Defence.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

10 March 1936 · House of Commons debate on the Defence White Paper · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 10, 1936, in the debate on the Defence White Paper, criticising delays in rearmament and urging a Ministry of Munitions and more destroyers.
Main themes
Delay in defence co-ordination, ten-years rule, German rearmament and spending, financing of German armaments, industrial preparation for munitions supply, skeleton Ministry of Munitions, air power and aircraft production, Territorial Army equipment, German submarine tonnage, destroyer flotillas, Defence White Paper, Royal Navy
Duration
~55 min
95th percentile
Words
6,620
95th percentile
Sentences
311
95th percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
10.4
25th percentile
Syntax
3.01
49th percentile
Vocabulary
2.03
15th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 42%42%
  • Economic 25%25%
  • Institutional 23%23%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

311 sentences in 69 paragraphs

As we respect the right hon. Gentleman, although we differ from him, I hope we may ask of him that he will also respect the views and methods of others, and not ask them to

2003

go against their convictions, which arise from a desire to keep the peace of the world. I am quite certain that there is not a man on these benches who would not regard it as the dearest purpose of his life to keep the horrors of war away from the world and to give security to the present generation of mankind. I have talked of sacrifices of property. I believe that if any man knew that by stretching out his right hand and having it cut off he would gain such an assurance, he would be proud to endure the mutilation. Therefore, in dealing with these matters connected with the White Paper, these complicated questions of defence, we ask that we shall not be accused of taking a light view of war or of seeking the means of triumphing in a sense of national pride. We hope that as we respect the right hon. Gentleman, so he will respect us.

With that very brief preliminary, I will come directly to the White Paper, which, unhappily, has to deal with the sterner aspects of defensive preparations. I listened to the most full and painstaking statement which the Home Secretary made to us upon the machinery of the Committees of Defence which are now in existence and of the reform which it is now intended to work in them. Certainly no one could accuse my right hon. Friend of not wishing to meet faithfully all the questions which were asked or all the arguments which were adduced; but there was one very simple question which he overlooked in regard to this reform in our system of defence co-ordination. Why has it been delayed until now? I remember a Debate which took place in July last, nine months ago, in this House, and I remember a memorial of 140 Members to the Prime Minister asking for something of this very kind. Is there an argument now which was not well-known then? Why have these very important nine months been lost in this matter?

It would seem, on the face of it, rather odd to invite the co-ordinator after the co-ordination is, according to the Government White Paper, already perfect and complete, to appoint the man who is to concert the plan after it has already been made and embodied in the detailed Estimates for the current year. The usual process, if I may model myself on the somewhat simplex types of exposition in

2004

which my right hon. and learned Friend excels, is to put the horse before the cart, the idea being, I presume, although I do not wish to take anything for granted, that as the horse moves forward he, as it were, drags the cart behind him. That, of course, would be the usual and normal procedure, but no doubt there may be very good reasons for having adopted the contrary one in this case.

I cannot feel that the Debate so far as it has proceeded, has done full justice to the anxiety which the House feels about the condition of our national defences. The Prime Minister yesterday and the Home Secretary to-day were concerned to offer two explanations of that condition. Both these explanations are familiar, and neither is without validity. The first is that we tried to set an example in disarmament. We continued to disarm while others were rearming, and consequently we very soon fell very far behind. The second is the ten-years rule, about which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has given the House a great deal of valuable information this afternoon. Now, I think there was a great deal to be said for the ten-years rule in 1919 and in 1924. As a matter of fact, the time has passed—the ten years have expired without the world being disturbed by a major war. As a means of giving a rough-and-ready guide to Departments, the ten-years rule in those days was very valuable, but of course it had to be revised each year. Every year you had to see whether it was ten, nine or eight years, or whether you had to abandon the principle altogether. There is nothing, I think, that anyone who supported that principle in those years after the War has any reason to regret.

