- Context
- Mao addressed Communist Party comrades on December 27, 1935, explaining the party's new tactics against Japanese imperialism and announcing a broad national united front and a change from workers' and peasants' republic to people's republic.
- Main themes
- Japanese imperialism's drive to colonise China, national united front against Japan, class attitudes toward resistance, national bourgeoisie's vacillation, splits in the Kuomintang camp, critique of closed-doorism, significance of the Long March, change from workers' and peasants' republic to people's republic, leading role of the Communist Party and Red Army, bourgeois-democratic character of the revolution, international support and righteous wars
- Duration
- ~61 min
- Words
- 7,371
- Sentences
- 428
- Readability
- 50
- Grade
- 10.5
- Syntax
- 2.87
- Vocabulary
- 2.29
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other428 sentences in 58 paragraphs
The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation
Comrades! The present political situation has undergone a great change. On the basis of this changed situation, our Party has defined its tasks.
What is the present situation?
The basic characteristic of the present situation is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into its colony.
As everyone knows, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism and to the struggles among the imperialist powers themselves, China has kept a kind of semi-independent status. For a time the First World War gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity to dominate China alone. But the Chinese people's struggle against Japanese imperialism, together with the intervention of the other imperialist powers, forced the declaration that the Twenty-One Demands were null and void. That treaty of submission and capitulation to Japan had been signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the arch-traitor of the day. The Washington Nine-Power Conference convened by the United States in 1922 concluded a treaty that once again restored China to a situation of joint domination by several imperialist powers. But before long this situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931 began the stage of turning China into a Japanese colony. Only because Japanese aggression was for the time being confined to the four northeastern provinces did people feel that the Japanese imperialists might not necessarily advance any further. Today things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown that they intend to advance into China proper, and they want to occupy the whole of China. Japanese imperialism now wants to change the whole of China from a semi-colony shared among several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent Eastern Hopei Incident and the diplomatic negotiations have shown this direction and threaten the survival of the people of the whole country. This situation confronts all classes and all political groupings in China with the question of "what is to be done?" Resist? Or surrender? Or vacillate between the two?
Now let us look at how the various classes in China answer this question.
China's workers and peasants all demand resistance. The revolution of 1924-27, the Agrarian Revolution from 1927 to the present, and the anti-Japanese tide since the September 18th Incident of 1931 prove that the Chinese working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces of the Chinese revolution.
China's petty bourgeoisie also wants to resist. Have not the young students and the urban petty bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement? These petty-bourgeois sections of China took part in the revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they occupy the economic position of small producers, which is irreconcilable with imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have done them great harm, and many of them have been reduced to unemployment, bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy. Now they are about to become slaves of a conquered nation before their very eyes, and they have no way out but to resist.
But how does the question stand for the national bourgeoisie, the comprador class and the landlord class, and for the Kuomintang?
The big local tyrants, the big evil gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradors made up their minds long ago. They said in the past, and they still say now, that revolution (whatever kind of revolution) is worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors. For them there is no question of whether or not to become slaves of a conquered nation. They have already erased the line between nations, and their interests are inseparable from those of imperialism. Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. This camp of traitors is the deadly enemy of the Chinese people. Were it not for this pack of traitors, Japanese imperialism could never have become so reckless. They are the running dogs of imperialism.
The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the revolution of 1924-27, but then, terrified by the flames of that revolution, it went over to the side of the people's enemy, the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The question is whether, under present conditions, there is any possibility of a change in the national bourgeoisie. We think there is. This is because the national bourgeoisie is not the same thing as the landlord class and the comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie does not have as many feudal features as the landlord class, nor as many comprador features as the comprador class. Within the national bourgeoisie there is a section that has closer ties with foreign capital and with Chinese landed interests. This section is the right wing of the national bourgeoisie, and for the time being we shall not try to assess its possibility of change. The question concerns the sections that have no such ties, or fewer of them. We think that in the new situation created by the threat of colonization, the attitude of these sections of the national bourgeoisie may change. The characteristic feature of this change is their vacillation. On the one hand they dislike imperialism, and on the other they fear the thoroughness of revolution, and they vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the revolution during the period of 1924-27, and why, at the end of that period, they went over to Chiang Kai-shek's side. How does the present period differ from 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? At that time China was still a semi-colony; now it is on the way to becoming a colony. In the past nine years they have abandoned their ally the working class and made friends with the landlord and comprador classes. Have they gained any benefit? None at all. All they got was the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of national industry and commerce. Because of these circumstances, we think that in today's situation the attitude of the national bourgeoisie may change. To what extent? The general characteristic is vacillation. But at certain stages of the struggle one section of them (the left wing) may join the struggle. Another section may move from vacillation to neutrality.
What class interests did the Nineteenth Route Army led by Tsai Ting-kai and others represent? They represented the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside. Did not Tsai Ting-kai and his like fight the Red Army to the death? Yet later they concluded an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. In Kiangsi they attacked the Red Army. In Shanghai they resisted Japanese imperialism. In Fukien they reached a compromise with the Red Army and opened fire on Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever the future careers of Tsai Ting-kai and his like may be, and however much the Fukien People's Government of that time clung to the old ways and failed to arouse the masses to struggle, their turning of the guns once aimed at the Red Army against Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek must be called an act beneficial to the revolution. It was a split in the Kuomintang camp. If the situation after the September 18th Incident could split off this section from the Kuomintang camp, why should the present situation be unable to bring about a split in the Kuomintang? Those in our Party who hold the following view are wrong. They say that the whole camp of the landlords and the bourgeoisie is united and fixed, and that under no circumstances can it be made to change. They not only fail to recognize the gravity of today's situation, they have even forgotten history.
Let me say a little more about history. In 1926 and 1927, when the revolutionary army was advancing on Wuhan and then fought its way to Wuhan and into Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang joined the revolution. In 1933 Feng Yu-hsiang even cooperated with the Communist Party for a time in Chahar and set up the Anti-Japanese Allied Army.
Another clear example is the Twenty-sixth Route Army. It had attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi together with the Nineteenth Route Army. Did it not stage the Ningtu Uprising in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-tang and others, became firm revolutionary comrades.
Ma Chan-shan's anti-Japanese action in the three northeastern provinces was also a split in the camp of the ruling classes.
All these examples show that the enemy camp will split at certain moments: when the range of Japanese bombs extends over the whole of China, and when the struggle breaks out of its normal course and suddenly surges forward in a turbulent array.
Comrades, now let us turn to another point.
Some may cite the political and economic weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie to oppose our argument. They would hold that despite the new situation the Chinese national bourgeoisie still cannot possibly change its attitude. Is this view correct? I think it is also incorrect. If the reason it cannot change its attitude is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, then why did it change its usual behaviour in 1924-27? Why then did it not merely vacillate but actually join the revolution? Is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie a new ailment contracted later, rather than an old one it was born with? Is it weak today but was it not weak then? One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colony is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie. That is precisely why imperialism dares to bully them, and this in turn determines their dislike of imperialism. Of course, we do not deny this; on the contrary, we fully admit it. Again because of this weakness, imperialism and the landlord and comprador classes can easily win them over with some temporary bribe as bait, and this in turn determines their lack of thoroughness towards the revolution. Still, it cannot be said that under present conditions there is no difference whatsoever between them and the landlord and comprador classes.
Therefore we stress that when the national crisis reaches a critical point, splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp. Such splits show themselves in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie, and in anti-Japanese figures who were briefly in the limelight, such as Feng Yu-hsiang, Tsai Ting-kai and Ma Chan-shan. Basically speaking, this situation is unfavourable to the counter-revolution and favourable to the revolution. The unevenness of China's political and economic development, and the resulting unevenness in the development of the revolution, increase the possibility of such splits.
