On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism

China Mao Zedong

27 December 1935

Context
Mao addressed Communist Party comrades on December 27, 1935, explaining the party's new tactics against Japanese imperialism and announcing a broad national united front and a change from workers' and peasants' republic to people's republic.
Main themes
Japanese imperialism's drive to colonise China, national united front against Japan, class attitudes toward resistance, national bourgeoisie's vacillation, splits in the Kuomintang camp, critique of closed-doorism, significance of the Long March, change from workers' and peasants' republic to people's republic, leading role of the Communist Party and Red Army, bourgeois-democratic character of the revolution, international support and righteous wars
Duration
~61 min
96th percentile
Words
7,371
96th percentile
Sentences
428
98th percentile
Readability
50
64th percentile
Grade
10.5
26th percentile
Syntax
2.87
30th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
70th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 69%64%
  • Institutional 11%10%
  • Economic 8%8%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

428 sentences in 58 paragraphs

The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation

Comrades! The present political situation has undergone a great change. On the basis of this changed situation, our Party has defined its tasks.

What is the present situation?

The basic characteristic of the present situation is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into its colony.

As everyone knows, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism and to the struggles among the imperialist powers themselves, China has kept a kind of semi-independent status. For a time the First World War gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity to dominate China alone. But the Chinese people's struggle against Japanese imperialism, together with the intervention of the other imperialist powers, forced the declaration that the Twenty-One Demands were null and void. That treaty of submission and capitulation to Japan had been signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the arch-traitor of the day. The Washington Nine-Power Conference convened by the United States in 1922 concluded a treaty that once again restored China to a situation of joint domination by several imperialist powers. But before long this situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931 began the stage of turning China into a Japanese colony. Only because Japanese aggression was for the time being confined to the four northeastern provinces did people feel that the Japanese imperialists might not necessarily advance any further. Today things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown that they intend to advance into China proper, and they want to occupy the whole of China. Japanese imperialism now wants to change the whole of China from a semi-colony shared among several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent Eastern Hopei Incident and the diplomatic negotiations have shown this direction and threaten the survival of the people of the whole country. This situation confronts all classes and all political groupings in China with the question of "what is to be done?" Resist? Or surrender? Or vacillate between the two?

Now let us look at how the various classes in China answer this question.

China's workers and peasants all demand resistance. The revolution of 1924-27, the Agrarian Revolution from 1927 to the present, and the anti-Japanese tide since the September 18th Incident of 1931 prove that the Chinese working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces of the Chinese revolution.

China's petty bourgeoisie also wants to resist. Have not the young students and the urban petty bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement? These petty-bourgeois sections of China took part in the revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they occupy the economic position of small producers, which is irreconcilable with imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have done them great harm, and many of them have been reduced to unemployment, bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy. Now they are about to become slaves of a conquered nation before their very eyes, and they have no way out but to resist.

But how does the question stand for the national bourgeoisie, the comprador class and the landlord class, and for the Kuomintang?

The big local tyrants, the big evil gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradors made up their minds long ago. They said in the past, and they still say now, that revolution (whatever kind of revolution) is worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors. For them there is no question of whether or not to become slaves of a conquered nation. They have already erased the line between nations, and their interests are inseparable from those of imperialism. Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. This camp of traitors is the deadly enemy of the Chinese people. Were it not for this pack of traitors, Japanese imperialism could never have become so reckless. They are the running dogs of imperialism.

The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the revolution of 1924-27, but then, terrified by the flames of that revolution, it went over to the side of the people's enemy, the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The question is whether, under present conditions, there is any possibility of a change in the national bourgeoisie. We think there is. This is because the national bourgeoisie is not the same thing as the landlord class and the comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie does not have as many feudal features as the landlord class, nor as many comprador features as the comprador class. Within the national bourgeoisie there is a section that has closer ties with foreign capital and with Chinese landed interests. This section is the right wing of the national bourgeoisie, and for the time being we shall not try to assess its possibility of change. The question concerns the sections that have no such ties, or fewer of them. We think that in the new situation created by the threat of colonization, the attitude of these sections of the national bourgeoisie may change. The characteristic feature of this change is their vacillation. On the one hand they dislike imperialism, and on the other they fear the thoroughness of revolution, and they vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the revolution during the period of 1924-27, and why, at the end of that period, they went over to Chiang Kai-shek's side. How does the present period differ from 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? At that time China was still a semi-colony; now it is on the way to becoming a colony. In the past nine years they have abandoned their ally the working class and made friends with the landlord and comprador classes. Have they gained any benefit? None at all. All they got was the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of national industry and commerce. Because of these circumstances, we think that in today's situation the attitude of the national bourgeoisie may change. To what extent? The general characteristic is vacillation. But at certain stages of the struggle one section of them (the left wing) may join the struggle. Another section may move from vacillation to neutrality.