After all, Germany was completely disarmed. France was heavily armed and our friend. Italy was our friend. The British battle fleet ten years ago was not as old as it is now; it was in its prime. In those days such a provision was entirely justified. No one will found a criticism upon this Government, or upon any Government from either side of the House, because during the years of assured security armaments were continually reduced, as they should be, and as they always have been during the progress of a long peace. But that hardly meets the point on which criticism arises. As the Prime Minister said, speaking of

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1933, a great change came over the situation, and to-day the Home Secretary mentioned the year 1932, when this ten-years rule was abandoned. What was the change that came over the situation?

I shall have to refer to Germany several times in these discussions. I protest that I have no ill-will or animus against the German people. On the contrary, I admire them in a great many ways; I admire their culture, their skill and their industry; and nothing would rejoice our hearts more than to see Germany take an honoured place in the family of Europe. But we have to deal in this Debate with the facts and the definite circumstances by which we are surrounded. The cause of that change was that Germany began to rearm, secretly at first but soon more openly, to create armed forces of various kinds, particularly in the air, and these forces became very soon increasingly formidable in their character. It was somewhere in that period 1932–33 that the Government scented the first signs of danger and abandoned the ten-years rule. But they ought to have done a great deal more than that. There was the moment when the change took place, and I think I may say that there were some of us in this House who gave full warnings on every occasion on which we had an opportunity to do so of the gravity of the change which was coming over the scene. The pages of the OFFICIAL REPORT are dark with the warnings which we gave, and I cannot believe that the very admirable intelligence service of this country, which in the Great War was considered to be the best in the world, did not give its warnings through other channels.

The gravamen of the criticism which lies against the Government is that they did not realise effectively, or at any rate that they did not act in accordance with, the marked deterioration in world affairs which occurred in 1932 and 1933. They continued to adhere to a policy which was adapted to one set of circumstances after an entirely different set of circumstances had supervened. They persisted in spite of all that we could say to the contrary. I suppose they resented the warnings which were given, although the warnings which I gave to the House were sober warnings, specific warnings and friendly warnings. Let us

2006

take the year 1933. In 1933 there was plenty of time to put our house in order. The bulk of the German preparations have been made since then. Everyone knows that in three years enormous results can be achieved. If three years ago the preliminary steps had been taken to repair our deficiencies we should not feel the anxiety—I am afraid the unspoken anxiety—which underlies the Debate this afternoon.

Let us survey the scene. The scale on which foreign rearmament is proceeding is prodigious. Some time ago I made a statement that Germany had spent, directly or indirectly, on armaments in the year 1935 upwards of £800,000,000 sterling. These figures startled people—at least they startled those people who are capable of taking in anything. I have seen since some figures in the "Daily Herald," a newspaper which has at no time sought to conceal the true facts of the European situation from its readers. I am bound to pay that tribute. Many of the most serious facts have appeared in that newspaper. The "Daily Herald" published figures and calculations to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) referred in his speech the other day, and which, I will not say absolutely confirmed, but went a long way to confirm the extraordinary statement which I had made.

I make that statement on good authority and I have had the assistance of a financial authority who has worked out for me a long argument, much too long to quote in Debate, showing how money has been secretly found for these purposes in the German finances. Broadly speaking, since the arrival of Herr Hitler in power three years ago the Germans have spent about £1,500,000,000 sterling upon warlike preparations directly or indirectly. The money has been raised by internal borrowing, and the revenues of Germany are already mortgaged two or three, or possibly four years, ahead. These figures are stupendous. Nothing like them has ever been seen in time of peace. Suppose they are exaggerated and that the figure is only £600,000,000 which they spent in 1935, we should still be confronted with facts which are unprecedented, unparalleled and immeasurable in their consequences. It must also be remembered that money goes further in

2007

Germany than here, in all probability. In face of these figures—from £600,000,000 to £800,000,000 spent on armaments in Germany in a single year—I put it to those who are supporting the Amendment that it surely seems unreasonable to blame His Majesty's Government for the modest sum for which they are asking in the Estimates of the year and for the additional expenditure that will be required under the White Paper.

