- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London during the debate on the international situation on April 6, 1936, urging collective action through the League of Nations in response to German fortification of the Rhineland.
- Main themes
- German remilitarisation and fortification of the Rhineland, Nazi Germany's growing prestige, danger to Belgium and Holland, Central and Eastern European states weighing alignment with Germany, Anglo-French-Belgian staff conversations, Locarno obligations, role of the League of Nations and collective security, return of German colonies and mandated territories, Abyssinia and the failure of sanctions, call for a settlement with Germany
- Duration
- ~21 min
- Words
- 2,471
- Sentences
- 93
- Readability
- 56
- Grade
- 12.0
- Syntax
- 3.15
- Vocabulary
- 2.10
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other93 sentences in 25 paragraphs
Yes, among the Germans. I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer who, I understand, is to reply to-night, and who has a heavy burden nowadays with the Budget and all the rest of it on his shoulders—I appeal to him, to give us a plain answer to-night. Does he or does he not accept the view put forward the other day by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham that there should be no question of handing over even mandated territories to Germany while race persecution is rife in that country? I ask him also is it not a fact that we could not in any case hand over these territories to Germany but only to the League of Nations, which alone could decide upon their future destiny? The Government must have a
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view, and they ought to declare it to us. We do not want to have another muddle about these Colonies—or our own Colonies—similar to that into which we have been led about Abyssinia. We do not want to excite all sorts of hopes, and in this case arouse all kinds of appetites, and then, when it comes to the issue, refuse point blank to do anything effective. No, I agree with my right, hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham, and I hope that he rightly interprets, and that we shall be told to-night that he rightly interprets, the view of the Government on this question.
I shall not detain the House very long this evening, and I will come to what is our main preoccupation, namely, our relations with Nazi Germany. The gravity of the situation is in no way diminished by the fact that it has become less exciting than it was two or three weeks ago. When you are drifting, floating, down the stream of Niagara, it may easily happen that from time to time you run into a reach of quite smooth water, or that a bend in the river or a change in the wind may make the roar of the falls seem far more distant: but your position and your preoccupation are in no way affected thereby. In this Northern problem also, dictatorship has gained an immense triumph. Herr Hitler has torn up treaties and has garrisoned the Rhineland. His troops are there, and there they are going to stay. All this means that the Nazi régime has gained a new prestige in Germany, and a most powerful and sustained impression of their strength has been spread abroad through all the neighbouring countries. But more than that. As I understand it, Germany is now fortifying the Rhine zone, or is about to fortify it. No doubt it will take some time. We are told that in the first instance only field entrenchments will be erected, but those who know to what perfection the Germans can carry field entrenchments like the Hindenburg line, with all the masses of concrete and the underground chambers there included—those who remember that, will realise that field entrenchments differ only in degree from permanent fortifications, and work steadily up from the first cutting of the sods to their final and perfect form.
I do not doubt that the whole of the German frontier opposite to France is to be fortified as strongly and as speedily
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as possible. Three, four or six months will certainly see a barrier of enormous strength. What will be the diplomatic and strategic consequences of that? I am not looking at the matter at all from the technical aspect, but from the aspect of its diplomatic reactions. The creation of a line of forts opposite to the French frontier will enable the German forces to be economised on that line, and will enable enormous forces to swing round through Belgium and Holland. That is for us a danger of the gravest kind. Suppose we broke with France. Suppose these efforts which are being made to divide the neighbouring countries and break the union of the last surviving free democracies of the Western world were successful, and they were sundered, and suppose that France, isolated, could do not more than defend her own frontier behind Belgium and Holland by prolonging her fortress line, those small countries might very speedily pass under German domination, and the large colonial Empire which they possess would no doubt be transferred at the same time. These are matters, most grave that ought not to escape our attention, and the public ought to be educated upon them constantly by Ministers and those who see very clearly what are the realities of the times.
I thought that the Prime Minister's remark which he made some years ago about our frontier being the Rhine, was liable at the time to be misunderstood, but if he meant by that that it was a mortal danger to Britain to have the Low Countries in the grip—in the fortified grip —of the strongest military power upon the Continent, and now, in these days, to have all the German aviation bases established there, he was only repeating the lesson taught in four centuries of history. Let me say that that danger will be brought definitely and sensibly nearer from the moment that this new line of German fortifications is completed. But then, look East. There, the consequences of the Rhineland fortification may be more immediate. That is to us a less direct danger but is a more imminent danger. The moment those fortifications are completed, and in proportion as they are completed, the whole aspect of Middle Europe is changed and the whole outlook, which is also important, of Middle Europe, is changed—
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the position of the Baltic States, of Poland and of Czechoslovakia, with which must be associated Jugoslavia, Rumania, Austria and some other countries. All those countries are affected very decisively the moment that this great work of construction has been completed.
Some of those nations, but not all, are now balancing in deep perplexity what course they should take. Should they continue in their association with the League of Nations? Should they continue their association with what is called collective security and the reign of law? Or should they make the best terms they can with the one resolute, warlike Power which is stirring in Europe at the present time I That is the question they have to ask themselves. If before the end of the year nothing satisfactory is done, and nothing satisfactory can be achieved by the negotiation and conferences which no doubt will occupy a large part of this year, we may see many powerful nations, with armies and air forces, associated with the German Nazi system, and the other nations who are opposed to that system will, by that very fact, become isolated and practically helpless. It is idle to say that these are not matters which the House of Commons is bound to view with vigilance and attention. It is idle to pretend that these are only matters affecting the obscurities, the politics and the hatreds of Central Europe.
