Debate On The Address.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

17 November 1938 · House of Commons debate on the Address (Liberal Amendment for a Ministry of Supply) · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on November 17, 1938, during the debate on the Address, urging Conservative members to back a Liberal amendment creating a Ministry of Supply to speed rearmament.
Main themes
Case for a Ministry of Supply, Liberal amendment to the Address, delay in armaments production, Conservative backbenchers' responsibility, British five-year rearmament plan versus German four-year plan, tangle of supply committees, Munitions Council of the First World War, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, abandonment of air parity for adequacy, confidence in the Government on defence, strength of Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, proposal for secret session
Duration
~21 min
69th percentile
Words
2,554
69th percentile
Sentences
112
68th percentile
Readability
55
76th percentile
Grade
11.2
34th percentile
Syntax
3.00
48th percentile
Vocabulary
2.18
44th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 44%41%
  • Geopolitical 27%25%
  • Economic 18%17%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

112 sentences in 25 paragraphs

I confess that I find some difficulty in making another speech in favour of a Ministry of Supply. I have used all the arguments of urgency and I have endeavoured to explain many of the processes of detail, three years ago, two years ago, and, finally, only six months ago. I have pleaded this cause in good time; I have pleaded when it was already late; and perhaps my right hon. Friend may remember I have even adjured him not to be deterred from doing right because it was impressed on him by the devil. But neither reason nor persuasion nor coaxing has had the slightest effect against the massive obstinancy of the powers that be, the powers that have led us to where we are now. This Debate, however, differs from others we have had on the same subject. It is possible to vote to-night upon a perfectly clear issue. We are indebted to the Liberal party for having brought the House of Commons squarely up to the fence. The House must jump that fence or swerve ignominiously away from it and, in the result, as I believe, lose a race upon which the stakes not only comprise the safety of our country, but also affect great causes of world significance.

I am going to address myself particularly to hon. Friends of mine above the Gangway who sit behind the Ministers. I cannot believe that many of them do not share the anxieties which are pressing upon the thinking majority of their fellow-countrymen. I appeal, therefore, to these gentleman, but I do not appeal in suppliant terms; indeed, if at all, it is in minatory and comminatory terms, I say they have a grave responsibility for our present plight. The history of England is still to be written and un-folded. History will disentangle individual responsibility and will lay the

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blame on the shoulders where blame should be, but hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway—pledged, loyal, faithful supporters on all occasions of His Majesty's Government—must not imagine that they can throw their burden wholly on the Ministers of the Crown. Much power has rested with them. One healthy growl from those benches three years ago—and how different to-day would be the whole lay-out of our armaments production! Alas, that service was not forthcoming. We have drifted on in general good-natured acquiescence for three whole years—not for three whole years of ignorance or unawareness, but for three whole years with the facts glaring us full in the face.

We have drifted on and we have drifted down, and the question to-night is sharply, brutally even, whether we shall go on drifting or make a renewed effort to rise abreast of the level of events. I put it as bluntly as I possibly can. If only 50 Members of the Conservative party went into the Lobby to-night to vote for this Amendment, it would not affect the life of the Government, but it would make them act. It would make a forward movement of real power of real energy. We should get our Ministry of Supply no doubt, but much more than that we should get a feeling of renewed strength and a prestige outside this country which would be of real service and value. I think it right to put these points at the outset of my observations. They are not meant in any spirit but that of one who shares with hon. Gentlemen the perils of the country in which we are all involved. This is no party question. It has nothing to do with party. It is entirely an issue affecting the broad safety of the nation.