I have seen a figure in the newspapers. A sum of £300,000,000 has been mentioned, to be spent in three years, additional to the ordinary Service Estimates. This is not a Government figure, but it has been freely stated. If the whole of that sum could be spent this year it would be a great comfort to many of us. I believe that it would be a comfort to the Government also, but I will explain shortly why that cannot be done. I doubt very much whether, on account of the unpreparedness of our industry, even £50,000,000 can be spent in the financial year 1936–37. Even if the whole were spent in the three years, that would be less than what Germany certainly spent last year. I cannot conceive how any sober-minded man, to whatever political party he belongs, can challenge the efforts which the Government are now making to place our defences in some order. On the contrary, many of us feel on this side of the House that the Government's plans, so far as they are revealed by the White Paper, err seriously on the side of inadequacy; and in the course of the Debate on the various Service Estimates, we shall have to probe the matter with a little more care. It is the duty of the Government to show that the figures they have fixed in their Estimates and that the efforts they are making are the maximum possible in the circumstances. When they have spent all that they can they will have spent much less than we need.

There are also complaints about the White Paper that it is vague and indefinite as to the actual cost. I suppose that that is because the Government do not know, apart from the ordinary Estimates, how much contractors will be able to earn. I suppose that the contractors will be urged to make the utmost efforts. We do not know how far they will be successful. Before the financial year comes to an end, the Supplementary Estimates

2008

will be able to tell us what the contractors have been able to earn. Unless measures of a far-reaching character are taken to organise industry, I fear the results in 1936 will be very disappointing to those who wish to see the deficiences in our defences repaired. I certainly do not see why the Government should be blamed for not giving exact figures.

Anyone who understands the conditions of munitions production under circumstances of urgency will know quite well that to forecast exactly would be only to mislead Parliament and the country, but I am glad to see that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has set up a strong finance committee to watch expenditure vigilantly and to make sure that we get value for our money. When things have been left so late as this no high economy is possible. That is part of the price the nation has to pay for being caught short. All the more must every effort be made to prevent actual waste. The fact that Germany is spending at this enormous rate upon armaments warns us not only of the magnitude of the danger but possibly of its imminence. Expenditure on armaments means wages. The weekly livelihood of a very large proportion of the German people has now become dependent upon military preparations. Several millions of people in Germany who were unemployed have found employment in munitions manufacture or in the armed forces. On the other hand, the whole is supported by borrowed money on a large scale, and the financial situation has become such that this cannot go on indefinitely.

It cannot go on, but how can it stop? A terrible dilemma lies ahead of the most peacefully-minded government in Germany. If they go on, there is bankruptcy; if they stop, there is tremendous unemployment. There is no chance of Germany finding additional substitute employment by trading with tropical colonies, or by the peaceful conquest of our markets or those of other nations, which would in the immediate future in the slightest degree compensate for the curtailment of the vast munitions programme on which the whole of Germany is now engaged. The German Government will have to choose at no distant date between an internal or an external catastrophe. We are here considering

2009

our own security. Can we doubt what course the man at the head of Germany would be likely to choose?

It is easy to say this cannot go on, but what will happen when it stops? It is that which invests the situation with the most alarming urgency, with a kind of doom-like inevitableness which causes the most melancholy and alarming reflections. Germany, we are told, is not yet ready for war. Some say she is only half ready. Yet we see already that they are the only nation in Europe unafraid of war. If what we have seen in the last few days is the mood of a partially armed Germany, imagine what the tone will be when the colossal preparations which are being made are approaching their zenith, and when at the same time the limits of internal borrowing are already in sight.

Wars do not always wait until all the combatants are ready. Sometimes they come before any are ready, sometimes when one nation thinks it less unready than another, or when one nation thinks it is likely to become not stronger, but weaker as time passes. I fear, indeed, that there may be a culminating point in the history of Europe—the armaments history of Europe. I cannot tell when it will be reached. It will certainly be reached in the lifetime of the present Parliament. Let us never accept the theory of inevitable war, neither let us blind our eyes to the remorseless march of events. I was glad to hear the Prime Minister devote so much of his speech yesterday to the problem of supply. There are two ways of preparing for the supply side of national defence. First, there is the accumulation of reserves of munitions of all kinds, which under modern conditions must be enormous, and the storing of them at great expense in magazines. That method was the only one which was known and practised up to the Great War.

