- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 12, 1935, on the Government's Motion adopting the Select Committee on Witnesses report, arguing it repudiated the Committee of Privileges and urging a further Standing Order barring Ministers.
- Main themes
- Report of the Select Committee on Witnesses, Committee of Privileges report and paragraphs 21 and 22, distinction between judicial and non-judicial committees, distinction between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion, alleged tampering with witnesses, new Standing Order on withdrawal of documents from committees, proposal to bar Ministers from the Committee of Privileges in cases involving colleagues, Government Motion as admission of impropriety, Lancashire case and the India Bill, Secretary of State for India, Foreign Secretary's commendation of the report
- Duration
- ~21 min
- Words
- 2,472
- Sentences
- 91
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 11.8
- Syntax
- 3.06
- Vocabulary
- 2.12
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other91 sentences in 20 paragraphs
While I was listening to the statement of my right hon. Friend the Deputy Leader of the House, I could not help reflecting what an invaluable thing it must be to have had a prolonged legal training. There was the right hon. Gentleman making his opening statement to the House, with every sentence perfect, every argument and point seeming in itself complete, and yet I do not suppose that any hon. Member who had not followed this matter closely would have gathered from that speech that anything in particular had happened or why this Motion was brought before the House at all. A certain amount of rigmarole this way and a certain amount of rigmarole that way, a few affable expressions and friendly gestures, and the House is rapidly invited to dispose of this matter. But there is a great deal more in it than that, and I shall endeavour to amplify, perhaps rather than traverse, the description which the right hon. Gentleman has given of the Report of the Select Committee on Witnesses and of its relations to the Report of the Committee of Privileges which, the House may remember, we discussed last year. I see the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General present. In winding up on the Third Reading of the India Bill he referred to me as a disappointed litigant, haunting or frequenting the courts of justice with his case. Who is the litigant who is frequenting the courts of justice on this occasion? It is the Government who come forward with this Motion. I have no power to bring it before the House. It is the Government, it is the successful litigant, frequenting the courts of justice, driven by very shame to make this tardy but partial act of reparation. That is the position in which we are in.
This great Government, with its overwhelming majority, master of all political and social forces which are dominant to- 710 day, has been compelled—I cannot tell why it has been compelled, or what forces remote and inherent in the Constitution have driven it forward—to put down this Motion to adopt this Report and to put upon the Paper a definite admission to the Standing Orders. It must have been very repugnant to them, and it certainly constitutes an admission, however veiled, however politely expressed, which I should have thought was most damaging to their general credit and position in regard to this controversy. I am looking round for my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). Here he is, waiting in the House of Commons on a Friday afternoon to discuss a "mare's nest," brought before Parliament by the Government. The Government of the day are keeping alive this "mare's nest." I can hardly refrain from saying, "I told you so." I am delighted to find myself in agreement with His Majesty's Government on this matter. I think the steps they are taking, so far as they go, are steps which it is indispensable for them to take. This Report of the Committee on Witnesses is a commentary upon the earlier Report of the Committee of Privileges. My complaint was that the Report of the Committee of Privileges put a new and a strained interpretation upon the Standing Orders. I also complained—I am not going to dwell upon this, although it is strictly relevant—that the evidence was suppressed and that the correspondence was printed in an unfair form. Let that pass. My complaint was, as the House will probably remember, that the Committee of Privileges had placed a new and strained interpretation upon the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, and that but for this strained interpretation they could not have reached the conclusion which they submitted to the House and which the House afterwards adopted.
The Committee of Privileges exculpated the Secretary of State for India from the charge of breach of Privilege on two main grounds; first of all, on the ground of the distinction between judicial and non-judicial committees, and, secondly, on the distinction between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion. They tried to make something out of the fact that, though he had endeavoured to tamper with the witnesses, in fact the witnesses had not been tampered with; that the
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witnesses had not had their judgment finally swayed by the attempted process of tampering. That was not a very substantial point, and the Committee rested, and wisely rested, I think, on the distinction between judicial and non-judicial and on the distinction between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion, and, on that, paragraphs 21 and 22 of this re port were written, a mixture of legal subtlety and ingenious casuistry which constitutes a web so tangled that it was perfectly clear that it could not afford any guidance to the House or to future Parliaments as to the correct conduct to be pursued by members of House of Commons Committees or by witnesses before those committees.
This ingenious and elaborate fabrication of arguments which figures in paragraphs 21 and 22, served its purpose at the time, but it was evident to all who understood these matters, and took care about the rights and wrongs of these matters and their merits, apart from the triumphs and failures of political warfare, that paragraphs 21 and 22 could not stand as being any foundation for what my right hon. and learned Friend has called the common law of Parliament. I can only quote my evidence which I gave before the Committee on Witnesses. I explained to them the difficulty in which the Committee of Privileges were put; on the one hand, were these very distinguished gentlemen, and, on the other, were the plain facts that they had broken the Privileges of the House of Commons, and there was the strong and unduly striking language of the old-fashioned Sessional Orders, and it was put to that Committee that the language should apply to these distinguished gentlemen. In my evidence, which I gave to the Committee on Witnesses, I explained the process how the Committee of Privileges drove a coach and four through the law of procedure of the House of Commons and conveyed their distinguished Friends to safety, leaving behind them this litter and this débris which the new Committee had to be set up in order to try to put right and to gather together.