In examining the Amendment which the Liberal party have placed upon the Paper and which has been laid before us in lucid speeches, there are three main issues which require examination. First, is the present system a sound workable system? Second, has it succeeded and is it succeeding? Third, whatever may be the difficulties in private Members making constructive proposals, we must consider what improvements are possible. Let me take the first of these issues—is the present system succeeding? Undoubtedly much of the preliminary work has been done. Very large sums are being earned and will be earned by the contractors—

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I regard the large sums which are earned by the contractors as a sign of progress. I am not dealing with the question of profit. Very large sums are being earned by the contractors, which will now emerge in the shape of weapons rather than of bricks and mortar, which necessarily occupy a part of the first year, at any rate—not the second, but the first year of expanded munitions production. Large deliveries of all kinds of important war material are now approaching and have now begun. I do not challenge that. I rejoice in it. I certainly should not attempt to submit this case to the House by arguing on false premises.

My submission is that, broadly speaking, the original programmes, when they were conceived, were less than one-third of what was then needed, that the original programmes have been expanded by a series of after-thoughts which would not have occurred if a firm view had been taken at the outset of the need and scale of our rearmament, and that the deliveries of these programmes, both original and supplementary, are in many cases at least 12 months lagging behind what might reasonably have been expected. Further, I submit that these evil tendencies, this lamentable lag, will continue, and that the friction, the hitches and the local and sporadic confusion will be aggravated as the scale of the business grows, unless new efforts are made to lift the whole process to a higher and more efficient basis of organisation and production. That is broadly what I venture to submit to the House. The Prime Minister told us the other day, and my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence dwelt on the point in his very patient and persuasive speech this evening, that we were engaged on a five-year plan of rearmament which had only now reached its third year. There is something in that, but it is by no means a complete and satisfactory answer. What relation has this British five-year plan to the facts of to-day? That is the question. Do the Government suppose that other nations are not expanding too? They say we are in the third year of our five-year plan, but the Germans are in the third year of their four-year plan.

What is the relevance of these plans to our actual needs? They are no guarantee of safety or adequacy. It is no use comparing what we have actually got at any

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given moment with what a plan says we ought to have. It is only useful to compare what we have got with what other people have got and of what we may need. So the only test which can be trusted is our ability from month to month to meet the dangers to which we are exposed. Everything is lagging many months behind. Consequently the entire situation for which the original plan was prepared, even assuming that it was properly measured against it, is now altogether changed. More than ever there is a need to establish without delay one supreme controlling authority over the whole field of Supply and over the whole process of interweaving munitions supply with the vital trade of the nation.

I explained elaborately to the House in May the existing machinery as it was unfolded to us by the statement of the Minister, and particularly by that of Lord Zetland in another place. It is a plan, a method, a machinery of which we can only say that it is fearfully and wonderfully made. There is the Admiralty with all its establishments and activities; Admiral Brown's Department of the War Office which comprises the old department of the Master General of Ordnance; the enormous system of committees working under the Committee of Imperial Defence; the Principal Supply Officers' Committee, which supervises Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board; the Board of Trade Supply Organisation, which works parallel with Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board; beneath Sir Arthur Robinson's Supply Board, as we were told by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence nearly two years ago, there are seven main committees, and no one knows how many subordinate and subsidiary committees. There is a tangle, a jungle of deliberative and advisory committees, amid which gape many rifts and amid which many conflicting departmental rivalries, stretching far below the Ministerial sphere, grow luxuriantly.

Perhaps I may explain, in answer to a retort to me some time ago, the difference between these advisory deliberative committees and the council committees under the Ministry of Munitions which were found effective during the War—at the end of the War. The Munitions Council presided over 70 branches of munitions supplies, divided into 10 or 12

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groups, each of which was represented by a councillor. Consequently, it was possible to deal with any problem of production, any demand, expeditiously merely by creating four or five of these chiefs of departments into a council committee. They were not advisory or deliberative personages; they were the men who actually had under them the organisation and the control of those particular branches of supply, and consequently, joining together, they could in a week or even shorter produce a workable scheme for submission to the Council for the approval of the political authorities which had been at every stage prepared by the men who knew they would be answerable in their particular departments for carrying it into concrete and effective practice. It is simply darkening counsel to mix up deliberative and advisory committees, "passing the buck" from one to the other, going round again, and so forth, with the grouping of executive functions in their proper sphere, with full plenary powers to carry out plans for making what is required.