There is a second method, the modern method, which is quite different. The whole industry of a country is prepared in time of peace for an alternative form of manufacture. Even the smallest workshops play their part in making components. Assembly centres are provided where the components can be fitted together. Thus the whole industry of the country is ready to turn over from peace to war conditions on the pressing of a

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button. The details of this scheme have been worked out with the utmost refinement in every great country in the world. The advantage of the second method is that you do not have to pile up and store these enormous accumulations of reserves of material which may never be used, which cannot be modernised, and which consequently become not only old but obsolete. Instead of that, the whole industry of the country is ready to spring into a different kind of action and the only reserves required are those to bridge the period between the transition from peace to war. It is this second method which has been for years past the great feature of industrial Europe, and is to-day, in every country but our own. It is this that gives the enormous latent war strength which is now recognised to be possessed by Germany. France has adopted it to a large extent. It is the rule in Italy and of all the smaller military countries.

What have we done? I hope we shall have some further account. The Prime Minister spoke yesterday about Sir Arthur Robinson's Committee. I have no doubt that some work on paper has been done, but it is not only on paper that this requires to be done. Preparations have to be made; a lay-out has to be considered and in some cases prepared. Appliances of all kinds have to be constructed. Not only must the organisation be thought out, but the actual tools must be to hand and everything planned in detail, together with the assembly of the skilled and unskilled labour and the co-ordination of power and transport. All this has to be done for each trade in great volume, and with preparations which have their reflections in the actual stocks of firms throughout the country. In other countries, on the contrary, a discerning eye can see what has already been prepared and the appliances which are hanging up in the shops to be brought into use when required. It may be very sad indeed that it should be so, but, nevertheless, it seems to me, and I put it to the party opposite, that it is not a development which should affront a sincere lover of peace because it enables a country to continue its peaceful industry to the last minute, and if the emergency passes away the alternative processes which have been prepared need never be used. It is a kind of territorial force for industry that has been developed, and

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the cost of developing those alternative processes, compared with the accumulation of vast reserves or the building of large national factories—although these may become necessary like the shell factories that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs devised early in the War—is petty.

If we had only begun to act three years ago when the danger first made itself apparent, we should possess a reserve power to-day which could spring at any moment into full preparatory activity. Very little disturbance three years ago would have produced enormous reserves at the present time. I am well aware that something has been done. What is immediately needed is to bring it out into the open, to support it with ample money any staff and to press it forward with the utmost vigour. Let me make myself clear. This does not mean any immediate increase in the deliveries. It does not mean immediately more ships, more munitions, more aeroplanes, but what it does mean is that you have an industry which, if the need ever arises, will not fail you, and will not interpose between you and your safety two horrible years of hiatus such as some of us in positions of responsibility went through in the Great War. What a thing to see the roads of this country covered with the volunteer youth of the nation drilling for a year with nothing but broomsticks and wooden muskets, and what a much more terrible thing to see those who were in the fighting line, in the trenches, under a continuous bombardment with batteries behind them that were limited to firing one round per battery per day.

Your industry must be ready to sustain you. This work should have been begun in vigour three yeasr ago, it should have been in progress two years ago, it should have been completed one year ago. All I urge is, Do it now. Here in a nutshell is the history of munitions production: First year, very little; second year, not much, but something; third year, almost all you want; fourth year, more than you need. We are only at the beginning of the second year, whereas Germany is already, in many respects, at the end of the third. Therefore, my recommendation to my right hon. Friend is to create as soon as possible a skeleton Ministry of Munitions, with a Munitions Council of ten or a dozen selected business men

2012

who would serve as before in an honorary capacity. I am sure this should be set on foot at the earliest moment, and unless it is we shall not get even the restricted deliveries which we are hoping to get under the present scheme.