Comrades! So much for the positive side of this question. Now let me speak of its negative side. Certain elements of the national bourgeoisie are often adept at deceiving the masses. Why? Apart from those among them who truly support the people's revolutionary cause, many of them can for a time appear in a revolutionary or semi-revolutionary guise. This at the same time gives them the means to deceive the masses, and the masses find it hard to see through their lack of thoroughness and their pretence. This increases the Communist Party's responsibility to criticize its allies, to expose sham revolutionaries and to win leadership. If we denied that the national bourgeoisie may vacillate and join the revolution in a great upheaval, we would be abolishing, or at least reducing, our Party's task of winning leadership. For if the national bourgeoisie were exactly the same as the landlords and compradors and showed the hideous face of traitors, the task of winning leadership could largely be dropped, or at least reduced.
In analysing as a whole the posture of China's landlords and bourgeoisie in a great upheaval, one more aspect should be pointed out. Even the camp of the landlord and comprador classes is not completely united. This results from the semi-colonial situation, that is, from many imperialist powers contending for China. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, the running dogs of the United States, or even of Britain, may obey their masters' commands. Depending on how loudly they are ordered, they may fight the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs covertly or even openly. There have been many such dogfights in the past, and we need not go into them. Let us mention only Hu Han-min, the Kuomintang politician once imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek. Not long ago he too signed the document of the six-point programme for resisting Japan and saving the nation that we put forward. The Kwangtung and Kwangsi warlords on whom Hu Han-min relies have also set themselves against Chiang Kai-shek. They do so under the deceptive slogans of "recovering the lost territories" and "giving equal weight to resisting Japan and suppressing the bandits" (Chiang Kai-shek's slogan is "first suppress the bandits, then resist Japan"). Look, isn't this a bit strange? It is not strange at all. It is just a particularly interesting scuffle between big dogs and little dogs, well-fed dogs and hungry dogs. It is a gap neither large nor small, a contradiction that both itches and hurts. But this scuffle, this gap, this contradiction is useful to the revolutionary people. We must gather up every scuffle, every gap and every contradiction in the enemy camp and turn them all against our main enemy of the moment.
To sum up this question of class relations: Japanese imperialism has invaded China proper. This basic change has altered the relations among the various classes in China. It has expanded the strength of the camp of national revolution and weakened the strength of the camp of national counter-revolution.
Now let us turn to the situation within the camp of the Chinese national revolution.
First, the situation of the Red Army. Comrades, look: for nearly a year and a half, all three main forces of the Chinese Red Army have been carrying out a great shift of positions. It began last August, when Comrade Jen Pi-shih and others led the Sixth Army Group in moving towards Comrade Ho Lung's area. Our own move followed, starting in October. In March this year the Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area also began to move. All three of these Red Armies abandoned their original positions and moved to new areas. This great shift turned the old areas into guerrilla zones. In the course of the move the Red Army itself was greatly weakened. If we take this one aspect of the overall situation, the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, and we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is it right to say this? I think it is right, because it is a fact. But some people (Chang Kuo-tao, for example) say that the Central Red Army has failed. Is that right? No, because it is not a fact. In looking at a problem a Marxist should see not only the part but also the whole. A frog sitting in a well says, "The sky is as big as the mouth of the well." That is wrong, because the sky is bigger than the mouth of a well. If it said, "A part of the sky is as big as the mouth of the well," that would be right, because it accords with the facts. We say that in one respect (that of holding our original positions) the Red Army has failed, but in another respect (that of carrying out the plan of the Long March) it has won. In one respect (that of occupying our army's original positions) the enemy has won, but in another respect (that of carrying out its plans of "encirclement and suppression" and "pursuit and suppression") it has failed. That is the proper way to put it, because we have completed the Long March.
Speaking of the Long March, what, may I ask, is its significance? We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history. It is a manifesto, a propaganda force and a seeding-machine. Ever since Pan Ku separated heaven and earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors reigned, down to the present day, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months, dozens of planes reconnoitred and bombed us from the sky every day. On the ground, several hundred thousand troops encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted us. On the way we met untold difficulties and dangers. Yet by using our two feet we swept across more than 20,000 li through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march like ours? No, never. The Long March is also a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the whole world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are completely useless. The Long March has proclaimed the bankruptcy of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception by the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that only the road of the Red Army is the road to their liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly that there is in the world such a great truth as the Red Army? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. It has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, leaf, blossom and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leading bodies, its cadres and its members fear no difficulties or hardships. Whoever doubts our ability to lead the revolutionary war will sink into the quagmire of opportunism. As soon as the Long March ended, a new situation began. In the battle of Chihlochen, the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, united like brothers, smashed the traitor Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of "encirclement and suppression" against the Shensi-Kansu border area. In doing so they laid the foundation stone for the task the Party Central Committee has set, of making the Northwest the headquarters of the national revolution.
So much for the main forces of the Red Army. What about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? The guerrilla war in the south has suffered some setbacks, but it has not been wiped out. In many places it is recovering, growing and expanding.
In the Kuomintang areas, the workers' struggle is moving from inside the factories to outside them, and from economic struggle to political struggle. The heroic struggle of the working class against Japan and against the traitors is now brewing deep down, and it seems not far from breaking out.
The peasants' struggle has never stopped. Oppressed by foreign aggression, domestic troubles and natural disasters on top of these, the peasants have widely launched struggles in the form of guerrilla warfare, popular uprisings, famine riots and so on. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the Northeast and in eastern Hopei is answering the attacks of Japanese imperialism.
The student movement has already grown enormously and will certainly grow still more in the future. But it can only be sustained if it is coordinated with the struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Only then can it break through the traitors' martial law and their policy of disruption and massacre carried out by police, detectives, academic hoodlums and fascists.
The possibility that the national bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside will vacillate, or even take part in the anti-Japanese struggle, has been discussed above.
The minority nationalities, and especially the Inner Mongolians, are rising in struggle under the direct threat of Japanese imperialism. In the future their struggle will merge with the struggle of the people of northern China and with the Red Army's activities in the Northwest.
All this shows that the revolutionary situation is changing from a local one into a national one, and gradually changing from a state of unevenness into a certain degree of evenness. We are now on the eve of a great upheaval. The Party's task is to merge the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie throughout the country into a united national revolutionary front.
The National United Front
Having examined the situation on both sides, the counter-revolution and the revolution, we can easily explain the Party's tactical tasks.
What is the Party's basic tactical task? It is nothing other than to build a broad national revolutionary united front.
When the revolutionary situation has changed, revolutionary tactics and methods of revolutionary leadership must change accordingly. The task of Japanese imperialism and of the collaborators and traitors is to turn China into a colony. Our task is to turn China into an independent, free and territorially integral country.
