- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on the Second Reading of the Finance Bill, dated June 1, 1937, urging the new Prime Minister and Chancellor to abandon the National Defence Contribution tax.
- Main themes
- National Defence Contribution, Second Reading of the Finance Bill, profits and profiteering, individual enterprise under capitalism, Excess Profits Duty and wartime levies, Budget procedure and Supplementary Estimates, Cabinet scrutiny of new taxes, borrowing for rearmament, Parliament's right to force changes to Budget proposals, call on the new Prime Minister to drop the tax
- Duration
- ~52 min
- Words
- 6,185
- Sentences
- 261
- Readability
- 58
- Grade
- 11.0
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 2.13
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other261 sentences in 59 paragraphs
The ranks of ex-Chancellors of the Exchequer have been severely thinned in the last few months from death and other causes, and I find myself the sole survivor on this side of the House. Therefore, it seems to me that I ought not to allow the Second Reading of the Finance Bill to pass without contributing an expression of opinion to the Debate. I certainly do not do so in any hostile spirit to the new Government and to the new Prime Minister. On the contrary, I take a friendly interest in this new Government. I do not quite know why I do. I cannot go so far as to call it a paternal interest, because, speaking candidly, it is not quite the sort of Government I should have bred myself. If it is not paternal, at any rate I think I may call it an avuncular interest.
I will this afternoon begin by expatiating at large upon the canons of financial orthodoxy. All taxes are evil, but the revenue must be found. "A tax," said Adam Smith, "must be clear, definite and equal." There is a well-known Treasury maxim that "an old tax is no tax." The most healthy tax is one whose sole purpose is revenue. Taxation to give effect to some political purpose, or even to inculcate some moral
883
principle, is usually found to fall short of the highest standard of financial economy. All the best authorities prescribe as the true test of any tax that it should yield the largest sum of money with the least possible disturbance of the life and business of the nation. Another well-known test by which any tax may be judged is the proportion of the cost of collection to the revenue yielded. These are, of course, only the well-known and accepted truisms of the British Exchequer, and we are all agreed upon them.
Now I will venture on the somewhat more disputable ground of profits and profiteering, and the position of individual enterprise. I know that it is the Socialist idea that making profits is a vice, and that making large profits is something of which a man ought to be ashamed. I hold the other view. I consider that the real vice is making losses. I believe that to lead a large number of wage-earners and shareholders up a blind alley into bankruptcy and disorganisation is almost a crime. In happy Communist Russia failure at the head of a manufacturing or trading enterprise is very often considered sabotage punishable by death, or one of the lesser punishments comprised in their somewhat elaborate penal code. The making of profits apart from the question of who gets them, is a virtue in any land, and no one should regard it as a virtue more than a Chancellor of the Exquer with his Income Tax, his Supertax, his Surtax and his Death Duties, which can take, without the Death Duties, 14s. in the £, and, with the Death Duties, according to an answer I remember to have been given by the late Lord Snowden, the whole lot if you insure against Death Duties upon the present scale. So much for the question of profits.
Let me pass to profiteering. The charge of profiteering is justly odious, but what is the essence of profiteering? It is the exploitation of monopoly or the exploitation of famine, disaster or war. I remember that in the pre-war days we used to say that Socialism attacks capital and Liberalism attacks monopoly. It is the exploitation of monopoly or of some public misfortune which constitutes the essential venom of profiteering. That was the
884
justification of the Excess Profits Duty of which I, as a subordinate Minister, was a strong supporter, and of the aftermath of which I saw and learned a. good deal during the five years I was at the Treasury. The Excess Profits Duty, for all its many obvious anomalies and wasteful defects, was an act of moral and social justice. Millions of men had volunteered to fight, and millions of others were compelled to follow and had to sacrifice their earning capacity at home to fight and die for four terrible years. Some of those who stayed at home made great fortunes in the absence of their natural competitors and under conditions which were totally different from normal life. It was essential that an effort should be made to reclaim for the purposes of reconstruction a portion at least of those excess wartime profits. In a single year a vast sum was recovered—300,000,000 or £400,000,000 at one stroke, if my recollection serves me. Moreover, the profits in this case had actually been made and they could be measured with considerable accuracy by comparing them with normal pre-war years before our affairs were so violently interfered with by the great struggle.
