long-term repetition I mean the repetition of the forms of war and of fighting. This is a fact that anyone can see at a glance. "Encirclement and suppression" and the counter-campaigns against it constitute a repetition of the form of war. The first stage, in which the enemy attacks against our defence and we defend against his attack, and the second stage, in which the enemy defends against our attack and we attack against his defence, constitute a repetition of the forms of fighting in each "encirclement and suppression".

As for the content of the war and of the fighting, it is not simply repeated but is different each time. This too is a fact that anyone can see at a glance. The law here is that the "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and our counter-campaigns grow bigger each time, the circumstances grow more complex each time, and the fighting grows fiercer each time.

But there have been ups and downs. After the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, because the Red Army had been greatly weakened, all the southern base areas had been lost, and the Red Army had moved to the northwest and was no longer in as important a position as in the south, threatening the enemy within the country, the scale, circumstances and fighting of the "encirclement and suppression" became comparatively smaller, simpler and less intense.

What is defeat for the Red Army? Strategically speaking, only a basic failure to counter an "encirclement and suppression" can be called defeat, and even then it can only be called a partial and temporary defeat. For the fundamental defeat in civil war would be the destruction of the whole Red Army, and there has been no such fact. The loss of extensive base areas and the shifting of the Red Army is a temporary and partial defeat, not an eternal and total one, although this part included ninety per cent of the Party, the army and the base areas. We call this fact a continuation of the defence, and call the enemy's pursuit a continuation of the offensive. That is to say, in the struggle of "encirclement and suppression" and counter-campaigns, we did not pass from the defensive to the offensive, but on the contrary our defence was broken by the enemy's offensive, our defence turned into retreat, and the enemy's offensive turned into pursuit. But when the Red Army arrived in a new region, as when we moved from Kiangsi and other places to Shensi, the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" appeared again. So we say that the Red Army's strategic retreat (the Long March) was a continuation of the Red Army's strategic defence, and the enemy's strategic pursuit was a continuation of the enemy's strategic offensive.

China's civil war, like any war ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, has only two basic forms of fighting, attack and defence. What is peculiar to China's civil war is the long-term repetition of "encirclement and suppression" and of the counter-campaigns, and the long-term repetition of the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, together with the inclusion in it of something like a great strategic shift of over ten thousand kilometres (the Long March).

The same is true of what is called the enemy's defeat. His strategic defeat consists in our smashing his "encirclement and suppression", our defence turning into attack, and the enemy being forced onto the defensive, so that he must reorganize before he can launch another "encirclement and suppression". The enemy has had nothing like our strategic shift of over ten thousand kilometres, because he is the ruler of the whole country and is much stronger than we are. But partial instances have occurred. In some base areas, enemy troops in White strongholds besieged by the Red Army have broken out and retreated into the White areas to reorganize and attack again; such things have happened. If the civil war is prolonged and the Red Army's victories spread more widely, such things will become more frequent. But their outcome cannot be compared with that of the Red Army, because they have no support from the people and there is disunity between officers and men. If they too tried long-distance shifts like the Red Army, they would certainly be destroyed.

During the Li Li-san line period in 1930, Comrade Li Li-san did not understand the protracted nature of China's civil war, and therefore could not see the law of long-term repetition in the development of China's civil war, "encirclement and suppression" again and again, smashing again and again (at that time there had already been three "encirclement and suppression" campaigns on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, two in Fukien, and so on); therefore, when the Red Army was still in its infancy, he ordered the Red Army to attack Wuhan and ordered armed uprisings throughout the country, in an attempt to bring quick victory to the revolution throughout the country. This was the mistake of "Left" opportunism.

The "Left" opportunism of 1931–34 likewise did not believe in the law of the repetition of "encirclement and suppression". In the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area base there was the so-called "side-army" theory: some leading comrades there held that the Kuomintang after the defeat of its third "encirclement and suppression" was no more than a side army, and that to attack the Red Army the imperialists would have to come out in person and serve as the main force. The strategic policy under this estimate was for the Red Army to attack Wuhan. This was identical in principle with the calls of some comrades in Kiangsi for the Red Army to attack Nanchang, their opposition to the work of linking the base areas into one whole, their opposition to the operational method of luring the enemy in deep, their placing victory in one province on the basis of seizing the provincial capital and central cities, and their view that "the fight against the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' is the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism", and so on. This "Left" opportunism sowed the seeds of the erroneous line in the struggle against the fourth "encirclement and suppression" in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area and against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the Central Area in Kiangsi, left the Red Army powerless in the face of the enemy's serious "encirclement and suppression", and brought great losses to the Chinese revolution.

Directly linked with the "Left" opportunism that denied the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" was the view that the Red Army should not adopt defensive means at all, which was also entirely incorrect.

"Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive": this statement is of course correct in its way. From the birth of revolution and revolutionary war to their growth, from small to large, from having no political power to seizing political power, from having no Red Army to creating a Red Army, from having no revolutionary base areas to creating them, one must always attack and cannot be conservative; the tendency towards conservatism should be opposed.

"Revolution and revolutionary war are offensive, but there are also defence and retreat": only this statement is entirely correct. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move sideways in order to move frontally, to take a roundabout route in order to take a direct one, are phenomena that cannot be avoided in the development of many things, let alone in military movements.

Of the two assertions above, the former may be right politically but is wrong when transferred to the military field. Even in politics it is right only in certain circumstances (when the revolution is advancing), and wrong when transferred to other circumstances (when the revolution is in retreat: in a general retreat, for example in Russia in 1906 and in China in 1927; in a partial retreat, for example in Russia in 1918 at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). Only the latter assertion is a truth that is correct in all respects. The "Left" opportunism of 1931–34, in mechanically opposing the use of military defence, was nothing but an extremely childish idea.

When will the form of the repetition of "encirclement and suppression" come to an end? In my view, if the civil war is prolonged, it will be when a fundamental change has occurred in the comparative strength of the enemy and ourselves. If the Red Army ever becomes stronger than its enemy, then this repetition will end. Then it will be we who encircle and suppress the enemy, while the enemy tries to counter our campaigns, but the political and military conditions will not allow the enemy to obtain the same position in countering campaigns as the Red Army had. Then, even if we cannot say that the form of repeated "encirclement and suppression" will have ended completely, it can be asserted that in general it will have ended.

Chapter V: Strategic Defence

In this chapter I want to explain the following questions: (1) active defence and passive defence; (2) preparations for countering "encirclement and suppression"; (3) strategic retreat; (4) strategic counter-offensive; (5) the question of starting the counter-offensive; (6) the question of concentrating forces; (7) mobile warfare; (8) quick-decision warfare; (9) war of annihilation.

Section 1: Active Defence and Passive Defence

Why start with defence? After the failure of China's first national united front in 1924–27, the revolution became an extremely profound and cruel class war. The enemy was the ruler of the whole country and we had only a few small units; therefore from the very beginning we have been fighting against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression". Our offensives are closely tied to smashing "encirclement and suppression", and the fate of our development depends entirely on whether we can smash it. The process of smashing "encirclement and suppression" is often roundabout and winding, not straight and smooth. The first and serious problem is how to preserve our strength and wait for the opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore the problem of strategic defence has become the most complicated and important problem in the Red Army's operations.

In our ten years of war, two deviations have often occurred on the problem of strategic defence: one is underestimating the enemy, and the other is being intimidated by the enemy.

Because of underestimating the enemy, many guerrilla units were defeated, and the Red Army failed to smash several of the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns.

When revolutionary guerrilla units first arise, their leaders often do not view the situation of the enemy and ourselves correctly. They see that they have won in one place by a sudden armed uprising, or have broken away from the White army by mutiny, and that the environment is for the moment very favourable; or there is a serious environment but they do not see it; and so they often underestimate the enemy. On the other hand, they do not understand their own weaknesses (lack of experience, small strength). That the enemy is strong and we are weak is an objectively existing phenomenon, but people are unwilling to think about it, and talk only of attack, not of defence and retreat; they have disarmed themselves mentally in respect of defence, and so lead their action in the wrong direction. Many guerrilla units were defeated for this reason.

Examples of the Red Army's failure to smash "encirclement and suppression" for the same reason are the defeat of the Red Army in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung in 1928, and the fact that in 1932 the Red Army in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, under the guidance of the so-called "side-army" theory about the Kuomintang, lost its ability to deal with the situation calmly in the fourth counter-campaign.

Examples of setbacks caused by being intimidated by the enemy are many.

In contrast to those who underestimate the enemy, people overrate the enemy and underrate themselves too much, and so adopt an unnecessary policy of retreat, and likewise disarm themselves mentally in respect of defence. The result is either the defeat of guerrilla units, or the defeat of the Red Army in certain campaigns, or the loss of base areas.

The most conspicuous example of the loss of a base area is the loss of the Central Base Area in Kiangsi in the counter-campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression". The mistake here arose from a Right viewpoint. The leaders feared the enemy as they would a tiger, set up defences everywhere and resisted at every step; they dared not launch an offensive towards the enemy's rear, which would have been advantageous, and dared not boldly and freely lure the enemy in deep and concentrate to annihilate him. The result was the loss of the whole base area and the Red Army's Long March of over twelve thousand kilometres. But this mistake was often preceded by a "Left" error of underestimating the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking central cities in 1932 was precisely the source of the passive-defence line adopted later in dealing with the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression".

An extreme example of being intimidated by the enemy is the retreatist "Chang Kuo-tao line". The defeat of the Western Column of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army west of the Yellow River was the final bankruptcy of this line.

Active defence is also called offensive defence, or defence with decisive engagements. Passive defence is also called purely defensive defence, or simple defence. Passive defence is in fact spurious defence, and only active defence is genuine defence, defence for the sake of counter-attack and offensive. As far as I know, no valuable military book and no reasonably intelligent military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, whether in strategy or tactics, fails to oppose passive defence. Only the most stupid or the most arrogant people treat passive defence as a magic talisman. Yet there are in the world such people who do such things. This is an error in war, an expression of conservatism in military affairs, and we must firmly oppose it.