Achieving China's independence and freedom is a great task. It requires fighting foreign imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces at home. Japanese imperialism is determined to drive ahead ruthlessly. The counter-revolutionary forces of the domestic gentry and comprador classes are for the present still stronger than the revolutionary forces of the people. The overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces cannot be accomplished in a day or two; we must be prepared to spend a long time on it. Nor can it be accomplished with a small force; we must build up a powerful force. The counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world are weaker than before, and the revolutionary forces in China and in the world have grown stronger than before. This is a correct appraisal, an appraisal of one aspect. At the same time, however, we must say that for the present the counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world are still stronger than the revolutionary forces. This is also a correct appraisal, an appraisal of another aspect. The uneven political and economic development of China gives rise to uneven development of the revolution. Victory in the revolution always begins, develops and is first won in places where the counter-revolutionary forces are relatively weak. Where the counter-revolutionary forces are strong, the revolution has not yet arisen or develops very slowly. This is what the Chinese revolution has encountered over a long period in the past. It can be expected that in the future, at certain stages, the overall revolutionary situation will develop further, but unevenness will still exist. Changing this uneven state into a generally even one will take a very long time and require great effort. It will also depend on the Party's tactical line being correct. The revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was finished within three years. The revolutionary war led by the Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, has already taken a very long time. To finish off the counter-revolutionary forces at home and abroad finally and thoroughly, we must be prepared to spend the time it requires, and the excessive impatience of the past will not do. We must also put forward a very good revolutionary tactic. If we keep going round and round in a narrow circle, as in the past, we shall never accomplish anything great. This does not mean that things in China can only be done slowly. Things in China must be done boldly, and the danger of national subjugation does not allow us a minute's slackness. From now on the revolution will certainly develop much faster than before, because both China and the world are entering a new period of war and revolution. Even so, China's revolutionary war remains a protracted war. The strength of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution determine its protracted character. We say that the characteristic of the present situation is the arrival of a new upsurge of the national revolution. China is on the eve of a new great nationwide revolution. This is a characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. It is a fact, the fact of one aspect. Now we also say that imperialism is still a formidable force, and that the uneven state of the revolutionary forces is a serious weakness. To defeat the enemy we must be prepared to fight a protracted war. This is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This, too, is a fact, the fact of another aspect. These two characteristics, these two facts, come together to teach us. They require us to adapt to circumstances, change our tactics and change the way we deploy our forces for battle. The present situation requires us boldly to discard closed-doorism, adopt a broad united front and guard against adventurism. We must not rashly engage in a decisive battle before the time for it has come and before we have the strength for it.
I shall not discuss here the relationship between closed-doorism and adventurism. Nor shall I discuss the possible dangers of adventurism as the larger situation unfolds in the future; that can wait until later. Here I shall only say that the tactics of the united front and the tactics of closed-doorism are two opposite tactics.
The one wants to recruit large forces so as to surround and annihilate the enemy.
The other relies on going it alone to fight a hard battle with a powerful enemy.
The one says the following. If we fail to give sufficient weight to the fact that Japanese imperialism's drive to turn China into a colony can shift the lines of revolution and counter-revolution in China, we shall fail to give sufficient weight to the possibility of organizing a broad national revolutionary united front. If we fail to give sufficient weight to the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese counter-revolutionary forces, the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall fail to see the necessity of organizing such a front. Then we shall not take resolute measures to break down closed-doorism. We shall not use the weapon of the united front to organize and rally millions of the masses and all potential revolutionary allies. We shall not advance with them to attack the most central target, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors. We shall not use our tactical weapon to fire at the most central target of the moment. Instead we shall scatter our aim, so that the main enemy goes unhit while secondary enemies, and even allies, are struck by our bullets. This is called failing to pick out the enemy and wasting ammunition. In this way we cannot drive the enemy into a narrow, isolated position. In this way we cannot win over from the enemy's camp and front the people who have been coerced into it, the people who were our enemies yesterday but may be our allies today. In this way we would in fact be helping the enemy, and the revolution would stagnate, become isolated, shrink and decline, and might even go down the road to defeat.
The other says that all these criticisms are wrong. The revolutionary forces must be pure, and purer still. The revolutionary road must be straight, and straighter still. Only what is written in the scriptures is correct. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch of concession can be made to the rich peasants. With the yellow trade unions we must fight to the death. If we shake hands with Tsai Ting-kai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the very moment we shake hands. Where is there a cat that does not eat fat, and where is there a warlord who is not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals stay revolutionary for only three days, and it is dangerous to recruit them. Hence the conclusion: closed-doorism is the sole magic weapon, and the united front is an opportunist tactic.
Comrades, which is right, the case for the united front or the case for closed-doorism? Which one does Marxism-Leninism endorse? I answer firmly: it endorses the united front and opposes closed-doorism. There are three-year-old children among us, and many of their ideas are right. But we cannot let them manage the great affairs of the state and the world, because they do not yet understand those affairs. Marxism-Leninism opposes infantile disorders in the revolutionary ranks. What the advocates of closed-door tactics stand for is precisely an infantile disorder. The road of revolution, like the course of every other activity in the world, is always tortuous and never straight. The alignment of revolution and counter-revolution can change, just as everything else in the world can change. Japanese imperialism is determined to turn the whole of China into its colony, while the present forces of the Chinese revolution still have serious weaknesses. These two basic facts are the starting point of the Party's new tactics, the broad united front. Organizing millions of the masses and mobilizing a mighty revolutionary army are what today's revolution needs in order to attack the counter-revolution. Only a force of this kind can crush Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors. This is a truth plain for all to see. Therefore only united front tactics are Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are the tactics of the isolated. Closed-doorism "drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets." It drives the "millions" and the "mighty army" over to the enemy's side and wins only the enemy's applause. In practice closed-doorism is the faithful servant of Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors. The "purity" and "straightness" of closed-doorism are things that Marxism-Leninism slaps in the face and Japanese imperialism commends. We definitely do not want closed-doorism. What we want is a national revolutionary united front that will deal a mortal blow to Japanese imperialism and the collaborators and traitors.
The People's Republic
Our government has hitherto been based on the alliance of the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. From now on, it should be changed to include, besides these, the elements of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.
At present the basic task of this government is to oppose Japanese imperialism's annexation of China. Its composition will be broadened widely. Those who are interested only in the national revolution and not in the agrarian revolution can join it. So, if they are willing, can those who have ties with European and American imperialism and cannot oppose it, but can oppose Japanese imperialism and its running dogs. Therefore the programme of this government should follow the principle of suiting the basic task of opposing Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, and on this basis our past policies should be appropriately revised.
The special feature on the revolutionary side today is that we have a tempered Communist Party and a tempered Red Army. This is a matter of the utmost importance. If we did not yet have a tempered Communist Party and Red Army, there would be tremendous difficulties. Why? Because China's collaborators and traitors are numerous and powerful, and they will certainly devise all kinds of ways to wreck this united front. They will use threats and inducements, and play off one party against another, to sow discord. They will use armed force to crush, one by one, the forces that are smaller than theirs and are willing to leave the traitors and join with us in fighting Japan. If the anti-Japanese government and anti-Japanese army lacked the element of the Communist Party and the Red Army, this would be hard to avoid. The chief cause of the failure of the 1927 revolution was the opportunist line within the Communist Party. It made no effort to expand our own ranks, that is, the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party. Instead it relied solely on its temporary ally, the Kuomintang. As a result, imperialism ordered its running dogs, the gentry and comprador classes, to stretch out a thousand hands. They first pulled away Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, and the revolution was defeated. The revolutionary united front of that time had no central pillar and no strong revolutionary armed force. When revolts broke out on every side, the Communist Party had to fight alone. It could not withstand the tactics by which imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolution crushed their opponents one by one. Although there were the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting at that time, they were not yet politically strong, and the Party did not know how to lead them well, so in the end they were defeated. This is the lesson, written in blood, of how the lack of a revolutionary core leads to the defeat of the revolution. Today the situation has changed. We already have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, and we also have the Red Army's base areas. The Communist Party and the Red Army are now the initiators of the anti-Japanese national united front. In the future they are bound to become its strong pillars in the anti-Japanese government and the anti-Japanese army. They will prevent the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek from achieving their final aim with the policy of undermining the anti-Japanese national united front. There is no doubt that the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek will use threats and inducements and play one side against another in every possible way, and we must be very much on our guard.