Personally, I do not mind saying that I would have gone as far after the War as a capital levy——I have always suffered from a lack of power to give full effect to my wishes. I know that Mr. Bonar Law was very much inclined that way. It seemed to me, and I think to others, that it would have been quite fair to say that no one should come out of the War richer than he went in. I think that that ought to be considered in case we have another unfortunate experience of that kind. All this dealt with the tremendous cataclysm of the Great War, Armageddon, an event without compare in human experience. That is not the situation to-day. To-day, in the conditions of peace and free competition, the making of large profits cannot be judged apart from the history of any particular firm or person, and I would say that those profits cannot be judged apart from the risk. There are some businesses which are seen to yield large profits, but how many people have tried and failed at one of those businesses before the successful ones made their profits? Again, there are some businesses which are profitable in one year out of five, others maintain a steady flow, but,
885
broadly speaking, in a free market risk is the shadow of profit and keeps pace with it every hour of the day.
I submit that the Treasury would make a profound mistake if they mix themselves up in these imponderable transactions. Similarly, I would say that it is much better for the Treasury to come along afterwards and say, "Hullo, you have made this money under laws which Parliament prescribed. Quite right. Many congratulations. Please hand over to us 5s. in the £ and anything up to 9s. for Super-tax, according to scale." It will be a great mistake for the Treasury to get mixed up in the processes by which this wealth is acquired, and to get into the position where it will have to sit as a kind of moral judge and say, "This is virtuous, that—h'm, that is not so virtuous, and this is plainly peccant." That is a sphere into which they would really be well advised not to enter. I have often seen it tried and sometimes I have lent myself to its mood, but it nearly always meets with failure and costs more than it is worth. If the State is to meddle with the wealth-getting process, apart, that is to say, from prescribing just laws and taking the lion's share of the profits, there are no grounds of justice for penalising the citizens who engage in risky enterprises or for regarding them as less reputable than those who seek the sweet simplicities of 2 and 3 per cent. On the contrary, as good a case can be made out for the merchant adventurer of modern times as can ever be put forward for the safety-first crowd.
I venture to say that if the capitalist system is to survive, it must be continuously refreshed by enterprises produced by the genius, the inventiveness, the calculation, the sacrifice and the audacity of individuals. We must not disparage or hinder new businesses making new work for the old unemployed. I can imagine a Governor of the Bank of England thinking first of the rentier class; I can imagine the Treasury officials, though I have not the slightest idea of suggesting that their's is the responsibility, keeping very prominently in their minds the state of the gilt-edged market, above all as it affects their short-term borrowings. Naturally that would be a great preoccupation with them. But the House of Commons, where all classes and all interests are represented, ought certainly not to take a view against the equity
886
shareholder or against the bold pioneer who, pushing through the crowd, reaps as his just reward what looks like an enormous prize.
If once you penalise the spirit of individual daring and initiative, if once you decide that that is to be discouraged—I am not suggesting that that is the attitude of the Government, but if once the course of legislation takes the form of suggesting that that is to be discouraged—then you are, in fact, abandoning the capitalist system, and you ought in all logic to go to the other extreme and weave the whole industry of the country into one vast structure under State planning. I am against that because I think it can be shown that it would be highlyinfertile, and that the mass of the people would be much worse off under an all-embracing bureaucracy and absolutely governed by Government Departments than they are at present with the wonderful, buoyant and apparently inexhaustible fund of personal energy, thrift and contrivance. I should much regret to see the Conservative party get into any position where it could be suggested that it took a hostile attitude towards adventurous, by which I mean novel, risky and speculative enterprise, for that would impede the new energies which each flood of youth contributes to our forward progress.