Among the military men of the late-rising and swiftly developing imperialist countries, Germany and Japan, there are those who vigorously advocate the advantages of the strategic offensive and oppose strategic defence. This thinking is fundamentally unsuited to China's revolutionary war. The military men of German and Japanese imperialism point out that an important weakness of defence is that it cannot inspire the people but instead makes them waver. This refers to countries where class contradictions are acute and the benefits of war accrue only to the reactionary ruling strata or even to the reactionary party in power. Our situation is different. Under the slogans of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can unite the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the invaded. The Red Army in the Soviet civil war also defeated the enemy in the form of defence. Their war was fought under the slogan of defending the Soviets not only when the imperialist countries organized the White Guards to attack, but even in the period of preparation for the October uprising, when military mobilization was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In all just wars, defensive fighting not only has the effect of paralysing politically alien elements but can also mobilize the backward masses to join the war.

When Marx said that after the armed uprising not a moment should be lost in attacking, he meant that the masses who rise suddenly when the enemy is unprepared should give the reactionary rulers no chance to keep or restore their power, should take that moment to catch the reactionary ruling forces within the country off guard, and should not be satisfied with the victory already gained, underestimate the enemy, slacken the offensive against the enemy, or hold back and lose the opportunity to destroy the enemy, thereby inviting the failure of the revolution. This is correct. But it does not mean that when the two sides are already in military confrontation and the enemy is superior, the revolutionaries should not adopt defensive means when pressed by the enemy. Anyone who thinks so is a fool of the first order.

Our wars in the past, taken as a whole, were offensives against the Kuomintang, but militarily they took the form of smashing "encirclement and suppression".

Militarily speaking, our war is an alternating application of defence and offensive. For us, it can be said either that the offensive comes after the defence or that it comes before the defence, because the key lies in smashing "encirclement and suppression". Before "encirclement and suppression" is smashed it is defence, and once it is smashed the offensive begins; these are merely two stages of one thing, and one "encirclement and suppression" by the enemy is followed directly by another. Of these two stages, the defensive stage is more complicated and more important than the offensive stage. It involves many problems of how to smash "encirclement and suppression". The basic principle is to recognize active defence and oppose passive defence.

In civil war, if the strength of the Red Army surpasses that of the enemy, then in general there will be no need for strategic defence. The policy at that time will simply be the strategic offensive. This change depends on a general change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. By then, the only defensive means left will be partial ones.

Section 2: Preparations for Countering "Encirclement and Suppression"

If we have no necessary and adequate preparations against an enemy's planned "encirclement and suppression", we shall inevitably fall into a passive position. To meet it hastily and at the last minute leaves no assurance of victory. Therefore, while the enemy is preparing his "encirclement and suppression", it is absolutely necessary for us to make preparations for countering it. The views opposing preparation that have appeared in our ranks are childish and laughable.

Here there is a difficult problem that easily gives rise to dispute: when should we end our own offensive and go over to preparations for countering "encirclement and suppression"? When we are in the midst of a victorious offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, the enemy's preparations for "encirclement and suppression" are carried on in secret, and it is hard for us to know when he will launch his attack. If we start preparations for the counter-campaign too early, we inevitably reduce the benefits of our offensive and sometimes produce some bad effects on the Red Army and the people. For the main steps in the preparatory stage are the military preparation for retreat and the political mobilization for that retreat. Sometimes, if the preparations are too early, they turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy coming, we have to launch our own offensive afresh. Sometimes, just as our new offensive is starting, we run into the start of the enemy's offensive, and put ourselves in a difficult position. So the choice of the time to begin preparations becomes an important question. In determining this time we must look at the circumstances of both the enemy and ourselves and the relations between them. To understand the enemy's situation, we must collect data on the enemy's politics, military affairs, finance and public opinion. In analysing this data, we must give full weight to the enemy's total strength; we must not exaggerate the degree of the enemy's past defeats, but we must on no account fail to take into account the contradictions within the enemy camp, his financial difficulties, the effects of his past defeats, and so on. As regards our own side, we must not exaggerate the degree of our past victories, but we must on no account fail to give full weight to the effects of our past victories.

But on the question of when to begin preparations, generally speaking it is better to err on the side of being too early than on the side of being too late, because the loss from the former is smaller than from the latter, and the benefit is that preparedness averts disaster and puts us fundamentally in an invincible position.

The main questions in the preparatory stage are the Red Army's preparation for retreat, political mobilization, recruitment of new soldiers, preparation of finance and grain, and the handling of politically alien elements.

By the Red Army's preparation for retreat is meant not letting the Red Army face in a direction unfavourable for retreat, not letting it advance too far, and not letting it get too tired. This is the necessary arrangement for the main Red Army force on the eve of a large-scale enemy offensive. At this time the Red Army's attention should be mainly on creating the battlefield, collecting resources, and plans for expanding and training itself.

Political mobilization is the first important question in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression". That is to say, we must tell the personnel of the Red Army and the people of the base areas clearly, resolutely and fully about the inevitability and imminence of the enemy's offensive and the gravity of the harm it will do to the people, and at the same time about the enemy's weaknesses, the Red Army's superior conditions, our determination to win, the direction of our work and so on. We must call on the whole Red Army and all the people to fight against "encirclement and suppression" and defend the base areas. Except for military secrets, political mobilization must be open and must strive to reach everyone who can possibly support the interests of the revolution. The key link is to convince the cadres.

Recruitment of new soldiers must proceed from two sides: on the one hand it must take into account the degree of the people's political consciousness and the population situation; on the other it must take into account the situation of the Red Army at that time and the possible limit of the Red Army's losses in the whole counter-campaign.

The problems of finance and grain are, needless to say, of great significance in countering "encirclement and suppression". We must take into account the possible prolongation of the "encirclement and suppression". We should calculate the minimum material needs, mainly of the Red Army and secondly of the people of the revolutionary base areas, during the whole counter-campaign.

In dealing with politically alien elements, we must not be off our guard against them, but neither must we be too afraid of their betraying us and adopt excessive measures of vigilance. A distinction should be made among landlords, merchants and rich peasants; the main thing is to explain things to them politically, win their neutrality, and organize the masses to keep watch on them. Only against the very few most dangerous elements may severe measures, such as arrest, be used.

The degree of victory in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression" is closely tied to the degree to which the tasks of the preparatory stage are accomplished. Both slackness in preparation arising from underestimating the enemy and panic arising from being intimidated by the enemy's offensive are bad tendencies that must be firmly opposed. What we need is an ardent yet calm mood and tense but orderly work.

Section 3: Strategic Retreat

Strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior army in the face of the offensive of a superior army, when it takes into account that it cannot quickly smash that offensive, in order to preserve its strength and wait for an opportunity to defeat the enemy. But the military adventurists firmly oppose this step; their proposal is the so-called "meet the enemy outside the gates of the country".

Everyone knows that when two boxers confront each other, the clever one often gives way a step, while the fool rushes in fiercely and uses up all his skill at the first blow, and in the end is often knocked down by the one who gave way.

In the novel Shui Hu Chuan, Instructor Hung in Chai Chin's house wanted to fight Lin Chung, and called out "Come on! Come on! Come on!" several times; the result was that Lin Chung, who had given way, saw through Hung's weakness and with one kick sent Instructor Hung sprawling.

In the Spring and Autumn Period, when Lu fought Chi, Duke Chuang of Lu at first wanted to fight before the Chi army was tired, but he was stopped by Tsao Kuei, who adopted the policy "when the enemy is tired, we attack", defeated the Chi army, and created a famous example in Chinese military history of a weak army defeating a strong one. Let us look at the account by the historian Tso Chiu-ming:

"In the spring, the army of Chi attacked us. The Duke was about to fight. Tsao Kuei asked for an audience. A man of his village said: 'The meat-eaters will plan for it; why should you meddle?' Kuei said: 'The meat-eaters are shallow and cannot plan far ahead.' So he went in to see the Duke. He asked: 'On what will you fight?' The Duke said: 'Food and clothing that give comfort I dare not keep to myself; I always share them with others.' He replied: 'Small favours are not spread to all; the people will not follow you.' The Duke said: 'Sacrificial animals, jade and silk I dare not embellish; I always keep faith.' He replied: 'Small good faith is not yet trusted; the spirits will not bless you.' The Duke said: 'In cases large and small, though I cannot examine them all, I always decide according to the facts.' He replied: 'That is a kind of loyalty. You may fight one battle. When you fight, I ask to follow.' The Duke let him ride in his chariot. They fought at Changshao. The Duke was about to sound the drums. Kuei said: 'Not yet.' The men of Chi sounded the drums three times. Kuei said: 'Now.' The army of Chi was routed. The Duke was about to give chase. Kuei said: 'Not yet.' He got down and looked at their wheel tracks, climbed on the crossbar and gazed afar, and said: 'Now.' Then they pursued the army of Chi. After the victory, the Duke asked the reason. He replied: 'Battle is a matter of courage. The first drum rouses courage; the second weakens it; by the third it is exhausted. They were exhausted and we were full, hence we overcame them. A great state is hard to fathom; I feared an ambush. I saw their tracks were in disorder and their banners drooping, so I pursued them.'"

The situation at that time was a weak state resisting a strong one. The passage points to the political preparation before the battle, winning the trust of the people; it mentions the position favourable for going over to the counter-offensive, Changshao; it mentions the moment favourable for starting the counter-offensive, when the enemy is exhausted and we are full; and it mentions the moment for starting the pursuit, when the tracks are in disorder and the banners drooping. Although it was a small campaign, it speaks at the same time of the principles of strategic defence. There are very many instances in Chinese military history of victories won in accordance with this principle. The famous great battles, such as the Battle of Chengkao between Chu and Han, the Battle of Kunyang between Hsin and Han, the Battle of Kuantu between Yuan and Tsao, the Battle of Chihpi between Wu and Wei, the Battle of Yiling between Wu and Shu, and the Battle of the Fei River between Chin and Chin, were all battles in which the two sides were unequal in strength, and the weaker side yielded a step at first, then struck after the enemy had struck, and so won.

Our war began in the autumn of 1927, when we had absolutely no experience. The Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Uprising failed, the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border area also lost a few battles and shifted to the Chingkangshan area on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. In April of the next year, the troops preserved after the failure of the Nanchang Uprising also moved through southern Hunan to the Chingkangshan. But beginning in May 1928, the basic principles of guerrilla warfare, simple in character and suited to the circumstances of the time, had already emerged, namely, the sixteen-character formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This sixteen-character military principle was recognized by the Central Committee before the Li Li-san line. Later our principles of operation developed further. By the time of the first counter-campaign in the Kiangsi base area, the policy of "luring the enemy in deep" had been put forward and applied successfully. By the time the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" was defeated, the whole body of the Red Army's operational principles had taken shape. This was a new stage in the development of military principles; the content was greatly enriched and the form also changed in many ways, mainly in going beyond the earlier simplicity, but the basic principles remained that sixteen-character formula. The sixteen-character formula embraces the basic principles of countering "encirclement and suppression", embraces the two stages of strategic defence and strategic offensive, and within defence embraces the two stages of strategic retreat and strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only its development.