Of course, we cannot expect every part of the broad ranks of the anti-Japanese national united front to be as solid as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of their activity some bad elements will come under the enemy's influence and quit the united front. But we are not afraid of such people leaving. Some bad people will leave under the enemy's influence, but some good people will join under ours. So long as the Communist Party and the Red Army themselves exist and grow, the anti-Japanese national united front will also exist and grow. This is the leading role of the Communist Party and the Red Army in the national united front. Communists are no longer children; they know how to handle themselves and how to handle their allies. The Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek can manoeuvre against the revolutionary ranks by playing one party against another. The Communist Party can do the same against the counter-revolutionary ranks. If they can lure bad elements out of our ranks, we can of course lure "bad elements" (good elements, from our point of view) out of theirs. If we can draw more people out of their ranks, the enemy's ranks will shrink and ours will grow. In short, two basic forces are now locked in struggle. All intermediate forces must attach themselves to one side or the other; this is inevitable. The Japanese imperialists aim to subjugate China, and Chiang Kai-shek's policy is to betray it. These policies cannot fail to drive many forces over to our side. They will either join the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army directly or form a united front with them. This aim can be achieved so long as our tactics are not closed-door tactics.
Why should the workers' and peasants' republic be changed into a people's republic?
Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. This meaning was implicit from the start in the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic, because the workers and peasants make up 80 to 90 per cent of the nation's population. The Ten-Point Programme adopted by our Party's Sixth National Congress represents the interests not only of the workers and peasants but also of the nation. But the present situation requires us to change the slogan to a people's republic. This is because Japanese aggression has altered class relations in China. Not only the petty bourgeoisie but also the national bourgeoisie may now take part in the anti-Japanese struggle.
There is no question that the people's republic does not represent the interests of hostile classes. On the contrary, it stands in direct opposition to the gentry and comprador classes, the running dogs of imperialism, and does not count them among the so-called people. This is just like Chiang Kai-shek's "National Government of the Republic of China." That government represents only the richest magnates and not the common people, and does not count the common people among the so-called "nationals." Eighty to ninety per cent of China's population are workers and peasants, so the people's republic should first of all represent their interests. But the people's republic will remove imperialist oppression and make China free and independent. It will remove the oppression of the landlords and free China from the semi-feudal system. These things will benefit not only the workers and peasants but the rest of the people as well. The interests of the workers, peasants and the rest of the people taken together make up the interests of the Chinese nation. The comprador and landlord classes also live on Chinese soil, but they disregard the interests of the nation, and their interests conflict with those of the majority. We part company only with this small minority and come into conflict only with them. Therefore we have the right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.
The interests of the working class also conflict with those of the national bourgeoisie. The working class is the vanguard of the national revolution. Unless it is given political and economic rights and is able to bring its strength to bear against imperialism and its running dogs, the traitors, the national revolution cannot succeed. But if the national bourgeoisie joins the united front against imperialism, the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. In the era of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's republic will not abolish private property other than imperialist and feudal property. Far from confiscating the industrial and commercial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie, it will encourage their development. We shall protect any national capitalist so long as he does not support the imperialists and the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers. But they will not oppose national capitalists making profits or the development of national industry and commerce, because such development is unfavourable to imperialism and favourable to the Chinese people. It is clear, then, that the people's republic represents the interests of the people of all strata who oppose imperialism and the feudal forces. The government of the people's republic will have the workers and peasants as its main body, and will also include the other classes that oppose imperialism and the feudal forces.
Isn't it dangerous to let these people into the government of the people's republic? No, it is not. The workers and peasants are the basic masses of the republic. The urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and others who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme will be given a voice and a role in the government of the people's republic. They will be given the right to vote and to stand for election. None of this need run counter to the interests of the basic masses of workers and peasants. The essential part of our programme should protect the interests of the basic masses of workers and peasants. Their representatives will form the majority in the government of the people's republic. Together with the Communist Party's leadership and activity in that government, this guarantees that the entry of the others is not dangerous. It is perfectly clear that the present stage of the Chinese revolution is still bourgeois-democratic in character and not proletarian-socialist. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites talk the nonsense that China has already completed its bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was bourgeois-democratic in character, and it was not completed but defeated. The Agrarian Revolution we have led from 1927 to the present is also bourgeois-democratic in character, because its tasks are to oppose imperialism and feudalism, not capitalism. This will remain the character of the revolution for a fairly long time to come.
The motive forces of the revolution are still basically the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Now the national bourgeoisie may be added.
The transformation of the revolution is a matter for the future. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. The test of when it should be transformed is whether the conditions for it exist, and this will take a fairly long time. We should not talk lightly of transformation until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present. Nor should we do so until it would benefit rather than harm the overwhelming majority of the people of the whole country. It is wrong to doubt this and hope to bring about the transformation within a very short time. Some comrades held that the revolution would begin to be transformed the very day the democratic revolution began to triumph in the key provinces. They were wrong. They failed to see what kind of country China is, politically and economically. They did not understand that completing the democratic revolution politically and economically is much more difficult in China than it was in Russia, and requires much more time and effort.
International Support
Finally, a word about the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution.
Ever since that monster imperialism came into being, the affairs of the world have become so bound up together that it is impossible to separate them. We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood. We have the determination to recover our lost territories on the basis of self-reliance, and the ability to stand on our own among the nations of the world. But this does not mean that we can do without international support. No, international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle of every country and every nation in the modern world. The ancients said, "In the Spring and Autumn era there were no righteous wars." This is even truer of imperialism today, which wages no righteous wars; only oppressed nations and oppressed classes can wage righteous wars. All wars throughout the world in which the people rise against their oppressors are righteous wars. The February Revolution and the October Revolution in Russia were righteous wars. The revolutions of the peoples of the various European countries after the First World War were righteous wars. China's Opium War of resistance, the war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the war of the Yi Ho Tuan and the war of the Revolution of 1911 were all righteous wars. So were the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to the present, and today's war against Japan and against the traitors. In the present anti-Japanese upsurge throughout China and the anti-fascist upsurge throughout the world, righteous wars will spread all over China and all over the world. All righteous wars support one another, and all wars that are not righteous should be turned into righteous wars. This is the Leninist line. Our war of resistance against Japan needs the support of the people of other countries, above all the support of the people of the Soviet Union. They will surely support us, because we and they share weal and woe. For a period in the past, Chiang Kai-shek cut off the revolutionary forces of China from the international revolutionary forces, and in this sense we were isolated. Now this situation has changed, and changed in our favour. From now on it will continue to change in our favour. We shall no longer be isolated. This is a necessary condition for victory in China's War of Resistance Against Japan and in the Chinese revolution.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
目前政治形势的特点
同志们!目前的政治形势已经发生了很大的变化。根据这种变化了的形势,我们的党已经规定了自己的任务。
目前的形势是怎样的呢?
目前形势的基本特点,就是日本帝国主义要变中国为它的殖民地。
大家知道,差不多一百年以来,中国是好几个帝国主义国家共同支配的半殖民地的国家。由于中国人民对帝国主义的斗争和帝国主义国家相互间的斗争,中国还保存了一种半独立的地位。第一次世界大战曾经在一个时期内给了日本帝国主义以独霸中国的机会。但是中国人民反对日本帝国主义的斗争,以及其它帝国主义国家的干涉,使得经过那时的卖国头子袁世凯签了字的对日屈服投降的条约二十一条,不得不宣告无效。一九二二年美国召集的华盛顿九国会议签订了一个公约,又使中国回复到几个帝国主义国家共同支配的局面。但是没有很久,这种情况又起了变化。一九三一年九月十八日的事变,开始了变中国为日本殖民地的阶段。只是日本侵略的范围暂时还限于东北四省,就使人们觉得似乎日本帝国主义者不一定再前进了的样子。今天不同了,日本帝国主义者已经显示他们要向中国本部前进了,他们要占领全中国。现在是日本帝国主义要把整个中国从几个帝国主义国家都有份的半殖民地状态改变为日本独占的殖民地状态。最近的冀东事变和外交谈判,显示了这个方向,威胁到了全国人民的生存。这种情形,就给中国一切阶级和一切政治派别提出了“怎么办”的问题。反抗呢?还是投降呢?或者游移于两者之间呢?
