- Context
- Churchill, a backbench Member of Parliament, addressed the House of Commons in London on November 24, 1938, criticising the Government's indecision over Palestine and proposing a 10-year plan fixing Jewish immigration.
- Main themes
- British Government indecision on Palestine, failure of the Peel Royal Commission, rejection of partition, second Royal Commission (Woodhead), "perseverance, not partition", proposed 10-year immigration plan, Jewish immigration quota of 30,000 to 35,000 a year, growth of the Arab population, obligations to Arabs and Jews under the Mandate, restoration of law and order, proposed London conference, Jewish self-defence if Arabs refuse
- Duration
- ~37 min
- Words
- 4,496
- Sentences
- 209
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 10.8
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 2.13
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other209 sentences in 45 paragraphs
I make my compliments to the new Secretary of State for the Colonies and for the Dominions upon the speech which he has made to us to-day, a speech admirable in form and also animated throughout by a sincere spirit of good will, which we are quite sure will guide him in his approach to this Palestinian problem. It was a speech which, of course, said most of the wise and agreeable things that can be thought
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of on both sides of this problem, and there was no part of the House, no division of opinion upon this matter, which did not from time to time feel that they were having their sentiments expressed in the most excellent and happy terms. But there lay over the speech an air of detachment from the responsibilities of the past which, perhaps, my right hon. Friend was entitled to assume in his individual capacity, but which cannot be shared by those who have long followed the course of affairs in Palestine since the Great War. The story goes back some distance. We are not now beginning this evening, in this quiet House, to discuss Palestine. We have to embark upon that discussion in the light of what has occurred and in the light of the situation which has been disclosed.
The situation in Palestine is lamentable. There is tragedy in Palestine. Blood is shed, murders are committed, executions are carried out, terror and counter-terror have supervened in the relationship between the Jews and the Arabs, both of whom have a right to dwell in the land which the Lord hath given them. The whole economic revival of Palestine, which was in active progress three years ago, has been cast down. From whatever angle you observe this scene, I say that it is painful. It is even horrible, and mark you, whether we feel it or not, it is humiliating to us in this country. But where does the blame lie? I cannot doubt that a great portion of the blame—ill will there is in abundance, wrong deeds there are done—lies here in London and on the Treasury Bench. When I use the word "blame" I do not mean to press it too sharply upon my right hon. Friend. I do not wish to press it too much upon Ministers, and yet one must press it a certain amount. They will no doubt protest that their hearts are clean, they never willed the great calamity that has overtaken Palestine, they never meant it, no unworthy motive has inspired them for a moment. All that is true. The path of the British Government is paved with good intentions. At every stage they have sought to practice good will and to do right. I admit it, and yet in practice they bear a responsibility which, if it be not blameworthy in a grievous sense, has nevertheless produced the same consequences as blameworthiness would
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have produced for bringing about a senseless, needless, and at the present moment, profoundly injurious exhibition of British incapacity.
What is the fault to which the Ministers of the Crown in my view lay themselves open? Kindly, humane, well-meaning men, what is the fault of which they have brought themselves to be accused, not only by their critics in the House of Commons, but in the eyes of the world—in the eyes of the whole world, friendly and hostile? What is this fault? It is the fault, very grievous in persons of high station—it is a fault which amounts to a crime—of not being able to make up their minds. It is a very grievous fault. Confronted with this problem of Palestine, a problem ever intensifying over the last three years, they have been utterly unable to come to a decision. The court is august, the judges are incorruptible, their private virtues are beyond dispute, but the case is urgent, and all they have been able to do in three whole years of classic incapacity is to palter and maunder and jibber on the Bench. I have spoken before of the inherent vice to which this National Government, with its overpowering majority, is addicted. It is the vice of infirmity of purpose, and following from that, an impotence of positive decision. They are suffering from "a decrepitude of the will power" which can easily be traced in other greater and graver fields at this moment which are not relevant to the subject which we are debating this evening.