But beginning in January 1932, after the Party's resolution "Win victory first in one province or several provinces after the smashing of the three 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns", which contained a serious error of principle, was issued, the "Left" opportunists struggled against the correct principles and finally abolished a whole set of correct principles and set up another complete set opposed to them, the so-called "new principles" or "regular principles". From then on, the earlier things could not be called regular; they were "guerrilla-ism" that had to be repudiated. The atmosphere of opposing "guerrilla-ism" dominated for three whole years. Its first stage was military adventurism, its second stage turned into military conservatism, and finally its third stage became flightism. Only when the Party Central Committee held the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Tsunyi in Kweichow in January 1935 was the bankruptcy of this erroneous line proclaimed and the correctness of the former line recognized again. What a great price was paid for this!

The comrades who so energetically opposed "guerrilla-ism" said: Luring the enemy in deep is wrong, because many places are abandoned. Although we won battles in the past, are things not different now from the past? And would it not be better still to defeat the enemy without giving up territory? Would it not be better to defeat the enemy in the enemy's area or on the border between our area and the enemy's? The old things had no regularity whatsoever; they were just the methods used by guerrilla units. Now our state has been established and our Red Army has become regular. Our fighting with Chiang Kai-shek is state against state and big army against big army. History should not repeat itself, and the things of "guerrilla-ism" should all be discarded. The new principles are "completely Marxist", while the old things arose with guerrilla units in the mountains, and in the mountains there is no Marxism. The new principles are the opposite: "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight courageously and resolutely, and pursue the victory straight on"; "strike out along the whole line"; "seize the central cities"; "strike with two fists". When the enemy attacks, the way to deal with him is to "meet the enemy outside the gates of the country", "gain the initiative by striking first", "not smash the pots and jars", "not give up an inch of territory", "divide the forces into six routes"; it is the "decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism"; it is short swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare, attrition warfare, and "protracted war"; it is the doctrine of the big rear area, absolute centralized command; and finally, it is large-scale removal. And anyone who does not accept these is punished and labelled an opportunist, and so on.

Undoubtedly this whole body of theory and practice was wrong. It was subjectivism. It was an expression of petty-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and revolutionary impatience when the environment was favourable; when the environment became difficult, it successively turned, according to the change in circumstances, into desperate-gambler-ism, conservatism and flightism. This was the theory and practice of rash men and outsiders, with not a whiff of Marxism in it, and was anti-Marxist.

Here I speak only of strategic retreat, which in Kiangsi was called "luring the enemy in deep" and in Szechuan "tightening the position". Military theorists and practitioners of former times all admitted that this is the policy a weak army must adopt at the beginning of a war when fighting a strong one. Foreign military men have said: "In operations of the strategic defensive, the general practice is first to avoid a decisive battle that is unfavourable and to seek a decisive battle only when the circumstances become favourable." This is completely correct, and we have nothing to add to it.

The aim of strategic retreat is to preserve strength and prepare the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary because, in the face of an offensive by a strong enemy, if one does not yield a step, the preservation of one's strength will certainly be endangered. In the past, however, many people firmly opposed retreat and regarded it as "the opportunist line of simple defence". Our history has proved that this opposition was completely wrong.

To prepare the counter-offensive, we must select and create a number of conditions that favour us and not the enemy, so as to change the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves, and then enter the counter-offensive stage.

According to our experience in the past, it is probably necessary to obtain at least two of the following conditions in the stage of retreat before the situation can be regarded as favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy, and before we can go over to the counter-offensive. These conditions are:

(1) The people actively support the Red Army;

(2) The terrain favours our operations;

(3) All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated;

(4) The enemy's weak spots are discovered;

(5) The enemy is made tired and demoralized;

(6) The enemy is induced to make mistakes.

The condition of the people is the most important condition for the Red Army. This is the condition of the base area. And because of this condition, the fourth, fifth, sixth and other conditions are also easily created or found. So when the enemy launches a large-scale attack on the Red Army, the Red Army always retreats from the White areas to the base area, because the people in the base area give the most active support to the Red Army against the White army. There is also a difference between the border areas and the central areas of a base area; in the matter of blockading information, reconnaissance, transport, participation in battle and so on, the people of the central areas are better than those of the border areas. So the "end point of retreat" was in the past chosen, in the counter-campaigns against the first, second and third "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi, in areas where the conditions of the people were best or relatively good. This characteristic of the base area makes the Red Army's operations greatly different from operations in general, and it is also the main reason why the enemy was later forced to adopt blockhouse-ism.

A retreating army can choose the favourable positions it wants and force the attacking army to fall in with our terms; this is an excellent condition of operations on interior lines. A weak army that wants to defeat a strong one must attend to the condition of terrain. But this condition alone is not enough; other conditions must be combined with it. First is the condition of the people. Next is an enemy who is easy to beat, for example, when the enemy is tired, or has made a mistake, or when the enemy column advancing along a given route is comparatively lacking in fighting power. When these conditions are absent, even if there is an excellent position we must leave it alone and continue to retreat, so as to fall in with the conditions we want. There are excellent positions in the White areas, but not excellent conditions of the people. If the other conditions have also not yet been created or found, the Red Army has to retreat to the base area. The distinction between the border areas and the central areas of the base area is also roughly of this kind.

Apart from local forces and forces for containing action, the principle is that all striking forces be fully concentrated. When we attack an enemy who is on the strategic defensive, the Red Army is often dispersed. As soon as the enemy launches a large-scale attack on us, the Red Army carries out the so-called "centripetal retreat". The end point of the retreat is often chosen in the middle of the base area, but sometimes in the forward part and sometimes in the rear part, as determined by the circumstances. This centripetal retreat can bring all the main force of the Red Army together completely.

Another necessary condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to attack the weak part first. But when the enemy begins his offensive, we often do not know which of his columns advancing on separate routes is strongest, which next strongest, which weakest, which next weakest, and a process of reconnaissance is needed. It often takes much time to achieve this. This is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary.

If the attacking enemy far surpasses us in numbers and strength, and we want the balance between strong and weak to change, we can only wait until the enemy has penetrated deep into the base area and tasted all the bitterness of the base area, as a chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai-shek's brigades said in the third "encirclement and suppression", "the fat are dragged thin and the thin are dragged to death", or as Chen Ming-shu, commander-in-chief of the western route of the "encirclement and suppression" forces, said, "The National army is in darkness everywhere, the Red Army in light everywhere." At such a time, although the enemy forces are strong, they are greatly weakened; their troops are tired, their morale is low, and many weaknesses are exposed. Although the Red Army is weak, it has conserved its energy and built up its strength, and rests while waiting for the tired enemy. At this point the comparison between the two sides often reaches a certain degree of balance, or the enemy's absolute superiority changes into relative superiority, and our absolute inferiority into relative inferiority, and there are even cases where the enemy is inferior to us and we are superior to the enemy. In the counter-campaign against the third "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi the Red Army carried out an extreme form of retreat (the Red Army concentrated in the rear of the base area), but without it the enemy could not have been defeated, because the "encirclement and suppression" forces at that time outnumbered the Red Army more than ten to one. Sun Tzu's "Avoid the enemy's keen spirit, strike him when he is lazy and homeward-bound" refers to making the enemy tired and demoralized in order to reduce his superiority.

The last requirement of retreat is to create and discover the enemy's mistakes. It must be understood that no matter how able an enemy commander is, it is impossible for him not to make some mistake over a fairly long period, so the possibility that we can take advantage of an opening in the enemy always exists. The enemy will make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes err and sometimes give the enemy an opening to exploit. Moreover, we can create the enemy's mistakes artificially, for instance by what Sun Tzu called "making a show of form" (showing a form in the east while striking in the west, that is, feinting in the east and attacking in the west). To do this, the end point of the retreat cannot be restricted to a particular area. Sometimes, when we have retreated to that area and there is still no opening, we have to retreat a few more steps and wait until the enemy makes an exploitable "opening".

The favourable conditions sought in retreat are broadly as described above. But this does not mean that we must wait until these conditions are all present before launching the counter-offensive. It is impossible to have them all at once, and not necessary either. But, in the light of the enemy's present situation, to strive for certain necessary conditions is something to which an army fighting on interior lines, weak against strong, should pay attention; views opposing this are incorrect.

To decide where the end point of the retreat should be, we must take the whole situation as our point of departure. If the situation in one locality looks favourable for us to go over to the counter-offensive, but the situation as a whole does not at the same time look favourable to us, it is wrong to decide the end point of the retreat on that basis. For in starting the counter-offensive we must calculate the later changes, and our counter-offensive always begins from a part. Sometimes the end point of retreat should be chosen in the forward part of the base area, for example in the second and fourth counter-campaigns in Kiangsi and the third counter-campaign in Shensi-Kansu. Sometimes it should be in the middle of the base area, for example in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. Sometimes it should be in the rear of the base area, for example in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi. In all these cases it was decided by linking the partial situation with the situation as a whole. In the fifth counter-campaign in Kiangsi our army paid no attention to retreat at all; the reason was that no attention was paid either to the partial situation or to the situation as a whole, which was truly a reckless and slipshod way of doing things. Situations are created by conditions; in observing the connection between the partial situation and the situation as a whole, we should judge by whether the conditions held by both sides at that time, as they appear in the part and in the whole, favour our starting the counter-offensive within certain limits.

The end point of retreat within the base area can be roughly divided into three kinds: forward part, middle part, and rear part. But do we absolutely refuse to fight in the White areas? No. When we refuse to fight in the White areas, it refers only to dealing with the enemy's large-scale "encirclement and suppression". It is because the enemy and we are so greatly unequal in strength that, under the principle of preserving our strength and waiting for the opportunity to defeat the enemy, we advocate retreat into the base area and luring the enemy in deep, for only in this way can we create or find conditions favourable to the counter-offensive. If the situation is not so grave, or if it is so grave that the Red Army cannot launch a counter-offensive even in the base area, or if the counter-offensive is unfavourable and we need to retreat further to change the situation, then choosing the end point of retreat in the White areas should also be recognized, at least in theory, although we have had little such experience in the past.

