Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union on the situation in Ukraine on March 6, 2014, before the German Bundestag on ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

13 March 2014 · Government statement before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on March 13, 2014, following an EU emergency summit on the escalating crisis in Ukraine and Russia's military intervention in Crimea.
Main themes
Ukraine crisis and territorial integrity, Crimea annexation and referendum, European unity and integration, Russia-EU relations, international law and sovereignty, geopolitical spheres of influence, historical lessons from European wars, globalization and interdependence, NATO-Russia relations, German foreign policy
Duration
~20 min
66th percentile
Words
2,423
66th percentile
Sentences
112
68th percentile
Readability
42
40th percentile
Grade
12.8
55th percentile
Syntax
3.01
49th percentile
Vocabulary
2.14
36th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 63%63%
  • Economic 16%16%
  • Ceremonial 12%12%
  • Social 5%5%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

112 sentences in 36 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

For centuries, the relationships between European states have been characterized by rivalry, shifting alliances, and repeated horrific bloodshed. We are particularly reminded of this in this year, 2014, the year of anniversaries.

We think of the First World War, which broke out 100 years ago. It was the first great catastrophe of the 20th century, soon to be followed by the second: the outbreak of the Second World War 75 years ago, marked by the civilizational break of the Holocaust. That this horror was followed by more than half a century of peace, freedom, and prosperity in large parts of Europe is still close to a miracle. With European unification, Europe has drawn lessons from its painful history, initially in Western Europe, and beyond that after 1989. This year, we also remember the fall of the Berlin Wall 25 years ago and the beginning of the EU's eastern enlargement ten years ago. European unification is and remains the great promise of peace, freedom, and prosperity in the 21st century.

Globalization has long since reached our world—our way of living, working, and doing business—down to the last corner. Today, over seven billion people live on Earth. They all want to share in prosperity. No one can afford to focus solely on their own interests anymore, and those who do will harm themselves sooner or later. This applies to everyone: It applies to Germany, it applies to our neighbors, it even applies to a large and powerful country like the United States of America, as well as to China and Russia. We are all, and increasingly so, interconnected—Russia included.

This is expressed, for example, in annual German-Russian government consultations, the Petersburg Dialogue, the German-Russian Raw Materials Forum, more than 20 bilateral agreements between Russia and the European Union, the Baltic Sea Council, our cooperation with Russia within the framework of the G8 and G20, the NATO-Russia Council, negotiation mandates in the Middle East peace process and in the nuclear talks with Iran, and much, much more.

All of this is lived globalization in the 21st century. It is an expression of the realization that we all in Europe and beyond must face the great challenges together. It is an expression of the fact that each of us alone achieves less than we do together.

This, dear colleagues, is the context in which we are experiencing a conflict over spheres of influence and territorial claims, as we did in 2008 in Georgia and now in the heart of Europe, in Ukraine, a conflict that we thought had been overcome. That it is clearly not overcome is already shown by three pieces of news from the last 14 days:

February 27. The Crimean parliament appoints a new government in a closed session and calls for a referendum on the future status of the region, initially planned for May 25. This was then moved forward to March 30 and finally to March 16. This is a violation of the Ukrainian constitution, which does not allow secession referendums in individual parts of the country without the consent of the state as a whole.

March 1. The Federation Council of Russia agrees, at the request of President Putin, in a precautionary resolution to a military operation in Crimea, after Russia had previously, as it is said, requested assistance.

March 11. The Crimean parliament declares the independence of Crimea from Ukraine, thereby circumventing the prohibition of secession referendums stipulated in the Ukrainian constitution.

It is evident: The territorial integrity and thus the state unity of Ukraine are openly called into question and violated. In a phase of great uncertainty in Ukraine, Russia has not proven to be a partner for stability in the historically, culturally, and economically closely connected neighboring country, but rather exploits its given weakness. The right of the stronger is placed above the strength of law, unilateral geopolitical interests over understanding and cooperation. This is acting according to the patterns of the 19th and 20th centuries in the 21st century. For once again: No one, least of all the European Union or countries like the United States of America or even Russia, can afford today in the 21st century to focus solely on their own interests. If they do, they will harm themselves sooner or later.