What class interests did the Nineteenth Route Army led by Tsai Ting-kai and others represent? They represented the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside. Did not Tsai Ting-kai and his like fight the Red Army to the death? Yet later they concluded an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. In Kiangsi they attacked the Red Army. In Shanghai they resisted Japanese imperialism. In Fukien they reached a compromise with the Red Army and opened fire on Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever the future careers of Tsai Ting-kai and his like may be, and however much the Fukien People's Government of that time clung to the old ways and failed to arouse the masses to struggle, their turning of the guns once aimed at the Red Army against Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek must be called an act beneficial to the revolution. It was a split in the Kuomintang camp. If the situation after the September 18th Incident could split off this section from the Kuomintang camp, why should the present situation be unable to bring about a split in the Kuomintang? Those in our Party who hold the following view are wrong. They say that the whole camp of the landlords and the bourgeoisie is united and fixed, and that under no circumstances can it be made to change. They not only fail to recognize the gravity of today's situation, they have even forgotten history.

Let me say a little more about history. In 1926 and 1927, when the revolutionary army was advancing on Wuhan and then fought its way to Wuhan and into Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang joined the revolution. In 1933 Feng Yu-hsiang even cooperated with the Communist Party for a time in Chahar and set up the Anti-Japanese Allied Army.

Another clear example is the Twenty-sixth Route Army. It had attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi together with the Nineteenth Route Army. Did it not stage the Ningtu Uprising in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-tang and others, became firm revolutionary comrades.

Ma Chan-shan's anti-Japanese action in the three northeastern provinces was also a split in the camp of the ruling classes.

All these examples show that the enemy camp will split at certain moments: when the range of Japanese bombs extends over the whole of China, and when the struggle breaks out of its normal course and suddenly surges forward in a turbulent array.

Comrades, now let us turn to another point.

Some may cite the political and economic weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie to oppose our argument. They would hold that despite the new situation the Chinese national bourgeoisie still cannot possibly change its attitude. Is this view correct? I think it is also incorrect. If the reason it cannot change its attitude is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, then why did it change its usual behaviour in 1924-27? Why then did it not merely vacillate but actually join the revolution? Is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie a new ailment contracted later, rather than an old one it was born with? Is it weak today but was it not weak then? One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colony is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie. That is precisely why imperialism dares to bully them, and this in turn determines their dislike of imperialism. Of course, we do not deny this; on the contrary, we fully admit it. Again because of this weakness, imperialism and the landlord and comprador classes can easily win them over with some temporary bribe as bait, and this in turn determines their lack of thoroughness towards the revolution. Still, it cannot be said that under present conditions there is no difference whatsoever between them and the landlord and comprador classes.

Therefore we stress that when the national crisis reaches a critical point, splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp. Such splits show themselves in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie, and in anti-Japanese figures who were briefly in the limelight, such as Feng Yu-hsiang, Tsai Ting-kai and Ma Chan-shan. Basically speaking, this situation is unfavourable to the counter-revolution and favourable to the revolution. The unevenness of China's political and economic development, and the resulting unevenness in the development of the revolution, increase the possibility of such splits.

Comrades! So much for the positive side of this question. Now let me speak of its negative side. Certain elements of the national bourgeoisie are often adept at deceiving the masses. Why? Apart from those among them who truly support the people's revolutionary cause, many of them can for a time appear in a revolutionary or semi-revolutionary guise. This at the same time gives them the means to deceive the masses, and the masses find it hard to see through their lack of thoroughness and their pretence. This increases the Communist Party's responsibility to criticize its allies, to expose sham revolutionaries and to win leadership. If we denied that the national bourgeoisie may vacillate and join the revolution in a great upheaval, we would be abolishing, or at least reducing, our Party's task of winning leadership. For if the national bourgeoisie were exactly the same as the landlords and compradors and showed the hideous face of traitors, the task of winning leadership could largely be dropped, or at least reduced.