In my experience—a long one—and survey of this remarkable country and the life of Britain, nothing has struck me more than the numberless uncounted springs, rills and rivulets which flow unseen into the broad stream of national economy. If once you dry these up by some mechanical pump you may find yourself deprived in a night-time of resources which can neither be measured nor replaced. Therefore, I venture to think that this Conservative and National Parliament should make it quite clear that they have no prejudice against new businesses and rising businesses, no prejudices against adventurous or speculative enterprises, and that they should assert with courage that these businesses ought to have their profits under the law, and ought to make their way if they can—subject, of course, to the Income Tax, the Super-tax, the Surtax and the Death Duties.
With these, I am afraid, rather elaborate, but not wholly irrelevant preliminaries I would like to come more directly
887
to the issue before us. I listened very closely to the Budget statement. Up to the last quarter of an hour my impressions were the same as those of the rest of the House, namely, that my right hon. Friend the then Chancellor of the Exchequer was terminating smoothly and successfully the very remarkable process of rehabilitating our finances and providing with masterful ease the cash and credit necessary for re-armament. Indeed, after he had spoken for an hour I thought the whole Budget was balanced and done with. But in the last 15 minutes my right hon. Friend seemed to be opening up a whole vista of doubtful, superfluous and troublesome new matter which we have now come to recognise under the initials N.D.C. The House, of course, has realised from the first that the National Defence Contribution is not at all required under the finances of the current year, and I have not yet been convinced that it is required by the finances of next year, but I must say that some parts of the speech of the right hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith), to which we have just listened, seemed to make out a rather stronger case for the anxieties of the Chancellor than I have yet heard put forward—I mean about the future. So far I have not felt convinced that this is required for the finance of next year, though I may be wrong.
I should like the House to think a little about the conditions of this Budget. It has one characteristic which makes it different from every other Budget. Budgets are usually the result of facts which are ungovernable and largely unforeseeable—the weather, the crops, the reaction of the sun upon the thirst of the public, the state of trade, the yield of various taxes, the arrival or non-arrival of windfalls, the javelins of death striking at hazard at the very rich. All these are the factors by which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is confronted, in a grim array, on the 3rst March, and with which in the following two weeks he endeavours to cope with all his apparatus of taxation. In this case we are not dealing with uncontrollable factors. The structure of this Budget is not shaped by external events. It has been shaped by the plenary discretion of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. He it was who decided whether we were to borrow £500,000,000
888
or £400,000,000, whether we were to borrow £400,000,000 in five years or £500,000,000 in four years. He it was who decided what draft should be made upon borrowing in relief of Estimates and what must be defrayed out of annual taxation. It was a matter for his decision and discretion.
The House has not been told of any principle which governs the use of the Defence credits by any particular fighting Department. We have not been told what class of services are to be paid for on the nail, and what class may fairly be assigned to the use of Defence credits, though it looks as if the Departments had been told by the Treasury precisely how much they were to borrow in each case. Such manipulation is perfectly proper and is part of the management of a great undertaking, but none the less—and this is the point I make—it remains an entirely controllable process. In all £80,000,000 has been borrowed in aid of the armaments programme, but that is the result of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer's personal decision. It might as well have been £70,000,000 or £90,000,000; he could adjust it as he chose.
Similarly, when we came to the actual Budget we saw an item of £10,000,000 thrown in for Supplementary Estimates. That is an entirely novel practice. To mention Supplementary Estimates in a Budget was done, I think, last year, though I believe it has never been done before, at least I do not remember it; and anyone acquainted with our procedure will readily understand that it is a contradiction in terms. If the regular Estimates of the year are honest Estimates it is not normal to stick alongside them a Supplementary Estimate which says that they are a miscalculation. It is not to be regarded as a satisfactory process to place Supplementary Estimates in the Budget which would tend to loose estimating. No doubt h is prudent in times like these to leave a margin for Supplementary Estimates and excess spending, but that has customarily been done in the past by declaring a prospective surplus of several millions, which has a healthy effect, and also secures the necessary margin for what no human being can foresee.