I accuse His Majesty's Government of having been, for more than three years, incapable of forming a coherent opinion upon the affairs of Palestine. All this time matters in Palestine have been going from bad to worse, and throughout all this period, when the situation was passing continuously out of control, the Government seemed to be constantly seeking the line of least resistance. What is astonishing is that, considering how long they have been looking for the line of least resistance, their patient quest has not been attended with a greater measure of success. They have occasioned the maximum of delay of effort, and the maximum of distress with the minimum of advantage to the people who are the victims of their indecision. A year passes, six months pass—we have a Debate on Palestine. Do not let it be
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forgotten that people are dying there, that they are being executed and meeting grisly deaths from day to day and week to week, while here all that can be done is to have from time to time Debates and pay each other compliments, and, above all, run no risks of taking any decision.
I now go back into the recent past. When the troubles arose in Palestine three years ago—not through any fault of ours—what was the remedy of the National Government? The remedy was to appoint a Royal Commission. What a happy, hopeful emergency exit that provided from the immediate difficulty. A Royal Commission, a body of important gentlemen were assembled, headed by the late Lord Peel, and sent to Palestine to find out exactly what the Government ought to do after hearing all persons and parties concerned. There was no need to send such a Commission to Palestine. All the facts were evident and even obvious. Having sat at the Colonial Office on these sort of matters about Palestine, I can assure the House that there was nothing that the Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel, could possibly have discovered in Palestine that was not already known to the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office—nothing. But the formation of a Royal Commission, with imposing names, the gratifying leading articles in the newsappers, all this was a device to save the Cabinet from making up its mind. Everyone can find comfort and unity in a Royal Commission. I do not say that there are not occasions when Royal Commissions may serve a useful purpose. In the executive government of a country like Palestine, after all these years of the carrying out of the Mandate, the scheme of the Royal Commission was nothing but a council of feebleness and a bankruptcy of ideas.
The Royal Commission was appointed and, of course, it repaired to the Holy Land. It went, and, having trapesed around, it came back to consider its report. Meanwhile, as things were growing worse, there was some anxiety, but the splendid argument of the Government was: "Hush! Do not say a word. The Royal Commission are considering their report. Do not let us say anything to disturb them. Give them fair play. Let them have a chance of presenting their case." Another six months, or, at any rate, four months went towards the evil account of wasted time, upon that
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plea, and that alone. At last, their report was presented. We were told, as we are told to-day, that it was one of the finest public documents of our time. The great bulk of the newspapers acclaimed it. The Government sucked it in at once, and rushed to applaud it.
The report was almost unanimously approved. What did it recommend? It recommended that Palestine should be partitioned into two Sovereign States. Let us in cold blood survey what the report recommended, after it had been hailed in this way. It recommended that this small country should be divided into two separate Sovereign States, each of which was to be a member of the then highly-extolled League of Nations. The Government's language about the League of Nations then was very different from what it is now. Each of these Sovereign States was to be entitled to raise an army, and in between these two embattled States of Jew arid Arab, there was to be sandwiched a thin line of British troops, British interests, and would-be British control.
When one looks back, with our short memories, upon those days, a long time ago, some 16 or 17 months, one is really astounded at the universal acceptance of this grotesque proposal. It was only with the very greatest difficulty that the Opposition parties and some of the independent Members of this House persuaded the Government not to commit the House to the adoption of this principle of partition. I remember well that night. The Patronage Secretary had all his men ready. They were ready to vote for partition if the Government asked them, but by coaxing, by cajoling, and by one kind of appeal and another we persuaded the Government not to force the House of Commons to endorse what they now admit was an impracticable policy. In preventing the House from committing itself to this most absurd and most inflammatory scheme the minority of the House of Commons rendered good service. This scheme amounted, in fact, to an almost perfect recipe for breeding an organised civil war which we, after it started, at great cost in troops, money and reputation, were to endeavour to pacify or assuage. It is lucky indeed that the chorus of machine-made approval, unthinking approval—which is so often given to matters that are thrown up today—was corrected by the exertions of the House of Commons, and I pay my
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respects to the Prime Minister for not having on that occasion used the machine, which is at his disposal, to ride rough-shod over the sincere and well-informed opinion of a great many individuals in this House.