In analysing as a whole the posture of China's landlords and bourgeoisie in a great upheaval, one more aspect should be pointed out. Even the camp of the landlord and comprador classes is not completely united. This results from the semi-colonial situation, that is, from many imperialist powers contending for China. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, the running dogs of the United States, or even of Britain, may obey their masters' commands. Depending on how loudly they are ordered, they may fight the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs covertly or even openly. There have been many such dogfights in the past, and we need not go into them. Let us mention only Hu Han-min, the Kuomintang politician once imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek. Not long ago he too signed the document of the six-point programme for resisting Japan and saving the nation that we put forward. The Kwangtung and Kwangsi warlords on whom Hu Han-min relies have also set themselves against Chiang Kai-shek. They do so under the deceptive slogans of "recovering the lost territories" and "giving equal weight to resisting Japan and suppressing the bandits" (Chiang Kai-shek's slogan is "first suppress the bandits, then resist Japan"). Look, isn't this a bit strange? It is not strange at all. It is just a particularly interesting scuffle between big dogs and little dogs, well-fed dogs and hungry dogs. It is a gap neither large nor small, a contradiction that both itches and hurts. But this scuffle, this gap, this contradiction is useful to the revolutionary people. We must gather up every scuffle, every gap and every contradiction in the enemy camp and turn them all against our main enemy of the moment.

To sum up this question of class relations: Japanese imperialism has invaded China proper. This basic change has altered the relations among the various classes in China. It has expanded the strength of the camp of national revolution and weakened the strength of the camp of national counter-revolution.

Now let us turn to the situation within the camp of the Chinese national revolution.

First, the situation of the Red Army. Comrades, look: for nearly a year and a half, all three main forces of the Chinese Red Army have been carrying out a great shift of positions. It began last August, when Comrade Jen Pi-shih and others led the Sixth Army Group in moving towards Comrade Ho Lung's area. Our own move followed, starting in October. In March this year the Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area also began to move. All three of these Red Armies abandoned their original positions and moved to new areas. This great shift turned the old areas into guerrilla zones. In the course of the move the Red Army itself was greatly weakened. If we take this one aspect of the overall situation, the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, and we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is it right to say this? I think it is right, because it is a fact. But some people (Chang Kuo-tao, for example) say that the Central Red Army has failed. Is that right? No, because it is not a fact. In looking at a problem a Marxist should see not only the part but also the whole. A frog sitting in a well says, "The sky is as big as the mouth of the well." That is wrong, because the sky is bigger than the mouth of a well. If it said, "A part of the sky is as big as the mouth of the well," that would be right, because it accords with the facts. We say that in one respect (that of holding our original positions) the Red Army has failed, but in another respect (that of carrying out the plan of the Long March) it has won. In one respect (that of occupying our army's original positions) the enemy has won, but in another respect (that of carrying out its plans of "encirclement and suppression" and "pursuit and suppression") it has failed. That is the proper way to put it, because we have completed the Long March.

Speaking of the Long March, what, may I ask, is its significance? We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history. It is a manifesto, a propaganda force and a seeding-machine. Ever since Pan Ku separated heaven and earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors reigned, down to the present day, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months, dozens of planes reconnoitred and bombed us from the sky every day. On the ground, several hundred thousand troops encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted us. On the way we met untold difficulties and dangers. Yet by using our two feet we swept across more than 20,000 li through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march like ours? No, never. The Long March is also a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the whole world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are completely useless. The Long March has proclaimed the bankruptcy of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception by the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that only the road of the Red Army is the road to their liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly that there is in the world such a great truth as the Red Army? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. It has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, leaf, blossom and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leading bodies, its cadres and its members fear no difficulties or hardships. Whoever doubts our ability to lead the revolutionary war will sink into the quagmire of opportunism. As soon as the Long March ended, a new situation began. In the battle of Chihlochen, the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, united like brothers, smashed the traitor Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of "encirclement and suppression" against the Shensi-Kansu border area. In doing so they laid the foundation stone for the task the Party Central Committee has set, of making the Northwest the headquarters of the national revolution.