It is undoubtedly distressing what we are currently experiencing in the heart of Europe. I fear we will need to have a long breath to resolve the conflict. But we can resolutely take on this central challenge for Europe. It is about the territorial integrity of a European neighboring country, about respect for the principles of the United Nations, about principles and methods of interest reconciliation in the 21st century.

Because in these days, some are drawing comparisons with the Kosovo conflict—perhaps even in this debate—I would like to make a brief side note. After the international community had more or less passively watched the so-called ethnic cleansing wars of Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia for years, after sanctions and negotiations had shown no effect, NATO decided to intervene militarily without a UN mandate, also because Russia had blocked any resolution of the UN Security Council for a UN mandate. To be clear: The situation back then is in no way comparable to that in Ukraine today.

However, if I am already engaging in this, in my view, shameful comparison, then the following must fundamentally apply: Russia's actions in Ukraine clearly represent a breach of fundamental principles of international law. This would not be relativized by the existence of other violations of international law. It remains a breach of international law in the heart of Europe, which we cannot simply move on from and which we have not moved on from.

In this tense and dangerous situation, we must find ways out of the crisis. The conflict cannot be resolved militarily. I say to all those who are afraid and worried: Military action is not an option for us.

The policy of the Federal Government and our partners in the European Union and the United States of America follows a politically-economic threefold approach:

First. We are working intensively for the establishment of an international observer mission and a contact group or coordination group; you can call it what you want. We are thus working towards a political-diplomatic way out of the crisis.

The goal of the observer mission would be to verify claims and achieve an objective picture of the situation throughout Ukraine. The goal of a contact group would be to establish a communication channel between Moscow and Kyiv with the mediation of international partners. In such discussions, all the topics that have led to the current conflict or could further inflame it in the future must be put on the table. Of course, this would also involve autonomy rights for Crimea and language issues. However, one thing must be unequivocally clear: The territorial integrity of Ukraine is not up for negotiation. In this context, it should be expressly mentioned: Other states, such as the Republic of Moldova or Georgia, also deserve our solidarity in this situation.

Second. At their meeting on March 6, 2014, the heads of state and government of the European Union decided on extensive aid for Ukraine. We welcomed the support program presented by the Commission with a total volume of eleven billion euros. This also includes measures from the European development banks EIB and EBRD. Quick assistance is now required. Close coordination with the IMF for EU support is also essential. An IMF and an EU delegation are already on the ground in Kyiv to get a complete picture of the situation in Ukraine and to develop initial proposals for a possible support and reform program.

Last week in Brussels, we also jointly decided to soon sign the political part of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine, which provides important impulses, especially in the area of the rule of law. Some of the economic benefits of the comprehensive free trade area laid out in the agreement will be made accessible by the EU in the short term through unilateral trade facilitation measures such as tariff reductions.

In this situation, it is also extremely important to promote contacts between people. We want to accelerate negotiations on visa facilitation for Ukraine. The EU is also ready to support Ukraine in strengthening its energy security, for example, through greater diversification of energy sources and transport routes and through modernization measures.

However, signals of solidarity from person to person will also be very important—especially in Eastern Ukraine. Existing city partnerships—there are quite a few of them—and other civil society contacts can play a very important role here. I would like to encourage German cities, as well as schools, universities, and associations with partners in Ukraine, to deepen contact during this special time and to see if practical assistance is possible.

We support the transitional government in Kyiv in being a government for all Ukrainians. It is about overcoming divides, taking first steps towards economic stabilization, and enabling free and fair elections in May. Ukraine should continue to be a place of peaceful coexistence for all its citizens, regardless of whether they speak Ukrainian, Russian, Tatar, or one of the other languages, and regardless of their faith.