现在,我们来看一看中国各个阶级怎样来回答这个问题。
中国的工人和农民都是要求反抗的。一九二四年至一九二七年的革命,一九二七年至现在的土地革命,一九三一年九一八事变以来的反日浪潮,证明中国工人阶级和农民阶级是中国革命的最坚决的力量。
中国的小资产阶级也是要反抗的。青年学生和城市小资产阶级,现在不是已经发动了一个广大的反日运动吗?中国的这些小资产阶级成分曾经参加过一九二四年至一九二七年的革命。和农民一样,他们有同帝国主义势不两立的小生产的经济地位。帝国主义和中国反革命势力,曾经给了他们以重大的损害,使他们中的很多人陷于失业、破产或半破产的境地。现在他们眼看就要当亡国奴了,除了反抗,再没有出路。
问题摆在民族资产阶级、买办阶级和地主阶级面前,摆在国民党面前,又是怎样的呢?
大土豪、大劣绅、大军阀、大官僚、大买办们的主意早就打定了。他们过去是、现在仍然是在说:革命(不论什么革命)总比帝国主义坏。他们组成了一个卖国贼营垒,在他们面前没有什么当不当亡国奴的问题,他们已经撤去了民族的界线,他们的利益同帝国主义的利益是不可分离的,他们的总头子就是蒋介石。这一卖国贼营垒是中国人民的死敌。假如没有这一群卖国贼,日本帝国主义是不可能放肆到这步田地的。他们是帝国主义的走狗。
民族资产阶级是一个复杂的问题。这个阶级曾经参加过一九二四年至一九二七年的革命,随后又为这个革命的火焰所吓坏,站到人民的敌人即蒋介石集团那一方面去了。问题是在今天的情况下,民族资产阶级有没有发生变化的可能性呢?我们认为是有这种可能性的。这是因为民族资产阶级同地主阶级、买办阶级不是同一的东西,他们之间是有分别的。民族资产阶级没有地主阶级那样多的封建性,没有买办阶级那样多的买办性。民族资产阶级内部有同外国资本和本国土地关系较多的一部分人,这一部分人是民族资产阶级的右翼,我们暂且不去估计他们的变化的可能性。问题是在没有那些关系或者关系较少的那些部分。我们认为在殖民地化威胁的新环境之下,民族资产阶级的这些部分的态度可能发生变化。这个变化的特点就是他们的动摇。他们一方面不喜欢帝国主义,一方面又怕革命的彻底性,他们在这二者之间动摇着。这就说明,在一九二四年至一九二七年的革命时期他们为什么参加了革命,及到这一时期之末,他们又为什么站到蒋介石方面去了。现在的时期,同一九二七年蒋介石叛变革命的时期有什么分别呢?那时的中国还是一个半殖民地,现在正在走向殖民地。九年以来,他们抛弃了自己的同盟者工人阶级,和地主买办阶级做朋友,得了什么好处没有呢?没有什么好处,得到的只不过是民族工商业的破产或半破产的境遇。因为这些情况,我们认为民族资产阶级的态度,在今天的时局下,有起变化的可能性。变化的程度怎样呢?总的特点是动摇。但在斗争的某些阶段,他们中间的一部分(左翼)是有参加斗争的可能的。其另一部分,则有由动摇而采取中立态度的可能。
蔡廷锴等人领导的十九路军是代表什么阶级的利益呢?他们是代表着民族资产阶级、上层小资产阶级、乡村的富农和小地主。蔡廷锴们不是同红军打过死仗的吗?可是后来又同红军订立了抗日反蒋同盟。他们在江西,向红军进攻;到了上海,又抵抗日本帝国主义;到了福建,便同红军成立了妥协,向蒋介石开起火来。无论蔡廷锴们将来的事业是什么,无论当时福建人民政府还是怎样守着老一套不去发动民众斗争,但是他们把本来向着红军的火力掉转去向着日本帝国主义和蒋介石,不能不说是有益于革命的行为。这是国民党营垒的破裂。九一八事变以后的环境能够使国民党营垒分裂出这样一部分人,为什么今天的环境反倒不能造成国民党的分裂呢?我们党内持这样一种论点的人是不对的,他们说,整个地主资产阶级的营垒是统一的,固定的,任何情况下也不能使它起变化。他们不但不认识今天的严重环境,并且连历史也忘记了。
让我再讲一点历史。一九二六年和一九二七年,当着革命军向武汉前进,以至打到武汉、打到河南的时候,发生了唐生智、冯玉祥参加革命的事情。冯玉祥于一九三三年在察哈尔还曾经和共产党一度合作,建立了抗日同盟军。
再一个明显的例子,就是曾经和十九路军一道进攻江西红军的第二十六路军,不是在一九三一年十二月举行了宁都起义,变成了红军吗?宁都起义的领导者赵博生、董振堂等人成了坚决革命的同志。
马占山在东三省的抗日行为,也是统治者营垒中的一个分裂。
所有这些例子都指明:在日本炸弹的威力圈及于全中国的时候,在斗争改变常态而突然以汹涌的阵势向前推进的时候,敌人的营垒是会发生破裂的。
同志们,现在让我们把问题转到另一点。
如果有人拿中国民族资产阶级在政治上经济上的软弱性这一点来反对我们的论点,认为中国民族资产阶级虽然处在新环境,还是没有改变态度的可能,这种说法对不对呢?我认为也是不对的。如果不能改变态度的原因,是民族资产阶级的软弱性,那末,一九二四年至一九二七年为什么改变了他们的常态,不仅是动摇,简直是参加了革命呢?难道民族资产阶级的软弱性是后来才得的新毛病,而不是他们从娘肚子里带出来的老毛病吗?难道今天软弱,那时就不软弱吗?半殖民地的政治和经济的主要特点之一,就是民族资产阶级的软弱性。正是因为这样,帝国主义敢于欺负他们,而这也就规定了他们不喜欢帝国主义的特点。自然,我们不但不否认,并且完全承认:又是因为这一点,帝国主义和地主买办阶级容易拿某种临时的贿赂为钓饵将他们拉了过去,而这也就规定了他们对于革命的不彻底性。可是总不能说,在今天的情况下,他们同地主阶级和买办阶级没有任何的分别。
所以我们着重地指出:国民党营垒中,在民族危机到了严重关头的时候,是要发生破裂的。这种破裂,表现于民族资产阶级的动摇,表现于冯玉祥、蔡廷锴、马占山等风头一时的抗日人物。这种情况,基本地说来是不利于反革命,而有利于革命的。由于中国政治经济的不平衡,以及由此而生的革命发展的不平衡,增大了这种破裂的可能性。
同志们!这个问题的正面,已经说完了。让我再来说一说它的反面,那就是民族资产阶级的某些分子常常是欺骗民众的好手这样一个问题。为什么?因为他们中间除了那些真正拥护人民革命事业的人们而外,有许多人在一个时期内能够以革命的或半革命的面目出现,所以他们同时就具备着欺骗民众的资格,使得民众不容易认识他们的不彻底性以及装模作样的假相。这就增加了共产党批评同盟者、揭破假革命、争取领导权的责任。如果我们否认民族资产阶级在大震动中有动摇及参加革命的可能性,那也就取消了至少也减轻了我们党对于争取领导权的任务。因为,如果民族资产阶级是同地主买办一模一样,以卖国贼的狰狞面孔出现,争取领导权的任务就大可取消,至少也可以减轻了。
在整个地分析中国地主资产阶级在大震动中的姿态时,还有一个方面应该指出,那就是:即使在地主买办阶级营垒中也不是完全统一的。这是半殖民地的环境,即许多帝国主义争夺中国的环境所造成的。当斗争是向着日本帝国主义的时候,美国以至英国的走狗们是有可能遵照其主人的叱声的轻重,同日本帝国主义者及其走狗暗斗以至明争的。过去这种狗打架的事情多得很,我们不去说它。于今只说被蒋介石禁闭过的国民党政客胡汉民,不久以前也签名于我们所提出的抗日救国六大纲领的文件。胡汉民所依托的两广派军阀,也在所谓“收复失地”和“抗日剿匪并重”(蒋介石的是“先剿匪,后抗日”)的欺骗口号之下,同蒋介石对立。你们看,不是有点奇怪吗?并不奇怪,这不过是大狗小狗饱狗饿狗之间的一点特别有趣的争斗,一个不大不小的缺口,一种又痒又痛的矛盾。但是这点争斗,这个缺口,这种矛盾,对于革命的人民却是有用的。我们要把敌人营垒中间的一切争斗、缺口、矛盾,统统收集起来,作为反对当前主要敌人之用。
