The Struggle to Win the Masses in Their Millions into the Anti-Japanese National United Front
Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
- Context
- Mao addressed a Communist Party conference on May 8, 1937, in concluding remarks on his report on resistance to Japan, answering dissenting comrades on peace, democracy, revolution, cadres and Party unity.
- Main themes
- Consolidating peace after the Sian Incident, striving for democracy, anti-Japanese national united front, Kuomintang's partial change, National Assembly and people's freedoms, transition from democratic revolution to socialism, rejection of Trotskyist permanent revolution, training of Party cadres, inner-Party democracy and democratic centralism, unity of the Party, winning the masses in their millions
- Duration
- ~25 min
- Words
- 2,992
- Sentences
- 145
- Readability
- 48
- Grade
- 11.7
- Syntax
- 3.01
- Vocabulary
- 2.25
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other145 sentences in 31 paragraphs
Comrades! After several days of discussion, everyone has expressed agreement with my report, "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan," apart from a few comrades who have raised differing opinions. These differing opinions are of considerable importance, so in my concluding remarks I will first discuss them and then turn to some other questions.
The Question of Peace
Our Party has been fighting for internal peace for almost two years now. After the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, we said that peace had been achieved, that the stage of "striving for peace" was over, and that the new task was "consolidating peace." We pointed out that this was linked with "striving for democracy," that is, consolidating peace by striving for democracy. According to a few comrades, this view of ours cannot stand. Their conclusion must be the opposite, or else wavering between the two. For they say: "Japan has retreated, Nanking is wavering even more, the national contradiction is declining and the domestic contradiction is rising." On this estimate there can, of course, be no talk of a new stage and new tasks; the situation has returned to the old stage, or is even worse. I consider this view wrong.
When we say that peace has been achieved, we do not mean that peace has been consolidated. On the contrary, we say that it is not consolidated. Achieving peace and consolidating peace are two different things. It is possible for history to go backward temporarily, and it is possible for peace to suffer setbacks, because Japanese imperialism and the traitorous pro-Japanese faction exist. Yet it is a fact that peace was achieved after the Sian Incident. This situation was brought about by many factors (Japan's basic policy of aggression, the support of the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and France for peace, the pressure of the Chinese people, the Communist Party's peaceful policy during the Sian Incident and its policy of ending the antagonism between the two regimes, the differentiation within the bourgeoisie, the differentiation within the Kuomintang, and so on). It is not something that Chiang Kai-shek alone can decide or overturn. To overturn the peace, one would have to fight against forces on many sides, and would have to move closer to Japanese imperialism and the pro-Japanese faction in order to succeed. There is no question that Japanese imperialism and the pro-Japanese faction are still trying to keep China in civil war. That is precisely why peace has not been consolidated. In these circumstances our conclusion is not to go back to the old slogans of "stop the civil war" or "strive for peace," but to take a step forward and put forward the new slogan of "strive for democracy." Only in this way can peace be consolidated, and only in this way can resistance be realized. Why have we put forward the threefold slogan "consolidate peace," "strive for democracy," and "carry out armed resistance"? In order to push the wheel of our revolution a step forward, and because the situation now permits us to take that step. If one denies the new stage and the new tasks, denies that the Kuomintang has "begun to change," and, as the logical conclusion, is also compelled to deny the achievements of all the forces that have fought for peace over the past year and a half, then one is simply standing still in the old position and has not advanced a single step.
Why have these comrades made such an unsound estimate? Because in observing the situation they do not start from the fundamentals but from many partial and transient phenomena (Sato's diplomacy, the Soochow trial, the suppression of strikes, the eastward transfer of the Northeastern Army, Yang Hu-cheng's going abroad, and so on), and so they paint a gloomy picture. We say that the Kuomintang has begun to change, but at the same time we say that the Kuomintang has not changed completely. It is inconceivable that ten years of reactionary Kuomintang policy could be completely changed without new, greater and more efforts by ourselves and the people. Quite a few people who call themselves "Left," who normally denounce the Kuomintang roundly, and who during the Sian Incident advocated killing Chiang and "fighting our way out through Tungkuan," discovered things like the Soochow trial just after peace had been achieved, and asked in astonishment: "Why is Chiang Kai-shek doing this again?" These people should understand that neither Communists nor Chiang Kai-shek are gods, and neither are isolated individuals; they are members of a party and of a class. The Communist Party has the ability to push the revolution forward step by step, but not the ability to sweep away all the evils in the country in a single morning. Chiang Kai-shek, or the Kuomintang, has begun to change, but without still greater efforts by the people of the whole country they will certainly not wash away ten years of filth in a single morning. We say that the movement is heading toward peace, democracy and resistance, but we do not say that the old poison of civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance can be swept away without effort. The old poison, the filth, certain setbacks in the course of the revolution and a possible backward turn can be overcome only through struggle and effort, and long struggle and effort at that.