So much for the main forces of the Red Army. What about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? The guerrilla war in the south has suffered some setbacks, but it has not been wiped out. In many places it is recovering, growing and expanding.

In the Kuomintang areas, the workers' struggle is moving from inside the factories to outside them, and from economic struggle to political struggle. The heroic struggle of the working class against Japan and against the traitors is now brewing deep down, and it seems not far from breaking out.

The peasants' struggle has never stopped. Oppressed by foreign aggression, domestic troubles and natural disasters on top of these, the peasants have widely launched struggles in the form of guerrilla warfare, popular uprisings, famine riots and so on. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the Northeast and in eastern Hopei is answering the attacks of Japanese imperialism.

The student movement has already grown enormously and will certainly grow still more in the future. But it can only be sustained if it is coordinated with the struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Only then can it break through the traitors' martial law and their policy of disruption and massacre carried out by police, detectives, academic hoodlums and fascists.

The possibility that the national bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside will vacillate, or even take part in the anti-Japanese struggle, has been discussed above.

The minority nationalities, and especially the Inner Mongolians, are rising in struggle under the direct threat of Japanese imperialism. In the future their struggle will merge with the struggle of the people of northern China and with the Red Army's activities in the Northwest.

All this shows that the revolutionary situation is changing from a local one into a national one, and gradually changing from a state of unevenness into a certain degree of evenness. We are now on the eve of a great upheaval. The Party's task is to merge the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie throughout the country into a united national revolutionary front.

The National United Front

Having examined the situation on both sides, the counter-revolution and the revolution, we can easily explain the Party's tactical tasks.

What is the Party's basic tactical task? It is nothing other than to build a broad national revolutionary united front.

When the revolutionary situation has changed, revolutionary tactics and methods of revolutionary leadership must change accordingly. The task of Japanese imperialism and of the collaborators and traitors is to turn China into a colony. Our task is to turn China into an independent, free and territorially integral country.

Achieving China's independence and freedom is a great task. It requires fighting foreign imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces at home. Japanese imperialism is determined to drive ahead ruthlessly. The counter-revolutionary forces of the domestic gentry and comprador classes are for the present still stronger than the revolutionary forces of the people. The overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces cannot be accomplished in a day or two; we must be prepared to spend a long time on it. Nor can it be accomplished with a small force; we must build up a powerful force. The counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world are weaker than before, and the revolutionary forces in China and in the world have grown stronger than before. This is a correct appraisal, an appraisal of one aspect. At the same time, however, we must say that for the present the counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world are still stronger than the revolutionary forces. This is also a correct appraisal, an appraisal of another aspect. The uneven political and economic development of China gives rise to uneven development of the revolution. Victory in the revolution always begins, develops and is first won in places where the counter-revolutionary forces are relatively weak. Where the counter-revolutionary forces are strong, the revolution has not yet arisen or develops very slowly. This is what the Chinese revolution has encountered over a long period in the past. It can be expected that in the future, at certain stages, the overall revolutionary situation will develop further, but unevenness will still exist. Changing this uneven state into a generally even one will take a very long time and require great effort. It will also depend on the Party's tactical line being correct. The revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was finished within three years. The revolutionary war led by the Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, has already taken a very long time. To finish off the counter-revolutionary forces at home and abroad finally and thoroughly, we must be prepared to spend the time it requires, and the excessive impatience of the past will not do. We must also put forward a very good revolutionary tactic. If we keep going round and round in a narrow circle, as in the past, we shall never accomplish anything great. This does not mean that things in China can only be done slowly. Things in China must be done boldly, and the danger of national subjugation does not allow us a minute's slackness. From now on the revolution will certainly develop much faster than before, because both China and the world are entering a new period of war and revolution. Even so, China's revolutionary war remains a protracted war. The strength of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution determine its protracted character. We say that the characteristic of the present situation is the arrival of a new upsurge of the national revolution. China is on the eve of a new great nationwide revolution. This is a characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. It is a fact, the fact of one aspect. Now we also say that imperialism is still a formidable force, and that the uneven state of the revolutionary forces is a serious weakness. To defeat the enemy we must be prepared to fight a protracted war. This is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This, too, is a fact, the fact of another aspect. These two characteristics, these two facts, come together to teach us. They require us to adapt to circumstances, change our tactics and change the way we deploy our forces for battle. The present situation requires us boldly to discard closed-doorism, adopt a broad united front and guard against adventurism. We must not rashly engage in a decisive battle before the time for it has come and before we have the strength for it.

