Interview with the producers of the series "Narration of Conquest"

Iran Ali Khamenei · Supreme Leader of Iran

2 September 1993

Context
Khamenei was interviewed by producers of the documentary series 'Narration of Conquest,' recounting his personal experiences during the Iran-Iraq War on the Khuzestan front in 1979–1980.
Main themes
Iran-Iraq War personal memoir, Khuzestan front operations, guerrilla warfare and tank hunting, Mostafa Chamran, Basij and volunteer fighters, military organization in Ahvaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan defense, personal combat experience, Islamic Revolutionary leadership in wartime
Duration
~35 min
87th percentile
Words
4,211
87th percentile
Sentences
286
95th percentile
Readability
71
98th percentile
Grade
7.0
1st percentile
Syntax
2.81
23rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
43rd percentile

Translated from Persian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 54%54%
  • Social 29%29%
  • Ceremonial 14%14%
  • Institutional 2%2%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

286 sentences in 33 paragraphs

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Our base during the eight or nine months I was in the operational area was "Ahvaz," not "Abadan." I went to the region in mid-Mehr (October 1979) and stayed until late Ordibehesht or early Khordad (May or June 1980). A month later, the incident of my injury occurred, which prevented me from going back. So, my time in the war zone lasted about eight or nine months. We went to the area about fifteen days after the start of the operations. Initially, I intended to go to "Dezful." That was my intention from here. Then it became clear that Ahvaz needed support more urgently. Therefore, I went to see Imam and requested permission to go to Ahvaz, which also has its own story.

I was in Khuzestan until the end of that year, and about two months later, until late Ordibehesht or early Khordad 1980, I went to the western region and conducted a broad survey of the entire area for information and things that were necessary; so that later we could come back and continue our work. Then the events in "Tehran" occurred, which prevented me from going there. During this time, I was mostly in Ahvaz. From the very first days, I intended to go to "Khorramshahr" and Abadan; however, it was not possible. The reason was that in Ahvaz, there was so much work that I couldn't even move from the place we were. Because those who were fighting in Khorramshahr needed our support from Ahvaz. They were truly not being supported from anywhere.

There were generally two types of work there. In the headquarters where we were, the late Dr. "Chamran" was the commander of that organization, and I was also working there. One type of work was related to Ahvaz itself, including operations and guerrilla activities and organizing small groups for work in the operational area. Of course, in these areas, I was involved to the best of my ability... The late Chamran also came to Ahvaz with me. We entered Ahvaz together on the same plane. Some clothing had been brought to the 92nd Division barracks for the companions of the late Chamran. I had no companions. I dismissed all the guards I had. I said, "I am going to a dangerous area; do you want to protect my life!? Protection no longer makes sense!" However, a few of them insisted, saying, "We also want to fight there as Basij." We said, "That's fine." So they were there and went about their work without bothering me.

The late Chamran had many companions with him. There were perhaps about fifty or sixty people with him. They brought some military uniforms for them to wear so that we could start from the very first night. That is, friends who were there in the governorate and the division said, "Now there is a field for tank hunting and guerrilla activities." He said, "We will start right now."

In summary, they brought uniforms for them. I said to the late Chamran, "How about I wear a uniform and come?" He said, "That's good. Not bad." I said, "Then give me a uniform too." They brought me a military uniform, which was, of course, very loose! I am still thin; but at that time, I was even thinner. It didn't fit me well. After a few days, they brought me a set of officer's clothing, which incidentally had the armored branch insignia on it. The other branches, after I had stayed there for a few months and had become familiar with me, complained about why my uniform was not of the artillery branch? Why was it not of the infantry? What is special about armored? So, I removed that armored insignia so that it wouldn't be a privilege for them. In any case, I wore the uniform and I had my own rifle. Of course, I don't remember if I had brought my own rifle or not. The rifle you saw in the film on my shoulder is my own Kalashnikov. I still have it. It is personal and has nothing to do with the government. Someone had gifted it to me once. It is a special Kalashnikov that, unlike other Kalashnikovs, has a fifty-round magazine. Anyway, I don't remember if my Kalashnikov was with me or if I got it there. That very first night, we went into operations. It may have lasted two or three hours, and this was while I didn't know how to fight. I only knew how to shoot. I didn't know anything about military operations. The point is; this was one of our tasks in Ahvaz, which involved forming groups that, as they called it back then, went to hunt tanks. The enemy's tanks had come as far as "Dab-e-Hardan," about seventeen, eighteen or fifteen, sixteen kilometers from Ahvaz, and their mortars reached Ahvaz. Mortars of 120 or less than 120 also reached Ahvaz.