I say frankly that I was astonished to see my right hon. Friend, in the Budget statement, slip in the remark that he
889
would allow £10,000,000 for Supplementary Estimates. Clearly that sum is only a guess. It might have been £8,000,000 or £12,000,000 or any other figure. The sum was £5,500,000 last year. No one can tell what the figure will be; that is what I am pointing out; and this was a figure my right hon. Friend chose to write. If he had chosen to make no provision for Supplementary Estimates he could have declared a balanced Budget showing a prospective surplus of £8,250,000, which would have had a very good effect, and would have left him with an ample margin for any normal contingency. That would have been an entirely straightforward and orthodox procedure, and would have rounded off the Budget very smoothly. But my right hon. Friend was not satisfied, and by this very anxiety—to follow out, I think, a train of thought which he pursued—he felt it necessary to produce a deficit so as to set on foot this new tax which he wanted for next year. Accordingly he threw in this £10,000,000 for Supplementary Estimates, which swamped the surplus he otherwise had in view, and showed a prospective deficit of £2,000,000, and this he declared it was our duty to meet by the National Defence Contribution. I am only laying these matters before the House because I can conceive a powerful justification being made for his action. But let us follow what is happening.
Our finances in the main are dealt with annually. We meet the troubles of one year with the resources which come to hand. It is extremely important that it should be realised that nothing in the present year requires this additional tax. If it is to be introduced, it is as a result of deliberate policy in fact, my right hon. Friend, as I said, went out of his way to create a deficit in order to drag in this tax by the heels. There is nothing reprehensible in it. Nearly everyone, I think, understands and sympathises with the motives of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer which led him to this tax. First of all, it proves the serious and grave view which he takes of the future of our affairs; secondly, it shows his habit of looking ahead; thirdly, it shows that he is not afraid, quite disinterestedly and without any immediate reward, to take upon his shoulders extra work and trouble; fourthly, it shows—I think this ought not
890
to be misunderstood—his resolve that every effort should be made to convince the munition workers, who are now beginning to be numbered by many hundreds of thousands, that he and the National Government of which he is the head are no champions of profiteering, and do not intend to tolerate it if they can possibly stop it. Those motives demand our respect, our general respect, but one may say and feel all that with sincerity and yet wonder whether the tax is, in fact, a good one or whether it will achieve the purpose which animated its author and with which we sympathise, namely, to provide effectually for the Defence programme.
Now let us see what has happened since the Budget was opened. Many things have happened. First of all, this particular tax has been riddled and shown to be virtually unworkable; secondly, an altogether excessive and exaggerated, but none the less costly, reaction has been produced in the markets and in industry; thirdly, both the parties of the Left, the Liberals and the Socialists alike, have denounced and derided the tax, so that it cannot be made very great use of in inspiring the munition workers; fourthly —. Well, I was Minister of Munitions during the War, and I know that if the Government cannot maintain a mental and moral relationship with those who are producing arms they may be confronted with the gravest difficulties. Certainly, this relationship requires the most careful study, and I am absolutely sure that that was the root of the process that led the right hon. Gentleman to this tax—fourthly, so many concessions have been made—have had to be made—that the yield, we were told yesterday, has fallen from £25,000,000 to something like £10,000,000 in the full year. Inevitably, in everybody's mind, is the thought: "Is not the business more trouble than it is worth?"
