CLAUSE 21.—(Rights of ministers and counsellors as respects Chambers.)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

30 July 1935 · House of Commons debate on the Government of India Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 30, 1935, during committee debate on Clause 21 of the Government of India Bill, arguing the Governor-General needs an Advocate-General to address the legislature.
Main themes
Powers of the Governor-General of India, Viceroy's reserve and dictatorial powers, clash of sixteenth-century Crown and modern Parliament, rights of counsellors to address the chambers, proposed Advocate-General for India, reply to Mr. Morgan Jones, Governor-General above controversy, power to dissolve chambers and veto legislation, Attorney-General as precedent, constitutional government in India
Duration
~6 min
22nd percentile
Words
778
22nd percentile
Sentences
23
13th percentile
Readability
37
29th percentile
Grade
16.2
84th percentile
Syntax
3.51
94th percentile
Vocabulary
2.18
44th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 90%83%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

23 sentences in 8 paragraphs

I thought the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) really threw an illuminating flash upon the whole of this subject in his speech just now, because we can see quite clearly what is in the mind of the party which he represents. He says the Governor-General must be above the storms of controversy, that the King's representative must not be drawn into controversial matters about which heat may be generated. Well, that is not the view which this Bill takes of the powers of the King-Emperor's representative. On the contrary, during the whole of the discussions on this Measure we have been exhorted to put our confidence in the fact of the immense powers, powers almost despotic, which are placed in the hands of the King's representative—

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power to act in every case of the most dire consequence and of the most bitter controversy, power to adjourn or dissolve the chambers, power to veto legislation, power to initiate legislation, power to disallow whole series of Bills, power to suspend the whole working of the constitution, power to carry on the whole administration of India in his own hands. This is no constitutional functionary, this is no constitutional sovereign such as we have developed in this country after centuries of Parliamentary practice. This is a sixteenth or seventeeth century Crown functionary which has been created in India, and it is well known that it is the whole purpose of a whole series of Clauses in this Bill to enable the Viceroy, if the Parliamentary machinery which we are now erecting in India should be found, as many of us think it will be found, unsuited to the situation, to assume what are unquestionably dictatorial powers.

But what is the use of saying that a person of these formidable attributes should be most carefully kept out of controversy, and what is the use of the hon. Member at this stage in our Debates imagining that the Viceroy can confine himself to the customary well-meaning platitudes which people use when they wish to avoid controversy? This is a real functionary, this is an officer of State of the highest possible activity and practical consequence, and to suppose that he can be treated as a mere instrument of Government, as a mere instrument of the chambers, is altogether to misread the intentions of His Majesty's Government in framing the Bill. I should have thought the hon. Gentleman, who took the trouble to sit on that lengthy Committee, had in his mind very clearly that the reality, the almost overpowering reality, of the functions which reside in the Governor-General is to intervene in the fiercest controversy, and if he is to do this, why should he not be equipped with the necessary means of explaining his position as well as possible to the Legislature? Surely that is a very reasonable thing.

Here you have a sixteenth or seventeenth century Crown and you have a modern Parliament. You are erecting that in the Constitution, and what we are now going to witness is a clash and collision of these two opposite principles,

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drawn from different centuries of our development. If that clash is not to carry consequences far and wide, it is indispensable that the Governor-General should have every means of access to the Assembly and should be able to use every process of discussion, advice and warning before he is called upon to repair to his well-stocked armoury of absolutism and draw forth the weapons with which he can, by a stroke of the pen, disband the entire structure of the so-called constitutional and democratic government which is contained in this bulky Measure. I cannot see any reason why, if he is to have the right to send messages, he should not have messengers, and what messenger, I should like to know, could be more suited than an Advocate-General?

How should we have got on in this House if we had not had at our disposal the services of the Attorney-General? The Bill would never have reached its present stage, if he had not always been there at hand, with his vast knowledge of the law and his extraordinary ability at adapting his readings of the law to the exigencies of Government business. Such a functionary would, I believe, be welcome in any assembly. The hon. Gentleman said that the Attorney-General is elected, but, as my Noble Friend has pointed out, that precedent has already been conceded so far as the Indian Legislature is concerned. When we passed this Measure through the House there was no resistance, as far as I can remember, to the principle of the counsellors speaking.