In any case, this training and military education was organized by the late Chamran. He designated places for training. He was genuinely knowledgeable about guerrilla activities. In the events before the revolution, he had trained in Palestine and Egypt. Unlike us, who had no experience, he had a solid military background and was physically stronger, more experienced, and more skilled than I was. Therefore, when it was discussed who should command this operation, without a doubt, we all agreed that the late Chamran should be the commander of this organization. We also became part of that organization.

The second type of work was related to the outside of Ahvaz. This included supporting Khorramshahr and Abadan and then the operation to break the siege of Abadan, which started from "Mohammadiyeh" near "Dar Khoyin." This gentleman "Rahim Safavi," our current General Safavi, may God protect these young people for this revolution, was among the first who had started the operation to break the siege several months earlier, which later led to the "Thamen al-A'imah" operation.

The point is that the second task was to assist them and deliver mortars. We had to forcibly take them from the army. Of course, the army personnel had no objections and willingly provided them. However, at that time, there was a command above the army that severely prevented anything from being moved, and we faced many difficulties in sometimes getting something for our brothers in the IRGC. Of course, they didn't dare refuse us for our own headquarters; because I was there and Mr. Chamran was also there. I was the representative of the Imam.

A few days after we went there (perhaps after two or three weeks), the Imam's letter was read on the radio stating that so-and-so and Mr. Chamran are my representatives in all matters of war and so on. These are in the works of Imam Khomeini, may God be pleased with him. Therefore, we could easily procure whatever we wanted. However, the IRGC members, especially those who wanted to go to the region, were in hardship, and one of our tasks was to support them.

I wanted to go to Abadan; however, it was not possible. Until one time I said, "I must go to Abadan by any means." This was when the siege of Abadan had begun. That is, the enemy had crossed the Karun River and had gone westward and had taken a bridge there and gradually expanded the bridgehead. It became such that the road between Ahvaz and Abadan was closed. When they had taken Khorramshahr, the road between Khorramshahr and Ahvaz was closed; however, the road to Abadan was open, and there was traffic. When the enemy came this way and took the bridgehead and gradually expanded it, that road was also closed. Only the road from Mahshahr to Abadan remained. Since Mahshahr connects to the island of Abadan, not to Abadan itself, it also came under fire. That is, the bridgehead was expanded by the enemy, and the third road also came under fire, and in fact, two or three uncertain routes remained. One was the water route, which was, of course, dangerous. One was the air route, and the problem was that the gentlemen who were sitting in Mahshahr did not easily give helicopters to anyone. There was also a dirt road behind the Mahshahr road that the boys had painstakingly created, and they were passing through it with great difficulty. Of course, some parts of it were under direct enemy fire, which caused many casualties there, and part of this road passed behind the embankments. This was separate from the main Mahshahr road. Of course, this third road was also quickly closed, and only those two roads remained; that is, the water route and the air route. I went by air, by helicopter, from Mahshahr to the island of Abadan. At that time, from the IRGC, the late martyr "Jahan Ara," who was the commander of this operation, was there. From the army, the late martyr "Aqarb Parast," one of the martyrs from Isfahan, was also there. He was a very good officer. He was an armored officer who went there and stayed. There was also Captain "Hashemi." I had a photo from this trip that was very good. I don't know who had brought that photo for me. Now, if this is broadcast, whoever brought that photo for me, if they have the film, should prepare that photo again; because it was a very good keepsake.

The story was that I was giving a speech in a center belonging to the Fars Basij. There were Shirazis and Tehranis; and it was my first speech upon my arrival in Abadan. Previously, no one knew I had come there. Four or five people were with me, and we said, "Let's go find the boys." As we entered the city of Abadan from the island of Abadan, we went to Khorramshahr. The part of Khorramshahr that had not been occupied was a place where the youth were. I went to give a speech to the Basij members. During that speech, a photo was taken of us, which was a very good keepsake. One of the Tajik leaders who came here some time ago saw this photo and liked it very much and took it. It was a unique photo that I did not see in anyone's hands. This photo was a gift from Captain Hashemi to us. I don't know if Captain Hashemi has been martyred or not; in any case, I remember there were several of the IRGC boys and several of the army personnel and the rest were Basij members.

In the island of Abadan, we inspected the former gendarmerie unit. Then we went to the place of the IRGC, which now you call a hotel. I don't know if it was a hotel or not. The place they took us to and we saw was a building that I thought was, for example, a warehouse.

In summary, I was in Abadan for only one or two days and then returned to Ahvaz. I found the situation in Abadan to be significant. I saw that despite the alienation that prevailed over all our combat forces there, the conditions for the fighters in terms of resources were also unfavorable. Truly, it was a situation where one could feel the alienation of the Islamic Republic there; because there were very few forces there, and the threat and pressure from the enemy were very high and severe. We only had six tanks there, which this gentleman Aqarb Parast had gone and gathered from here and there, repaired, and with great effort had formed a truly incomplete tank company. The IRGC boys were fighting with Kalashnikovs, grenades, mortars, and such things, and they had nothing.