"They are bent on destroying us." Correct, they are always trying to destroy us. I fully accept that this estimate is right; not to take it into account would be to fall asleep. But the question is whether the method of destruction has changed. I believe it has. It has changed from a policy of war and massacre to a policy of reform and deception, from a hard policy to a soft one, from a military policy to a political one. Why this change? Faced with Japanese imperialism, the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang have had to seek allies in the proletariat for the time being, just as we seek allies in the bourgeoisie. That is the point from which the problem should be viewed. Internationally, the French government has changed from hostility to the Soviet Union to alliance with it, for the same reason. Our task at home has likewise changed from a military to a political one. We have no need of plots and tricks; our aim is to unite with all the elements in the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang who sympathize with resistance to Japan, so as to defeat Japanese imperialism together.
The Question of Democracy
"It is wrong to stress democracy; we should stress only resistance to Japan. Without direct action against Japan there can be no democratic movement. Most people want only resistance to Japan, not democracy. Another 'December 9th' is what is needed."
Let me first pose a few questions. Could it be said that in the previous stage (from the December 9th Movement of 1935 to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang in February 1937) most people wanted only resistance to Japan and not peace? Was it wrong to stress peace in the past? Was it impossible to have a peace movement without direct action against Japan? (The Sian Incident and the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang came after the Suiyuan resistance had ended, and even now there is no Suiyuan resistance or "December 9th.") Who does not know that resisting Japan requires peace, that without peace there can be no resistance, that peace is a condition for resistance? All the direct and indirect anti-Japanese actions of the previous stage (from "December 9th" to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang) revolved around the fight for peace. Peace was the central link in the previous stage, the most essential thing in the anti-Japanese movement during that stage.
In relation to the task of resisting Japan, democracy is likewise the most essential thing in the new stage; to work for democracy is to work for resistance to Japan. Resistance to Japan and democracy are conditions for each other, just as resistance to Japan and peace, and democracy and peace, are conditions for each other. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance to Japan, and resistance to Japan can provide favourable conditions for the development of the democratic movement.
In the new stage, we hope there will be, and there will be, many direct and indirect struggles against Japan; these will push forward the war of resistance and greatly help the democratic movement. Yet the central, essential thing in the revolutionary task history has given us is the fight for democracy. "Democracy, democracy" — is that wrong? I think it is not.
"Japan has retreated, Britain and Japan are moving toward a balance, Nanking is wavering even more." This is an unwarranted anxiety arising from a failure to understand the laws of historical development. If Japan were to retreat fundamentally because of revolution at home, that would help the Chinese revolution; it is what we hope for, it would be the beginning of the collapse of the world front of aggression. Why be anxious? But that is not yet the case after all. Sato's diplomacy is a preparation for a great war, and the great war is before us. Britain's wavering policy can only come to nothing; this is determined by the conflicting interests of Britain and Japan. If Nanking wavers for long, it will become the enemy of the whole nation, and its own interests will not permit that. Temporary phenomena of retreat cannot replace the general law of history. Therefore one cannot deny the new stage, nor can one deny the putting forward of the task of democracy. Moreover, the slogan of democracy fits every situation; everyone knows that what the Chinese lack is democracy, and that it is not superfluous to them. Furthermore, the actual situation has already shown that pointing out the new stage and putting forward the task of democracy are a step toward the war of resistance. The situation has moved forward; do not drag it back.
"Why stress the National Assembly?" Because it is something that may affect the whole of life, because it is a bridge from reactionary dictatorship to democracy, because it has a national defence character, and because it is legal. Recovering eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, opposing smuggling, opposing "economic co-operation" and so on, as comrades have proposed, are all quite right, but they do not in the least contradict the task of democracy and the National Assembly; the two complement each other. But the central thing is the National Assembly and the people's freedoms.
