Spain (Non-Intervention Proposals).

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

15 July 1937 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 15, 1937, in the debate on the Spanish non-intervention proposals, backing the Government's plan and urging belligerent rights be granted if foreign volunteers withdrew.
Main themes
Spanish Civil War non-intervention plan, Concert of Europe, withdrawal of foreign volunteers, control of arms entering Spain, belligerent rights recognition, compromise among 27 nations, Adjournment Motion challenge, influence with both sides in Spain, capture of Bilbao, executions and reprisals, confidence in His Majesty's Government
Duration
~11 min
39th percentile
Words
1,314
39th percentile
Sentences
38
24th percentile
Readability
46
50th percentile
Grade
16.0
84th percentile
Syntax
3.31
83rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.02
13th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 89%82%
  • Ceremonial 9%8%
  • Institutional 3%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

38 sentences in 14 paragraphs

As to this plan which has been put forward, I was very glad to hear the lucid defence of certain intricate points put forward by the right hon. Gentleman. Of course it is a compromise. It is a compromise between not only divergent but vehemently antagonistic views and interests. You cannot expect to find an attractive, symmetrical, clear-cut proposal such as would spring in its integrity from one man's mind,

1609

when you have to cater for no fewer than 27 different nations. I have not the slightest doubt there are points in this plan which are extremely repugnant to Germany and Italy, but then, I imagine, there are also points in it which are repugnant to Soviet Russia, and there are some points which, perhaps, are not entirely in accord with the views of France. But if we are to keep the whole of these Powers together round the table, it is absolutely necessary for everybody to put up with a certain amount which they do not like, for the sake of producing a scheme upon which all may be able, possibly, to agree.

I go as far as this. I conceive that our safety is enormously dependent upon the maintenance of the Concert of Europe and the united treatment of this topic, and even if this plan were worse, even if it were less equipped with hopeful feeling, I still would say that it would be necessary to find even a formula, which would keep these Powers together round the table. I have no hesitation in saying—I am sure it is true—that the fact that the Powers should remain together is of greater consequence to the peace of Europe than the actual merits of any agreement which keeps them together. I am not at all convinced—and I was very glad to hear the argument of the right hon. Gentleman upon this point—that it is a bad and a vicious plan making it necessary for the Opposition immediately to challenge an Adjournment Motion. As far as I can see, the worst you can say about it is that it is probably too good to be true. We should be very glad indeed if we could to-night congratulate the Foreign Secretary on having netted all the fish that are in this White Paper. Indeed that is a stage which lies ahead. But if this plan were adopted, does anybody doubt that the control may actually be less inefficient than it has been in the past.

Certainly, the control of arms going into Spain, if you regard that as a matter of high consequence—personally, I think there is a certain amount of illogicality in supposing that preventing arms going to belligerents shortens the war; I think it would probably have the opposite effect—but certainly the object has been to prevent arms from going in, and if this scheme were to come into operation, can anyone doubt that the control would

1610

be far greater than could be exerted supposing that all went by the board and you had a vast, chaotic intrusion of arms from all quarters to both sides? What could be a greater advance—and here we are all agreed—than to procure the withdrawal of the so-called volunteers—I say "so-called" advisedly—from both sides in Spain? There we are all at one. What could be better than to strip from this Spanish quarrel this odious infusion of foreign malevolence and of people who care nothing for the future of the Spaniards, but who are there simply as the champions of grisly abstractions which are equally detestable to all parties and classes in this island?

Lastly, there is this question of according belligerent rights. It has been explained, and it is the essence of the story, that belligerent rights are not to be accorded unless this great advantage of the withdrawal of the foreign intruders has been rendered very largely effective, and on that I understand that we ourselves will be the judges, judges with others, but unanimity is required, and therefore we have an absolute judgment upon the matter. Does anyone doubt, does even the right hon. Gentleman who is going to reply doubt, that if you could get the foreign volunteers from each side to withdraw, it would be well worth while according the very limited and guarded form of belligerent rights recognition which is proposed here? But I must say this, that the refusal to accord any measure, even the most restricted, of belligerent rights to a combatant Power which disposes of armies numbered by several hundred thousands. That is the information which I have from many direct quarters—which is in possession of the greater part of the Spanish Peninsular, judged both by territory and by population, which has a constituted Government, which has upon the whole the command of the seas, behind whose frontiers there is, as we get by testimonies from almost every quarter, a remarkable measure of order and even of normal life—to refuse even to consider this question of the recognition of belligerency, I say that is in itself a highly questionable proposition and one which does not accord with the majority of precedents which have guided us in the past.

1611

We need not waste our time prophesying what the end of the Spanish war will be—all these matters are veiled in the uncertainty of the future—but we must recognise this fact, that whoever wins in Spain, we shall have to try to live with them in more or less neighbourly fashion —whoever wins—as we have done with all sorts of Governments, as we are doing now, living as well as we can with all sorts of Governments, some of them very powerful Governments, which I shall certainly not attempt to particularise. It seems to me that we should not be prudent or right in trying to draw some absolute line against the recognition of belligerency to either side or to both sides in Spain, and certainly we should not do so if, at the price of this comparatively small concession on our part, we were able to achieve the great, solid advance of a substantial withdrawal of the volunteers.

There is one more reason why I venture to suggest that we should not allow ourselves to become too much the partisans of either side. We ought also to try to gain influence with both sides in Spain. I must say, when people talk of the horrors of war, that there are worse things than the horrors of war, and those are the cruel executions and blottings out of whole political classes on both sides which have stained the Spanish struggle. I am very glad indeed to notice that the capture of Bilbao has not been attended by anything like those scenes which took place in the earlier days of the struggle, but obviously and certainly it will be of the very greatest importance to us, if we have got influence with both sides in Spain, and especially with the side which is going to win in Spain, because then alone may we be able to intervene and procure mercy for the vanquished.

I have not tried to exacerbate this Debate, because I know how strongly, ardently, and passionately hon. Members opposite feel, and that there are equally strong opinions on the other side. But, in view of the challenge of this Motion, in view of the calamitous consequences which would follow its adoption, it is surely the duty of those who support His Majesty's Government to give the fullest expression to their feelings of confidence, and I will say of gratitude, to Ministers who have brought us through this year

1612

of Spanish turmoil without involving our country in the cauldron, without rupturing the general peace, and without losing—nay they have enhanced it to an unprecedented point—the respect which is extended to us from so many nations.