I do not think there was ever any comprehensive plan on a scale appropriate to the foreign programme. We have had many half-measures and many afterthoughts as different courses have emerged from successive shocks to our efforts. I have always had sympathy for my right hon. Friend, the Minister for the Coordination of Defence. On public grounds, at considerable personal sacrifice, he accepted nearly three years ago an office for which his high gifts and lifelong specialist training had in no way fitted him, but as the House seemed to realise at the time, although it could not shake off its inertia, the office itself was framed in a manner so curious that he really never had a chance of discharging it successfully. It was a compromise which bore in every paragraph the imprint of inter-departmental interests and rivalries.

I know how hard my right hon. Friend has tried within the limits to which he unwisely submitted himself, and I have no doubt that his tales of praiseworthy activities is a very long one and a very creditable one. He has told us to-night of some of the things he has been doing and I have no doubt there is very much more to tell, and that he has played a

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very solid part in pushing this great process of production forward, but I continue to ask, Why was it that an office so irrationally conceived was devised by the Government, and why was it tolerated by the House? It could not have resulted in a smooth or abundant or rapid supply, it could not have resulted in clear definitions of our strategic needs. The mixture of these two opposite spheres and functions was sufficient to vitiate this administrative appointment from the very outset.

Such a system as I have described, with its strangely-appointed, strangely-shaped departmental functions, was on the face of it bound to give results which are less than satisfactory. Prima facie you would have expected a breakdown. What has been the result? I say that there has been a very great falling-short of what we might have had even in the life of this Parliament, and in spite of all that has been achieved and all that is coming forward, I say that you cannot to-day claim that this system has succeeded. I will offer some proof of that statement. Some proof can be found in the decision referred to by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Welling-borough (Wing-Commander James) to substitute adequacy for parity in the air. Parity was the Government's own pledge. First-line strength was the Government's own measure. That was not invented by their critics; that was put forward by the Air Ministry, and adhered to rigorously and vehemently as long as it afforded a satisfactory line of defence. But both are now abandoned. Why are they abandoned? I say because of the lag and failure in supplies. That is the reason why this definition and this standard have both been abandoned.

Now we have "adequacy." What is adequacy? Adequacy is no standard at all. It is simply what His Majesty's Ministers at any given moment, surveying what they have got, choose to say is adequate. I shall be asked, Have you no confidence in His Majesty's Government? Sir, I say "Yes" and "No." I have great confidence that these hon. and right hon. Friends of mine will administer faithfully and well the Constitution of this country, that they will guard its finances in a thrifty manner, that they will hunt out corruption wherever it may be found, that they will preserve the

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peace and order of our streets and the impartiality of our courts—and keep a general hold upon Conservative principles. In all these matters I have a sincere and abiding confidence in them. But if you ask me whether I have confidence in them execution of Defence programmes, or even in their statements as to the degree to which those Defence programmes have at any moment advanced—there I must beg the House not to press me too far.

I am making some criticisms of a disparaging character upon some aspects of our defences, but I take this opportunity to say that in my opinion not only is the British Navy stronger relatively to the dangers it may have to meet than ever before, but that the Royal Air Force constitutes one of the finest and most magnificent bodies of men and scientific attainment that exist in the whole field of modern military progress. No criticism must give the idea that we have not got great and powerful air forces in this country, and nothing that I can say shall detract from that, but if an opportunity were given in secret Session I should, I think, be able to bring forward a very large number of matters of detail, and important detail, which would show that there are defects in the organisation quite apart from the defects in materiel. But I do not intend to go into these matters about the Air Force in public, for reasons of which we have been reminded by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence and which readily occur to everyone here. I should very much like to see some of these matters discussed in a secret Session, but not in public, because—