- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 16, 1936, in a naval debate answering the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, defending the battleship and the Singapore base.
- Main themes
- Value of the battle fleet and the battleship, Singapore naval base as a defensive measure, Japanese and American naval ratios, British food supplies and the narrow seas, Scapa Flow and the Grand Fleet in the Great War, blockade of Germany, protection of Australia and New Zealand, protection of the Indian Empire, battleship armour and survivability, Jutland and the Queen Elizabeth
- Duration
- ~12 min
- Words
- 1,390
- Sentences
- 54
- Readability
- 48
- Grade
- 13.1
- Syntax
- 3.16
- Vocabulary
- 2.20
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other54 sentences in 14 paragraphs
Impenitence may not be a virtue, but it must be regarded as a fact. The last six years have been very unfortunate for us. We are in a far worse position for dealing with our food supplies and with protection of the narrow seas than we should have been if the ideas which are generally accepted now had generally prevailed before. It is said that although we do not mind the United States building whatever she may require, it may start Japan upon large increases in her Navy, and this would react upon us. There may be something in that argument, but not much. More than half the revenues of Japan are spent upon military purposes, and although for sentimental reasons they may not relish the ratio of 5.5.3, I
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do not believe that they have much margin for greatly increased naval construction. Therefore, it seems to me that if the United States wish to increase the size of their Fleet in any particular class of vessel, even if beyond what we find necessary, we should not be led by the possible Japanese reaction to object to the course which they think fit to take.
There are only three Powers in the world, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, which continue to maintain regular battle fleets. They are, happily, situated at the opposite corners of the globe, divided from each other by immense expanses of ocean. If any one of those three Fleets were to traverse these ocean spaces in order to attack another without having some enormously strong fortified harbour close at hand, that attacking fleet would find itself at an almost immeasurable disadvantage, and without a base at hand it could certainly not maintain itself against a fleet defending its homeland for any length of time. The vast wastes of the Pacific Ocean give a considerable measure of security to the main interests of the United States and Japan. Singapore, our most easterly Fleet base, is about as far from Japan as Portsmouth is from New York. Therefore, I have never been able to feel that either here or in the two other leading naval countries there ought to be any great anxiety about the strength of their battle fleets. They do not want to get at each other, and if they did they could not without at least a decade of preparation.
This, I trust, disproves of the suggestion which we so often hear made, that Singapore is an aggressive or provocative feature in our strategic position. Singapore never is, and never can be, an offensive base against Japan. It is a defensive protection for the British Empire, and as such it rightly takes a high place in our thoughts. I was closely concerned with Lord Beatty after the Great War in the decision which brought Singapore into existence. It seemed to me then, and it is none the less now, that Singapore is a guard for the Indian ocean and an indispensable means of our discharging our duty of protecting the Indian Empire. But, in addition, it is a link or a steppingstone with Australia and New Zealand, which will enable us to cover them and, if necessary, proceed to their aid in an
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emergency. Considering what Australia and New Zealand did for us in the Great War it is the sacred duty of the Mother country to place herself in a position to offer them this protection. And this protection can be discharged in no other way. I hope, therefore, there will be no misconception or misrepresentation about the purpose for which the fleet base at Singapore is being constructed, and that the Admiralty will persevere with it with all possible speed.
Now I come to the question which formed the staple part of the speech of my Noble Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. He spoke of the value of the battle fleet and of the battleship as an instrument of war. We had a speech the other day, to which most of us listened with the greatest pleasure from the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and although I agreed with much that he said—especially the kindly references to myself—I was surprised that he did not seem to understand what the battle fleet did in the Great War. If we had not been able to place in good time a superior battle fleet at Scapa Flow, or if that battle fleet had been defeated in a great action, the German Navy could have sallied forth into the oceans of the world and immediately cut us off from our food supplies and trade, and starved us into submission. If they had thought it worth while they could have invaded this country, or have taken bases on the Western side for the convenience of their operations in intercepting our vital trade. I was surprised that the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs did not sufficiently realise the supreme service rendered during the War by the British battle fleet. Without it the War could not have continued for a month; we should have been reduced by famine to subjugation.
It was an extraordinary sensation to see how the placing of a superior battle fleet at Scapa Flow instantaneously and automatically dominated all the waters of the globe. German commerce vanished from the seas, while our merchant ships sailed to and fro in a security so great that an additional insurance rate of 1 per cent. covered the war risks for a long period of time. The very powerful German fleet, one of the finest features of naval discipline and efficiency ever seen,
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remained in its harbours, content with the command of the Baltic, and never dared to do more than make occasional darts and raids of no major strategic significance. Unless the German fleet had been willing to challenge a fleet action and fight it out to the end and were successful in that action, they had no other choice. They never were willing, and I think rigs t]y, for all their valour and military qualities, to make a main trial of strength, and in consequence they were forced to submit year after year to the slow and remorseless pressure of the blockade which ultimately played a predominant part in the final result of the War. Therefore, it seems to me absurd that people should ask whether a superior battle fleet has any utility in naval strategy merely because they found that for m my months in the War it remained stationary in harbour. Great preparations have to be taken before the most powerful and Valuable engines of war can be launched on the open seas.
But the question arises whether the new conditions which have arisen since the War have not rendered the large battleship so vulnerable that it can no longer serve as the foundation of naval power. The Noble Lord asked, what is a battleship? I would answer that a battleship is an inexpugnable floating battery which used to be built of oak and now is built of steel. Its effectiveness depends not on avoiding being hit but on being capable of withstanding severe battering. The first requisite of a battleship, or indeed of any ship of war, is that it should keep afloat, and the second that it should carry the most powerful battery at sea. The qualities of a battleship might well be considered in the following order: first, armour and internal subdivision; second, guns; and, third, speed. I do not suppose that everyone will agree on these priorities, but I believe they will be found to have some sense behind them. Up to the present it has been found possible to construct battleships which will stand an enormous amount of pounding from modern armour-piercing shells and also sustain two or three under-water explosions by torpedoes without ceasing to be able to steam and fight. We saw what tremendous pressure the German battle cruisers, much more stiffly built than our own battle cruisers which Lord
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Fisher designed, took at the Battle of Jutland, and we also saw the "Queen Elizabeth" battleship, which we built, resist the heaviest fire that could be directed upon her by four or five of the largest German battleships without sustaining any damage which affected her fighting efficiency.
