Lord Stanley'S Statement.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

16 March 1936 · House of Commons debate on the Navy Estimates · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, speaking as a backbench Member in the House of Commons in London on March 16, 1936, responded to Lord Stanley's naval statement, urging a secret inquiry into new battleships and warning of Britain's relative naval decline.
Main themes
Case for an inquiry into new battleships, vulnerability of battleships to air bombs and torpedoes, large versus small battleships, 1919 parliamentary inquiry on battleships, 8-inch gun treaty cruisers, Washington and London naval treaties, relative decline of British broadside weight, need for more destroyer flotillas, Anglo-German Naval Treaty and German submarines, retention of obsolete ships in reserve, aircraft carriers for trade protection
Duration
~24 min
74th percentile
Words
2,902
74th percentile
Sentences
106
66th percentile
Readability
56
78th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
3.27
80th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
34th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%64%
  • Institutional 26%25%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

106 sentences in 28 paragraphs

I have not in my mind at the moment exactly the fate of every one of the ships engaged at the battle of Jutland, but my recollection is that the "Marlborough," which was the only ship that was struck by a. torpedo, remained in action and kept on steaming. I do not however see the relevance of that to the point I was making. Altogether, I say that in the sphere of gunfire nothing seems to have happened since the War which invalidates the battleship, but the size of the torpedoes—and here perhaps I am getting into somewhat more happy relations with my hon. and gallant Friend, with whom I worked for so many years and with whom I should never like to lose touch—the size of torpedoes and their bursting charge have been greatly increased, and, above all, there is a new danger—and here I believe I am in close touch with my hon. and gallant Friend—heavy bombs from the air. It is admittedly difficult to decide the resisting powers of existing battleships to this new form of attack, though I am of opinion that it should be possible to give them a very great measure of defence, without seriously affecting their efficiency, against bombs from the air.

What we now have to consider when we are asked in principle to agree to the construction of two new battleships, is whether they can be built in such a way as to withstand the new perils of air bombing and, secondly, whether their harbours and resting places can be furnished with defences of one kind or another which will deter and defeat any attack. These questions are far too complicated to be argued out here. A great deal can be said on both sides. There is a keen dispute, a fierce dispute, between sailors and airmen on the subject, in which civilians have intervened on both

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sides with asperity and technicalities. I have seen it stated that the anti-aircraft guns of a battleship would fire away all their ammunition in one and a-half hours. Has anyone calculated how many aeroplanes would have to fly over that ship at the rate of 200 miles an hour in such a way as to offer a continuous stream of targets for an hour and a-half? Such a calculation would have to be worked -out before we can accept the argument as conclusive. The whole question of the usefulness of battleships turns on whether ships can be built whose structure will withstand modern cannon, air bombs and modern torpedoes, and whose paravanes and sweeping vessels can keep them clear of mines.

There is also a controversy about large and small battleships, which should certainly be thrashed out, and about which I will only say that I believe it is generally admitted that the problem of making a comparatively unsinkable ship is much more likely to be solved in a large vessel than in a small vessel. I have stated these matters to the House not in any way to lead them to a conclusion. I am not at all opposed to the idea of a battleship being constructed as the Noble Lord seems to think, nor am I committed to such a principle at the present time, but it seems to be quite clear that there ought to be a thorough inquiry into these matters before we commit ourselves to the construction of new battleships or new large battleships. After the War, in 1919, we had a Parliamentary inquiry into this very question. I was a member of it, with Mr. Bonar Law and other Ministers. We sat for some months, and the conclusion which I reached—if my memory serves me aright there were several reports—was that the Admiralty had made out their case at that date. We therefore continued to build battleships, the idea at that time being to build four battleships of 45,000 tons. Owing to our agreement at Washington with the United States, that was converted into the two battleships of 35,000 tons now represented by the "Nelson" and the "Rodney," which, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite truly said, are incomparably the strongest war vessels in the world. The view which was taken by that committee has also apparently been confirmed by the naval science of every other important naval Power, and

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there is a great deal, though not everything, to be said for the consensus of opinion.

But my point is that this is not a matter which the Admiralty ought to settle for itself, especially when there are very great differences of naval opinion both upon the size of battleships—the main principle—and still more when there is this clear difference between officers of the sea arm and officers of the new arm of the air. I was surprised to hear that the First Lord, speaking in another place, seemed to take it for granted that the whole of this principle was settled. I am sure there should be a re-examination of the whole problem. That is something on which Parliament ought to insist, not at all for the purpose of obstructing anything that it is necessary should be done, but with a view to satisfying itself and the public.