It is entirely right, and beyond any dispute, that day-to-day struggles against Japan and struggles over the people's livelihood should be co-ordinated with the democratic movement. But in the present stage the central and essential things are democracy and freedom.
The Question of the Future of the Revolution
Several comrades have raised this question. My answer can only be brief.
There are two essays, the first part and the second part, and only when the first is done well can the second be done well. Resolutely leading the democratic revolution is the condition for winning the victory of socialism. We fight for socialism, and in this we differ from any revolutionary believer in the Three People's Principles. Our present efforts are directed toward the great goal of the future; whoever loses sight of this great goal is no longer a Communist. Yet whoever slackens in today's efforts is no longer a Communist either.
We are advocates of the theory of the transition of the revolution; we hold that the democratic revolution will transform itself in the direction of socialism. There will be several stages of development in the democratic revolution, all under the slogan of the democratic republic. The change from bourgeois predominance to proletarian predominance is a long process of struggle, a process of fighting for leadership, which depends on the Communist Party raising the level of political consciousness and organization of the proletariat, and raising the level of political consciousness and organization of the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie.
The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, and next comes the urban petty bourgeoisie. The one that contends with us for leadership is the bourgeoisie.
Overcoming the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie depends on the strength of the masses and on correct policy; otherwise the bourgeoisie will turn round and overcome the proletariat.
A bloodless transition is what we hope for, and we should strive hard for it; the outcome will depend on the strength of the masses.
We are advocates of the theory of the transition of the revolution, not advocates of the Trotskyist theory of "permanent revolution." We hold that we must go through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic to arrive at socialism. We oppose tailism, but we also oppose adventurism and impetuosity.
To reject the bourgeoisie because its participation in the revolution is temporary, and to call alliance with the anti-Japanese section of the bourgeoisie (in a semi-colonial country) capitulationism, is the Trotskyist position, and we cannot agree with it. Today's alliance with the anti-Japanese section of the bourgeoisie is precisely the bridge that must be crossed on the way to socialism.
The Question of Cadres
To lead a great revolution requires a great party and many of the very best cadres. In China, a country of 450 million people, it is impossible to carry out a great revolution unprecedented in history if the leadership is a narrow little group, and it is equally impossible if the Party has only petty-minded leaders and cadres who cannot see the overall picture, who lack foresight and lack ability. The Chinese Communist Party has long been a big party, and despite its losses in the period of reaction it is still a big party. It has many good leaders and cadres, but they are not enough. Our Party organization must expand throughout the country, must consciously train tens of thousands of cadres, and must have several hundred of the very best mass leaders. These cadres and leaders must understand Marxism-Leninism, have political foresight and working ability, be full of the spirit of self-sacrifice, be able to solve problems independently, stand firm in the face of difficulties, and work loyally and devotedly for the nation, the class and the Party. It is on them that the Party relies for its links with the membership and the masses, and it is through their firm leadership of the masses that the Party will achieve the goal of defeating the enemy. These people must be free from selfishness, from individual heroism and showing off, from laziness and passivity, and from arrogant sectarianism; they must be selfless national and class heroes. Such are the character and style of work that Communist Party members, Party cadres and Party leaders should possess. This is also the spirit bequeathed to us by the tens of thousands of members, the thousands of cadres and the dozens of our very best leaders who have died. Without doubt we should learn these things, remould ourselves to be better, and raise ourselves to a higher revolutionary level. But even that is not enough. We must also make it a task to discover many new cadres and leaders in the whole Party and the whole country. Our revolution depends on cadres. As Stalin said: "Cadres decide everything."
The Question of Inner-Party Democracy
To achieve this aim, inner-Party democracy is essential. For the Party to be strong, it must rely on practising the Party's democratic centralism to bring the initiative of the whole Party into play. In the period of reaction and civil war, centralism was more prominent. In the new period, centralism should be closely linked with democracy. Through the practice of democracy, bring the initiative of the whole Party into play. By bringing the initiative of the whole Party into play, train large numbers of cadres, eliminate the remnants of sectarian notions, and unite the whole Party like iron and steel.
The Unity of the Conference and the Unity of the Whole Party
The differences of opinion on political questions at this conference have been resolved through explanation and agreement has been reached. The divergence between the former line of the Central Committee and the line of retreat led by certain individual comrades has also been resolved. This shows that our Party is very firmly united. This unity is the most important foundation for the present national and democratic revolution, because only through the unity of the Communist Party can the unity of the whole class and the whole nation be achieved, and only through the unity of the whole class and the whole nation can the enemy be defeated and the tasks of the national and democratic revolution be accomplished.
