- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 22, 1935, in the debate on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, criticising the Government for condoning a German treaty breach and urging disclosure of naval programmes.
- Main themes
- Anglo-German Naval Agreement, German breach of the Treaty of Versailles, abolition of the submarine, German 35 per cent fleet ratio, secret German battleship construction, British naval replacement programme, French naval modernisation, Mediterranean position, Far East and Japan, collective security and the League of Nations
- Duration
- ~21 min
- Words
- 2,576
- Sentences
- 95
- Readability
- 60
- Grade
- 10.9
- Syntax
- 3.30
- Vocabulary
- 2.07
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other95 sentences in 21 paragraphs
The First Lord said the other day on a festive occasion that he had passed a great many years in zones of silence on the benches of the House of Commons, but I think that any of those who have heard him this afternoon will be sure that in those years of silence he was most carefully acquainting himself with all the Parliamentary arts, because certainly the speech to which we have just listened was one of the most successful ministerial utterances that we have heard for a long time. He has for the first time put the case which led the Admiralty into making this Anglo-German Agreement into the public view so that it may be contrasted with the various arguments which have been advanced against it from many parts of the Committee. Let me congratulate
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the right hon. Gentleman upon his speech, and at the same time say with how much regret we have all heard that it is his intention not to be a Member in the next House of Commons. Perhaps even at the eleventh hour it is not too late for him to reconsider his decision.
I do not take a very keen or excited part in the controversy between the First Lord and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). It is not because the quality of the combatants on both sides and the explosive material employed were not such as to give a prospect of a certain liveliness whenever it occurred, but, frankly that there is a great element of unreality in the arguments about German co-operation in the abolition of the submarine. The Government dwelt upon this as one of the arguments to recommend their agreement to the public, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs turned the argument against the Government by suggesting that they had not gone the full length in meeting the German offer for co-operation. I have never felt that there was very much in this offer which the Germans made to co-operate with us in abolishing the submarine. I should have thought it was a very safe offer for them to make—for any country to make—when the condition attached to it was that all other countries should agree at the same time and when it was perfectly well known that there was not the slightest chance of other countries agreeing. The First Lord says we cannot tell now whether other countries will agree or not. Does he really suppose that at this forthcoming multilateral conference, to which he is looking forward, and which must take place in some form or other before the end of 1936, there is the slightest chance of securing a world agreement on the abolition of the submarine? I should have thought that the French, the Italian, and the Japanese view would all be absolutely averse to it. If that be so, it seems to me that the Germans have not run any great risk of diminishing their facilities for making war at sea by offering to co-operate with Great Britain in securing this abolition.
Another statement which was made on the subject of submarines was that the Germans were willing to subscribe to the terms of the international agreement
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which many of the Powers have signed restricting the use of the submarine in such a way as to strip submarine warfare against commerce of its inhumanity. I am bound to say that I feel very great difficulty in being entirely reassured by that. Lord Beatty said the other day that the battle fleet was now practically secure against submarines if properly protected by its flotillas, etc. I believe that to be correct. Submarines are not needed, then, for attack upon the battle fleet. If they are not needed for that purpose, and the Germans are not going to use them, in the only way in which they can be effectively used, against commerce, it seems to me strange that they should dwell with so much reiteration on the importance of having not merely 35 per cent., but 45 per cent., and, in the long run in some cases, up to 100 per cent. If neither of these spheres of activity for submarines is to be used by them, it seems strange that they should attach so much importance to the possession of this weapon, which they have begun to construct in considerable numbers in flat defiance of the Treaty. If we are to assume, as we may for the purposes of this discussion, the hideous hypothesis of a war in which Britain and Germany would be on opposite sides and the British blockade is being enforced on the coast of Germany as it was in the late war, who in his senses would believe that the Germans, possessed of a great fleet of submarines and watching their women and children being starved by the British blockade, would abstain from the fullest use of that arm? Such a view seems to me to be the acme of gullibility.
I do not want particularly to concern myself with the dispute between my right hon. Friend the member for Carnarvon Boroughs and His Majesty's Government upon that point, but to concern myself rather with the more general aspects which were raised by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Burton (Colonel Gretton), and which were brought forward in a speech of great calmness and study by the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks). I do not entirely find these arguments met by the speech of my right hon. Friend the First Lord. The great argument which has been put forward from many quarters has been that all of a sudden the Government broke away from the course on which they were proceeding in European affairs,
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namely, Stresa, Geneva, and the collective disapprobation of the breaking of treaties, and made this side arrangement with Germany. Nothing that the right hon. Gentleman said at all freed the Government policy from the reproach of inconsistency in that respect. Certainly it was a new method. Hitherto, the right hon. Gentleman was looking forward to a general conference at the end of 1936 of all the naval Powers except Germany, and he hoped that Germany would come, too. He was having tentative bilateral discussions with all these Powers, and no doubt, as each point of agreement was reached, note was to be taken that that part of the jigsaw puzzle would be satisfactory as long as it was not affected by something else. I do not understand why the German bilateral conversations could not have been treated on that basis, and why it could not have been said that in all other circumstances, if everything else fits in, this kind of arrangement will be satisfactory to both sides. The matter could then have been referred to the general conference on naval matters, as it will have to be referred. Obviously, everything is affected by that general conference because, if as a result of it our construction has to be increased, there will be a propportionate increase in the German naval construction.