把这个阶级关系问题总起来说,就是:在日本帝国主义打进中国本部来了这一个基本的变化上面,变化了中国各阶级之间的相互关系,扩大了民族革命营垒的势力,减弱了民族反革命营垒的势力。
现在我们来说中国民族革命营垒里的情形。
首先是红军的情形。同志们,你们看,差不多一年半以来,中国的三支主力红军都在作阵地的大转移。从去年八月任弼时同志等率领第六军团向贺龙同志的地方开始转移起,接着就是十月开始的我们的转移。今年三月,川陕边区的红军也开始转移。这三支红军,都放弃了原有阵地,转移到新地区去。这个大转移,使得旧区域变为游击区。在转移中,红军本身又有很大的削弱。如果我们拿着整个局面中的这一方面来看,敌人是得到了暂时的部分的胜利,我们是遭遇了暂时的部分的失败。这种说法对不对呢?我以为是对的,因为这是事实。但是有人说(例如张国焘):中央红军失败了。这话对不对呢?不对。因为这不是事实。马克思主义者看问题,不但要看到部分,而且要看到全体。一个虾蟆坐在井里说:“天有一个井大。”这是不对的,因为天不止一个井大。如果它说:“天的某一部分有一个井大。”这是对的,因为合乎事实。我们说,红军在一个方面(保持原有阵地的方面)说来是失败了,在另一个方面(完成长征计划的方面)说来是胜利了。敌人在一个方面(占领我军原有阵地的方面)说来是胜利了,在另一个方面(实现“围剿”“追剿”计划的方面)说来是失败了。这样说才是恰当的,因为我们完成了长征。
讲到长征,请问有什么意义呢?我们说,长征是历史纪录上的第一次,长征是宣言书,长征是宣传队,长征是播种机。自从盘古开天地,三皇五帝到于今,历史上曾经有过我们这样的长征吗?十二个月光阴中间,天上每日几十架飞机侦察轰炸,地下几十万大军围追堵截,路上遇着了说不尽的艰难险阻,我们却开动了每人的两只脚,长驱二万余里,纵横十一个省。请问历史上曾有过我们这样的长征吗?没有,从来没有的。长征又是宣言书。它向全世界宣告,红军是英雄好汉,帝国主义者和他们的走狗蒋介石等辈则是完全无用的。长征宣告了帝国主义和蒋介石围追堵截的破产。长征又是宣传队。它向十一个省内大约两万万人民宣布,只有红军的道路,才是解放他们的道路。不因此一举,那么广大的民众怎会如此迅速地知道世界上还有红军这样一篇大道理呢?长征又是播种机。它散布了许多种子在十一个省内,发芽、长叶、开花、结果,将来是会有收获的。总而言之,长征是以我们胜利、敌人失败的结果而告结束。谁使长征胜利的呢?是共产党。没有共产党,这样的长征是不可能设想的。中国共产党,它的领导机关,它的干部,它的党员,是不怕任何艰难困苦的。谁怀疑我们领导革命战争的能力,谁就会陷进机会主义的泥坑里去。长征一完结,新局面就开始。直罗镇一仗,中央红军同西北红军兄弟般的团结,粉碎了卖国贼蒋介石向着陕甘边区的“围剿”,给党中央把全国革命大本营放在西北的任务,举行了一个奠基礼。
主力红军如此,南方各省的游击战争怎么样呢?南方的游击战争,受到了某些挫折,但是并没有被消灭。许多部分,正在恢复、生长和发展。
在国民党统治区,工人的斗争正在从厂内向着厂外,从经济斗争向着政治斗争。工人阶级的反日反卖国贼的英勇斗争,现在是在深刻地酝酿着,看样子离爆发的时候已不远了。
农民的斗争没有停止过。在外祸、内难、再加天灾的压迫之下,农民广泛地发动了游击战争、民变、闹荒等等形态的斗争。东北和冀东的抗日游击战争,正在回答日本帝国主义的进攻。
学生运动已有极大的发展,将来一定还要有更大的发展。但学生运动要得到持久性,要冲破卖国贼的戒严令,警察、侦探、学棍、法西斯蒂的破坏和屠杀政策,只有和工人、农民、兵士的斗争配合起来,才有可能。
民族资产阶级、乡村富农和小地主们的动摇以至参加抗日斗争的可能性,前面已经说过了。
少数民族,特别是内蒙民族,在日本帝国主义的直接威胁之下,正在起来斗争。其前途,将和华北人民的斗争和红军在西北的活动,汇合在一起。
所有这些都指明,革命的阵势,是由局部性转变到全国性,由不平衡状态逐渐地转变到某种平衡状态。目前是大变动的前夜。党的任务就是把红军的活动和全国的工人、农民、学生、小资产阶级、民族资产阶级的一切活动汇合起来,成为一个统一的民族革命战线。
民族统一战线
观察了反革命和革命两方面的形势以后,我们就容易说明党的策略任务了。
党的基本的策略任务是什么呢?不是别的,就是建立广泛的民族革命统一战线。
当着革命的形势已经改变的时候,革命的策略,革命的领导方式,也必须跟着改变。日本帝国主义和汉奸卖国贼的任务,是变中国为殖民地;我们的任务,是变中国为独立、自由和领土完整的国家。
实现中国的独立自由是一个伟大的任务。这须同外国帝国主义和本国反革命势力作战。日本帝国主义是下了凶横直进的决心的。国内豪绅买办阶级的反革命势力,在目前还是大过人民的革命势力。打倒日本帝国主义和中国反革命势力的事业,不是一天两天可以成功的,必须准备花费长久的时间;不是少少一点力量可以成功的,必须聚积雄厚的力量。中国的和世界的反革命力量是比较过去更加衰弱了,中国的和世界的革命力量是比较过去更加增长了。这是正确的估计,这是一方面的估计。但是同时我们应当说,目前中国的和世界的反革命力量暂时还是大于革命力量。这也是正确的估计,这是又一方面的估计。由于中国政治经济发展的不平衡,产生了革命发展的不平衡。革命的胜利总是从那些反革命势力比较薄弱的地方首先开始,首先发展,首先胜利;而在那些反革命势力雄厚的地方,革命还是没有起来,或者发展得很慢。这是中国革命在过去长时期内已经遇到的情形。在将来,可以想到,在某些阶段里,革命的总的形势是更加发展了,但是不平衡状态还会存在着。要把不平衡的状态变到大体上平衡的状态,还要经过很长的时间,还要花费很大的气力,还要依靠党的策略路线的正确。如果说,苏联共产党领导的革命战争是在三个年头里完结了的话,那末中国共产党领导的革命战争,过去已经花去了很长的时间,而要最后地彻底地解决内外反革命势力,我们还得准备再花一个应有的时间,像过去那样地过分的性急是不行的。还得提出一个很好的革命策略,像过去那样地老在狭小的圈子里打转,是干不出大事情来的。不是说中国的事情只能慢吞吞地去干,中国的事情要勇猛地去干,亡国的危险不容许我们有一分钟的懈怠。今后革命发展的速度,也一定比过去要快得多,因为中国的和世界的局面都是临在战争和革命的新时期了。虽然如此,中国革命战争还是持久战,帝国主义的力量和革命发展的不平衡,规定了这个持久性。我们说,时局的特点,是新的民族革命高潮的到来,中国处在新的全国大革命的前夜,这是现时革命形势的特点。这是事实,这是一方面的事实。现在我们又说,帝国主义还是一个严重的力量,革命力量的不平衡状态是一个严重的缺点,要打倒敌人必须准备作持久战,这是现时革命形势的又一个特点。这也是事实,这是又一方面的事实。这两种特点,这两种事实,都一齐跑来教训我们,要求我们适应情况,改变策略,改变我们调动队伍进行战斗的方式。目前的时局,要求我们勇敢地抛弃关门主义,采取广泛的统一战线,防止冒险主义。不到决战的时机,没有决战的力量,不能冒冒失失地去进行决战。
