London Naval Treaty Bill.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

20 July 1937 · House of Commons debate on the London Naval Treaty Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 20, 1937, in the debate on the London Naval Treaty Bill, welcoming parts of the agreements with Germany but criticising the 14-inch gun choice for new British battleships.
Main themes
London Naval Treaty Bill, Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, retention of old British ships, German sub-category A cruisers, British ban on 8-inch cruisers until 1943, barring of intermediate cruiser type, interchange of naval information, 16-inch versus 14-inch battleship guns, new Russian surface fleet and Baltic, Washington Treaty and naval limitation
Duration
~25 min
75th percentile
Words
2,999
75th percentile
Sentences
113
69th percentile
Readability
53
72nd percentile
Grade
12.6
52nd percentile
Syntax
3.23
75th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
39th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 87%77%
  • Institutional 9%8%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 12%

113 sentences in 31 paragraphs

I too join with the right hon. Gentleman in offering my congratulations to my right hon. Friend upon his appointment to one of the four or five great key offices of the State, and to express to him—I have known him for so many years—not only my good wishes for his success, but my confidence that his abilities will be found of distinguished service to the country in his new office. The matter which we have to discuss tonight has been thrust upon us at rather short notice. It is quite true that we are familiar with the 1935 Treaty, but the important Russian and German papers, which are very bulky and very technical, were only in the Vote Office at seven o'clock last night, and it is rather severe that Members whose duty it is to follow and take an interest in these matters should not have a little longer notice of the fact. However, as the Session is drawing to its close some of this telescoping probably is necessary, but these are very large and complex matters, and it is much better that publication of matters of interest to the British Government should be in the Vote Office at least a week, if it is possible, before the House is asked to adopt them. But I bring that forward in no captious spirit, because on the whole I have very little to say against this arrangement, as we now see it, and, having regard to all that has gone before, something to say in its favour.

I have always been an opponent of these naval treaties, except the Treaty of Washington after the Great War which was a Treaty for which I was partly responsible. But I have always been the opponent of the subsequent naval arrangements, particularly the Treaty of London, which inflicts an immense amount of inconvenience and injury upon the whole naval structure of our country, although I

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must in fairness say that it has, in the course of its working, ended the feeling of rivalry and friction which formerly existed with the United States. But judged from the point of view of the structure and formation of the British Navy, all these agreements have been very much to our disadvantage. I did not like the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935 and thought that it was a very unfortunate moment to bring it forward. It seemed to me that we then prematurely conceded a number of points which might well have been the subject of broader discussions than those into which any one Power should enter. However, that Treaty has become the law between the two great countries, and these agreements which we now have are supplementary to it, and explanatory of it.

I feel less critical of them for the very reason which has been opened to the House by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. I admire their elasticity. I welcome the multiplicity of bolt-holes, of emergency exits, escalators and parachutes which are provided at every quarter and in every direction, because, when all is said and done, in these matters of such technique and complexity, it is very dangerous to be bound too tightly. It is far better to trust to general agreement on principles and to good faith and a friendly desire to give honourable effect to these agreements. But, broadly speaking, my view is that the injury done to the Royal Navy by these many arrangements, all at the expense of our naval freedom and initiative, is less in the set of papers now before us than in any before, and the final arrangements in respect of the Anglo-German agreements are a very definite improvement upon the original agreement.

I should like to remind the House that I repeatedly pointed out the great flaw in the Anglo-German agreement of 1935, namely, that it made no provision for our retaining our old vessels, and all our old ships were amalgamated for the purposes of the percentage with our newer ships, against which the German navy would be entitled to build entirely new vessels. I pointed out how much that harmed us. My hon. Friend and other Members will remember, in the first place, that we being the leading naval Power in Europe and the equal naval Power with the United States in the whole world, have a very large reserve

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which we can accumulate. We had a very great reserve before the War in material, which proved of very high value. In the second place we have reserves of technicians and of seafaring population and of sea experience in this country, which enable us to bring that material reserve into some reality perhaps more reality than some other nations could do who have rather recently started navies, and it is not right that we should be asked to give that all up.

Up to the present moment we have been in a difficult situation, when a ship has come to the end of its prime activity, of deciding whether we will cast it away and lose it for ever or whether, by keeping it on the list, we will open to the other party to this arrangement the right to build 35 per cent. of its tonnage. I am very glad indeed that that oversight in the Treaty of 1935 has been remedied, and let me say that I consider that the Germans, in meeting us upon the point, have shown their very sincere desire to work in naval matters with us upon a fair and square basis. It is a matter of great importance that we should be able to keep our old ships and not be clogged by that danger.