Let me now say that I hope that the free and full discussion to which Parliament is entitled will not be complicated by any question of personal prestige. In China, face-saving is usual, but it is less important in this country. Indeed, the successful avowal of mistakes was one of the most important arts in the armoury of the late Prime Minister, and one that was frequently practised to the discomfiture of those who had pointed out, with much precision and much toil, the error
891
which he had committed. The doctrine that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is infallible and that the Budget statement is one of the laws of the Medes and Persians has no foundation in our Parliamentary life. I seem to remember having heard that Mr. Gladstone, or perhaps it was Mr. Disraeli or some very eminent and respectable statesman in the past, said, when he was reproached for giving way on some point, something to this effect: "In a democratically governed country, possessing powerful, representative, Parliamentary institutions, it is sometimes necessary to defer to the opinion of other people." In House of Commons finance and on questions of ways and means, it is right that the Executive should, from time to time, yield to the sense of the House. In nine times out of 10, and 19 times out of 20, the Government will prevail; but their status will be increased and not decreased, if, on the tenth or the twentieth occasion, they bow to the opinion of the Assembly.
There were many such occasions in our history. There was Walpole, who, after the Division on the Excise Bill, came into the Chamber and said to his colleagues: "This dance can no further go." Then there was Mr. Lowe with his tax on matches "Ex lute lucellum." I myself remember Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in 1901, when he increased the tax on cheques. We have got used to it nowadays, but in those days it seemed infinitely horrible; the shock was almost intolerable when the tax was raised from 1d. to 2d. He introduced this tax, which had a most chilling effect upon the Conservative party and the Liberal leaders. Two days later, I saw him come down to the House. I pushed my way through the crowd at the Gangway, which was enormous. It was a moment of great excitement and they said to me: "Black Michael is giving up the tax." But what happened? Was he regarded as having done anything wrong? On the contrary; he was praised. He was cheered. In those days, the Conservative party used to live, or at any rate, used to lunch, at the Carlton Club, and for weeks afterwards they were talking about the magnificent way in which Black Michael had extricated himself from this difficult situation, and of the courage and good feeling he had shown.
892
Perhaps the House may remember that only seven or eight years ago I got into some trouble myself about the Kerosene Tax. It was a very good tax. I was quite right about it. My right hon. Friend slipped it through a year or two later without the slightest trouble and it never ruined the homes of the people at all. Anyhow, the Chief Whip of those days telephoned me. I was resting in the country after the Budget speech. He said: "You had better come up. All our fellows are against the tax, and all the others too." I do not know whether any similar communication has been made by the present occupant of that most important office. Anyhow, I acted with great promptitude. I came up to London immediately. It was said to be very difficult to withdraw the Kerosene Tax; it was said to me by the experts, who so often turn out to be wrong, to be impossible to withdraw it without wrecking the whole of the oil tax, which was a very good tax. May I remind hon. Members that more than £50,000,000 from the oil tax is being derived this year? It was so much abused but, so far as I can make out, it has not stopped motoring. I came down to the House in the nick of time. Lord Snowden—Mr. Snowden, he was then—was rising, full of pent-up, overwhelming fury, to fall upon me. I got up. I withdrew the tax. Was I humiliated? Was I called weak? Was I accused of running away? Not at all. There were loud and prolonged cheers. Nor only did people say: "How clever how quick; how very well he has outwitted them"; but others came along and said: "How very right it is to meet with respect the opinion of the House of Commons." I hope you will pardon me. Mr. Speaker, for referring to those matters, but that was one of my best days.
How has this tax been examined hitherto? I am all for the Chancellor of the Exchequer being master of the Budget for the year; that is to say, he should present to the Cabinet in a very advanced condition his solution of the financial problem, as it is revealed when the accounts are closed on 31st March. It is a great advantage to this country that this decision is the project of one man's brain and not the result of a hugger-mugger disputation in a finance committee, such as you have in the French Chamber, where the Chancellor
893
of the Exchequer is surrounded by his predecessors, his rivals, and potential successors, and has to unfold all his plans to them. Although the general layout of financial policy should emanate in its full integrity from the Chancellor of the Exchequer personally, and should be submitted to the Cabinet only in its final form, there ought to be, and there nearly always has been, a special procedure in respect of new and novel imposts. I remember, for instance, that we sat for five months and had at least a dozen Cabinet Councils, on the Land Tax and Mineral Royalty duties. That was in 1909, and for five months those matters were continuously argued out. They were very important—important politically, anyhow, to us. When the Betting Tax, of inglorious memory, was being considered, a strong Cabinet Committee was appointed in November, and sat for over four months before they reported, wrongly, that, on the whole, it was worth trying.