Strive to Win the Masses in Their Millions into the Anti-Japanese National United Front
Our correct political line and our firm unity serve the aim of winning the masses in their millions into the anti-Japanese national united front. The broad masses of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie await our work of propaganda, agitation and organization. An alliance between the anti-Japanese section of the bourgeoisie and ourselves also still awaits further work on our part. To turn the Party's line into the line of the masses still requires our long and persistent, indomitable, arduous, patient and painstaking efforts. Without such efforts nothing will succeed. The formation and consolidation of the anti-Japanese national united front and the accomplishment of its tasks, and the realization of a democratic republic in China, cannot be separated in the slightest from this effort to win over the masses. If through such efforts we win the masses in their millions to our leadership, our revolutionary tasks can be quickly accomplished. Our efforts will certainly overthrow Japanese imperialism and bring about complete national and social liberation.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
同志们!对于我的报告——《中国共产党在抗日时期的任务》,经这几天的讨论,除了个别同志提出了不同意见之外,大家都已表示同意。他们这些不同的意见,颇带重要性,因此我的结论,首先就来讨论这些意见,然后再说到一些其它的问题。
和平问题
我们党为国内和平而斗争,差不多有两年的时间了。国民党三中全会后,我们说和平已经取得,“争取和平”的阶段已经过去,新的任务是“巩固和平”,并指出这是同“争取民主”相关联的——用争取民主去巩固和平。我们的这种意见,按照几个同志的说法却不能成立。他们的结论必是相反的,或者是动摇于两者之间的。因为他们说:“日本后退了,南京更动摇了,民族矛盾下降,国内矛盾上升。”根据这种估计,当然无所谓新阶段和新任务,情况回到旧阶段,或者还不如。这种意见,我以为是不对的。
我们说和平取得了,并不是说和平巩固了,相反,我们说它是不巩固的。和平实现与和平巩固是两件事。历史暂时地走回头路是可能的,和平发生波折是可能的,原因就在于日本帝国主义和汉奸亲日派的存在。然而西安事变后和平实现是事实,这种情况是由多方面促成的(日本进攻的基本方针,苏联和英美法的赞助和平,中国人民的逼迫,共产党在西安事变中的和平方针及停止两个政权敌对的政策,资产阶级的分化,国民党的分化等等),不是蒋介石一个人所能决定和推翻的。要推翻和平必须同多方面势力作战,并且必须同日本帝国主义和亲日派靠拢,才能成功。没有问题,日本帝国主义和亲日派还在企图使中国继续内战。和平没有巩固,正是因为这一点。在这种情况下,我们的结论不是回到“停止内战”或“争取和平”的旧口号去,而是前进一步,提出“争取民主”的新口号,只有这样才能巩固和平,也只有这样才能实现抗战。为什么提出“巩固和平”、“争取民主”、“实现抗战”这样三位一体的口号?为的是把我们的革命车轮推进一步,为的是情况已经允许我们进一步了。如果否认新阶段和新任务,否认国民党的“开始转变”,并且逻辑的结论也将不得不否认一年半以来一切为争取和平而斗争的各派势力努力的成绩,那末,只是把自己停顿在旧位置,一步也没有前进。