I shall not discuss here the relationship between closed-doorism and adventurism. Nor shall I discuss the possible dangers of adventurism as the larger situation unfolds in the future; that can wait until later. Here I shall only say that the tactics of the united front and the tactics of closed-doorism are two opposite tactics.

The one wants to recruit large forces so as to surround and annihilate the enemy.

The other relies on going it alone to fight a hard battle with a powerful enemy.

The one says the following. If we fail to give sufficient weight to the fact that Japanese imperialism's drive to turn China into a colony can shift the lines of revolution and counter-revolution in China, we shall fail to give sufficient weight to the possibility of organizing a broad national revolutionary united front. If we fail to give sufficient weight to the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese counter-revolutionary forces, the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall fail to see the necessity of organizing such a front. Then we shall not take resolute measures to break down closed-doorism. We shall not use the weapon of the united front to organize and rally millions of the masses and all potential revolutionary allies. We shall not advance with them to attack the most central target, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors. We shall not use our tactical weapon to fire at the most central target of the moment. Instead we shall scatter our aim, so that the main enemy goes unhit while secondary enemies, and even allies, are struck by our bullets. This is called failing to pick out the enemy and wasting ammunition. In this way we cannot drive the enemy into a narrow, isolated position. In this way we cannot win over from the enemy's camp and front the people who have been coerced into it, the people who were our enemies yesterday but may be our allies today. In this way we would in fact be helping the enemy, and the revolution would stagnate, become isolated, shrink and decline, and might even go down the road to defeat.

The other says that all these criticisms are wrong. The revolutionary forces must be pure, and purer still. The revolutionary road must be straight, and straighter still. Only what is written in the scriptures is correct. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch of concession can be made to the rich peasants. With the yellow trade unions we must fight to the death. If we shake hands with Tsai Ting-kai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the very moment we shake hands. Where is there a cat that does not eat fat, and where is there a warlord who is not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals stay revolutionary for only three days, and it is dangerous to recruit them. Hence the conclusion: closed-doorism is the sole magic weapon, and the united front is an opportunist tactic.

Comrades, which is right, the case for the united front or the case for closed-doorism? Which one does Marxism-Leninism endorse? I answer firmly: it endorses the united front and opposes closed-doorism. There are three-year-old children among us, and many of their ideas are right. But we cannot let them manage the great affairs of the state and the world, because they do not yet understand those affairs. Marxism-Leninism opposes infantile disorders in the revolutionary ranks. What the advocates of closed-door tactics stand for is precisely an infantile disorder. The road of revolution, like the course of every other activity in the world, is always tortuous and never straight. The alignment of revolution and counter-revolution can change, just as everything else in the world can change. Japanese imperialism is determined to turn the whole of China into its colony, while the present forces of the Chinese revolution still have serious weaknesses. These two basic facts are the starting point of the Party's new tactics, the broad united front. Organizing millions of the masses and mobilizing a mighty revolutionary army are what today's revolution needs in order to attack the counter-revolution. Only a force of this kind can crush Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors. This is a truth plain for all to see. Therefore only united front tactics are Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are the tactics of the isolated. Closed-doorism "drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets." It drives the "millions" and the "mighty army" over to the enemy's side and wins only the enemy's applause. In practice closed-doorism is the faithful servant of Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors. The "purity" and "straightness" of closed-doorism are things that Marxism-Leninism slaps in the face and Japanese imperialism commends. We definitely do not want closed-doorism. What we want is a national revolutionary united front that will deal a mortal blow to Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors.

The People's Republic

Our government has hitherto been based on the alliance of the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. From now on, it should be changed to include, besides these, the elements of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.

At present the basic task of this government is to oppose Japanese imperialism's annexation of China. Its composition will be broadened widely. Those who are interested only in the national revolution and not in the agrarian revolution can join it. So, if they are willing, can those who have ties with European and American imperialism and cannot oppose it, but can oppose Japanese imperialism and its running dogs. Therefore the programme of this government should follow the principle of suiting the basic task of opposing Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, and on this basis our past policies should be appropriately revised.