这里不来说关门主义和冒险主义的关系,也不来说冒险主义在将来大的时局开展中可能发生的危险性,这点等到将来再说不迟。这里只说统一战线的策略和关门主义的策略,是正相反对的两个不同的策略。
一个要招收广大的人马,好把敌人包围而消灭之。
一个则依靠单兵独马,去同强大的敌人打硬仗。
一个说,如果不足够地估计到日本帝国主义变中国为殖民地的行动能够变动中国革命和反革命的阵线,就不能足够地估计到组织广泛的民族革命统一战线的可能性。如果不足够地估计到日本反革命势力、中国反革命势力和中国革命势力这几方面的强点和弱点,就不会足够地估计到组织广泛的民族革命统一战线的必要性;就不会采取坚决的办法去打破关门主义;就不会拿着统一战线这个武器去组织和团聚千千万万民众和一切可能的革命友军,向着日本帝国主义及其走狗中国卖国贼这个最中心的目标而攻击前进;就不会拿自己的策略武器去射击当前的最中心目标,而把目标分散,以至主要的敌人没有打中,次要的敌人甚至同盟军身上却吃了我们的子弹。这个叫做不会择敌和浪费弹药。这样,就不能把敌人驱逐到狭小的孤立的阵地上去。这样,就不能把敌人营垒中被裹胁的人们,过去是敌人而今日可能做友军的人们,都从敌人营垒中和敌人战线上拉过来。这样,就是在实际上帮助了敌人,而使革命停滞、孤立、缩小、降落,甚至走到失败的道路上去。
一个则说,这些批评都是不对的。革命的力量是要纯粹又纯粹,革命的道路是要笔直又笔直。圣经上载了的才是对的。民族资产阶级是全部永世反革命了。对于富农,是一步也退让不得。对于黄色工会,只有同它拚命。如果同蔡廷锴握手的话,那必须在握手的瞬间骂他一句反革命。哪有猫儿不吃油,哪有军阀不是反革命?知识分子只有三天的革命性,招收他们是危险的。因此,结论:关门主义是唯一的法宝,统一战线是机会主义的策略。
同志们,统一战线的道理和关门主义的道理究竟哪一个是对的呢?马克思列宁主义到底赞成哪一个呢?我坚决地回答:赞成统一战线,反对关门主义。人中间有三岁小孩子,三岁小孩子有许多道理都是对的,但是不能使他们管天下国家的大事,因为他们还不明白天下国家的道理。马克思列宁主义反对革命队伍中的幼稚病。坚持关门主义策略的人们所主张的,就是一套幼稚病。革命的道路,同世界上一切事物活动的道路一样,总是曲折的,不是笔直的。革命和反革命的阵线可能变动,也同世界上一切事物的可能变动一样。日本帝国主义决定要变全中国为它的殖民地,和中国革命的现时力量还有严重的弱点,这两个基本事实就是党的新策略即广泛的统一战线的出发点。组织千千万万的民众,调动浩浩荡荡的革命军,是今天的革命向反革命进攻的需要。只有这样的力量,才能把日本帝国主义和汉奸卖国贼打垮,这是有目共见的真理。因此,只有统一战线的策略才是马克思列宁主义的策略。关门主义的策略则是孤家寡人的策略。关门主义“为渊驱鱼,为丛驱雀”,把“千千万万”和“浩浩荡荡”都赶到敌人那一边去,只博得敌人的喝采。关门主义在实际上是日本帝国主义和汉奸卖国贼的忠顺的奴仆。关门主义的所谓“纯粹”和“笔直”,是马克思列宁主义向之掌嘴,而日本帝国主义则向之嘉奖的东西。我们一定不要关门主义,我们要的是制日本帝国主义和汉奸卖国贼的死命的民族革命统一战线。
人民共和国
如果说,我们过去的政府是工人、农民和城市小资产阶级联盟的政府,那末,从现在起,应当改变为除了工人、农民和城市小资产阶级以外,还要加上一切其它阶级中愿意参加民族革命的分子。
在目前,这个政府的基本任务是反对日本帝国主义吞并中国。这个政府的成分将扩大到广泛的范围,不但那些只对民族革命有兴趣而对土地革命没有兴趣的人,可以参加,就是那些同欧美帝国主义有关系,不能反对欧美帝国主义,却可以反对日本帝国主义及其走狗的人们,只要他们愿意,也可以参加。因此,这个政府的纲领,应当是以适合于反对日本帝国主义及其走狗这个基本任务为原则,据此以适当地修改我们过去的政策。
现时革命方面的特点,是有了经过锻炼的共产党,又有了经过锻炼的红军。这是一件极关重要的事。如果现时还没有经过锻炼的共产党和红军,那就将发生极大的困难。为什么?因为中国的汉奸卖国贼是很多的,并且是有力量的,他们必然想出各种法子来破坏这个统一战线,用他们威迫利诱、纵横捭阖的手段来挑拨离间,用兵力来强压,来各个击破那些比较他们小的、愿意离开卖国贼而同我们联合起来打日本的力量。如果抗日政府抗日军队中缺乏共产党和红军这个要素,这种情形是难于避免的。一九二七年革命的失败,主要的原因就是由于共产党内的机会主义路线,不努力扩大自己的队伍(工农运动和共产党领导的军队),而只依仗其暂时的同盟者国民党。其结果是帝国主义命令它的走狗豪绅买办阶级,伸出千百只手来,首先把蒋介石拉去,然后又把汪精卫拉去,使革命陷于失败。那时的革命统一战线没有中心支柱,没有坚强的革命的武装队伍,四面八方都造起反来,共产党只得孤军作战,无力抵制帝国主义和中国反革命的各个击破的策略。那时虽然有贺龙、叶挺一支军队,但还不是政治上坚强的军队,党又不善于领导它,终归失败了。这是缺乏革命中心力量招致革命失败的血的教训。在今天,这件事起了变化了,坚强的共产党和坚强的红军都已经有了,而且有了红军的根据地。共产党和红军不但在现在充当着抗日民族统一战线的发起人,而且在将来的抗日政府和抗日军队中必然要成为坚强的台柱子,使日本帝国主义者和蒋介石对于抗日民族统一战线所使用的拆台政策,不能达到最后的目的。没有疑义,威迫利诱、纵横捭阖的手段,日本帝国主义者和蒋介石是一定要多方使用的,我们是要十分留神的。
当然,对于抗日民族统一战线的广泛的队伍,我们不能希望每部分都有如同共产党和红军一样程度的巩固。在他们的活动过程中,有些坏分子因为受了敌人的影响退出统一战线的事情,是会发生的。但是我们不怕这些人退出去。一些坏人受敌人的影响退出去,一些好人却会受我们的影响加进来。只要共产党和红军本身是存在的,发展的,那末,抗日民族统一战线必然也会是存在的,发展的。这就是共产党和红军在民族统一战线中的领导作用。共产党人现在已经不是小孩子了,他们能够善处自己,又能够善处同盟者。日本帝国主义者和蒋介石能够用纵横捭阖的手段来对付革命队伍,共产党也能够用纵横捭阖的手段对付反革命队伍。他们能够拉了我们队伍中的坏分子跑出去,我们当然也能够拉了他们队伍中的“坏分子”(对于我们是好分子)跑过来。假如我们能够从他们队伍中多拉一些人出来,那敌人的队伍就减少了,我们的队伍就扩大了。总之,现在是两个基本势力相斗争,一切中间势力,不附属于那一方面,就附属于这一方面,这是一定的道理。而日本帝国主义者和蒋介石灭亡中国和出卖中国的政策,不能不驱使很多的力量跑到我们方面来,或者径直加入共产党和红军的队伍,或者同共产党和红军结成联合战线。只要我们的策略不是关门主义,这个目的是能够达到的。
为什么要把工农共和国改变为人民共和国呢?