What happened after the House had persuaded the Government not to commit them to that scheme? The Government said: "Partition is still the policy and the principle but, of course, nothing is going to happen for quite a long time. Meanwhile, there will be further consultations and inquiries." The League of Nations again afforded a wide field for discussion, for consultations and inquiries. In this ridiculous posture, the Mandatory Power, Great Britain, managed with all its widespread but, alas, fading influence, to carry things off at Geneva in the autumn of last year. Time passed and other preoccupations supervened. Meanwhile, the condition of Palestine progressively degenerated. No wonder it degenerated. No policy could be proclaimed by the Mandatory Power. Can we wonder that the position degenerated? The British Government lived from hand to mouth, in Jerusalem, while the responsible Ministers at home held firm to the opinion that nothing was settled and that all speculations and comments were premature.
Presently, it was found necessary to send out another Royal Commission, in order to report upon the first Royal Commission. The second Royal Commission is what brings us to this day's Debate. That Commission has reported that the plan of the first Royal Commission was rubbish, and that partition was impracticable. We have had two Royal Commissions, we have spent all this time upon them, and now where are we? We have to turn to something else. Therefore, my right hon. Friend comes forward and says: "I have a new idea. Let us have a conference. Royal Commissions are worn out. They have exhausted their virtue. It is some time since we had a conference." After three years of chatter, vain, futile chatter on this subject, he announces that we are to have some discussion. It would be laughable but for the grim background upon which failure to meet this situation manifests itself.
I am sometimes twitted with the fallibility of my judgment. God knows, error is easy, but I have always held to the doctrine, slogan if you like—in respect of Palestine—I have repeated it to my
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right hon. Friend and he has mentioned it to the House—"Perseverance, not partition." I have not seen any reason to lead us to abandon the task we undertook 20 years ago—no reason of safety or of capacity, so long as we have the strength, the will and the purpose to carry it out. Now, the Government assure us that partition is dead. The report has riddled it and torn it to pieces. I agree with that part of my right hon. Friend's speech where he explained that they have abandoned partition, but I have a certain element of misgiving when I find myself in agreement with the Government upon this point, and I ask myself very seriously whether there is not something wrong somewhere that has not occurred to me.
What is this Palestinian story? It was until recent years one of the best in the history of British administration in alien regions. When I was in Palestine for a short time, three or four years ago, a handful of troops and police presided over a rapidly-developing economic, financial and social well-being throughout the Holy Land. In contrast with the great masses of armed men who were held in French Mandated Syria, the position in Palestine was most remarkable. The cost to the Government of the military forces was no serious burden upon the economic development. The Zionist policy, to which we had pledged ourselves in the stresses of the Great War, was being continued with remarkable success. The Jews were coming in in a steady stream, bringing with them, as every speaker has testified to-day, wealth, development and civilisation. The Arabs—and here again it is common ground—were prospering and greatly increasing in numbers.
People who reproach us for having mishandled affairs in Palestine until the troubles broke out, should remember that the population had doubled. I know of no case where the population had so increased in numbers and in prosperity. That is a test by which the good faith and good conduct of any Government can be judged; there is no better test. You could not have had a more satisfactory development. It showed that honest, clean, humane, British administration had not yet lost its touch, so long as times were quiet. Then the Hitler persecution of the Jews began. The cruel, and forced exodus of the Jews from Nazidom began, and, from the best of motives, under these
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cruel stresses, for which we were not in any way to blame, the immigration quota was increased, in my opinion, too suddenly and too rapidly.