That is a fact. We may not like it, but there we are. The Government have been forced to appoint this new Committee on Witnesses, and the Committee on Witnesses has utterly demolished the two main pillars upon which the report
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of the Committee of Privileges rested, namely, the distinction between judicial and non-judicial and the distinction between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion. What an absurd thing that you should try to pretend that you can distinguish between judicial and non-judicial Committees of the House of Commons, and that you can leave the procedure in this way, with no protection for the proper conduct of any Committee that is dubbed non-judicial. It was quite impossible in the first instance to find any line of distinction between judicial and non-judicial. I invited the Committee on Witnesses to draw a line if they could, but they very properly rejected that invitation. All the thought and care of the Noble Lord the Minister of Thought—I mean, of course, the Minister without Portfolio—was devoted to this matter, without his being able to find any distinction between judicial and non-judicial. And obviously it would not be in the public interest to do so. All Committees of this House ought to be conducted in a proper manner, and all witnesses and members of Committees ought to comport themselves, whether the Committee can be called judicial or non-judicial, in a manner which is considered to conduce to the proper attainment of the purposes which the House of Commons has in view.
The two main pillars of the Report of the Committee of Privileges have been pulled over. Whatever anyone may contend in this debate, and no doubt we shall have a lot of statements contrary to that fact, the Report of the Committee of Privileges is hopelessly weakened and undermined in regard to these two main conditions. By the adoption of the Government Motion, which we are all going to support, though we cannot possibly reach a decision on this matter to-day, the reasoning in paragraph 21 is publicly and decisively repudiated, and the future procedure of the House is free from the laboured, irrational, and not specially ingenuous trammels in which it would have been confined by paragraph 21. But that is not all. More than that, a specific new Standing Order is found to be necessary preventing the withdrawal of documents which have been deposited with a Committee from that Committee without the knowledge or assent of that Committee. I wonder that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham
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(Sir A. Chamberlain) did not notice that. I am quite sure that, if it had occurred to him, he would not have hesitated, but he, with his great knowledge of this House, overlooked altogether that this was a loophole which had to be stopped. There is no dispute about it; you do not require numbers to back up a thing like this. The Government had to put down this Motion, and, by putting it down, they have made it absolutely clear that they admit that an impropriety was committed, and that the need has arisen for a new specific Standing Order of the House of Commons to prevent such things ever occurring again.
I must say that, when I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks that the Government were engaged upon a tardy act of reparation, I was perhaps wrong in using the word "tardy," because it is more than tardy—it is too late. The Bill out of which this controversy arose is practically through. The Lancashire case has gone by default. If the Report of this Committee on Witnesses had been before the House of Commons at the time when the House considered the Report of the Committee of Privileges, it is inconceivable that more justice would not have been done to the case which, at very great personal exertion and with much personal regret, I brought before Parliament. Of course, it has now gone down to the past; it is done; you have got your Bill, your triumph of resolution and so on. This comes on afterwards; Justice is done after the evil has occurred. But I would like to look in the face some of those gentlemen of great knowledge who enforced this brazen assertion upon us, and ask if they could conscientiously say that in the face of the facts and arguments brought forward in this report they would have adopted the same attitude as they did.
There is one other thing I should like to say. We are proposing an additional Amendment to the Standing Orders. It seems to me there ought to be another, and that is that Ministers of the Crown ought not to sit on the Committee of Privileges in respect of cases where the conduct of one of their own colleagues is impugned. I would not say that without making it perfectly clear that I am making no aspersion upon the conscientious manner in which my right hon. Friends did their duty on that Committee. I do not agree with the
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view they took, but I am sure that any bias that they showed was unconscious or subconscious bias. It is always a great mistake to put people in a position where human nature may be too highly tried. We are not dealing with the past. We are dealing with the future. You may not always have Ministers of this high character. You may not always have Ministers who can be quite free from any form of bias. We must legislate for the weaker brethren of Ministerial life as well as for the paragons, and it seems to me that it would be a very salutary thing, and I hope the Government will consider—as they are in the mood of repentance to-day—adding another Standing Order that no Minister should sit on the Committee of Privileges if the conduct of another Minister of the Crown is impugned. It puts everyone in a false position. It is not everyone's reputation that is so firmly established as to be able to stand such shocks and temptations without disquietude and with impunity.
I felt very keenly my treatment at the time by the Committee of Privileges and by the House. I thought there was in Parliament one of those moods that I detest of all swinging against one man. I have seen it several times and have never shared it—the sort of idea that if you can get enough people together you can browbeat and cow an individual though he is acting strictly in accordance with his constitutional rights. What I felt most was the way in which the Foreign Secretary commended the report of the Committee of Privileges to the House. No one, I think, was more capable, both from his legal and political experience, than the right hon. Gentleman of seeing through the absurdity and the manifold complications of paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Committee of Privileges report. But my right hon. Friend imported prejudice into that discussion and accused me of wishing to ruin the Secretary of State at a time when I stood almost alone in the House. I regret that.
Circumstances have changed, and I do not wish to pursue the right hon. Gentleman in these days, as I would if the matter had been raised a little while ago, but I may take this opportunity of saying, which I had not before, that I absolutely deny any intention of ill-will towards the right hon. Gentleman. I
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have never felt anything but personal admiration and regard for him, and I feel it hard that at a moment when I stood almost alone this matter of prejudice should have been imported into the discussion. It seems to me that when one is fighting for great public issues, and when wrong things are done against the cause for which you are fighting, any Member of the House is bound to act without any question of personal ill-will and do his duty to the utmost in interpreting in their full rigour the resources which the free constitution of Parliament gives him. That is the only thing which has actuated me in the matter. It was far from my mind and my heart to have the slightest personal ill-will towards my right hon. Friend, and still less towards Lord Derby, who was also involved in these matters.