Therefore, I do not quite see why Germany should have been singled out for such exceptional treatment in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman asked what would have happened if we had refused? I do not suggest that it should have been arbitrarily turned down and that we should have said there was no question of our ever making any agreement with Germany. The suggestion which is put forward by the critics of this policy is that the proper course would have been to say that this Agreement involves a breach of the treaty, that we have joined with other Powers in condemning breaches of the Treaty and unilateral action, and that we must, while noting all the facts, refer this matter to other nations with whom we have so recently joined in expressing a decided and definite view. I do not believe that if that had been done the position would have been worsened. The position is very bad. Do not let us underrate the position. The German fleet which is to be
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constructed under this Treaty is to be 35 per cent. of the British fleet. We have seen the first year's programme of its construction, which programme would undoubtedly be described, in our ordinary language in dealing with these affairs, as the programme of 1934, and not of 1935. It is already far on the way; even the battleships are laid down. I am bound to say that I do not know how the Admiralty were without information that even battleships were being laid down, contrary to the Treaty, before the end of 1934. I am astonished at that, astounded at such a thing. We always believed before the War that never could battleships be laid down without knowledge being obtained. So that there was a slip. The Germans were entitled to build 10,000-ton ships according to the Treaty, but they, by a concealment which the Admiralty were utterly unable to penetrate, converted these into 26,000-ton ships. Let us be careful about gullibility when we see all these extremely awkward incidents occurring.
It seems to me that we have now before us the first year's programme of the new German fleet. What I want to know is—the right hon. Gentleman probably will not tell us, but I think we ought to know as soon as he can get permission to inform Parliament—in how many years do the Germans propose to complete the building, the laying down, of that 35 per cent. The year 1942 has been mentioned in another connection. I was not clear from what the right hon. Gentleman said whether it was in this connection or not. But it seems to me that if they have four programmes of the size that they announce—the 1934 programme—if they have four successive annual programmes of that size, they will practically come up to 35 per cent. of the British fleet as it exists to-day by the year 1939 or 1940. I do not say we must be told this afternoon, but we must be better informed upon these matters. Nobody wants to hamper the right hon. Gentleman or the Government in having tentative, informal, bilateral discussions and getting as many combinations together as possible and then making the super-combination in a general conference, and nobody would ask that all the offers and counter-offers which are put forward in the course of those negotiations should, while the negotiations are still in an unformed and
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unsettled condition, be made public. I agree with the claim the Government make in that matter, but in a reasonable space of time we have got to know what is to be the rate of German construction, if that is known to the Government, what are to be the annual programmes which His Majesty's Government consider necessary for the British fleet.
Take this question of the German fleet. In my view if, in four or five years, the Germans have built or laid down 35 per cent. new construction, we shall in that period have to lay down or build, at the same rate pari passu certainly 50 per cent. replacement of our own fleet. That is to say that in the period during which they will be building 400,000 tons, we will say, of new navy, we shall have to rebuild practically the half of our existing navy. Otherwise our position will be a most perilous one, a most dangerous one, as it is. Let me say one word about France. It is true that if we take mere tonnage the First Lord is able to show a satisfactory arrangement for France in the percentage of superiority which she would possess, but what is to be the position of the French navy if the Germans in the next four years build, by four programmes, a fleet 35 per cent. of the British fleet? The entire navy of France, except the latest vessels, will require to be reconstructed. The new German navy, although somewhat behind the French in the matter of percentages, would undoubtedly be overwhelmingly superior from the point of view of matériel. Therefore, we cannot feel at all reassured about this position unless we know the programmes, and it seems most dangerous to continue month after month, and even year after year, because I gather it may not be till next year we can be told, with the House of Commons not knowing these vital programmes on both sides, although they are known in all Cabinets of the various nations with whom we have had these conversations.
Lord Beatty said the other day that we ought to be grateful to Germany for not having asked for 50 per cent., and the First Lord indicated that she might have asked for 100 per cent. But would our answer have been the same? I hope not. But the reasons by which it would have been defended would have been the same. You would say: "What could we do? We could not control them. Nobody is going to war to prevent them."
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Even after hearing the able statement to which we have listened, I must say that I regret that we have condoned this flagrant breach of the Treaty. It would have been far better, even though we could not get complete assurances in regard to the ratio of Germany with ourselves, to have carried these matters forward to the League of Nations and endeavoured to use this further breach of the Treaty by Germany as a means of gathering forces for a policy of collective security among all the nations of the world.
I do not believe for a moment that this isolated action by Great Britain will be found to work for the cause of peace. The immediate reaction is that every day the German fleet approaches a tonnage which gives it absolute command of the Baltic, and very soon one of the deterrents of a European war will gradually fade away. So far as the position in the Mediterranean is concerned, it seems to me that we are in for very great difficulties. I agree with very much that my right hon. Friend said when he spoke of the position in the Mediterranean. Certainly a great addition of new shipbuilding must come when the French have to modernise their fleet to meet German construction, and the Italians follow suit, and we shall have pressure upon us to rebuild from that point of view, or else our position in the Mediterranean will be affected. But worst of all is the effect upon our position at the other end of the world, in China and in the Far East. What a windfall this has been to Japan—I am not saying the Naval Agreement, I do not put it on that, because it is foolish to blame the evils which come from the growth of German naval power upon the Naval Agreement. But observe what the consequences are. The First Lord said: "Face the facts." The British fleet, when this programme is completed, will be largely anchored to the North Sea. That means to say the whole position in the Far East has been very gravely altered, to the detriment of the United States and of Great Britain and to the detriment of China.