I see no reason why this inquiry should not contain one or two independent persons, although naturally it must be a matter of secrecy. Moreover, although I will not say there is plenty of time, there is time, because, as I pointed out, the Government do not propose that these ships shall actually be built—although no doubt some preliminary work will be done—until 1937. Therefore, my first suggestion to the Government and to the Noble Lord is that there should be a fresh secret inquiry into the technical and tactical issues involved in sanctioning new battleships.

I come now to cruisers. My right hon. Friend opposite has spoken a great deal about the little value we seem to be getting for our money. We certainly have spent a great deal of money on cruisers since the War, but I think the explanation of that resides very largely in the trammels of treaties in which we have, for good or ill, been bound. The Washington Treaty prescribed 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns as the absolute top limit for cruisers. So of course everybody, the Japanese in the van, at once took up that limit and endeavoured to build the most powerful vessel they could within those limits. The result has been—I hope I do not speak with disrespect—a monstrosity of naval architecture. The 8-inch gun cruisers violate almost every principle of

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naval construction. They are very expensive, for they cost almost as much as the "Lion" or the "Tiger"; they are very weak ships, with little or no armour; they carry many hundreds of men for whom no proper protection is provided; they each present an enormous silhouette; their great speed can be shorn away by a single shot in the forehand on or below the water-line—in fact they violate every principle.

There is a very sound rule, although I admit it is only a rough-and-ready one, which I learned years ago from those masters of naval design. Lord Fisher and Sir Philip Watts, that a warship ought to be able to withstand the battery of as big a gun as she carries herself. I think that on reflection it will be found that that is a very rough-and-ready guide to the symmetry and proportion of naval design. These 8-inch gun cruisers could not stand up to each other's fire, once it became effective, for even a few minutes. In fact, they are really not built for war purposes, but are built to conform to the artificial conditions of a treaty. I am sure that if we had had freedom of design such as we used to enjoy, the Admiralty would have been able to create far more serviceable vessels, and the strictures of my right hon. Friend would not need to be so severe. That which I have been saying about these 8-inch gun cruisers does not apply so much to the later class of United States 8-inch gun cruisers, which were built after the bulk of ours were completed—so that the United States were able to profit from the mistakes which we had made—and are very much stronger internally. Altogether this chapter is a very melancholy one in the history of the British Navy. There is, however, one thing for which the 8-inch gun cruiser is admirably adapted, and it is the destruction of commerce. She is the most powerful destroyer of commerce that can be imagined, but that is not much consolation to the Power which, above all others, has commerce to be destroyed.

Even worse is the chapter since the London Treaty. I hope to rally the right hon. Gentleman opposite to some repentance, however tardy. Let me at least not be daunted by his signs of refusal. In the last six British programmes that have been presented to Parliament, we have not added to the

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Fleet a gun over G-inches in calibre, that is to say, a gun which fires a 100 lb. shot, a very small gun as naval ordnance goes. In the last six programmes we have not added to the Fleet a gun larger than that. Relatively to other Powers, we have thus been steadily falling back in our naval. position, and as these Six latest programmes govern the future—govern certainly the next three or four years—we are in an unfortunate position whatever we now do. For instance, in these last six programmes we have added in the aggregate 17,600 lbs. to the weight of our broadside in new ships. France has added nearly 49,000 lbs.; Italy nearly 40,000 lbs.; and Germany nearly 30,000 lbs. to their broadsides in the period of the last six British programmes. It is worth noting, however, although it is not strictly relevant to my point, that the Japanese broadside during these six British programmes has increased only by 9,000 lbs. I am not contending that the broadside is the only test of naval power, but it is a very good test, a very searching and important test of the relative strengths of fleets.

Those figures which I have had collected for me with all the care I can give to such matters, give an idea as to how much weaker our fleet will be in three or four years' time relatively to the Fleets of European nations than it is now. We would not have to go on very long like that to be decidedly outclassed. I am not suggesting for a moment that there is need for panic in respect of the Navy. Never have I done that—not at the election—but it is quite clear that the present strength—I am not speaking of cruisers only, but of the whole Fleet—will undergo a marked diminution relatively to other Powers in the next three or four years whatever we do, and those three or four years will certainly be among the most critical in the history of Europe.