I must utter this warning which is borne in upon me. Contractors are usually glad to book orders from the Government, however large those orders may be, because they know that when they are found to be behind-hand in their deliveries the Government cannot punish them, because it has become dependent on them, and all it can do is to come along and help them out. It was a cruel mortification to Lord Kitchener, in the first year of the War, when he found that so many of the promises made by the contractors—not the regular War Office contractors, but the outside contractors—were in the excitement of the early months completely falsified by events, and that deliveries bore no relation to what had been counted upon or what the troops in the field counted upon. I was very glad to hear my right hon. Friend talk about setting up a. Supply Ministry or a Supply Office, but I am sure he will make a great mistake if he does not set up a Ministry of Munitions, in a skeleton form at least, in the near future, and clear his plan from the fault which now resides in it of mixing up the quite different functions of a Ministry of Supply with the higher concert of Imperial Defence. There is a sentence in the White Paper which shows how very urgent this matter is. It is on page 10, paragraph 3, dealing with the Territorial Army:

For the present, owing to the demands upon the capacity of industrial output which must necessarily be made, in the first instance, by the Regular Army, it is not possible simultaneously to recondition the Territorial Army.

Just think of that. Why? These two forces put together are only a quarter of a million men, and we are told that this British industry, this vast, flexible, buoyant, rich, fertile, adaptable British industry, is incapable of conducting the equipment of these two comparatively small forces simultaneously. I refuse to believe such a thing. What is it they are needing? It is not weapons—the weapons they have—but the equipment, which is to be delayed. I suppose wagons, and appliances of various kinds, field cookers, and all the different appliances which the

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Territorials require. These are the things which, we are told, cannot be made by industry in Britain. Do you want anything other than this tell-tale sentence to prove that the industry has not been organised? And what a discouragement to the Territorial Force, which we must exert ourselves in every way to recruit from the gallant and patriotic youth of the country, who have taken this burden on themselves, when they see that a long interval must elapse, even in times like this, before it will be possible to recondition them, because all the plant is being used to recondition our small Regular Army.

Let me apply this consideration for a moment to aeroplanes. Eight months ago, when the present Secretary of State for Air took office, the aeroplane industry was roused to a most urgent exertion. Very large orders of all kinds were placed with the existing firms, which were building to their utmost capacity. What the results have been no one can tell. That this great volume of production is going forward in the existing factories is undoubted, but we cannot tell how far the deliveries will correspond. That has been done, and very rightly done, by the energetic Minister who occupies that post; but we have not, I believe, attempted in any concrete physical manner to organise the manufacture of components by firms not normally accustomed to produce aviation parts, nor have we provided the suitable assembly plants necessary in times of emergency.

Here is the great disadvantage at which we stand compared with the German air industry. I am not mentioning this for the first time. I told the House 18 months ago of the extraordinary development of this method which was proceeding in Germany. There is not the slightest reason why it should not be set on foot here. It might have corrected to some extent the boom in aircraft shares. It would, anyhow, have given a reserve without which, if this trouble comes, although you may have a force at the beginning of the war, you will not have the power to keep that force in continuous activity, and it will come to an end after a few months. There is no doubt that this method of the widely distributed manufacture of components ought to be as much a part of the life of an industrial country in this present unhappy modern age as the practice of archery on the

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village green was in medieval England. It is the simplest and most primary method by which the freedom of a country can be assured, and it is the very heart of modern national defence.

The air power of any country cannot be measured by the number of aeroplanes, nor by any of the particular definitions which are given. It must be measured by the number of aeroplanes which can be placed in the air simultaneously and maintained in action month after month. It is dependent not only on the number of organised squadrons but upon the expansive power of the industrial plant. A mere comparison of the number of machines possessed by the different countries, or the number of pilots trained, or even the number of squadrons formed, is no true guide. The organisation of the aeroplane industry is not merely the production or the accumulation of so many thousands of aeroplanes by a given date. It must also ensure the continuous flow of supplies from the date of the outbreak, and the supreme advantage which Germany has seized at the present time resides in this fact. They do not need to have any considerable reserve. They can feed the fighting squadrons direct from the factories and testing grounds, just as, in the last year of the War, when my right hon. Friend's great national shell factories and gun plants came into operation, we were able to feed the field armies direct from the factories without the need to accumulate supplies short of the actual fighting zone.