When I coined the phrase of economic absorptive capacity I cannot think, so far as my memory serves me, that I meant to exclude other considerations. Obviously, economic absorptive capacity was to be interpreted in regard to the general political situation of the country. It was to be interpreted by the British Government, pledged to the Zionist experiment, and naturally that Government and any office like the Colonial Office must watch its steps and pick its steps from day to day. Here is a country, Palestine, where it is the essence of the duty of the Mandatory Power to persuade one side to concede, and the other to forbear. Here is a country in which British administration has been a success in quiet times; but are we to conclude that British administration in Oriental lands is no longer capable of facing a storm? Is our gift in the Orient capable of being exercised only when the waters are smooth?
We ought to rouse ourselves, because much more than the fate of Palestine is at stake. Our capacity for Imperial government all over the world is impugned. The problem which we have to solve is far greater than any confined to the shores of the Levant, and we have to solve that problem or suffer most grievously. The case for perseverance holds the field. We must not expect that the task we undertook at the close of the Great War and in the hour of victory is one that can be achieved within the compass of our short lives. In Palestine, as my right hon. Friend reminded us, you touch world causes and come in contact with the history of 2,000 or 3,000 years. I will not ask too much of His Majesty's Government, but for the time being, unless we are overthrown in some world convulsion, we have the power in Palestine, the physical power and the legal right.
First of all the restoration of law and order. We are all agreed upon that; and that is being done. I express my sympathy with the Colonial Secretary in having to bear the stress which this task imposes upon the Minister responsible, but he will have the support of all parties in the House in taking the necessary measures to put down murder and rapine and restore respect for Government and
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the law. When that has been done, and it is being accomplished, it seems to me that we should come to a decision. Let us make a 10 year plan with the assent, if possible, of all parties and let us enforce that plan with resolute conviction and use all our strength to make it successful. I hold, having been somewhat concerned in these matters, that we have obligations to the Palestinian Arabs as well as to the Jews and world Jewry. I agree with the contention made on behalf of this country and the Government of this country, that we have always observed those obligations. The Arabs may release us from our obligations to them. They may release us from them if after a fair offer is made to them they continue to levy war upon the Crown. At present, as I see it, it is our duty to make a fair offer to the Palestinian Arabs. If they refuse that offer we must still endeavour to do justice; but justice unhampered by any special understanding with them.
Since I have reproached the Government with being unable to make up their mind I will run the risk, and it is a considerable risk for a private Member, of offering a positive plan which I trust may be unfolded to its end without judgment favourable or hostile being formed upon it, in any quarter of the House. It is a plan based on the principle of perseverance, and it is a 10 year plan. Roughly, it is to fix the immigration of the Jews into Palestine for 10 years at a certain figure which at the end of the 10 year period will not have decisively altered the balance of the population as between Arab and Jew. Let us look at the means of determining that figure. In the first place we must consider this fact, stressed to-day in a way which I have not heard it stressed before in Parliament—the great increase in the Arab population during the time of the Zionist policy. Actually the increase of the Arab population, according to the census figures, has been almost as great as that of the Jewish population; according to the figures of the Woodhead Report it has been considerably greater.
I entirely agree with the right hon. Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair) that this great increase in the Arab population disposes at once of the suggestion that they are being driven out by Jewish immigrants. They are, on the contrary,
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being brought into Palestine, into the sunlight of life by the very process we are pursuing and which we are determined to pursue. It would seem that in the last 15 years an increase of 300,000 according to the census figures has taken place in the Arab population and 315,000 in the Jewish population. Therefore, it would seem to me, having regard to our wartime pledges, that it would obviously be right for us to decide now that Jewish immigration into Palestine shall not be less in any given period than the growth of the Arab population arising largely from the animating and fertilising influence of the Jews. That is one factor which we can adopt in fixing the quota. The average increase in the Arab population is 20,000 to 25,000 a year and the Colonial Secretary has indicated that they look forward to an increase up to 1,500,000 in the next 20 years. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that Jewish immigration is no inroad on the Arab population as long as it keeps pace with the growth of the Arab population. Therefore, the first element in the quota should be the increase in the Arab population, and that gives the Jews, the Zionists, an interest in stimulating an increase in the Arab population, helping them in their employment and bringing the two into a common interest in the matter.