The end point of retreat in the White areas can also be roughly divided into three kinds: first, in front of the base area; second, at the side of the base area; third, behind the base area. As an example of the first kind, in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the Red Army had not had internal disunity and the split in the local Party, that is, the two difficult problems of the Li Li-san line and the AB Corps, it would have been conceivable to concentrate forces for a counter-offensive among the three points of Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu. For at that time the strength of the enemy advancing from between the Kan and Fu rivers was not greatly superior to that of the Red Army (100,000 against 40,000). The conditions of the people were not as good as in the base area, but the conditions of terrain were present, and we could have defeated the enemy one column after another as they advanced on separate routes. As an example of the second kind, in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the scale of the enemy's offensive had not been so large, and if one enemy column advancing from Chienning, Likiang and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border had been of a strength suited to our attack, it would likewise have been conceivable for the Red Army to concentrate in the White area in western Fukien and first smash that column, without taking a roundabout route of a thousand li via Juichin to Hsingkuo. As an example of the third kind, again in the third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had advanced not westward but southward, we might have been forced to retreat to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), luring the enemy still further south, and then the Red Army would have struck from south to north into the interior of the base area, where the enemy forces in the north would not have been very numerous. But all these statements are hypothetical, with no experience behind them, and can be treated as special cases, not as general principles. For us, when the enemy launches a large-scale "encirclement and suppression", the general principle is to lure the enemy in deep and to retreat into the base area to fight, because this is the method by which we can smash the enemy's offensive with the greatest assurance.

Those who advocate "meeting the enemy outside the gates of the country" oppose strategic retreat on the grounds that retreat loses territory, harms the people (the so-called "smashing the pots and jars"), and also produces a bad effect abroad. In the fifth counter-campaign, they said that when we retreat a step the enemy's blockhouses advance a step, that the base area shrinks day by day and cannot be recovered. If luring the enemy in deep was useful before, they said, it is useless in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" with its blockhouse-ism. The fifth "encirclement and suppression" could be dealt with only by dividing forces to resist and by short swift thrusts.

It is easy to answer these views, and our history has already answered them. As for the loss of territory, it often happens that one can avoid loss only by suffering loss; this is the principle of "if you want to take, you must first give". If what we lose is territory and what we gain is the defeat of the enemy, plus the recovery of the territory, plus the expansion of territory, this is a profitable business. In market transactions, if the buyer does not lose money he cannot obtain goods, and if the seller does not lose goods he cannot obtain money. The loss caused by revolutionary movements is destruction, and what is gained is progressive construction. Sleep and rest lose time but gain the energy for tomorrow's work. If some fool, not understanding this, refuses to sleep, he will have no energy tomorrow; this is a losing business. Our losses in the period of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" were due precisely to this. Unwilling to lose part of the territory, we lost all of it. The hard fighting of Abyssinia also resulted in the loss of the whole country, although the cause of Abyssinia's defeat was not this alone.

The question of harming the people is the same. If we do not smash pots and jars in the homes of a part of the people for a while, we shall make the whole people smash pots and jars for a long time. To fear a bad political effect for a while is to pay for it with a long-term bad effect. After the October Revolution, if the Russian Bolsheviks, following the views of the "Left Communists", had refused the peace treaty with Germany, the newborn Soviets would have been in danger of dying young.

This kind of "Left" view, which looks revolutionary, arises from the revolutionary impatience of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and also from the partial conservatism of the peasant small producers. They look at problems only from the standpoint of one part, are incapable of surveying the whole, are unwilling to link today's interests with tomorrow's, or partial interests with the interests of the whole, and cling to something partial and momentary and will not let go even if it costs their lives. It is right that whatever, in the light of the concrete circumstances at the time, is beneficial to the whole situation and the whole period, and especially a part and a moment that are decisive, should be held on to and not let go; otherwise we would become drifters or laissez-faire-ists. This is the reason why retreat must have an end point. But this can by no means rely on the short-sightedness of the small producer. What we should learn is the wisdom of the Bolsheviks. Our eyesight is not sufficient, and we should use the help of the telescope and the microscope. The Marxist method is the telescope and microscope in politics and military affairs.

Of course, strategic retreat has its difficulties. The choice of the time to start the retreat, the choice of the end point of retreat, and the political persuasion of the cadres and the people are all difficult problems, and all must be solved.

The question of the time to start the retreat is of great importance. Our retreat in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi, had it not come exactly at that time, that is, if it had come later, would at least have affected the degree of our victory. Retreating too early or too late both of course involve loss. But generally speaking, the loss from being too late is greater than from being too early. A timely retreat puts us entirely in the initiative, which has a great effect, after reaching the end point of retreat, on reorganizing our dispositions and going over to the counter-offensive, resting while waiting for the tired enemy. In the campaigns that smashed the enemy's first, second and fourth "encirclement and suppression" in Kiangsi we dealt with the enemy unhurriedly. Only in the third campaign, because we did not expect that after so miserable a defeat in the second campaign the enemy's new offensive would come so quickly (we finished the operations of the second counter-campaign on May 31, 1931, and on July 1 Chiang Kai-shek began his third "encirclement and suppression"), the Red Army had to concentrate hurriedly by a roundabout route and was very tired. How to choose this time depends entirely on collecting the necessary data and judging from the general situation of both sides, by the same method as was said earlier for choosing the time to begin the preparatory stage.

As for strategic retreat, when cadres and people have as yet no experience, and when the authority of the military leadership has not yet reached the point where the power to decide strategic retreat is concentrated in the hands of the fewest people, or even one, and is accepted by the cadres, persuading the cadres and the people is a very difficult problem. Because the cadres lacked experience and did not believe in strategic retreat, great difficulties were met on this question in the early part of the first and fourth counter-campaigns and throughout the fifth. In the first counter-campaign, because of the influence of the Li Li-san line, the cadres' view before they were persuaded was not to retreat but to attack. In the fourth counter-campaign, because of the influence of military adventurism, the cadres' view was against preparation. In the fifth counter-campaign, the cadres' view at the beginning continued the military adventurist opposition to luring the enemy in deep, and later turned into military conservatism. The Chang Kuo-tao line, which did not believe that we could not build base areas in Tibetan and Moslem regions until it ran into a wall, is also an example. Experience is necessary for cadres, and failure is indeed the mother of success. But it is also necessary to accept other people's experience with an open mind; if everything must wait for one's own experience, or if one stubbornly insists on one's own views and refuses to accept others', that is the very "narrow empiricism". Our war has suffered not a little from this.

The people's disbelief in the necessity of strategic retreat, because of lack of experience, was greatest in the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi. At that time the local Party organizations and the masses in Kian, Hsingkuo, Yungfeng and other counties all opposed the Red Army's retreat. But after that experience, in the later counter-campaigns this problem no longer arose at all. Everyone believed that the losses of the base area and the hardships of the people were temporary, and everyone had confidence that the Red Army could smash "encirclement and suppression". But whether the people trust or not is closely tied to whether the cadres trust or not, so the main and first task is to persuade the cadres.

The whole purpose of strategic retreat is to go over to the counter-offensive; strategic retreat is only the first stage of strategic defence. The decisive key to the whole strategy lies in whether the counter-offensive stage that follows can be won.

Section 4: Strategic Counter-Offensive

Defeating the offensive of an absolutely superior enemy depends on the situation created in the stage of strategic retreat, which favours us and not the enemy and has changed from what it was when the enemy began his offensive, and this situation is created by various conditions. This has been discussed above.

But the existence of conditions and a situation favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy does not yet mean the enemy's defeat. These conditions and this situation contain the possibility of deciding victory or defeat, but are not yet the reality of victory or defeat; they have not yet realized victory or defeat for the two armies. To realize this victory or defeat depends on the decisive battle between the two armies. Only a decisive battle can settle the question of which army wins and which loses. This is the whole task of the strategic counter-offensive stage. The counter-offensive is a long process; it is the most brilliant and lively stage of defensive war, and it is also the final stage of defensive war. What is called active defence mainly refers to this strategic counter-offensive of a decisive character.

Conditions and situations are created not only in the stage of strategic retreat but continue to be created in the counter-offensive stage. The conditions and situations at this time are not entirely of the same form and the same nature as those of the previous stage.

They may be of the same form and nature; for example, the greater tiredness and loss of numbers of the enemy forces at this time are merely a continuation of the tiredness and loss of the previous stage.

But entirely new conditions and situations also necessarily appear. For example, when the enemy has suffered one or several defeats, the conditions then favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy are not merely the enemy's tiredness and so on, but include the new condition of the enemy's defeat. The situation also undergoes new changes. The enemy's movements are hasty and confused and his actions improper, and the relative superiority of the two armies is no longer the same as before.

If one to several defeats belong not to the enemy but to our army, then whether conditions and situations are favourable also changes to the opposite. That is to say, the enemy's disadvantages diminish, our disadvantages begin to appear and even grow. This again is something entirely new and different from before.

Whichever side suffers defeat, it directly and rapidly gives rise on the losing side to a new effort, an effort to retrieve the critical situation, to extricate itself from the newly appearing conditions and situation unfavourable to itself and favourable to the enemy, and to create anew conditions and situations favourable to itself and unfavourable to the enemy in order to press upon the other side.

The effort of the winning side is the opposite: it strives to develop its victory, inflict greater damage on the enemy, increase or develop the conditions and situations favourable to itself, and make sure the other side does not succeed in extricating itself from the unfavourable position and retrieving the critical situation.

So, on whichever side, the struggle in the stage of decisive battle is the most intense, most complex and most changeable in the whole war or the whole campaign, and also the most difficult and most arduous; in terms of command, it is the time at which it is least easy.

In the counter-offensive stage there are many problems, the main ones being the question of starting the counter-offensive, the question of concentrating forces, the question of mobile warfare, the question of quick-decision warfare, the question of the war of annihilation, and so on.

The principles in these questions, whether for the counter-offensive or for the offensive, are in their basic nature not different. In this sense it can be said that the counter-offensive is an offensive.

But the counter-offensive is not entirely an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy attacks. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are again some differences.