为什么这些同志作出这种不妥当的估计呢?原因在于他们观察时局不从根本之点出发,而从许多局部和一时的现象(佐藤外交,苏州审判,压制罢工,东北军东调,杨虎城出洋等等)出发,于是形成一幅暗淡的画图。我们说国民党已经开始转变,但我们同时即说国民党并没有彻底转变。国民党的十年反动政策,要它彻底转变而不用我们和人民的新的更多更大的努力,这是不能设想的事情。不少号称“左”倾的人们,平日痛骂国民党,在西安事变中主张杀蒋和“打出潼关去”,及至和平刚刚实现又发现苏州审判等事,就用惊诧的口气发问道:“为什么蒋介石又这样干?”这些人们须知:共产党员和蒋介石都不是神仙,且都不是孤立的个人,而是处于一个党派、一个阶级里头的分子。共产党有本领把革命逐步地推向前进,但没有本领把全国的坏事在一个早晨去掉干净。蒋介石或国民党已经开始了他们的转变,但没有全国人民的更大努力,也决不会在一个早晨把他们的十年污浊洗掉得干净。我们说运动的方向是向着和平、民主和抗战,但不是说不经努力能够把内战、独裁和不抵抗的旧毒扫除干净。旧毒,污浊,革命进程中的某些波折,以及可能的回头路,只有斗争和努力才能够克服,而且需要长期的斗争和努力。
“他们是一心要破坏我们。”对的,他们总是在企图破坏我们,我完全承认这种估计的正确,不估计这一点就等于睡觉。但问题在破坏的方式是否有了改变。我以为是有了改变的。从战争和屠杀的政策改变到改良和欺骗的政策,从硬的政策改变到软的政策,从军事政策改变到政治政策。为什么有这种改变?资产阶级和国民党处在日本帝国主义面前不得不暂时向无产阶级找同盟军,也和我们向资产阶级找同盟军一样。观察问题应从这一点出发。国际上,法国政府由仇苏变为联苏,同此道理。我们在国内的任务,也从军事的变到政治的。我们不需要阴谋诡计,我们的目的在团结资产阶级和国民党中一切同情抗日的分子,共同战胜日本帝国主义。
民主问题
“强调民主是错误的,仅仅应该强调抗日;没有抗日的直接行动,就不能有民主运动;多数人只要抗日不要民主,再来一个‘一二九’就对了。”
让我首先发出一点问题:能够在过去阶段中(一九三五年一二九运动到一九三七年二月国民党三中全会)说,多数人只要抗日不要和平吗?过去强调和平是错了吗?没有抗日的直接行动就不能有和平运动吗?(西安事变和国民党三中全会正在绥远抗战结束之后,现在也还没有绥远抗战或“一二九”。)谁人不知:要抗日就要和平,无和平不能抗日,和平是抗日的条件。前一阶段一切直接间接的抗日行动(从“一二九”起到国民党三中全会止)都围绕着争取和平,和平是前一阶段的中心一环,是抗日运动在前一阶段中的最本质的东西。
对于抗日任务,民主也是新阶段中最本质的东西,为民主即是为抗日。抗日与民主互为条件,同抗日与和平、民主与和平互为条件一样。民主是抗日的保证,抗日能给予民主运动发展以有利条件。
新阶段中,我们希望有、也将会有许多直接的间接的反日斗争,这些将推动对日抗战,也大有助于民主运动。然而历史给予我们的革命任务,中心的本质的东西是争取民主。“民主”,“民主”是错的吗?我以为是不错的。
“日本退后了,英日向着平衡,南京更动摇了。”这是一种不了解历史发展规律而发生的不适当的忧虑。日本如因国内革命而根本后退,这是有助于中国革命的,是我们所希望的,是世界侵略战线崩溃的开始,为什么还忧虑?然而究竟还不是这样;佐藤外交是大战的准备,大战在我们面前。英国的动摇政策只能落得无结果,这是英国和日本的不同利害决定了的。南京如果是长期动摇,便变为全国人民之敌,也为南京的利益所不许。一时的后退现象,不能代替总的历史规律。因此不能否认新阶段,也不能否认民主任务的提出。况且无论什么情况,民主的口号都能适应,民主对于中国人是缺乏而不是多余,这是人人明白的。何况实际情况已经表明,指出新阶段和提出民主任务,是向抗战接近一步的东西。时局已经前进了,不要把它拉向后退。
“为什么强调国民大会?”因为它是可能牵涉到全部生活的东西,因为它是从反动独裁到民主的桥梁,因为它带着国防性,因为它是合法的。收复冀东察北、反对走私、反对“经济提携”等等,如像同志们所提出的,都是很对的,但这丝毫也不与民主任务和国民大会相矛盾,二者正是互相完成的,但中心的东西是国民大会和人民自由。