The special feature on the revolutionary side today is that we have a tempered Communist Party and a tempered Red Army. This is a matter of the utmost importance. If we did not yet have a tempered Communist Party and Red Army, there would be tremendous difficulties. Why? Because China's collaborators and traitors are numerous and powerful, and they will certainly devise all kinds of ways to wreck this united front. They will use threats and inducements, and play off one party against another, to sow discord. They will use armed force to crush, one by one, the forces that are smaller than theirs and are willing to leave the traitors and join with us in fighting Japan. If the anti-Japanese government and anti-Japanese army lacked the element of the Communist Party and the Red Army, this would be hard to avoid. The chief cause of the failure of the 1927 revolution was the opportunist line within the Communist Party. It made no effort to expand our own ranks, that is, the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party. Instead it relied solely on its temporary ally, the Kuomintang. As a result, imperialism ordered its running dogs, the gentry and comprador classes, to stretch out a thousand hands. They first pulled away Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, and the revolution was defeated. The revolutionary united front of that time had no central pillar and no strong revolutionary armed force. When revolts broke out on every side, the Communist Party had to fight alone. It could not withstand the tactics by which imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolution crushed their opponents one by one. Although there were the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting at that time, they were not yet politically strong, and the Party did not know how to lead them well, so in the end they were defeated. This is the lesson, written in blood, of how the lack of a revolutionary core leads to the defeat of the revolution. Today the situation has changed. We already have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, and we also have the Red Army's base areas. The Communist Party and the Red Army are now the initiators of the anti-Japanese national united front. In the future they are bound to become its strong pillars in the anti-Japanese government and the anti-Japanese army. They will prevent the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek from achieving their final aim with the policy of undermining the anti-Japanese national united front. There is no doubt that the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek will use threats and inducements and play one side against another in every possible way, and we must be very much on our guard.

Of course, we cannot expect every part of the broad ranks of the anti-Japanese national united front to be as solid as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of their activity some bad elements will come under the enemy's influence and quit the united front. But we are not afraid of such people leaving. Some bad people will leave under the enemy's influence, but some good people will join under ours. So long as the Communist Party and the Red Army themselves exist and grow, the anti-Japanese national united front will also exist and grow. This is the leading role of the Communist Party and the Red Army in the national united front. Communists are no longer children; they know how to handle themselves and how to handle their allies. The Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek can manoeuvre against the revolutionary ranks by playing one party against another. The Communist Party can do the same against the counter-revolutionary ranks. If they can lure bad elements out of our ranks, we can of course lure "bad elements" (good elements, from our point of view) out of theirs. If we can draw more people out of their ranks, the enemy's ranks will shrink and ours will grow. In short, two basic forces are now locked in struggle. All intermediate forces must attach themselves to one side or the other; this is inevitable. The Japanese imperialists aim to subjugate China, and Chiang Kai-shek's policy is to betray it. These policies cannot fail to drive many forces over to our side. They will either join the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army directly or form a united front with them. This aim can be achieved so long as our tactics are not closed-door tactics.

Why should the workers' and peasants' republic be changed into a people's republic?

Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. This meaning was implicit from the start in the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic, because the workers and peasants make up 80 to 90 per cent of the nation's population. The Ten-Point Programme adopted by our Party's Sixth National Congress represents the interests not only of the workers and peasants but also of the nation. But the present situation requires us to change the slogan to a people's republic. This is because Japanese aggression has altered class relations in China. Not only the petty bourgeoisie but also the national bourgeoisie may now take part in the anti-Japanese struggle.

There is no question that the people's republic does not represent the interests of hostile classes. On the contrary, it stands in direct opposition to the gentry and comprador classes, the running dogs of imperialism, and does not count them among the so-called people. This is just like Chiang Kai-shek's "National Government of the Republic of China." That government represents only the richest magnates and not the common people, and does not count the common people among the so-called "nationals." Eighty to ninety per cent of China's population are workers and peasants, so the people's republic should first of all represent their interests. But the people's republic will remove imperialist oppression and make China free and independent. It will remove the oppression of the landlords and free China from the semi-feudal system. These things will benefit not only the workers and peasants but the rest of the people as well. The interests of the workers, peasants and the rest of the people taken together make up the interests of the Chinese nation. The comprador and landlord classes also live on Chinese soil, but they disregard the interests of the nation, and their interests conflict with those of the majority. We part company only with this small minority and come into conflict only with them. Therefore we have the right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.