In these circumstances it is, I am sorry to say, not likely that we shall be able to overtake Germany and achieve air parity, as was promised, unless and until Germany herself decides to slow down or arrest her air expansion. Clearly a saturation point will be reached when those who are guiding Germany decide that they have given to air development all that portion of their resources which they can spare, having regard to all other needs. If, when that point is reached, we continue to develop our force, ultimately we shall achieve air parity, but that day will be fixed by decisions which will be taken in Germany and not by decisions which will be taken here, whatever we do.

Let us see what we are doing. It is a general impression that we are overhauling Germany now, that we started

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late, it is true, but are making up for lost time, and that every month our relative positions will improve. That is a delusion. It is contrary to the truth this year, and probably for many months next year. I am not saying anything which is not known in every country in the world. These matters are thoroughly understood. Germany will be outstripping us more and more even if our new programmes are accepted, and we shall be worse off at the end of this year than we are now, in spite of all our exertions. The explanation of this grievous fact lies in the past. Take the simple test, of money. I am assuming that the Government are doing all they can. I am absolutely certain that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is putting no financial restriction on any money that can be usefully spent in achieving our security. But, let us look at the position. We spent in the financial year which is now closing £29,000,000 on the air, under the original and Supplementary Estimates. In about the same period—the dates do not quite tally—the French voted nearly £70,000,000 and spent, I expect, at least £60,000,000. The Germans spent certainly far more, though I cannot hazard a figure; but both France and Germany spent on their air development at least twice what we were able to spend last year, and, as I have said, money goes farther in those countries than here.

When we look at that position it is clear there is not much catching-up by our Government up to the present. I have no doubt His Majesty's Government would gladly spend more money than was asked for, but it is no use to clamour for larger programmes. The Government could easily double their paper programmes and get a cheap cheer from uninstructed persons, but they would be doing nothing except deceiving the public. Before I press the Government for any larger programmes of aeroplanes I should like to feel sure that the present programmes are being executed, and I very much doubt whether, with the existing methods, that will be achieved.

I have one more section for which I claim the attention of the House. I have been speaking about, the Army and the Air Force as they are affected by the present conditions of supply. Those conditions do not apply in the same degree to the Navy. The Admiralty have large

2016

regular establishments of gun plants, armour plants and dockyards, and firms of all kinds which are capable of serving and maintaining the Fleet on a great scale, and which are adapted to the ponderous kind of supplies which the Admiralty requires. They have that, and the Fleet has been fed during all these years with a very considerable flow of public money. I am not at all prepared to suggest that the Fleet has not been given considerable support by the House of Commons during these years. The consequence is that it is possible to spend additional money on the Navy rapidly. That explains, perhaps, the remarkable fact that the Navy expenditure this year is much greater than the Air expenditure, a fact which many people comment on and regard as unreasonable. That is the explanation. They have the great plants, and if and when the order is put out, those plants rapidly respond to the demand.

There is one form of naval construction which would involve the small shipbuilding yards of the country and on which I would like to say the last few words with which I shall trouble the House. By the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Germany is entitled, if she desires, to build tonnage in submarines equal to our own. I do not know whether the day may not come when the fact that we agreed to that may not be regretted. If Germany decides to exercise this right, she may produce the result with altogether unexpected rapidity. We were all shocked in the last Parliament to hear the First Lord of the Admiralty tell us that Germany was building two 26,000-ton battleships, which the Admiralty only expected would be, according to the treaty, 10,000-tonners. No one believed that the construction of gigantic ships could proceed in secret. Apparently, however, this happened. How much more difficult will it be to keep track of the manufacture of submarines by component parts. Even in the Great War, 20 years ago, we ordered at the Admiralty in November, 1914, from Mr. Schwab and the Bethlehem Steel Works, 18 submarines, which were to be constructed in the surprisingly short time of six or seven months apiece. The manufacture of these submarines was begun in America, but neutrality difficulties were raised, and Mr. Schwab had to pick up the whole of this enormous plant

2017

and material in different stages of preparation at Pittsburg, put it on railway trucks and send it to Canada, where it was put together. In spite of that interruption, the deliveries were achieved with extreme punctuality. I do not doubt that a similar method of preparing naval components for submarines has also been carried to perfection in Germany.