If this path of transition can be successfully navigated, then the European offer of a reform partnership, as laid out in the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, can be fulfilled. The objective is closely intertwined with the expectations that emerged in the protests on Maidan: strengthening the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, more transparency, less corruption, and further reduction of trade restrictions. This offer of modernization is an approach of neighborhood policy, not geopolitics. It is not directed against anyone.

In this context, I repeat what I said in my government statement on the EU summit on the Eastern Partnership on November 18 of last year here in the German Bundestag, namely, that neither the Eastern Partnership nor the bilateral contractual relations that the EU wants to conclude with its partners are directed against Russia.

We must—as I said back then—continue to work towards ensuring that there is no either-or between the rapprochement of the Eastern Partnership countries with the EU and Russia's efforts for a closer partnership with these countries.

The events of these weeks seem to sweep this aside: Nevertheless, it remains correct to leave no stone unturned in pursuing exactly this approach, for which the EU has made concrete proposals.

By the way, both Russia benefited from the strengthening and modernization of the economies of our Eastern European partners. Therefore, it is of course also part of our approach to talk to Russia about perceived disadvantages from a Ukrainian association for Ukrainian-Russian trade. This includes working with Russia on solutions to unresolved conflicts in our common neighborhood. This would also include discussing a new economic agreement with Russia.

Third. However, it is also true: In the event that Russia is not willing to return to the path of cooperation and law, in the event that Russia remains unwilling to contribute to de-escalation, the heads of state and government of the European Union at their meeting last week in Brussels established three stages for their further course of action.

In a first stage, we have suspended negotiations on a new agreement on the foundations of EU relations with Russia and on visa issues. If negotiations with Russia do not take place in the very near future, and negotiations that produce results and in which not just time is being played, then the foreign ministers of the EU member states will decide on further measures at their council meeting next Monday, March 17, 2014, as a second stage. These include entry bans, account freezes, and the cancellation of the EU-Russia summit.

Dear colleagues, I believe it is on behalf of all of you that I take this opportunity to thank our Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. I thank him for his tireless efforts in seemingly endless, unfortunately also frustrating discussions, but never relenting in our joint efforts to find a way out of the crisis.

It goes without saying that the next regular meeting of the Heads of State and Government will, in addition to the long-planned agenda items on climate and energy issues, also address the further developments in Ukraine.

In the event that Russia continues to destabilize the situation in Ukraine – we are also seeing worrying developments in Eastern Ukraine – the Heads of State and Government agreed at their meeting on March 6 to a third stage of measures that we would be prepared to take. These could affect economic cooperation with Russia in various ways.

To make it unequivocally clear: None of us wishes for such measures to be necessary. However, we would all be ready and determined to take them if they become unavoidable. We all, that is, the 28 member states of the European Union in close coordination with our transatlantic partners and within the G7. Together, we also decided in the G7 last week to suspend our participation in the preparatory processes for the G8 summit planned for June until an environment is created in which meaningful discussions within the G8 framework can take place again.

If Russia continues its course of the past weeks, it would not only be a catastrophe for Ukraine. We would not only perceive it as a threat as neighboring states of Russia. It would not only change the relationship of the European Union as a whole with Russia. No, it would also, and I am deeply convinced of this, massively harm Russia, both economically and politically. Because – I cannot say it often enough and emphatically enough – the clock cannot be turned back. Conflicts of interest in the middle of Europe in the 21st century can only be successfully overcome if we do not revert to patterns of the 19th and 20th centuries. They can only be overcome if we act with the principles and means of our time, the 21st century.

Developing geopolitical strength can only be successfully achieved with the principles and means of our time. For all of us in Europe and the world – including Russia – this path opens up so many more opportunities than risks. This follows the three fold approach of our actions as a federal government: dialogue, assistance, and sanctions, as Germany takes the next steps in close coordination with our partners in the current crisis. For this, I ask for your support.