It would be, in my opinion, a departure from custom, for any Chancellor of the Exchequer to present to a Cabinet, only a few days before the opening of the Budget, some great scheme of new taxation which had not been examined. When I say "examined," I mean by people who have the right and the mood, and are encouraged to criticise and pick holes in the plan. It is in the last degree imprudent to go into action upon a political or financial scheme which has not first of all had a good knocking about behind the scenes. It is only by that process that you can find out whether it can stand up to the battery to which it will, and ought to be, exposed when it comes to the House of Commons. New propositions ought to be tested and hammered out, and they ought not to slip through, easily from permanent officials —if that was where they emanated—to Minister and from Minister to the Royal Assent. Both the Cabinet and the House of Commons—in this I agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite—have a real duty to test and prove them.
In this case, we know that, owing to the unhappy events of last year, there was held to be special need of secrecy, and we know that the Cabinet were not consulted upon the Budget until the day before the announcement. We know that the Cabinet sat on that day for only about
894
two hours. We do not know what other business there was. It is quite certain that it would have taken more than 40 minutes for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to summarise, even in the briefest manner, the financial proposals for the year, let alone go into the special details of this tax. No real opportunity, therefore, seems to have been afforded to the Cabinet of examining and, if they chose, of criticising or pointing out flaws in these new proposals. My right hon. Friend the new Chancellor of the Exchequer tells us that subsequently he has weighed them all in his capacious brain and finds them O.K., and anyone who heard him yesterday would feel that he has mastered all the details with his customary industry and efficiency. But I have also heard that he has had quite another set of preoccupations about the Treasury during these last few weeks, which may well have prevented him from giving absolutely unprejudiced and dispassionate consideration to this National Defence Contribution. I cannot, of course, say, but I do not think that at any stage in this business anyone who has been free and independent in the matter has had a chance, of bringing another point of view to bear.
Just as the great question of how much we should borrow for armaments and how much we should provide by taxation was settled by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, just as the figure of £10,000,000 for Supplementary Estimates was interpolated in the Budget and settled out of hand by him, so this tax emanated from him, with the aid of only a very few confidential advisers with whom he felt himself at liberty to discuss it. He has told us of the great need of secrecy, and we all sympathise with that, but still it would have been much better, and, if I may say so, more in accordance with practice, to have a high degree of confidence and secrecy among Ministers and to be able to thrash these matters out in private among themselves before they are flung out upon Parliament and the country as the decisions of a united Cabinet and driven through with the force of a loyal party. I cannot, of course, speak with any authority upon City finance, but, taking a broad point of view, it would seem from all that is said that the check to enterprise, the restrictions on business, the fall in values, have already lost to the revenue far more than
895
the £10,000,000 or £12,000,000 which I gather is all that this tax is estimated to yield in 1937 and 1938 put together. Perhaps the loss is very much greater.
When we are told that there are 35,000 firms which must be rummaged from top to bottom, which must subject their whole method of life to the sharp teeth of the Revenue, which must be combed over from a different angle from that of the Income Tax collector, all for the sake of such comparatively small sums, the situation produced is one which certainly calls for very searching Parliamentary examination, and, I would add, for very serious Ministerial defence. When we are told that 11,000 of these 35,000 will probably be hit, but that whether they are hit or not, or how much they are hit, bears no relation to the class of work in which they are engaged or to the merits of their contribution to the process of national wealth getting, we must feel misgivings; and it is on these considerations that the decision that the House has to take will turn.