For this reason, although here many questions of operations are all discussed under the counter-offensive section of strategic defence, and in the section on the strategic offensive only other questions are discussed, in order to avoid repetition, in applying them we must neither overlook their points of similarity nor overlook their points of difference.

Section 5: The Question of Starting the Counter-Offensive

The question of starting the counter-offensive is the question of the so-called "first battle" or "opening battle".

Many bourgeois military men advocate caution in the first battle, whether in strategic defence or strategic offensive, and especially in defence. In the past we also raised this question seriously. The operations against the enemy's first to fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns in Kiangsi gave us rich experience, and it is not without benefit to study this experience.

In the first "encirclement and suppression", the enemy attacked the Red base area from north to south, along the line from Kian to Chienning, with about 100,000 men in eight columns. The Red Army at that time numbered about 40,000 and was concentrated in the Huangpi and Hsiaopu area of Ningtu County, Kiangsi Province.

The situation at that time was as follows: (1) The "suppression" forces numbered no more than 100,000, and none of them were Chiang's own troops, so the overall situation was not very serious. (2) The enemy's Lo Lin division was defending Kian, separated on the west side of the Kan River. (3) The enemy's Kung Ping-fan, Chang Hui-tsan and Tan Tao-yuan divisions had advanced into the area of Futien, Tungku, Lungkang and Yuantou, southeast of Kian and northwest of Ningtu. Chang's division had its main force at Lungkang, and Tan's at Yuantou. Futien and Tungku, because the people there had been deceived by the AB Corps and for the moment did not trust the Red Army and were opposed to it, were not suitable as battlefields. (4) The enemy's Liu Ho-ting division was far away in Chienning in the White area of Fukien and would not necessarily cross into Kiangsi. (5) The enemy's Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ko-hsiang divisions had advanced to Toupi, Lokou and Tungshao between Kwangchang and Ningtu. Toupi was a White area, Lokou a guerrilla area, and Tungshao had the AB Corps and information easily leaked. Moreover, if we attacked Mao Ping-wen and Hsu Ko-hsiang and then went on to attack westward, we feared that Chang Hui-tsan, Tan Tao-yuan and Kung Ping-fan in the west would concentrate, making a decision difficult and the problem not finally solved. (6) The Chang and Tan divisions were the main force of the "suppression" army and the own troops of Lu Ti-ping, Chairman of Kiangsi and commander-in-chief of the "encirclement and suppression" forces, and Chang was also the commander at the front. If these two divisions were destroyed, the "encirclement and suppression" would be basically smashed. Each division had about 14,000 men, and Chang's division was stationed in two places, so attacking one division at a time gave us absolute superiority. (7) The Lungkang and Yuantou area, where the main forces of the Chang and Tan divisions were, was close to our concentration area, and the conditions of the people were good, enabling us to approach under concealment. (8) Lungkang had an excellent position. Yuantou was not good for attacking. If the enemy attacked Hsiaopu and came to us, the position there was also good. (9) We could concentrate the greatest force in the direction of Lungkang. Hsingkuo, several tens of li southwest of Lungkang, also had an independent division of over a thousand men that could circle to the enemy's rear. (10) Our army carried out a breakthrough in the centre, and when a gap was opened in the enemy's line, the enemy's eastern and western columns were separated into two widely separated groups. On the basis of the above reasons, we decided to fight our first battle and did fight, destroying the two brigades of Chang Hui-tsan's main force and one divisional headquarters, capturing all nine thousand men including the division commander, without letting a single man or horse escape. One victory so frightened Tan's division that it ran towards Tungshao, and Hsu's division ran towards Toupi. Our army then pursued Tan's division and destroyed half of it. Two battles in five days (December 30, 1930, to January 3, 1931), and then the enemy at Futien, Tungku, Toupi and elsewhere, afraid of being attacked, withdrew one after another, and the first "encirclement and suppression" came to an end.

The situation in the second "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) The "suppression" forces numbered 200,000, with Ho Ying-chin as commander-in-chief, stationed in Nanchang. (2) As in the first "encirclement and suppression", all were non-Chiang troops. The Nineteenth Route Army under Tsai Ting-kai, the Twenty-sixth Route Army under Sun Lien-chung and the Sixth Route Army under Chu Shao-liang were the strongest or relatively strong, and the rest were relatively weak. (3) The AB Corps had been eliminated, and the people of the base area all supported the Red Army. (4) Wang Chin-yu's Fifth Route Army, newly arrived from the north, showed fear, and its left wing, the divisions of Kuo Hua-tsung and Hao Meng-ling, were much the same. (5) If our army began fighting from Futien and swept eastward, it could expand the base area in the Chienning, Likiang and Taining area on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, collect resources, and make it easier to smash the next "encirclement and suppression". If we fought from east to west, we would be limited by the Kan River, with no room for development after the campaign ended. If after fighting we turned east again, it would tire the troops and waste time. (6) Our army's numbers, though slightly reduced from the previous campaign (over 30,000), had four months of rest and conserved energy. On the basis of the above reasons, we decided to fight our first battle against Wang Chin-yu and Kung Ping-fan (eleven regiments altogether) in the Futien area. After the victory, we went on to attack Kuo, attack Sun, attack Chu, attack Liu. In fifteen days (May 16 to 31, 1931) we marched 700 li, fought five battles, captured over 20,000 rifles, and smashed the "encirclement and suppression" thoroughly. When we attacked Wang Chin-yu we were between the two enemy forces of Tsai Ting-kai and Kuo Hua-tsung, more than ten li from Kuo and more than forty li from Tsai; some said we were "boring into a bull's horn", but in the end we bored through. This was mainly because of the conditions of the base area, plus the disunity among the enemy's various forces. After Kuo's division was defeated, Hao's division fled back to Yungfeng during the night and so escaped disaster.

The situation in the third "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: (1) Chiang Kai-shek himself took the field as commander-in-chief, under whom there were commanders-in-chief of the left, right and centre routes. The central route was under Ho Ying-chin, stationed with Chiang in Nanchang; the right route was under Chen Ming-shu, stationed in Kian; the left route was under Chu Shao-liang, stationed in Nanfeng. (2) The "suppression" forces numbered 300,000. The main force was five divisions of Chiang's own troops, those of Chen Cheng, Lo Cho-ying, Chao Kuan-tao, Wei Li-huang and Chiang Ting-wen, each of nine regiments, about 100,000 men altogether. Next were the three divisions of Tsai Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai and Han Teh-chin, 40,000 men. Next was Sun Lien-chung's army, 20,000 men. The rest were non-Chiang troops and weaker. (3) The "suppression" strategy was "driving straight in", greatly different from the "consolidating step by step" of the second "encirclement and suppression", with the aim of pressing the Red Army against the Kan River and destroying it. (4) From the end of the second "encirclement and suppression" to the beginning of the third was only one month. The Red Army, after hard fighting, had had no rest and no replenishment (about 30,000 men), and had returned by a roundabout route of a thousand li to concentrate at Hsingkuo in the west of the base area in southern Kiangsi, when the enemy was already advancing in separate columns right in front of us. Under these circumstances, the first plan we decided on was to break through at Futien from Hsingkuo via Wanan, then sweep from west to east along the enemy's rear lines of communication, letting the enemy's main force penetrate deep into the base area in southern Kiangsi and be placed in a position where it could not be used; this was fixed as the first stage of operations. When the enemy turned back north, he would certainly be very tired, and we would take the opportunity to attack what could be attacked; this was the second stage. The core of this plan was to avoid the enemy's main force and strike at his weak points. But as our army was advancing towards Futien, it was discovered by the enemy, and the Chen Cheng and Lo Cho-ying divisions rushed up. We had to change the plan and return to Kaohsingwei in western Hsingkuo; at this time only this one market town and some dozens of square li around it allowed our army to concentrate. After concentrating for one day, we decided to thrust eastward towards Lientang in eastern Hsingkuo County, Liangtsun in southern Yungfeng County and Huangpi in northern Ningtu County. On the first day we passed by night through a gap of forty li between Chiang Ting-wen's division and the Chiang, Tsai and Han armies, and turned to Lientang. On the second day we made contact with the forward elements of Shangkuan Yun-hsiang's army (Shangkuan commanding his own division and Hao Meng-ling's division). On the third day we fought Shangkuan's division as the first battle, on the fourth day we fought Hao Meng-ling's division as the second battle, and then, after a three-day march, we fought Mao Ping-wen's division at Huangpi as the third battle. We won all three battles and captured over ten thousand rifles. By this time all the enemy's main forces advancing westward and southward had turned their banners eastward, focused their eyes on Huangpi, and advanced fiercely to look for our army to fight, approaching our army in a dense, large encircling posture. Our army then slipped through a gap of twenty li, through great mountains, between the Chiang, Tsai and Han armies and the Chen and Lo armies, and returned from the east to concentrate in the Hsingkuo area in the west. By the time the enemy discovered it and advanced westward again, we had already rested for half a month, while the enemy was hungry, tired and demoralized, and powerless, and resolved to retreat. We then took advantage of his retreat to attack Tsai Kuang-nai, Tsai Ting-kai, Chiang Ting-wen and Han Teh-chin, destroying a brigade of Chiang Ting-wen's and a division of Han Teh-chin's. As for the divisions of Tsai Kuang-nai and Tsai Ting-kai, we fought them to a standoff and let them escape.

The situation in the fourth "encirclement and suppression" was as follows: The enemy advanced on Kwangchang in three routes, with his main force on the eastern route, while the two divisions on the western route were exposed in front of us and close to our concentration area. So we were able to attack the western route first in the southern part of Ihwang, and wiped out the two divisions of Li Ming and Chen Shih-chi in one stroke. When the enemy detached two divisions from his left route to join the central route in advancing again, we were again able to destroy one of his divisions in the southern part of Ihwang. In the two battles we captured over ten thousand rifles, and the "encirclement and suppression" was basically smashed.

In the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the enemy advanced with the new strategy of blockhouse-ism and first occupied Likiang. We, however, tried to recover Likiang and meet the enemy outside the base area, and attacked Hsiaoshih, north of Likiang, which was a consolidated enemy position and also a White area. We did not win in one battle, and we then attacked Tzuchiao, to its southeast, also a consolidated enemy position and a White area, and again did not win. After that we wandered about seeking battle between the enemy's main force and his blockhouses, and fell completely into a passive position. Throughout the whole year of the fifth counter-campaign, there was not the least semblance of independence and initiative. In the end we had to leave the Kiangsi base area.