I warn my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that there may well lie before us the same kind of disconcerting surprise in regard to German "U" boats as we have already experienced to our detriment in the air power. Let us suppose that by August, 1937, which will certainly be a dangerous period in the armaments history of Europe—I am not talking of the political aspect, which is another aspect—we are confronted with the fact that Germany has a submarine tonnage equal to our own, that is to say, 40,000 or 50,000 tons in submarines. That would be considerably more than the submarine tonnage with which the Germans began their first attack upon British trade in February, 1915. I mentioned this point in a sentence or two the other night, but I wish to bring it to the attention of the House because it is most important. We were deeply alarmed at their attack, but we beat it off. We learned that day many lessons which enabled Lord Fisher and the Admiralty to make that vast construction of anti-submarine craft which, in 1917, when the great attack began, were the means of our salvation.

But the original attack—how did we beat it off? I put this point to the House, and I make no apology for repeating it, because it is essential to a realisation of our position. We beat it off by the possession of 220 destroyers. Without these we could not possibly have escorted our ships in and out of the harbours of Britain, nor could we, at the same time, have continued the hunt of the "U" boats. I am not assuming that war is coming at all, but we ought not to be unprepared, in a matter affecting the very life of this country, to protect it from reduction, from subjugation by panic or by neglect of this precaution, and we ought to be prepared to meet a stronger attack in August, 1937, than that to which we were exposed in February, 1915. Surely steps should be taken now to provide us with as large and effective

2018

destroyer flotillas as we can possibly make.

I noticed in the White Paper, in paragraph 27, that a steady replacement programme for destroyers will be undertaken. I am most surprised that the word "replacement" is used. What is needed is not only replacement but multiplication to the utmost capacity of the small and otherwise unoccupied building yards in Great Britain. It need not be of the largest type, but at this stage in our affairs it is the time factor which is vital. My right hon. Friend who interested us so much yesterday dwelt upon the importance, and reiterated the importance, of speed. The time factor is what matters. People talk about battleships, and there is great discussion as to whether you should continue to build battleships or not. It is to my mind largely an academic question. I will not go into it at this moment. Perhaps on the Naval Estimates we may discuss the merits of different types of naval architecture, but I do not see the relevance of it to the immediate emergency if they are not to be begun until 1937 and cannot be built until 1940 or 1941. It seems almost certain that the culminating point in Europe which I have mentioned will be reached, and that we shall have to meet whatever troubles lie before us, with our existing vessels.

These flotillas are different. They can be constructed with very great rapidity. You have them in your command; you have only to give the orders, and they will be supplied. I have great confidence in the Admiralty, and I make this suggestion in a manner which is tentative. I would ask my hon. Friend who represents the Admiralty so agreeably in this House, that when he speaks upon the Navy Estmates he should give a very full explanation of this position, because it is perfectly clear that we have, within the next two years, to have a very much larger tonnage of destroyers, and a larger number of destroyers, available than we have hitherto been permitted under the limitations of the London Treaty.

I thank the House for listening to me. I have been speaking mainly about the supply side of our defence. When the Estimates come I will have something else to say on the more military aspect. I

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ask this one question, which I think I must put before I sit down: Will there be time to put our defences in order? We live in contact with the unknown, but we are not defenceless now. Will there be time to make these necessary efforts, or will the awful words "too late" be recorded? I will never despair that we can make ourselves secure. The Royal Navy, especially after the toning up which it has received, is unsurpassed in the world, and is still the main bulwark of our security, and even at this eleventh hour, if the right measures are taken and if the right spirit prevails in the British nation and the British Empire, we may surround ourselves with other bulwarks equally sure, which will protect us against whatever storms may blow.