I have already referred to profiteering. Ministers boast that their costing system prevents profiteering in Government contracts, and they have assured us that their view is confirmed by the Public Accounts Committee; but I am not so sure that profiteering is entirely excluded. I think that the whole question requires careful vigilance. But why all the ordinary business of the country should be dragged into the tax collector's machine and re-rummaged for this purpose, I cannot conceive. Certain it is that the Socialist party are unable to accept the tax as any assurance that there is no profiteering. I should deprecate the imposition of a tax merely to satisfy our political opponents, but it gives them no satisfaction. They have already derided and denounced it. Both parties of the Left are going to vote against it. It certainly seems to be bad finance, but is it not bad politics too?
Our Parliamentary procedure is built mainly around finance. All financial proposals are, of course, subject to special stages of elaborate discussion; the House will have ample opportunity of resisting or reshaping the new tax. Therefore, there can be no need for any supporter of the Government to vote against the Finance Bill as a whole; indeed, I think there can be no excuse for it. We must
896
all remember that the Finance Bill is the sole vehicle which carries supplies of money to National Defence. Therefore, there are far better opportunities of dealing with this tax in Committee. Then will be the opportunity, if we desire it, to vote against a particular tax entirely separated from the rest of the Budget; then will be the opportunity to vote for some special improvement: and I hope and trust that we may be met in some way in the matter then, if the worst comes to the worst. But no one who wishes to see the rearmament programme carried out, and who is pledged to that, will think of giving an adverse vote upon the Second Reading of the Finance Bill. Hon. Gentlemen will be disappointed if they have any hopes of that. The arguments are so overwhelming that any Conservative supporting the National Government and supporting the Defence programme is absolutely bound to vote for the Second Reading of the Finance Bill; and he is absolutely free to do so, because the future is left entirely at his disposal when we reach the Committee stage.
I have pointed out some of the changes which have occurred since the tax was first announced, but there is one still greater change which I have not yet mentioned. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has become Prime Minister; and, the more one understands his point of view in the early stages of this tax, the more one feels that he ought to change it now. I can understand him, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, taking the view that he did, but as Prime Minister, with the whole weight and burden of these hazardous times upon his shoulders, he is in an altogether different position. His success in his new office is a matter, not only of party, but of national importance. We all want him to have a fair start. He has a perfect right to take a new decision, and in my opinion he is bound to do so. The only trail worth following at any given moment is the well-being of the nation. The Bible says: "Lay aside every impediment".— I have the quotation here. In spite of my knowledge, I am always glad to refresh my memory. It says:
Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us.
897
It also says:
If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.
I hope the Government will not degenerate into half measures, quarter measures. I hope that we shall not have a draggle-tailed, tattered tax forced through sulky Lobbies, while the great mass of the trade and business of the country stands agog and agape, with recovery impeded and the Session spoiled, all for the sake of a beggarly £10,000,000 out of a Budget of over £800,000,000. That matter is urgent. Every day's delay will be damaging to the credit of the Government; every day's uncertainty will hamper business and rob the revenue. I believe that the new Prime Minister and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer will be right and courageous if they drop the whole thing, and if they make a virtue of dropping it, if they drop it in the grand manner, if they drop it now. By so doing they will return to the canons of sound finance, they will restore and revive public confidence and enterprise, and they will, I venture to say, even recover a large proportion of the losses which have been incurred. So far from being impoverished, they will be enriched; so far from being humiliated, they will be strengthened; so far from neglecting the future, they will find themselves in a better position to cope with it. I hope that my right hon. Friend, at the outset of his Premiership, will show the flexibility and resiliency of mind, and the necessary detachment from personal and departmental aspects, to enable him to take the simple, bold, manly decision which good sense, Parliamentary opinion, and, as far as I can judge, the interests of the nation, urgently require.