The interests of the working class also conflict with those of the national bourgeoisie. The working class is the vanguard of the national revolution. Unless it is given political and economic rights and is able to bring its strength to bear against imperialism and its running dogs, the traitors, the national revolution cannot succeed. But if the national bourgeoisie joins the united front against imperialism, the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. In the era of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's republic will not abolish private property other than imperialist and feudal property. Far from confiscating the industrial and commercial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie, it will encourage their development. We shall protect any national capitalist so long as he does not support the imperialists and the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers. But they will not oppose national capitalists making profits or the development of national industry and commerce, because such development is unfavourable to imperialism and favourable to the Chinese people. It is clear, then, that the people's republic represents the interests of the people of all strata who oppose imperialism and the feudal forces. The government of the people's republic will have the workers and peasants as its main body, and will also include the other classes that oppose imperialism and the feudal forces.

Isn't it dangerous to let these people into the government of the people's republic? No, it is not. The workers and peasants are the basic masses of the republic. The urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and others who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme will be given a voice and a role in the government of the people's republic. They will be given the right to vote and to stand for election. None of this need run counter to the interests of the basic masses of workers and peasants. The essential part of our programme should protect the interests of the basic masses of workers and peasants. Their representatives will form the majority in the government of the people's republic. Together with the Communist Party's leadership and activity in that government, this guarantees that the entry of the others is not dangerous. It is perfectly clear that the present stage of the Chinese revolution is still bourgeois-democratic in character and not proletarian-socialist. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites talk the nonsense that China has already completed its bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was bourgeois-democratic in character, and it was not completed but defeated. The Agrarian Revolution we have led from 1927 to the present is also bourgeois-democratic in character, because its tasks are to oppose imperialism and feudalism, not capitalism. This will remain the character of the revolution for a fairly long time to come.

The motive forces of the revolution are still basically the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Now the national bourgeoisie may be added.

The transformation of the revolution is a matter for the future. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. The test of when it should be transformed is whether the conditions for it exist, and this will take a fairly long time. We should not talk lightly of transformation until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present. Nor should we do so until it would benefit rather than harm the overwhelming majority of the people of the whole country. It is wrong to doubt this and hope to bring about the transformation within a very short time. Some comrades held that the revolution would begin to be transformed the very day the democratic revolution began to triumph in the key provinces. They were wrong. They failed to see what kind of country China is, politically and economically. They did not understand that completing the democratic revolution politically and economically is much more difficult in China than it was in Russia, and requires much more time and effort.

International Support

Finally, a word about the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution.

Ever since that monster imperialism came into being, the affairs of the world have become so bound up together that it is impossible to separate them. We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood. We have the determination to recover our lost territories on the basis of self-reliance, and the ability to stand on our own among the nations of the world. But this does not mean that we can do without international support. No, international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle of every country and every nation in the modern world. The ancients said, "In the Spring and Autumn era there were no righteous wars." This is even truer of imperialism today, which wages no righteous wars; only oppressed nations and oppressed classes can wage righteous wars. All wars throughout the world in which the people rise against their oppressors are righteous wars. The February Revolution and the October Revolution in Russia were righteous wars. The revolutions of the peoples of the various European countries after the First World War were righteous wars. China's Opium War of resistance, the war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the war of the Yi Ho Tuan and the war of the Revolution of 1911 were all righteous wars. So were the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to the present, and today's war against Japan and against the traitors. In the present anti-Japanese upsurge throughout China and the anti-fascist upsurge throughout the world, righteous wars will spread all over China and all over the world. All righteous wars support one another, and all wars that are not righteous should be turned into righteous wars. This is the Leninist line. Our war of resistance against Japan needs the support of the people of other countries, above all the support of the people of the Soviet Union. They will surely support us, because we and they share weal and woe. For a period in the past, Chiang Kai-shek cut off the revolutionary forces of China from the international revolutionary forces, and in this sense we were isolated. Now this situation has changed, and changed in our favour. From now on it will continue to change in our favour. We shall no longer be isolated. This is a necessary condition for victory in China's War of Resistance Against Japan and in the Chinese revolution.