日常的反日斗争和人民生活斗争,要和民主运动相配合,这是完全对的,也是没有任何争论的。但目前阶段里中心和本质的东西,是民主和自由。
革命前途问题
有几个同志发出了这个问题,我的答复只能是简单的。
两篇文章,上篇与下篇,只有上篇做好,下篇才能做好。坚决地领导民主革命,是争取社会主义胜利的条件。我们是为着社会主义而斗争,这是和任何革命的三民主义者不相同的。现在的努力是朝着将来的大目标的,失掉这个大目标,就不是共产党员了。然而放松今日的努力,也就不是共产党员。
我们是革命转变论者,主张民主革命转变到社会主义方向去。民主革命中将有几个发展阶段,都在民主共和国口号下面。从资产阶级占优势到无产阶级占优势,这是一个斗争的长过程,争取领导权的过程,依靠着共产党对无产阶级觉悟程度组织程度的提高,对农民、对城市小资产阶级觉悟程度组织程度的提高。
无产阶级的坚固的同盟者是农民,其次是城市小资产阶级。同我们争领导权的是资产阶级。
对资产阶级的动摇和不彻底性的克服,依靠群众的力量和正确的政策,否则资产阶级将反过来克服无产阶级。
不流血的转变是我们所希望的,我们应该力争这一着,结果将看群众的力量如何而定。
我们是革命转变论者,不是托洛茨基主义的“不断革命”论者。我们主张经过民主共和国的一切必要的阶段,到达于社会主义。我们反对尾巴主义,但又反对冒险主义和急性病。
因为资产阶级参加革命的暂时性而不要资产阶级,指联合资产阶级的抗日派(在半殖民地)为投降主义,这是托洛茨基主义的说法,我们是不能同意的。今天的联合资产阶级抗日派,正是走向社会主义的必经的桥梁。
干部问题
指导伟大的革命,要有伟大的党,要有许多最好的干部。在一个四亿五千万人的中国里面,进行历史上空前的大革命,如果领导者是一个狭隘的小团体是不行的,党内仅有一些委琐不识大体、没有远见、没有能力的领袖和干部也是不行的。中国共产党早就是一个大政党,经过反动时期的损失它依然是一个大政党,它有了许多好的领袖和干部,但是还不够。我们党的组织要向全国发展,要自觉地造就成万数的干部,要有几百个最好的群众领袖。这些干部和领袖懂得马克思列宁主义,有政治远见,有工作能力,富于牺牲精神,能独立解决问题,在困难中不动摇,忠心耿耿地为民族、为阶级、为党而工作。党依靠着这些人而联系党员和群众,依靠着这些人对于群众的坚强领导而达到打倒敌人之目的。这些人不要自私自利,不要个人英雄主义和风头主义,不要懒惰和消极性,不要自高自大的宗派主义,他们是大公无私的民族的阶级的英雄,这就是共产党员、党的干部、党的领袖应该有的性格和作风。我们死去的若干万数的党员,若干千数的干部和几十个最好的领袖遗留给我们的精神,也就是这些东西。我们无疑地应该学习这些东西,把自己改造得更好一些,把自己提高到更高的革命水平。但是还不够,还要作为一种任务,在全党和全国发现许多新的干部和领袖。我们的革命依靠干部,正像斯大林所说的话:“干部决定一切。”
党内民主问题
要达到这种目的,党内的民主是必要的。要党有力量,依靠实行党的民主集中制去发动全党的积极性。在反动和内战时期,集中制表现得多一些。在新时期,集中制应该密切联系于民主制。用民主制的实行,发挥全党的积极性。用发挥全党的积极性,锻炼出大批的干部,肃清宗派观念的残余,团结全党像钢铁一样。
大会的团结和全党的团结
大会中政治问题上的不同意见,经过说明已经归于一致了;过去中央路线和个别同志领导的退却路线之间的分歧,也已经解决了,表示了我们的党已经团结得很坚固。这种团结是当前民族和民主革命的最重要的基础;因为只有经过共产党的团结,才能达到全阶级和全民族的团结,只有经过全阶级全民族的团结,才能战胜敌人,完成民族和民主革命的任务。
为争取千百万群众进入抗日民族统一战线而斗争
我们的正确的政治方针和坚固的团结,是为着争取千百万群众进入抗日民族统一战线这个目的。无产阶级、农民、城市小资产阶级的广大群众,有待于我们宣传、鼓动和组织的工作。资产阶级抗日派的和我们建立同盟,也还待我们的进一步工作。把党的方针变为群众的方针,还须要我们长期坚持的、百折不挠的、艰苦卓绝的、耐心而不怕麻烦的努力。没有这样一种努力是一切都不成功的。抗日民族统一战线的组成、巩固及其任务的完成,民主共和国在中国的实现,丝毫也不能离开这一争取群众的努力。如果经过这种努力而争取千百万群众在我们领导之下的话,那我们的革命任务就能够迅速地完成。我们的努力将确定地打倒日本帝国主义,并实现全部的民族解放和社会解放。