North Atlantic (Supreme Commander)
Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom
- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on April 19, 1951, criticising the appointment of an American admiral as Supreme Commander of the Atlantic and urging shared command with the Admiralty.
- Main themes
- American supreme command of the Atlantic, coastal waters reserved to Britain, 100-fathom line, British sentiment about the Navy, Prime Minister's 1936 'Britannia rules the Waves' remark, Communist propaganda, Anglo-American partnership, command in proportion to forces, American mothball fleet, paragraph 28 of the White Paper, Eastern and Western Atlantic commands, English Channel
- Duration
- ~8 min
- Words
- 909
- Sentences
- 43
- Readability
- 58
- Grade
- 10.6
- Syntax
- 3.15
- Vocabulary
- 2.08
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other43 sentences in 13 paragraphs
I was coming to all that, but I was talking of the coastal waters. I ask what that means because the Eastern Atlantic like the Western is under Supreme American command. It is the coastal waters alone that are reserved for Great Britain and I am asking if they end at the 100-fathom line. In any case the area is severely restricted round our own coast, and the line that is drawn, be it the 100-fathom line or not, like the line that will be drawn across the Atlantic in no way corresponds to any boundary which applies to U-boat attack. The English Channel is reserved to us. It is surely not more vital to the integrity of the reception of convoys than the Bay of Biscay or the waters between Iceland and Ireland, or the North Sea, or the Arctic approaches to and from North Russia. It is all one story, and one story that can only be intelligently told from one place.
Let me turn now to another aspect—sentiment. Sentiment should not rule in war, but neither should it be forgotten or overlooked. I am sorry that the Prime Minister is not here and still more sorry for the cause of his absence, but I must state the case. He plays too important a part in it to be omitted from any coherent discussion. He certainly does not understand British sentiment about the Navy. Going back a long time, I admit, to 27th March, 1936—it was on the same subject and in the same discussion—the Prime Minister said, accord-
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ing to the "Daily Herald"—from which I take the report:
We shall have to give up certain of our toys—one is 'Britannia rules the Waves'.
This was certainly a misquotation. As has been often pointed out, it is, "Britannia rule the Waves"—an invocation not a declaration of fact. But if the idea "Rule Britannia" was a toy, it is certainly one for which many good men from time to time have been ready to die.
No one can doubt that it was a great shock and even an affront—quite unintended by the United States—to the whole nation when, following on an American general's supreme command in Europe, which we all welcome, we were told that an American admiral would have the supreme command of the Atlantic. It was also a shock to see that our Prime Minister had so little knowledge and even less feeling in the matter. However, the United States themselves should consider the sentiments of others in executing their great mission of leading the resistance of the free world against Communist aggression and infiltration. It should not be possible for their enemies to say that they are grasping the supreme command everywhere—on the land, in the air, on the sea. Moreover, it is not true; that is not their wish or their desire.
To create this superfluous supreme command of the Atlantic would be a psychological mistake, making things harder than they are already. Of course, it plays right into the hands of the Communist propagandists and their fellow travellers who declare, in their lying fashion, that we have all been bought up by Wall Street and the almighty dollar. Why make them this present in the discussion when the matter is not, as I have said, of real and fundamental importance? It would, I think, have been a natural thing in sentiment, and also on practical and technical arguments, to have shared the Atlantic Command with equal status between the Admiralty and the United States Navy Department.
I am quite sure it was not the wish of the American people or their government to treat us roughly in this matter, or to make an issue of it at all. When I made my protest I received most active and sincere and widespread American support. It is a trouble into which they have been brought, not at all by their own decision
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or desire but through other reasons which I will presently indicate.
I have heard the argument used—and it is even suggested in the last sentence of paragraph 28 in the White Paper—that we shall get much more out of the Americans by letting them have the command, even though it is mainly nominal. That, I think, is a train of thought unworthy of the dignity of both our countries. It implies that the Americans are willing to be fooled by being flattered and that the British have no pride if they can get more help. We should dismiss such arguments from our thoughts. But still we can see the traces of them on the last page of the White Paper. The issue, I think, should be settled between comrades and brothers in common danger and on a self-respecting moral basis, and with the sole desire and resolve to find the best way of winning victory and salvation from our dangers.
It is true, no doubt, that the United States has a larger fleet than we have—double, we are told—in ships in commission, and a great preponderance in the air. Also, they have wisely and carefully kept in "mothball" many scores of war vessels which we have improvidently scrapped, sold or given away. Thus, they have a larger material reserve. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the Supreme Command in war goes naturally with the size of the forces involved, and I accepted and affirmed that rule in the late struggle.