- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on June 30, 1938, in a debate on the Official Secrets Acts, warning against using them to restrain Members' parliamentary criticism of national defence.
- Main themes
- Official Secrets Act and its new interpretation, privilege of Members of Parliament, Select Committee inquiry, Territorial Force officers sitting as Members, duty of Members on national defence, ministerial correspondence with Members, deputation to Baldwin on air defences, Ministers as judges in their own case, government neglect of national defences, Nazi and Fascist parliaments
- Duration
- ~16 min
- Words
- 1,979
- Sentences
- 69
- Readability
- 51
- Grade
- 13.3
- Syntax
- 3.18
- Vocabulary
- 1.96
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other69 sentences in 20 paragraphs
I shall certainly endeavour to fulfil in the spirit as well as in the letter the obligation which you, Mr. Speaker, indicated to us at the beginning of this discussion, and certainly I agreed with the Prime Minister when he said that it would be very foolish for us to attempt to do the work of the Select Committee for them. It is quite certain that in this House we could not go into the personal issues involved. Each one of these cases which have been presented to us represents only the most abridged form in which the Member or Minister concerned would state his points, and in order to form any judgment upon the merits, it would be necessary to have a far longer statement and to have it thrashed out by examination and cross-examination. Therefore, I can assure you, Sir, that you will not find that I shall endeavour to open in any detailed way the personal question involved; though I consider that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Opposition, in certain remarks which he made upon the minor aspects of this case, the question of the usage of
2174
Members by Ministers, was fully justified in saying what he did. I propose to confine myself to a comparatively small number of general observations which I believe it is appropriate to make on such occasions, as they are intended to have a suggestive effect to the Committee which very soon will begin its labours, and also because there are certain points at the present time which are of real importance and on which it is really important that opinion should be expressed in this House.
Of course the Select Committee will certainly consider the position and dual character of a Member of Parliament who is also a Territorial Force officer. There are a good many, I am glad to say a great many, in this House who also render that other form of service. This arises from long custom. Admittedly it raises sometimes difficult cases, but the House has always wished its Members to serve in the forces—in the auxiliary forces, not of course in the regular forces—and those coats of arms which we see upon the panels of the Gallery, arouse in our breasts treasured memories of those who made that service good to the end. My long experience, not only as a Member but as having been head of all the fighting Departments in peace and war, for I think a longer time than anyone else, will perhaps induce the House to allow me to say a few words upon what I suppose to be the usual practice in these matters.
Again and again I have heard yeomanry and militia officers belabour the Government in this House with material which they had derived from the fact that they were serving in units of the Territorial Force. During the War and in later years I must recognise that more technical characteristics have crept into our armaments, and the issues are not as simple as they were in the days of the militia and the yeomanry before the War. But I must say this. I have never known in my experience any Minister who would have resented information given to him by a Parliamentary colleague even though that information came to him through that Parliamentary colleague being an officer in the Territorial Force. We all have different duties to discharge according to the station which we occupy. A Member of Parliament has a duty to discharge. If he has information he must try his best to make that information effective
2175
upon the Government. He must make sure that a Minister knows the truth. He has not only the right, but the duty, to force an unpalatable truth upon the consideration of a Minister, and the vehicle and the instrument which he can use for that purpose—the only instrument which he can use—is the possibility that, in the ultimate issue, he may, subject to his discretion, at the last moment utilise the procedure and opportunities of Debate and Question Time in this House.
The responsibility of Members for National Defence at the present time is a very real one. It is a prime duty to keep up to the mark a Government which has been repeatedly found in error and default, a Government which has a bad record in this matter, a Government which has admitted woeful miscalculations and mistakes. The intervention of the House of Commons, the basis upon which such discussion starts, has been vindicated as, step my step and year by year, the measures have been taken which are now recognised as necessary, and as they have been extorted one by one from His Majesty's Government. I say that the House must guard this liberty of Members above all things, because it affects the safety of the country. Conversations with Ministers and correspondence with Ministers play a great part in the inner life of the House of Commons. When such correspondence refers to the possibility of future Parliamentary action, such as a question, a speech or a Motion, I am inclined to hold the opinion that it is in fact a privilege. Otherwise it is covered by friendly confidence.