Then there is another aspect in which also, I think, we have no reason to complain of the attitude which the German Government have taken. I am talking now of what are called sub-category "A" cruisers. Sub-category "A" cruisers are 10,000 ton, 8-inch gun cruisers. That is the type which arose at the Washington Conference 18 years ago. We built a great many of these in the early days, three, four and five a year, and the Americans gradually became concerned and raised the question. There was a considerable controversy, as the result of which we have given up building any more of these cruisers, and now as the result of another agreement entered into after the last General Election, we have undertaken not to build any more of these 8-inch gun 10,000 ton cruisers until 1943. These are the most powerful cruisers which exist or which are contemplated at the present time, apart from the capital ships.

I should like to point out how very much we have suffered by the course which has been followed. In the first place, all these early cruisers that we built are very inferior in protection and

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in other qualities to the type of 10,000 ton cruiser which can be built now. The gallant Admiral the Member for Portsmouth, North (Sir R. Keyes) will bear me out in that. We have a considerable number of what are called subcategory "A" cruisers but they in no way compare with the latest construction of sub-category "A" cruisers in the United States—not that we have any anxiety about what the United States build, but rather the contrary—and they will not compare with the sub-category "A" cruisers which will be built and are building now by Germany.

Germany has the right to build five of these cruisers, while we are forbidden by the arrangements we have made to build any until 1943. Therefore, if Germany exercises her right to build the whole of the five cruisers under the Agreement, she will have five cruisers which will be superior to any cruisers we have in existence and which will be capable of meeting in a single ship action and fighting at great advantage any cruisers which the British Navy possesses or will be allowed to construct until 1943. Five cruisers is a great many. There were only five German cruisers loose at the beginning of the Great War, and every one of them not only raided commerce but destroyed an allied warship before it was finally brought to its fate. All these five cruisers are sub-category A cruisers, which if they are to be built by Germany will be in the water long before we are allowed to begin building a single one. Every one of those five ships will be eminently superior. They will be fighting ships of the highest class, ships of enormous capacity as commerce raiders and capable of resisting any vessel except a battle cruiser, by which they might eventually be brought to action. Therefore, I thought that that was a very serious and needless complication of our naval strategy and our naval position.

I am very glad that the Germans have assured us that it is their desire—it is not an absolute bargain or agreement—not to use their right to construct the whole of the five cruisers but to construct only three of them. Certainly, nothing could illustrate more the foolish tangle into which we have got ourselves than that we should have to sit down till 1943 and see these enormously powerful,

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potential commerce destroyers brought into being. It is very remarkable that the Germans should have agreed to that, having regard to the new complication in their own household in the Baltic, owing to the decision of Russia to build a surface Fleet. I am often thought to be a critic of Germany, and therefore I wish to make full recognition of what she has done. In spite of this Russian pre-occupation, which nautrally concerns Germany, because the Baltic is a vital strategic matter for German defence, they have been willing to give us an assurance that they will try their best to meet us. We hope they will take pity on the forlorn and foolish situation in which we have allowed ourselves to be entangled by our good-natured agreements, and will agree to reduce their construction of these cruisers from five to three.

I must congratulate the Government upon having obtained an agreement to bar out the intermediate type of cruiser, that is, the cruiser above the sub-category "A" cruiser, the cruiser between the subcategory "A" ship and the capital ship. There is a gap from the 17,500-ton ship down to the 10,000-ton ship. Considering that the United States and Great Britain have a considerable number of 8-inch gun 10,000-ton cruisers, it is very much to their interest that no class of vessels of 15,000 tons, mounting 9-inch or 10-inch guns, should come into existence and render their whole stock-in-trade obsolete. Therefore, it has become a matter of enormous importance to the unfortunate Admirals and naval authorities who have been entangled and trammelled in the provisions of the Treaties, to bar out this intermediate gap which would render their Treaty-constructed cruisers extremely out-of-date instruments of war. The proper way to throw them out of gear is the construction of 15,000-ton vessels, with 9-inch or 10-inch guns, but there is an agreement that that shall not be done. That is a very great advantage and I think we have been met in a considerate way on that point.

It is also highly advantageous that there should be an agreement in regard to the interchange of information. Nothing could be better than that. I am all for the fullest information being given on all occasions. Half the suspicions that arise between countries is removed when the full facts are laid

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before the world. I remember well before the War the scare there was that the Germans were building additional battleships in the boat-houses on the Elbe, and that concealed and secret Dreadnoughts were going to spring into existence. I pleaded then that we should have the fullest interchange of information. Certainly, the words that were spoken by Admiral von Tirpitz and the assurances he gave were in every respect true. I welcome the interchange of information. The more we know about these matters, the more we are able to say openly about them, the less harmful and dangerous will become the situation in which we live.