This was our real situation; however, the morale was at the highest level. It was truly astonishing! Seeing these scenes was very interesting to me. I was there for a day or two and made a visit, and my goal was to have an accurate report from there, so to speak, for our work (to see the situation in the area up close and know what to do) and also to encourage the fighters who were there. I went to each of them and said, "May God give you strength." I gave speeches everywhere and spoke. I took commemorative photos with the boys who gathered, and I returned. This was the summary of my presence in Abadan. Therefore, my presence in Abadan throughout the war was this short period of two or three days; I don't remember exactly, and our base was in Ahvaz. There was a place you saw in the film where we were passing through houses. This was because the area was entirely under the direct view of the enemy, and the IRGC boys connected the empty houses of the fleeing and displaced people from Abadan and the empty parts of Khorramshahr to reach the closest lines to the enemy, which might have been about a hundred meters, or less, or more. I don't remember if these were in Abadan or Khorramshahr? Most likely, it was Khorramshahr... Yes; it was "Kout Sheikh." They connected these houses and removed the walls.

When one entered these houses, one saw heart-wrenching scenes. We passed through dozens of houses to reach a point where our sniper targeted the enemy and its patrols with direct fire. I saw our boys who were snipers and had reached behind the positions that were directly overlooking the enemy's passage. Of course, the enemy, as soon as they shot one of them, would heavily bombard that area. This was the situation. However, they did their job.

This was one part of the houses that we went to see. The empty houses and the belongings that were not properly gathered were signs of the utmost displacement and misery of the people who had left their belongings scattered and gone. It was very moving! The young men who were advancing with all their might kept telling me, "This place is dangerous." I said, "No. As long as there is someone, we must go see!"

The last place we went was under the bridge. The bridge had been broken. The Abadan-Khorramshahr bridge was cut off at one point and was not passable. Under the bridge, up to the point of that break, our boys had cleared a path, and I went all the way to the end. I believe, and it comes to my mind, that at that last point we went to, we also performed a congregational prayer. I saw heroism and resistance everywhere. This was the summary of our several-hour presence in Abadan and that part of the unoccupied Khorramshahr, so to speak, Kout Sheikh.

***

Of course, there was a gap of several months between the Imam's remarks and the "Thamen al-A'imah" operation, and this work was not carried out immediately. However, the Imam correctly diagnosed the issue. When one summarizes, two points were very important for the enemy: one was this end of the connection between Iran and Iraq in the south, which was Abadan and Khorramshahr and the entire island of Abadan. The other point was Dezful. Dezful was important in that if they crossed the bridge over the "Karkheh" and threatened Dezful and closed the Dezful road, all of Khuzestan would be besieged, and our routes would be blocked. Therefore, Dezful had strategic importance for the enemy. Thus, you see that the enemy had deployed five or six divisions in front of Dezful. They had filled the entire "Dasht Abbas." (I had seen that area up close as well.) One point was the main point. Because the enemy did not want to hold Dezful. Even if they did something, Dezful was not a place they could keep. What was important for them was the island of Abadan. They wanted the island of Abadan absolutely. They wanted to have both sides of the Arvand River. Therefore, the place that was ultimately desirable and definitive for them, with no going back, was the island of Abadan, which included Abadan and Khorramshahr. Thus, these two points were sensitive points. Khorramshahr was taken in the early days despite the incredible resistance. It was such that it was indefensible and was taken. However, they could not take Abadan. The goal was that now that they could not come from that side, they would go around and enter from the island. It was a very calculated move that the enemy was making, and they were advancing step by step and were successful. As I said, the island of Abadan was indeed besieged.

The Imam pointed to a fundamental point. He said, "This siege must be broken." In fact, with this order, he neutralized one of those two plans and two main points of the enemy's war and attack, which was the final and absolute occupation of this part of Iran. It was clear that when the Imam gave an order, the youth would go and implement it.

Therefore, the order was a wise and precisely calculated one. From the moment the Imam said (it seems it was around that time, and now I don't remember the exact date), a number of young IRGC members went and chose a point near the enemy's crossing area from the Karun River, which was approximately around "Mard." As far as I remember, its name was "Mohammadiyeh." There, they dug the ground and entered the trenches near the enemy without having any equipment. The commander of that group was this gentleman "Rahim Safavi," who regularly came to Ahvaz and asked us for equipment. When I inquired about their work report, I saw that they were advancing step by step. That is, for example, they were initially a few kilometers away from the enemy and gradually got closer.