This brings me to the staff conversations which are to begin to-morrow or the-day after in London. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made a manly speech the other day. He took his political life in his hands, and Parliament sustained him very decidedly. It is extremely important that there should be a responsible Foreign Secretary and not a headless committee. I trust that the result of that Debate will give my right hon. Friend the necessary power to produce some coherent theme which the country can understand, and which Parliament can faithfully pursue. Almost any honourable policy would be better in times like these, and safer, than a succession of attempts, however well-meant, to find the line of least resistance, and to avoid saying things which might offend this or that well-meaning section of British public opinion. Let us beware, henceforth, of being mealy-mouthed in
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these matters which affect our lives and our future.
Staff conversations are now to begin. I do not expect that those generals will have very much to tell each other which they do not know already unofficially. It is certainly unusual to elevate staff conversations into a prime feature of policy or diplomacy, and it would hardly be possible to choose a more awkward counter which the Government could use as a means of conveying to France and Belgium the assurance that Great Britain stands by her obligations, but the very awkwardness of the counter and its unusual use for this purpose, and the fact that the Government have adhered to this point actually emphasises its healthy significance, in spite of some apparent difficulty which it was anticipated that it might have, and in spite of the efforts made from abroad to prejudice British public opinion on this subject. It surely means, and it is taken to mean, and meant to mean, that Great Britain has linked herself with France and Belgium in the event of an unprovoked invasion of their soil, and that Great Britain will not go back upon her word, even if that means war. That is what is meant. Let us face that, if we are agreed upon it. The importance of this act is in no way diminished because as a matter of fact Germany is not in the slightest degree likely to invade France or Belgium in the next few months. No doubt the Government hope by this act to steady opinion in all countries, and in all the countries which I have mentioned, and which are in great apprehension in Central Europe, and to rally them to the earnest support of the League of Nations.
We ought, therefore to support the Government and to defend them in the country, even if some of us do not think that this would be actually the best method to adopt; but I must point out that any steadying effect which this act of Great Britain may produce will be more than wiped out by the development and completion of the German fortress barrier, because that will be a decisive closing of the door upon the influence of the Western democracies on the fate of Central Europe. Therefore, I hold that the time is coming for a final and lasting friendly settlement with Germany. The time available is short. What should be our next step? I hope we shall not re-
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peat the Abyssinian story; I hope we shall not claim an undue prominence, more than we are ready to make good. I should regret to see this issue drawn as if it were one between Great Britain and Germany; I should regret to see the discussions conducted any further as if they were conversations or correspondence between my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and Herr von Ribbentrop or any other German representative. We have not the solidarity of conviction yet in this country, nor have we adequate defences to take a line of undue prominence or to seek to dominate this matter.
We must do our part, but not more than our part, and that is why I agree with the Leader of the Opposition in the view which he has expressed, and which I gather was not at all unwelcome to the Foreign Secretary, that these supreme issues should not be settled by any single Power, but by all chose Powers, or all who matter, at Geneva, and within the circle and under the authority of the League of Nations. We ought to intimate, therefore, to Germany that the points raised in Herr Hitler's interesting and important Note involve the whole of Europe, and that, without prejudice to our specific obligations under Locarno, it would be far better that they should be discussed at Geneva, and that our answers should be made as far as possible from Geneva and with the broadest possible backing of the Powers associated under the Covenant of the League. It does not follow that, because the League of Nations has been ineffective and impotent in protecting Abyssinia, however much we may regret it, that it will not have a real power to deal with the perils which have arisen in Northern Europe. Here you have great nations banded together by solemn treaties, armed most powerfully, whose vital interests are affected; here you have small nations in numbers who, individually, may be helpless, but who, organised and united under the authority of the League, may exert a very great power indeed. Thus the League of Nations, in dealing with these matters for all the interested countries, ought not to lack champions. That is why I agree with what has been proposed. There is safety in numbers, and I believe also that there may be peace in numbers.
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The Leader of the Opposition twitted me the other night with having become a recent convert to these ideas of collective security, and I venture to ask the great indulgence of the House to do what otherwise I should be loth to do—to read in vindication of myself a very few words which I used two and a-half years ago, on the 7th November, 1933. I was urging the Government of my right hon. Friend the Lord President to desist from endeavouring to persuade France to disarm, and I was urging him to begin the rearmament of Great Britain, in view of all the news that was reaching us as to the beginning of German preparations. This is what I said:
I believe that we shall find our greatest safety in co-operating with the other Powers of Europe, not in taking a leading part but in coming in in our proper place, with all the neutral States and the smaller States of Europe which will gather together anxiously in the near future at Geneva. We shall make a great mistake to separate ourselves entirely from them at this juncture. Whatever way we turn there is risk. There is peril on every side. I believe that the least risk and the greatest help will be found in recreating the Concert of Europe through the League of Nations, not for the purpose of fiercely quarrelling and haggling about the details of disarmament"—
German rearmament was then in its infancy—
but in an attempt to address Germany collectively, so that there may be some redress of the grievances of the German nation and that that may be effected before this peril of rearmament reaches a point which may endanger the peace of the world."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th November, 1933; col. 142, Vol. 281.]
That was the counsel which I ventured to offer to the House nearly three years ago, when all was so easy; it is still the counsel which I renew to the House tonight, when all has become so hard.