It is for this reason that I specially urged the other day that we should have the largest possible increase in our destroyer flotillas, because these certainly can be obtained in a comparatively short period of time, whereas decay in our cruiser strength can only be repaired gradually. I was not entirely satisfied with the answer of my Noble Friend on that subject, but perhaps he is not entirely prepared to give at this time the answer which he will give later on in the

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session, and I am prepared not to press the matter any further at the moment. But I suggest that under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Germany may be in possession of a very large submarine force in the near future and certainly by the end of 1937, for it is absolutely within their capacity to execute that. I suggest that we are entitled for the most precise assurance that the destroyer and flotilla force at our disposal will be sufficient to cope with such an attack whether there is any reason to expect it in policy or not. I hope that this is not the last word we shall hear on this subject.

There is another point which, I think, is to be regretted so far as this Anglo-German Treaty is concerned. There is no doubt that if we were engaged in war with any Power which had a considerable number of powerful cruisers in the oceans no matter how many cruisers we had—even if we had 100—we should have to rely, at any rate in part, upon convoys to bring our food cargoes in from South America and from Australasia. The kind of ships which are invaluable for convoy work would have been vessels like the "Lion" and "Tiger," which we have had to throw away, and all those older classes of dreadnoughts which we have had to discard, or may be compelled to discard, under our treaty engagements. There are also, as the Noble Lord suggested, a large number of old destroyers which it might be very convenient to keep in being in spite of new ones being built. There is general determination I gather, or there was last year, not to scrap any more old ships but to keep them on what was called the "Mother Bank" near Portsmouth, where they could be kept for a case of emergency.

There is a great value to our country in having a materiel reserve, because probably we who live in this island are capable of expanding our supply of seamen much more rapidly than any other country. Therefore, I say that this decision to keep old ships—for instance, there is the case of the "Effingham" and the "Frobisher" which the Admiralty decided not to scrap—is a very wise one, and I am glad it has been reached and sorry it was not reached before. But now see how the Anglo-German Treaty cuts across that policy. Under that treaty Germany is entitled to build one-third of the tonnage of our total fleet. So far as

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I am aware there is no distinction between the obsolete tonnage which is retained and the new tonnage. By what I can only regard as a lamentable oversight no provision was made in regard to obsolete tonnage. Therefore, if we keep these old vessels—and the question is one that is bound to arise—by that very act we authorise German construction of new vessels of one-third of those vessels' weight, and that brand new German tonnage is probably equal not to one-third but to more than one-half of the value of the old ships we keep. I thought this treaty deplorable in its diplomatic aspect, but here is this very unfortunate technical feature to which I have had to refer.

I have only one other point to make to the House, and it is in connection with the Fleet Air Arm. On the question of commerce protection, my right hon. Friend opposite spoke of the greatly improved power of cruisers caused by their having aeroplanes which they catapult from the deck. I am sorry that my Noble Friend was not able to tell us that there would be some aircraft carriers constructed for trade protection. The difficulty in protecting trade and ridding the seas of hostile cruisers is to find them. Once they can be found it should be easy to direct a more powerful vessel upon them. I remember well how we had to concentrate 30 ships to catch the "Emden." Once she was located one vessel was enough to sink her in an hour. With these new vessels and aircraft an enormous range of vision and search is open, and consequently great relief may be given to our commerce protection cruisers and a great measure of security to our trade as it traverses the wastes of the sea. I hope we shall hear something further from the Government on this point, which may well be productive of saving in expenditure as well as greater efficiency and security. I am not going to attempt to pronounce—especially with my hon. and gallant Friend the Admiral sitting so close behind me and my other hon. and gallant Friend in a tactical position on the other side—upon the vexed controversy of the Fleet Air Arm, but this I will say. If aeroplanes can be used, whether from cruisers or from trade protection aircraft carriers, in the protection of commerce, an important argument will have come into being for the unification of the whole

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work of commerce protection and for its control by the Royal Navy.

I have thought it may duty to make this contribution, to which the House has listened so kindly, and I hope it will not be taken in ill part by the Government or the Admiralty. It is difficult for laymen without access to official facts and figures to state a case on these matters without the risk of making mistakes. I shall certainly be glad to be corrected if I have made a mistake, and as long as I am corrected in the kindly and courteous manner of which I am sure my Noble Friend will be capable, nothing will give me greater pleasure than to learn that the Government have satisfactory answers.