CLAUSE 3.—(The Governor-General of India and His Majesty's Representa tive as regards relations with Indian States.)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

19 February 1935 · House of Commons Committee debate on the Government of India Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons Committee in London on February 19, 1935, on an amendment to Clause 3 of the Government of India Bill, urging that the Viceroy's appointment and dismissal be safeguarded from partisanship.
Main themes
Position and dismissal of the Viceroy of India, Governor-General's appointment and tenure, amendment to Clause 3, Government of India Bill, reserved powers over defence, autocratic powers over Provinces, Indian self-government and party politics, parliamentary criticism of the Viceroy, formal dismissal by Act of Parliament, House of Lords veto and the Parliament Act, Conservative opposition to the Bill
Duration
~8 min
27th percentile
Words
944
27th percentile
Sentences
30
18th percentile
Readability
47
55th percentile
Grade
13.9
66th percentile
Syntax
3.49
94th percentile
Vocabulary
2.20
48th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 90%90%
  • Ceremonial 10%10%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

30 sentences in 8 paragraphs

I do not care to give a vote for this Amendment without offering in a few sentences my explanation to the Committee. I admit, quite frankly, that there are disadvantages in this proposal, as there were disadvantages in the previous proposal we discussed this afternoon. Anyone can see how we trespass, or seem to trespass, upon the plenary responsibilities of the Government of the day, and to some extent on the liberty of discussion in this House. But the defects are but the shadow of the far greater defects inherent in the structure of the Bill. I agree that these kinds of remedies would not be proposed were the disease which we are resisting and endeavouring to check as far as we can, not so grave and desperate. A public functionary is being created under the Bill unique in character. Nothing like it has ever been conceived, or ever will be conceived after an experience which future years will no doubt bring. This is not the time to enlarge upon the functions of the Viceroy, but to suggest that they will not be functions exciting the fiercest controversy and almost continuous friction is to miss the whole point.

Hon. Members opposite seem to suppose that now that responsible self-government is being given to India, the Viceroy will have nothing to do. It is not merely the vast range of subjects with which he will have to deal, but also their highly controversial nature. At any moment he may be called upon to resume autocratic government of a Province, to sweep away a Constitution. At any moment he may be called upon to dismiss Ministers, to dissolve Parliaments and veto legislation. Now that the Government by their Measure have dragged India into party politics, and have raised issues which will not slumber during a whole generation, the position and actions of the Viceroy will be the subject of continuous criticism in this House, whichever party occupies the seat of power or opposition. There will be criticism. The Viceroy will be expected to act in regard to the reserved powers to maintain security of defence, and great anxiety will be caused as to whether he is, in fact, discharging that duty. You may see that movement from this side of the House.

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On the other hand, in India you may have great resentment of his exercise of safeguards, and pressure being put upon him by his Ministers, complaints of the autocratic temper of the Viceroy, Ministers in conflict with the Viceroy, and with the Houses of Parliament over here, and the Ministry of the day in conflict with them. Is it to be wondered at that in these circumstances, when you have this official lifted up so entirely out of the common run of all political devices and arrangements, around whom these storms are going to beat—is it strange that we should in the best way we can, and by the best amendments we can propose, seek, in the first place, to free his appointment as much as possible from partisanship, to ensure continuity in the appointment of any such functionary and to secure him a certain reasonable stability once he has undertaken these duties?

Those are the objects of the Amendment. It may be that the actual wording of the proposal shows defects—many of us can see them—but, nevertheless, the object is of the most serious character. The speeches which have been made from the Government Bench, and the speech of the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy), have indicated the serious character of the difficulties we are endeavouring to meet. The Government have brushed them away and leave the Viceroy, confronted not merely with the difficulties I have mentioned, but with crises of a most extraordinary character, to be dismissed from his office in the ordinary manner as if he were no more than a simple official placed in this extraordinary position. It seems to many of us that his dismissal ought to be affected in the broad, open light of day, and by the full act of Parliament. It should not be a matter which should rest exclusively with the executive. It is true that the executive, if it wished to dismiss the Viceroy, would presumably command a. majority of the House, and I cannot myself conceive that in these matters the present House of Lords would use its veto on Indian questions, which I observe are not subject to the Parliament Act.

It seems to me that when you are placing the Viceroy in this position, charged with these peculiar functions, he is going to be the storm centre for many years, and the least you can do is to

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fortify his position in some way, not relieve him from the criticism of Parliament, but make sure that his dismissal, if it is decided upon, shall operate only through the most formal, ceremonious and grave methods in which such an act can take place. It is too much to expect that the Government will accept the Amendment in its present form any more than they did the pertinent Amendment by which the right hon. Member for Hill head (Sir R. Horne) sought to mitigate the defects of the Bill; but while pointing the moral of the danger in which we stand we may still express a hope, a faint hope, and, therefore, a hope which requires to be cherished all the more, that as our discussions continue the Government will take steps to reassure the sincere and urgent fears which are held not only in this House, but with increasing force throughout large parts of the country.