The experience of our army's operations in the first to fifth counter-campaigns described above proves that for the Red Army on the defensive, in order to smash a strong "suppression" army, the first battle of the counter-offensive is of very great importance. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous influence on the whole situation, even right down to the last battle. We therefore draw the following conclusions:

First, we must win. We must act only when the enemy's situation, the terrain, the people and other conditions are all favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy and we have real assurance. Otherwise we would rather yield and wait cautiously for an opportunity. There are always opportunities; we must not rashly accept battle. In the first counter-campaign we first wanted to attack Tan Tao-yuan, but only because the enemy would not leave that commanding position at Yuantou, our army twice advanced and twice patiently withdrew, and after a few days found Chang Hui-tsan, who was easy to beat. In the second counter-campaign our army advanced to Tungku, and only because it was waiting for Wang Chin-yu to leave his consolidated position at Futien it preferred to risk the danger of leaked information, rejected all proposals for impatient quick action, stayed close to the enemy, and waited as long as twenty-five days, and finally achieved its aim. In the third counter-campaign, although the situation was one of such storm and haste, the return march of a thousand li, and the enemy discovering our plan to circle round his flank and rear, we still patiently turned back, changed to a breakthrough in the centre, and finally won the first good battle at Lientang. In the fourth counter-campaign, when we failed to take Nanfeng, we resolutely took the step of retreat, finally turned to the enemy's right flank, concentrated in the Tungshao area, and began the great victory in the southern part of Ihwang. Only in the fifth counter-campaign was the importance of the first battle not understood at all; startled by the loss of the one city of Likiang, with the intention of retrieving it, we went north to meet the enemy, and after the unexpected meeting-engagement victory at Hsunkou (in which we destroyed one enemy division), we did not regard this battle as the first battle, did not look at the changes it would inevitably bring about, and rashly attacked Hsiaoshih, where victory was by no means certain. Losing the initiative with the very first step was truly the stupidest and worst way of fighting.

Second, the plan for the first battle must be an organic prelude to the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign there can never be a truly good first battle. That is to say, even if we win the first battle, if this battle is not only not beneficial but harmful to the whole campaign, then although won, the battle can only count as lost (for example the Hsunkou battle in the fifth "encirclement and suppression"). Therefore before fighting the first battle we must think roughly how to fight the second, third, fourth and even the last battle; if our successive battles are won, what changes will occur in the enemy's whole situation; and if they are lost, what changes will occur. Although the result will not necessarily, or indeed will certainly not, be entirely as expected, we must think it out carefully and realistically on the basis of the whole situation on both sides. Without the whole situation in mind, one cannot truly place a good piece on the board.

Third, we must also think about the next strategic stage. If we think only of the counter-offensive and not of what to do after the counter-offensive succeeds, or after it fails, we have still not fully discharged the duty of a strategic director. When a strategic director is in one strategic stage, he should calculate several stages ahead, or at least the next stage. Although later changes are hard to foresee and the further we look the more vague it becomes, a rough calculation is possible, and estimating the long-term prospect is necessary. The way of directing by taking one step and then seeing the next is unfavourable in politics and also unfavourable in war. At each step we should look at the concrete changes of that step and, on that basis, modify or develop our strategic and campaign plans; if we do not, we shall make the error of rash plunging. But a long-term policy that runs through the whole strategic stage, or several strategic stages, and has been roughly thought through, is absolutely indispensable. If we do not have one, we shall make the error of hesitation and being stuck in a trap, and in practice will fit the enemy's strategic requirements and put ourselves in a passive position. It must be understood that the enemy's high command has a certain strategic vision. Only if we train ourselves to be a cut above him can we have the possibility of strategic victory. The reason the strategic direction of the "Left" opportunist line and of the Chang Kuo-tao line in the period of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" was wrong lay mainly in failure to do this. In short, in the stage of retreat we must calculate the stage of counter-offensive, in the stage of counter-offensive we must calculate the stage of offensive, and in the stage of offensive we must again calculate the stage of retreat. Without such calculation, to be bound by immediate gains and losses is the road to defeat.

We must win; we must take account of the plan for the whole campaign; we must take account of the next strategic stage: these are the three principles that must not be forgotten when starting the counter-offensive, that is, when fighting the first battle.

Section 6: The Question of Concentrating Forces

Concentrating forces seems easy but is quite difficult in practice. Everyone knows that the best method is to use the many to defeat the few, yet many people cannot do it and on the contrary often disperse their forces, because their directors lack strategic minds and are bewildered by a complex environment and thereby dominated by it, lose the capacity for independent initiative, and adopt a policy of muddling through.

No matter how complicated, serious or bitter the environment, what a military director first needs is to organize and use his own forces independently and on his own initiative. Being forced into a passive position by the enemy is something that often happens, and what is important is to regain the initiative quickly. If this position cannot be regained, what follows is defeat.

The position of initiative is not imaginary but concrete and material. The most important thing here is to preserve and assemble the largest force that has vitality.

Defensive war easily falls into a passive position, and is far from being able to display initiative as fully as offensive war. But defensive war can have active content in a passive form, and can pass from a passive stage in form to an active stage in both form and content. A completely planned strategic retreat is in form forced upon one, but in content it is preserving strength, waiting for an opportunity to defeat the enemy, luring the enemy in deep, and preparing the counter-offensive. Only refusing to retreat and rushing into battle (for example, the Hsiaoshih battle), though it seems on the surface to strive for initiative, is in fact passive. The strategic counter-offensive is active not only in content but also in form, abandoning the passive posture of the retreat period. For the enemy forces, the counter-offensive is our effort to force him to give up the initiative and at the same time to put him in a passive position.

To achieve this aim fully, concentration of forces, mobile warfare, quick-decision warfare and the war of annihilation are all necessary conditions. And concentration of forces is the first and main one.

Concentration of forces is necessary in order to change the situation between the enemy and ourselves. First, to change the situation of advance and retreat. Formerly the enemy advanced and we retreated; now we seek to achieve our advance and the enemy's retreat. If forces are concentrated and one battle is won, this aim is achieved in that battle and also influences the whole campaign.

Second, to change the situation of attack and defence. Retreating to the end point of retreat is basically the passive stage of defensive war, that is, the "defence" stage. The counter-offensive belongs to the active stage, that is, the "attack" stage. Although in the whole of strategic defence we have not departed from the nature of defence, nevertheless, compared with retreat, the counter-offensive is something that has changed, not only in form but also in content. The counter-offensive is a transitional thing between strategic defence and strategic offensive, with the character of the eve of the strategic offensive, and concentration of forces serves this end.

Third, to change the situation of interior and exterior lines. An army on interior lines strategically, especially a Red Army in the environment of "encirclement and suppression", suffers many disadvantages. But we can and fully should change this in campaigns or battles. We change the enemy's one big "encirclement and suppression" of our army into our many separate small encirclements and suppressions of the enemy. We change the enemy's strategic converging attack on our army into our converging attack on the enemy in campaigns or battles. We change the enemy's strategic superiority over our army into our superiority over the enemy in campaigns or battles. We make the enemy, who is in the position of the strong strategically, become the weak in campaigns or battles. At the same time, we change our own position of the weak strategically into the position of the strong in campaigns or battles. This is what is called exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement within "encirclement", blockade within blockade, offensive within defence, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity. To win victory out of strategic defence depends basically on the stroke of concentrating forces.

In the military history of the Chinese Red Army this question has often become an important subject of dispute. In the battle of Kian on October 4, 1930, we advanced and attacked without waiting for our forces to be fully concentrated; fortunately the enemy (Teng Ying's division) ran away of his own accord, and our attack itself had no effect.

From 1932 there was the slogan of "striking out along the whole line", demanding that we strike out on all four sides, east, west, south and north, of the base area. This is wrong not only in strategic defence but also in strategic offensive. As long as the overall balance between the enemy and ourselves has not fundamentally changed, both strategy and tactics have two aspects, defence and offence, containing action and assault, and in fact there is hardly ever any such thing as striking out along the whole line. The slogan of striking out along the whole line was military equalitarianism that accompanied military adventurism.

In 1933 the military equalitarians had the so-called "two fists" way of fighting, splitting the main force of the Red Army into two in an attempt to win victory simultaneously in two strategic directions. The result at that time was that one fist was left unused, the other fist was worn out with fighting, and the greatest victory that could have been obtained at that time was not obtained. In my opinion, where a strong enemy force exists, no matter how many troops one has, at any one time there should be only one main direction of use, not two. I am not against having two or more directions of operation, but the main direction at any one time should be only one. The Chinese Red Army appeared on the battlefield of the civil war as a weak force, and its record of repeatedly defeating strong enemies and astonishing the world depended very largely on the concentrated use of forces. Every one of the great victories proves this. "Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred" is a strategic way of speaking, applied to the whole war and the whole balance between the enemy and ourselves; in this sense we really are so. It is not applied to campaigns and tactics; in this sense we must by no means be so. Whether in counter-offensive or offensive, we always assemble large forces to strike at a part of the enemy. The operation against Tan Tao-yuan in the Tungshao area of Ningtu County, Kiangsi, in January 1931, the operation against the Nineteenth Route Army in the Kaohsingwei area of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi, in September 1931, the operation against Chen Chi-tang in the Shuikouwei area of Nanhsiung County, Kwangtung, in July 1932, and the operation against Chen Cheng in the Tuantsun area of Likiang County, Kiangsi, in December 1933, all suffered from non-concentration of forces. Battles like those of Shuikouwei and Tuantsun were in general counted as victories, and even as great victories (in the former we routed twenty regiments of Chen Chi-tang, in the latter twelve regiments of Chen Cheng), but we have never welcomed such victories, and in a sense they can even be called defeats. For with no captures, or captures not exceeding our expenditure, we see little significance in them. Our strategy is "pit one against ten", and our tactics are "pit ten against one"; this is one of the fundamental rules by which we defeat the enemy.