The next question is by how much should this figure of annual growth of the population be exceeded in consequence of our pledge to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. I should feel a difficulty myself in giving an exact figure, but it seems to me that we owe it to the Arabs to offer them now that immigration shall not be so great in the 10-year period as to derange seriously the existing balance between the Jew or Arab populations. That would be a great assurance to the Arabs. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of their having fear. I would give them an assurance that in 10 years—it is a long period in the present condition of the world and one which eyes pierce with great difficulty—their position will be substantially what it is to-day; that they will be in a large majority in the country. I quite agree that you cannot expect Palestine to absorb the whole of the exodus of the Jews from other countries, but the figure of immigration is one which should be settled. There is the crux of the matter; that is the question around which fighting is going on, and I think
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it should be settled on a 10-year basis. First fix the quota of your immigration and then give this overriding assurance to the Arabs that in the 10-year period they will not be submerged. That is a policy which would, I imagine, yield an immigration figure of between 30,000 and 35,000 a year, if the forecasts of populations are correct.
It seems to me that we have to take a decision on this point. It will be said "Suppose the Arabs do not agree." In that case, as I have indicated already, I think we should feel that we have made them a reasonable offer, and if they do not accept it within a certain time I think we should be entitled to consider our special obligations to them discharged. We should then be compelled to look around for methods of fulfilling our Mandate which would not compel us to keep a very large proportion of the British Army always on guard in Palestine, at enormous expenditure to this House and with very serious dislocations of our military system. If we have not the good will and agreement of the Arabs on this 10 year plan, we must look to other means in that country to discharge our policy, and this can only be found, if the Arabs will not hearken to our counsels and will not accept any offer, in the strong armament of the Jewish population and the main reliance of the British administration in Palestine upon Jewish military strength. Of course, in the event of the Arabs refusing to come to any agreement, there would be in that case no arbitrary limit upon immigration. We should offer them a limit for their consent, but if their consent is not forthcoming and we have to rely on these other elements to maintain our security, then we must have no upward bar except what is practically possible in that respect.
It used to be represented that the Jews in Palestine would be speedily destroyed if they were left alone to face the Arabs. I am bound to say that that was the impression on my mind some years ago; but the situation has changed. Although the Jewish colonies have not been protected by the Imperial Government they have held their own without difficulty and not one of them has been seriously attacked. Very high authorities, some of whom have been in contact with the right hon. Gentleman, fresh from Palestine, have assured me that within a short
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period the Jewish population could not only hold their own in Palestine but could if they chose do very much more. Thus it seems to me that the elements of a settlement are present, provided that the British Government produce a clear plan and stand by it. I have not seen much need of the conference in London following on the Commissions, but if the right hon. Gentleman is going to use the conference to put a British policy before them and require a swift and faithful answer from both sides as to whether they will accept the policy, then, indeed, it may serve a good purpose.
We have to do what we think is right, the responsibility is upon us. We have taken before all the world the responsibility for guiding this historic country of Palestine and all the world is watching how we discharge our duty. I appeal to the Government to make up their mind and proclaim a plan, and thereafter to enforce it with persistency so that we do not have any more debate or argument about what we ought to do, but only about how to do it. I think the Arabs should be told quite plainly that unless they accept within a reasonable period of time a fair offer and cease to wage war upon the Crown of Britain we shall have to carry out our plan, not without regard to their rights but without any sense of special obligation.
I have dared to put this positive proposal before the House in no rigid form. I have no doubt it will find its opponents, but at least it is a plan, a policy, and few things are more important at the present time than for the British Empire to have a plan for the settlement of Palestine, a plan on which all parties can agree and a plan in which the House of Commons—not only this House but future Parliaments—is determined to persevere.