我们的政府不但是代表工农的,而且是代表民族的。这个意义,是在工农民主共和国的口号里原来就包括了的,因为工人、农民占了全民族人口的百分之八十至九十。我们党的第六次全国代表大会所规定的十大政纲,不但代表了工农的利益,同时也代表了民族的利益。但是现在的情况,使得我们要把这个口号改变一下,改变为人民共和国。这是因为日本侵略的情况变动了中国的阶级关系,不但小资产阶级,而且民族资产阶级,有了参加抗日斗争的可能性。
那是没有问题的,人民共和国不代表敌对阶级的利益。相反,人民共和国同帝国主义的走狗豪绅买办阶级是处在正相反对的地位,它不把那些成分放在所谓人民之列。这和蒋介石的“中华民国国民政府”,仅仅代表最大的富翁,并不代表老百姓,并不把老百姓放在所谓“国民”之列,是一样的。中国百分之八十至九十的人口是工人和农民,所以人民共和国应当首先代表工人和农民的利益。但是人民共和国去掉帝国主义的压迫,使中国自由独立,去掉地主的压迫,使中国离开半封建制度,这些事情就不但使工农得了利益,也使其它人民得了利益。总括工农及其它人民的全部利益,就构成了中华民族的利益。买办阶级和地主阶级虽然也住在中国的土地上,可是他们是不顾民族利益的,他们的利益是同多数人的利益相冲突的。我们仅仅离开他们这些少数人,仅仅同他们这些少数人相冲突,所以我们有权利称我们自己是代表全民族的。
工人阶级的利益同民族资产阶级的利益也是有冲突的。要开展民族革命,对于民族革命的先锋队不给以政治上、经济上的权利,不使工人阶级能够拿出力量来对付帝国主义及其走狗卖国贼,是不能成功的。但是民族资产阶级如果参加反对帝国主义的统一战线,那末,工人阶级和民族资产阶级就有了共同的利害关系。人民共和国在资产阶级民主革命的时代并不废除非帝国主义的、非封建主义的私有财产,并不没收民族资产阶级的工商业,而且还鼓励这些工商业的发展。任何民族资本家,只要他不赞助帝国主义和中国卖国贼,我们就要保护他。在民主革命阶段,劳资间的斗争是有限度的。人民共和国的劳动法保护工人的利益,却并不反对民族资本家发财,并不反对民族工商业的发展,因为这种发展不利于帝国主义,而有利于中国人民。由此可知,人民共和国是代表反帝国主义反封建势力的各阶层人民的利益的。人民共和国的政府以工农为主体,同时容纳其它反帝国主义反封建势力的阶级。
让这些人参加人民共和国的政府,不危险吗?不危险的。工人农民是这个共和国的基本群众。给城市小资产阶级、知识分子及其它拥护反帝反封建纲领的分子以在人民共和国政府中说话做事的权利,给他们以选举权和被选举权,不能违背工农基本群众的利益。我们纲领的重要部分应当保护工农基本群众的利益。工农基本群众的代表在人民共和国政府中占了大多数,共产党在这个政府中的领导和活动,都保证了他们进来不危险。中国革命的现时阶段依然是资产阶级民主主义性质的革命,不是无产阶级社会主义性质的革命,这是十分明显的。只有反革命的托洛茨基分子,才瞎说中国已经完成了资产阶级民主革命,再要革命就只是社会主义的革命了。一九二四年至一九二七年的革命是资产阶级民主主义性质的革命,这次革命没有完成,而是失败了。一九二七年至现在,我们领导的土地革命,也是资产阶级民主主义性质的革命,因为革命的任务是反帝反封建,并不是反资本主义。今后一个相当长时期中的革命还是如此。
革命的动力,基本上依然是工人、农民和城市小资产阶级,现在则可能增加一个民族资产阶级。
革命的转变,那是将来的事。在将来,民主主义的革命必然要转变为社会主义的革命。何时转变,应以是否具备了转变的条件为标准,时间会要相当地长。不到具备了政治上经济上一切应有的条件之时,不到转变对于全国最大多数人民有利而不是不利之时,不应当轻易谈转变。怀疑这一点而希望在很短的时间内去转变,如像过去某些同志所谓民主革命在重要省份开始胜利之日,就是革命开始转变之时,是不对的。这是因为他们看不见中国是一个何等样的政治经济情况的国家,他们不知道中国在政治上经济上完成民主革命,较之俄国要困难得多,需要更多的时间和努力。
国际援助
最后,需要讲一点中国革命和世界革命的相互关系。
自从帝国主义这个怪物出世之后,世界的事情就联成一气了,要想割开也不可能了。我们中华民族有同自己的敌人血战到底的气概,有在自力更生的基础上光复旧物的决心,有自立于世界民族之林的能力。但是这不是说我们可以不需要国际援助;不,国际援助对于现代一切国家一切民族的革命斗争都是必要的。古人说:“春秋无义战。”于今帝国主义则更加无义战,只有被压迫民族和被压迫阶级有义战。全世界一切由人民起来反对压迫者的战争,都是义战。俄国的二月革命和十月革命是义战。第一次世界大战后欧洲各国人民的革命是义战。中国的反鸦片战争,太平天国战争,义和团战争,辛亥革命战争,一九二六年至一九二七年的北伐战争,一九二七年至现在的土地革命战争,今天的抗日和讨伐卖国贼的战争,都是义战。在目前的全中国抗日高潮和全世界反法西斯高潮中,义战将遍于全中国,全世界。凡义战都是互相援助的,凡非义战都是应该使之转变成为义战的,这就是列宁主义的路线。我们的抗日战争需要国际人民的援助,首先是苏联人民的援助,他们也一定会援助我们,因为我们和他们是休戚相关的。过去一个时期内,中国革命力量和国际革命力量被蒋介石隔断了,就这点上说,我们是孤立的。现在这种形势已经改变了,变得对我们有利了。今后这种形势还会继续向有利的方面改变。我们不会再是孤立的了。这是中国抗日战争和中国革命取得胜利的一个必要的条件。