I take my own case. I have on several occasions written to the Prime Minister upon matters connected with the air. I have even sent him documents and I have given him information which I think he has found out afterwards not to have been incorrect. I have always received the utmost courtesy from the right hon. Gentleman and he has always written back to thank me for this information. But I am bound to say that it came to me with a shock of astonishment to learn that he would have been entitled to send the Attorney-General to me to ask me where I got that information. The most remarkable case that I can recollect was when over two years ago we had a deputation to the late Prime Minister, Mr.
2176
Baldwin, as he then was, to which about a dozen Members of both Houses who were Privy Councillors went. For two long sessions, on two successive days, we unfolded a vast mass of complicated detail relating to the bad conditions of the defences of the country and made recommendations to improve them in the future. I need scarcely say that if we had been asked where we got this material, we should have refused, certainly, to offer any assistance to the Government in that matter. I have been trying to calculate what our collective liability would have been to punishment on the maximum scale. It certainly would not have fallen far short of 800 years. But the late Prime Minister, like his sucessor, received us with the utmost consideration and never ventured to ask any questions which it would be improper to put to hon. Gentlemen serving this House, and the only complaint I have to make about what happened on that occasion, is that although what was said eventually proved to be true, very little effective action was taken.
All this is part of the inner life of the House of Commons from which Ministers would be mad to cut themselves off, and they would be mad to divorce themselves from the Members of the House, as they will certainly do, if they attempt to hold over the heads of Members the powers of the Official Secrets Act. I remember that I was Secretary of State for War at the time this Act was passed. I therefore looked up the previous records in order to make sure that I had not left anything unexpected behind me, as one may well do in the course of a long and busy life. But I do remember now, very strongly and very clearly, how this Act was never intended to be put to the purposes for which it is now being used, and I see that the then Attorney-General, now Lord Chief Justice of England, in moving the Bill in the House opened with these words:
Unfortunately one of the things which increase and develop in an imperfect world is the ingenuity of spies, and another is the elaboration of the systems and methods of spying."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 2nd December, 1920; col. 1537, Vol. 135.]
Later on he entirely disclaimed any suggestion that it was intended to apply the Measure in its penal aspects to the Press. Evidently there has been a completely new interpretation of this Measure and it
2177
is that interpretation which has played a part in involving us in these very lengthy discussions. The Government clearly consider themselves—or they did a few days ago—possessed of hitherto unsuspected powers under the Official Secrets Act, and as far as one can judge they have not by any means excluded from their minds the possibility of using these against Members for statements made in the discharge of their Parliamentary duties It is perfectly clear that the decision to which the House is coming, to support the Prime Minister's Motion, will bring that question forward as a most grave and urgent matter, which must be settled one way or the other and which I have no doubt can be settled only in the sense that the obligations of the Official Secrets Act shall not extend beyond the interpretation which was always put upon them up to a few years ago.
Many Members have brought themselves within the scope of this new interpretation of the Act. In every part of the House they sit. There was scarcely, as has been well said, a speech made in the long and successive Debates on Defence, which would not, if the Government chose to use these powers—and apparently they have still not entirely banished from their minds the prospect—come under them. There is scarcely one Member who has taken part in those Debates who might not be invited to give the answer to what I think the Attorney-General called a request to co-operate with him—that is to say to betray the confidence of his informant. There is another serious objection to this Act in its new interpretation—in the extended and novel interpretation which has crept in, and is now I think going to walk out. That is that the Ministry claim to be and become in such a marked way the judges in their own case. They are able to say, "This is an official secret," and very often without, as in the present case, it being disclosed at all to the House, they can plead that the public safety requires a matter to be kept secret.
The Official Secrets Act was devised to protect the national defences and ought not to be used to shield Ministers who may have neglected the national defences. It ought not to be used to shield Ministers who have strong personal interests in concealing the truth about matters from the country.
2178
I am choosing my words with care. I am not saying that is so at the moment. I am taking the case that if there were a Minister who had strong reasons to believe that he would be convicted of inefficiency, he would have a strong interest in preventing the disclosure of facts which would support that charge. The Nazi and Fascist States exercise such powers over their Parliaments or what is left of their Parliaments, but at least they use them to strengthen the defensive energies of their countries. We must be careful that these powers are in no way used to keep public opinion quiet, or to prolong inaction or neglect. You may blame a Member who commits the indiscretion of making our weaknesses public, but how much more must you blame a Minister or an administration which has prepared the conditions of that weakness beforehand!