The subject that has caused me most anxiety in regard to these documents is the fact that we have definitely recognised that the other Powers concerned will build 16-inch gun battleships. They are entitled to do so. That would not have been stipulated for in the agreement unless they were determined to do it. Otherwise, there would be no difficulty in deferring to our wish to build 14-inch gun battleships. The position is that there will be 16-inch gun battleships built. Japan is doing it. The First Lord professes not to know, but the United States know enough about it to have taken their decision and to have announced the building of 16-inch gun ships, and they are pretty well informed of the intentions of Japan. If Germany, and Italy also, do it, there will be two of the principal European naval Powers with 16-inch guns.

We have already committed ourselves to the construction of five 14-inch gun battleships. These great weapons of war, each costing £8,000,000 or £9,000,000, which are to be the symbol of our right and our power to preserve our freedom and to intervene in world affairs, are definitely to be equipped with 14-inch guns. It is a highly technical discussion as to whether you should have 16-inch guns or 14-inch guns. All the Powers apparently are agreed upon the 35,000-ton limit, except Japan, and the question which naval constructors have to face and on which this argument turns is whether you can put 16-inch guns satisfactorily into a 35,000-ton ship. I have seen some statements about it which apepar to me to be by no means exhaustive of the topic. We are told that you must save the weights in order to

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protect your new construction against the new dangers from the air and so forth.

Anyone who looks at the well known and easily accessible figures can see what a very serious short-fall there is in the 14-inch gun as from the 16-inch gun. I elicited certain figures last year in reply to a question in debate, and therefore the figures which I am about to give are public property. Nine 16-inch guns in three triple turrets would fire nearly a 50 per cent. heavier broadside than the same number of 14-inch guns, and the additional cost would be only a few hundred thousand pounds. A 50 per cent. or even a 40 per cent. addition to a broadside is an enormous difference. But it does not stop with the amalgamated weight of the salvo and broadside. Not only has it got a greater crushing power, but the cubic content of the explosive is again lifted on a geometrical rather than an arithmetical scale.

Therefore, there is a great deal to be said for the heavy gun. The heavy gun has always been the traditional weapon upon which Great Britain has relied. It was the heavy gun which defeated the Armada. Our smaller ships had far heavier guns. In the construction of the Queen Elizabeth we went in for the heaviest guns in Europe, and I have no prickings of conscience in regard to it. These ships are among the most successful constructed for the Royal Navy. Observe, then, that nine 16-inch guns in three turrets would cost very little more and would weigh no more than nine, ten or eleven 14-inch guns in four turrets, because of the great weight of the turret in the gun-house. Therefore, it seems to me that we must not regard the problem of placing 16-inch guns successfully and satisfactorily in the 35,000-ton ship as beyond the skill of competent designers in the United States, or Japan, or Germany, or Italy. If they do solve the problem satisfactorily and make thoroughly seaworthy ships, ships which are in every respect well balanced and which can carry these much heavier guns, then in future years it will be something of a reproach in the Royal Navy that the first five great new battleships we built—in deference to setting an example to other countries and with an earnest and honourable desire to try to retard the pace of naval armaments—battleships costing £40,000,000, and being for 25 years the governing

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factor in the Battle Fleet of the Royal Navy, were constructed upon a basis and with a gun power which renders them definitely inferior to the contemporary vessels they will have to meet.

It is not only a question of material force—after all when you are building a battleship you are thinking of the supreme expression of material force—there is a great moral value also. We regard British battleships as symbols of naval power, but they are also the means by which we gain credit in the world for working towards a peaceful solution of many difficulties, and British prestige will not be advanced if it is found in possession of a large number of these extremely costly vessels which, however excellent they may be—and I do not for a moment doubt their excellence—will be considered as not the strongest vessels in the world, that is assuming that German, American and Japanese designers are able to solve a problem which we are assured by the Admiralty is insoluble.

I apologise to the House for dealing at length with these matters, but they are important and ought to be considered by the House. What I would say to the Government is this: The past is past, what is done is done, whether right or wrong. We are going to have five magnificent ships. I have no doubt that they will be magnificent ships, but suppose that the Japanese, the Germans, the Americans and the Italians solve the problem of mounting these big guns inside a 35,000 ton ship in a satisfactory manner—