Military equalitarianism reached its extreme in the fifth counter-campaign in 1934. "Dividing the forces into six routes" and "resisting along the whole line", in the belief that the enemy could be curbed this way, ended in our being curbed by the enemy, and the reason lay in the fear of losing territory. To concentrate the main force in one direction and leave only containing forces in the other directions naturally cannot avoid loss of territory. But this is a temporary and partial loss, and its price is victory in the direction of the assault. When the assault direction is victorious, the loss in the containing directions can be recovered. The enemy's first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns all caused us loss of territory, especially in the enemy's third campaign when the Red Army's base area in Kiangsi was almost entirely lost, but in the end we recovered all of our territory and even expanded it.

Because of failure to see the strength of the people in the base area, the mistaken psychology of fearing that the Red Army would go far from the base area often arose. This psychology appeared when the Red Army in Kiangsi went far afield in 1932 to attack Changchow in Fukien, and in 1933 when the Red Army turned to attack in Fukien after the victory of the fourth counter-campaign. In the former case there was fear that the whole base area would be occupied, in the latter that part of the base area would be occupied, and in both cases concentration of forces was opposed and dividing forces to guard was advocated; both proved wrong. In the enemy's eyes, on the one hand the base area makes him afraid to advance, on the other the Red Army that strikes into the White areas is his main danger. The attention of the enemy forces is always directed to where the main Red Army is; it is very rare for them to ignore the main Red Army and go solely against the base area. Even when the Red Army is on the defensive, the enemy's attention is still concentrated on the Red Army. The plan to reduce the base area is a part of the enemy's overall plan; but if the Red Army concentrates its main force and destroys one of his columns, the enemy's high command will have to turn its attention and its forces still more towards the Red Army. So the enemy's plan to reduce the base area can also be wrecked.

The statement "In the period of the blockhouse-ism of the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' we could not fight concentrated, and could only divide forces to defend and carry out short swift thrusts" is also incorrect. The enemy's blockhouse method of advancing three or five li at a time and pushing ten or eight li at a time was entirely brought about by the Red Army's own resistance step by step. If our army had given up the method of resisting step by step on interior lines and then, when necessary and possible, turned to strike at the enemy's interior, the situation would certainly have been quite different. The rule of concentration of forces is precisely the tool for defeating blockhouse-ism.

The concentration of forces that we advocate does not include giving up the people's guerrilla warfare. The Li Li-san line advocated abandoning small-scale guerrilla warfare, "even a single rifle should be concentrated in the Red Army", and this was proved wrong long ago. From the viewpoint of the whole revolutionary war, the people's guerrilla warfare and the main-force Red Army are each other's left and right hands; having only the main-force Red Army and no people's guerrilla warfare is like a one-armed general. The condition of the people in the base area, concretely speaking and especially in respect of operations, means having an armed people. The enemy's dread of the base area lies mainly in this.

It is also necessary to place detachments of the Red Army in secondary directions of operation; not everything is to be concentrated. The concentration of forces we advocate is based on the principle of ensuring absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. Against a strong enemy, or in battlefields of vital importance, we should confront him with forces of absolute superiority; for example in the first battle of the first counter-campaign on December 30, 1930, we concentrated 40,000 men to fight Chang Hui-tsan's 9,000. Against a weak enemy, or in battlefields not of vital importance, confronting him with forces of relative superiority is enough; for example in the last battle of the second counter-campaign on May 31, 1931, in attacking Liu Ho-ting's division of 7,000 men at Chienning the Red Army used only a little over 10,000.

Nor does it mean superior forces every time. Under certain circumstances we may also appear on the battlefield with relatively inferior or absolutely inferior forces. A case of relative inferiority is, for example, when in a certain area there is only one small Red Army unit (not that we have troops but fail to concentrate them), and in order to smash the offensive of a superior enemy, where conditions of the people, terrain, weather and so on give us great help, we contain his front and one flank with guerrilla units or small detachments, and the Red Army concentrates all its strength to make a sudden attack on a part of his other flank; this is of course necessary and can succeed. When we attack a part of one flank of the enemy, the principle of superiority over inferiority, the many defeating the few, still applies in the comparison of forces. A case of absolute inferiority is, for example, when a guerrilla unit attacks a big body of White troops and attacks only a small part of it; the same principle applies.

The argument that concentrating a big army on one battlefield is restricted by terrain, roads, supplies, billeting and so on should also be looked at according to circumstances. These restrictions differ in degree for the Red Army and the White army, because the Red Army can endure greater hardships than the White army.

We defeat the many with the few: this is what we say to the rulers of the whole of China. We defeat the few with the many: this is what we say to the individual enemy forces on the battlefield. This is no longer any secret; the enemy in general has got to know our temperament. But the enemy can neither cancel our victories nor avoid his losses, because he does not know when and where we shall do this. This we keep secret. The Red Army's operations are in general surprise attacks.

Section 7: Mobile Warfare

Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is: mobile warfare. Under conditions where there are no large forces, no replenishment of ammunition, and in each base area only a single Red Army unit fights back and forth, positional warfare is basically useless for us. For us, positional warfare is basically unusable not only in defence but also in attack.

One of the conspicuous characteristics of the Red Army's operations, arising from the enemy's strength and the Red Army's poverty in technique, is the absence of fixed operational lines.

The Red Army's operational lines are subject to the Red Army's operational direction. The operational direction is not fixed, and this affects the lack of fixity of operational lines. Although the main direction does not change for a period, the sub-directions within the main direction change at any time; when one direction is blocked we must turn to another. After a period, when the main direction too is blocked, even this main direction has to be changed.

In the period of revolutionary civil war, operational lines cannot be fixed, and even in the Soviet Union this has been so. The difference between the Soviet army and ours is that its lack of fixity was not as great as ours. No war can have absolutely fixed operational lines, since changes of victory and defeat, advance and retreat do not permit it. But relatively fixed operational lines are often seen in wars in general. Only an army like the Chinese Red Army at the present stage, where the enemy and we are so widely unequal in strength, is an exception.

The lack of fixity of operational lines affects the lack of fixity of the territory of the base areas. Expansion and shrinkage, extension and contraction are constant, and as one rises another falls, which often happens. This fluidity of territory comes entirely from the fluidity of the war.

The fluidity of war and of territory affects the fluidity of all kinds of construction work in the base areas. A construction plan of several years cannot be conceived. Frequent change of plans is everyday fare for us.

To recognize this characteristic is advantageous to us. Starting from this characteristic, we should fix our schedules: we must not dream of a war in which we only advance and never retreat, must not be startled by temporary fluidity of territory and of the military rear, and must not try to draw up long-term concrete plans. We should adapt our thinking and work to the circumstances, be prepared both to sit down and to walk, and not lose our dry-ration bags. Only by making an effort in the present fluid life can we strive for comparative non-fluidity in the future and for stability in the end.

The strategic policy of the so-called "regular war" that dominated the period of the fifth counter-campaign denied this fluidity and opposed what it called "guerrilla-ism". The comrades who opposed fluidity wanted to act as the rulers of a big country, and the result was an extraordinarily big fluidity, the Long March of 25,000 li.

Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a state, but today it is still an incomplete state. Today we are still in the period of strategic defence in the civil war; our political power is still far from a complete state form, our army is far behind the enemy in numbers and technique, our territory is still very small, and our enemy wants at every moment to destroy us before he can be happy. In deciding our policy from this, it is not a matter of opposing guerrilla-ism in general but of honestly recognizing the guerrilla character of the Red Army. To be shy about it is useless. On the contrary, guerrilla character is precisely our characteristic, precisely our strength, precisely our instrument for defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard guerrilla character, but today we cannot yet discard it. Guerrilla character will certainly be something to be ashamed of and to be discarded in the future, but today it is precious and must be upheld.

"Fight if you can win, move away if you cannot win": this is the popular explanation of our mobile warfare today. There is no military man in the world who recognizes only fighting and not moving away; the difference is only that we move away so much more. For us, the time spent walking is usually more than the time spent fighting, and to fight one big battle a month on average is counted good. All our "moving away" is for the sake of "fighting", and all our strategic and campaign policies are built on the one basic point of "fighting". But there are several circumstances in which it is hard for us to fight: first, when there are many enemies in front, it is hard to fight; second, when the enemy in front is not numerous but is very close to neighbouring enemy forces, it is sometimes hard to fight; third, generally speaking, enemies who are not isolated and who occupy very consolidated positions are all hard to fight; fourth, when fighting cannot bring the battle to a decision, it is hard to go on fighting. On all these occasions, we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is permitted and necessary. For we admit the necessity of moving away only on condition of first admitting the necessity of fighting. The basic characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare lies here.

Mobile warfare is basic, but this does not mean refusing necessary and possible positional warfare. In strategic defence, the holding of certain strong points on the containing front, and in strategic offensive, the encountering of an isolated and unsupported enemy, should be handled by positional warfare. We have already had a good deal of experience in defeating the enemy by such positional warfare in the past; many cities, blockhouses and stockades have been opened by us, and the enemy's field positions have been broken through to a certain degree. In future we shall increase our efforts in this respect and make up for our weakness here. We should fully advocate positional attack and positional defence where circumstances need and permit them. What we oppose is only the adoption of positional warfare in general today, or putting positional warfare on a par with mobile warfare; these are what cannot be permitted.

The guerrilla character of the Red Army, the absence of fixed operational lines, the fluidity of the base areas, and the fluidity of construction work in the base areas: have they not changed at all in the ten years of war? They have changed. The period from the Chingkangshan to before the first counter-campaign in Kiangsi was the first stage; in this stage guerrilla character and fluidity were very great, the Red Army was still in its infancy, and the base areas were still guerrilla areas. The period from the first to the third counter-campaign was the second stage; in this stage guerrilla character and fluidity were greatly reduced, front armies had been set up, and base areas containing several million people already existed. The period from after the third to the fifth counter-campaign was the third stage, in which guerrilla character and fluidity were reduced still more. The Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission were established. The Long March was the fourth stage. Because of the mistaken denial of small-scale guerrilla activity and small fluidity, there came a great guerrilla movement and great fluidity. The present is the fifth stage. Because we did not defeat the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and there was the great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas were greatly reduced, but we have already gained a foothold in the northwest and consolidated and developed the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border-area base. The three front armies, the main force of the Red Army, are already under unified command, which has never happened before.

According to the nature of strategy, it can also be said that the period from the Chingkangshan to the fourth counter-campaign was one stage, the period of the fifth counter-campaign another stage, and the period from the Long March to now a third stage. In the fifth counter-campaign people wrongly negated the earlier policy that had been correct; today we have rightly negated the wrong policy of the people of the fifth counter-campaign and revived the earlier correct policy. But we are not negating everything of the fifth counter-campaign, nor reviving everything of the earlier time. What is revived is the good things of the earlier time, and what is negated is the wrong things of the fifth counter-campaign.