Once he said: "We hit the enemy from our trenches at night." This meant the enemy was unaware that they were there and had not discovered them. This was the prelude to the Operation Thamen al-A'immah. There was a gap of several months between the command of the Imam and the breaking of the siege. The breaking of the siege of Abadan occurred after the events of July 7 and the events of the year sixty, and the Imam had previously stated this. It was in the early days of the siege that he said, "The siege of Abadan must be broken." But I think there was a gap of six or seven months or seven or eight months.

I do not like the scene of farewell to this extent and I do not think it is something very desirable. That special atmosphere in that hall and those young people is not reflected to the viewer at all so that they can understand the meaning of this scene. Two or three examples would suffice. However, the state of prayer and prostration, the more you include, the better. Or those statements that civilians make about the Basij children and chant, are good. These are very good; and so are the other events. Except for that farewell incident, which I think has been exaggerated.

It is a very interesting and artistic work. If, God willing, you can have strong screenplays, making a series is good. Of course, we do not have much difficulty in terms of artists and actors. We have very strong actors. Especially in the field of war, some have entered the field seriously. However, the screenplays are often weak. But the way he referred to that series, which I do not know where it was from, the screenplay was very strong. The screenplays are so strong, so artistically and precisely arranged that one is truly amazed at how well they have organized them in their minds. This work is a mental and intellectual endeavor.

After that, it comes to the role of the director and the actor, which you must think about a bit to be able to produce something that when someone sits down to watch this film for half an hour or forty minutes, it has a beginning and an end and they take something away from it. They should not just present a series of consecutive events. It must have a theme; even if it is a strong narrative theme. One should not be too focused on moral themes for each episode. Because the essence of this matter has a great theme, and that is enough. That is, the theme of sacrifice, revolution, and war, and so on. However, ultimately, it must have an acceptable narrative theme. There must be a story that attracts you to it.

After that, it comes to the acting, which must also be very strong, and today there is capacity for it in the country. You must search to find it. The gentleman you mentioned, is a good director. God willing, he can also utilize good actors. However, the part of documentary filmmaking that I insisted should remain, is due to its special role in preserving the atmosphere of war in the country. Not that we want to instill a wartime state. Now that there is practically no war. However, we want to prevent the feelings and state that existed during the war from being erased from memories. You must see what is appropriate at any time and prepare it. If you can continue documentary filmmaking, in my opinion, it is an important and good work. Of course, in documentary filmmaking, the role of narration, just like what the late martyr Avini did, is very important. Both the writing and the expression of that writing are extremely important. If it were not for his insightful remarks, many of the scenes would not have made sense at all.

For a long time while the "Narration of Victory" was being broadcast, I did not know martyr Avini at all; but I was a regular viewer of "Narration of Victory." That is, every Friday night, I would definitely sit down and watch this program. It had a great impact on me, and I saw how much this speech had an effect. One time, those young people came to me (I think they were from Jihad) and I said in that session: "This noble voice that expresses these things is very interesting; keep it." He himself was presumably in that session. No one told me, "This is the gentleman." But later, he himself wrote to me: "I am the one who produces these." Anyone who wants to create such programs must have that nobility, innocence, strength, and confidence in their speech. Sometimes someone says something, and it is a great statement; but it is clear that they themselves do not believe in this statement. But this voice was the one that spoke the greatest words and believed in them. For example, he said: "Our young people are more familiar with the paths of heaven than with the paths of the earth." He said this in such a way that it seemed he had traveled those heavenly paths, seen them, and knew that they were more familiar! We think that a war voice must be a deep and unrefined voice. However, he did not have such a voice. It was an innocent and noble voice, and at the same time had a special strength; in a strong and artistic written form.

These writings were strong and good writings. He wrote them himself and also presented them. If you can work on these and produce something good, even if you cannot provide a half-hour program, it does not matter. A fifteen-minute program is also good. Shorten the introduction. A long introduction is not good. The introduction, no matter how good it is, should be short. Why? Because it is repetitive. I enjoy listening to the introduction of his first program. In the second program, this enjoyment diminishes. In the fourth and fifth programs, it becomes something repetitive. Therefore, the shorter the introduction, the better, and it reduces the burden and boredom of repetition. But if you cannot extend the main program, set it for a quarter, ten minutes. Although martyr Avini himself could not either. The few programs he produced after the war, I was very grateful for. They were truly excellent. However, they were different from what was during the war.

Producing these in this atmosphere is very difficult. When you produce them, you must create the atmosphere. You must place yourself in that atmosphere to be able to produce something good.

Therefore, it is a difficult task. But I believe that it is possible. These books that the children of the war have written about their memories and have been published, I have read many of them and I feel that it is possible to recreate that state in the hearts of individuals; even if it is through writing; even through these means. Although it is difficult, it can be done.

In summary, if you can continue this documentary filmmaking, it is an interesting thing that, of course, that narrative work will not replace it. God willing, you will be successful.

And peace be upon you and the mercy of God and His blessings.