Guerrilla-ism has two aspects. One aspect is irregularity, that is, lack of concentration, lack of unity, lax discipline, simplistic methods of work and so on. These things were brought along by the Red Army in its infancy, and some were precisely needed at that time. But when the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously get rid of them, and make the Red Army more concentrated, more united, more disciplined, and its work more painstaking; that is, make it more regular. In operational command too we should gradually and consciously reduce the guerrilla character that is unnecessary at the higher stage. To refuse to advance in this respect and obstinately remain at the old stage is not permitted, is harmful, and is unfavourable to large-scale operations.

The other aspect is the policy of mobile warfare, the guerrilla character of strategic and campaign operations that is still needed now, the fluidity of the base areas that cannot be stopped, the flexible changing of construction plans for the base areas, and the avoidance of premature and untimely regularization in building the Red Army. To refuse historical facts in this respect, to oppose keeping what is useful, to rashly leave the present stage and blindly run towards a so-called "new stage" that can be seen but not reached and has no practical meaning at present, is likewise not permitted, is harmful, and is unfavourable to present operations.

We are now on the eve of a new stage in the technique and organization of the Red Army. We should prepare to change over to the new stage. Not to make such preparation is wrong and is unfavourable to future wars. In the future, when the technical and organizational conditions of the Red Army have changed and Red Army building has advanced to the new stage, the operational directions and operational lines of the Red Army will appear relatively fixed; positional warfare will increase; the fluidity of war and the fluidity of territory and construction will be greatly reduced and in the end will be eliminated; and the things that restrict us now, such as the superior enemy and the consolidated positions he holds, will no longer be able to restrict us.

On the one hand we now oppose the mistaken methods of the period dominated by "Left" opportunism, and on the other hand we also oppose reviving the many irregularities of the Red Army's infancy that are not needed now. But we must firmly restore the many valuable principles of army building and the strategic and tactical principles by which the Red Army has won battles all along the way. We must sum up all the good things of the past into a systematic, further developed and richer military line, so as to strive to defeat the enemy today and to prepare to change over to the new stage in the future.

In the practice of mobile warfare there are many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgment, decision, battle dispositions, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, raiding, positional attack, positional defence, meeting engagements, retreat, night fighting, special kinds of fighting, avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, besieging a city to destroy the relieving forces, feint attacks, anti-aircraft defence, operating between several enemy forces, operating by bypassing the enemy, continuous operations, operating without a rear, the necessity of conserving energy and building up strength, and so on. These problems have shown many special features in the military history of the Red Army, should be systematically described in campaign science, and should be summed up; I shall not discuss them here.

Section 8: Quick-Decision Warfare

Protracted war strategically, quick decision in campaigns and battles: these are two sides of one thing, two principles of equal importance in civil war, and they can also be applied to war against imperialism.

Because the reactionary forces are strong and the revolutionary forces grow only gradually, the war is bound to be protracted. To be impatient on this is to suffer for it, and to advocate "quick decision" on this is incorrect. To have fought a revolutionary war for ten years may seem astonishing to other countries, but to us it is as if, in writing an eight-legged essay, we had only done the opening, the elaboration and the introduction, and many lively passages are still to come. The development ahead, under the influence of all internal and external conditions, will undoubtedly have the possibility of a greatly increased speed over the past. For the international and domestic environment has already changed and still greater changes will come; it can be said that we have already left the earlier situation of slow development and fighting alone. But we should not expect to succeed tomorrow. The spirit of "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is good, but a concrete plan to "wipe out the enemy before breakfast" is not good. Because China's reactionary forces are supported by many imperialists, and until the revolutionary forces within the country have accumulated enough to break through the enemy's main positions at home and abroad, and until the international revolutionary forces have broken and contained the greater part of the international reactionary forces, our revolutionary war remains protracted. Setting our long-term strategic policy of war on this basis is one of the important policies of strategic direction.

The principles for campaigns and battles are the opposite: not protracted but quick decision. In campaigns and battles, striving for quick decision is the same in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad. In war, in all times and places, quick decision is demanded, and long-drawn-out war is always regarded as unfavourable. Only China's war must be treated with the greatest patience, must be treated as protracted war. In the period of the Li Li-san line some people ridiculed our way of doing things as "boxing tactics" (meaning fighting back and forth in order to capture big cities), and ridiculed our having to wait until our hair turned white before seeing the victory of the revolution. This mood of impatience was proved wrong long ago. But their criticism, if applied not to strategic problems but to problems of campaigns and battles, is quite right. The reasons are: first, the Red Army's weapons, and above all ammunition, have no source of supply; second, the White army has many units while the Red Army has only one, and to smash one "encirclement and suppression" we must prepare for rapid, continuous operations; third, although the White army columns advance separately, they are mostly rather close together, and if in attacking one of them we cannot quickly decide the battle, the rest will all come. For these reasons we cannot but carry out quick-decision warfare. For us it is the routine to decide a battle in a few hours, one day or two. Only under the policy of "besieging a city to destroy the relieving forces", where the aim is not to destroy the besieged enemy but the relieving enemy, are we prepared to make the operation against the besieged enemy fairly protracted, while against the relieving enemy it is still quick decision. In strategic defence, in holding strong points on the containing front, in strategic offensive in attacking isolated, unsupported enemies, and in destroying White strongholds within the base areas, we also often give campaigns or battles a protracted character. But these protracted operations only help, and do not hinder, the quick-decision warfare of the main Red Army force.

Quick decision cannot be achieved merely by wanting it in one's mind; many concrete conditions must be added. The main conditions are adequate preparation, not losing the opportunity, concentrating superior forces, tactics of encirclement and outflanking, good positions, attacking the enemy while he is on the move, or attacking the enemy while he has halted but his position is not yet firm. Without solving these conditions, to seek quick decision in campaigns or battles is impossible.

Smashing one "encirclement and suppression" belongs to a big campaign and still follows the principle of quick decision, not that of protraction. For the conditions of the base area in manpower, finance, military strength and so on do not permit protraction.

But under the general principle of quick decision, it is necessary to oppose improper impatience. The highest military and political leading organ of a revolutionary base area, taking into account these conditions of the base area, and taking into account the enemy's situation, must not be intimidated by the enemy's fierce posture, must not be dispirited by difficulties that can still be endured, and must not lose heart at certain setbacks, but must show the necessary patience and endurance. In Kiangsi, the first "encirclement and suppression" was smashed in only one week from the first battle to the end, the second in only half a month, the third dragged on for three months, the fourth took three weeks, and the fifth dragged on for a whole year. But when the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was not smashed and we were forced to break out, we showed an unwarranted haste. According to the circumstances we could still have held on for two or three months, using the time to rest and reorganize the army. If we had done so, and if the leadership after the breakout had been a little wiser, the situation would have been very different.

Even so, this does not violate the principle we spoke of, of striving to shorten the time of the whole campaign. In addition to the conditions of striving for concentration of forces and mobile warfare in campaign and battle plans, of making sure to destroy the enemy's effective strength on interior lines (in the base area) and quickly settling the "encirclement and suppression", when the "encirclement and suppression" has proved to be impossible to settle on interior lines, we should use the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's line of encirclement and go over to our exterior lines, that is, the enemy's interior lines, to settle the problem. Now that blockhouse-ism is highly developed, this method will become a regular method of operation. Two months after the fifth counter-campaign began, when the Fukien Incident occurred, the main force of the Red Army should without doubt have broken into the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsi area centred on Chekiang, ranged freely between Hangchow, Soochow, Nanking, Wuhu, Nanchang and Foochow, changed the strategic defence into a strategic offensive, threatened the enemy's vital areas, and sought battle in the vast area without blockhouses. By this method we could have forced the enemy attacking southern Kiangsi and western Fukien to turn back to relieve his vital areas, smashed his offensive against the Kiangsi base area, and supported the Fukien People's Government; this method would definitely have supported it. This plan was not used, so the fifth "encirclement and suppression" could not be smashed, and the Fukien People's Government could only collapse. When a whole year had been spent in fighting, although it was no longer favourable to go to Chekiang, we could still have switched to a strategic offensive in another direction, that is, advanced with the main force into Hunan, not going through Hunan to Kweichow but advancing into central Hunan, drawing the enemy in Kiangsi into Hunan and destroying him there. This plan too was not used, and the hope of smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" was finally cut off, leaving only the road of the Long March.

Section 9: War of Annihilation

The proposal of "contest of attrition" is untimely for the Chinese Red Army. A "contest of treasures" is not a Dragon King against a Dragon King but a beggar against a Dragon King, which is rather comical. For the Red Army, which gets almost everything from the enemy, the basic policy is the war of annihilation. Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash "encirclement and suppression" and expand the revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties on the enemy is adopted as a means of annihilating him; otherwise it has no meaning. Casualties inflicted on the enemy cost us losses, while annihilation of the enemy gives us replenishment, so that not only are our losses made good but our strength is increased. Routing the enemy is not basically decisive of victory or defeat against a strong enemy. The war of annihilation has an immediate and great effect on any enemy. For a man, it is better to cut off one finger than to injure all ten; for the enemy, it is better to annihilate one of his divisions than to rout ten.

In the first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, our policy was the war of annihilation. What we annihilated each time was only a part of the whole enemy, yet the "encirclement and suppression" was smashed. In the fifth counter-campaign, the opposite policy was adopted, and in effect helped the enemy to achieve his aims.

The war of annihilation has the same meaning as concentrating superior forces and adopting tactics of encirclement and outflanking. Without the latter there is no former. The support of the people, good positions, an enemy easy to beat, taking the enemy by surprise and other conditions are all indispensable for achieving annihilation.

Routing the enemy has meaning, and even letting the enemy escape has meaning, only in relation to the annihilating operations carried out by the main force of our army against a definite enemy in the whole battle or the whole campaign; otherwise they have no meaning. This again is a case where meaning lies in a loss set against a gain.

In establishing our military industry, we must see that it does not foster dependence. Our basic policy is to depend on the military industry of the imperialists and of our enemies within the country. We have a claim on the arsenals in London and Hanyang, and they are delivered to us by the enemy's transport corps. This is the truth, and it is not a joke.