Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the NATO Summit before the German Bundestag on March 26, 2009, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

26 March 2009 · Government statement on the NATO Summit (anniversary summit, 60th anniversary of the alliance) · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on March 26, 2009, ahead of the NATO 60th anniversary summit co-hosted by Germany and France.
Main themes
NATO 60th anniversary summit, transatlantic partnership, German-French relations, Franco-German cooperation, NATO strategic concept revision, European security and defense policy, peace and freedom, Germany's reunification legacy, France's reintegration into NATO structures, Afghanistan and ISAF, Iran nuclear program, Obama's first visit to Europe
Duration
~32 min
85th percentile
Words
3,871
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Sentences
206
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Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
11.6
40th percentile
Syntax
2.89
32nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
43rd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 81%79%
  • Ceremonial 9%9%
  • Institutional 8%8%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

206 sentences in 61 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

We are pleased that Germany, together with France, will host the NATO summit at the end of next week, the anniversary summit marking the 60th anniversary of the alliance.

There is no doubt in my mind: It will not only be an anniversary summit, but above all a future-oriented summit, a summit where the course for future work in the transatlantic partnership and also with regard to our united Europe must be set. This summit will also be a milestone for German-French relations.

I am very keen that we properly contextualize this summit today. Perhaps a quote from an interview that Albania's Prime Minister Berisha gave to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung last Monday can help us with that. When asked what NATO would actually bring to Albania, he replied – I quote:

"The goal of NATO is for enemies to become friends. It is a great victory that the once hardest communist country in the world is now part of the western alliance."

In these few words, the historical dimension of the upcoming summit for NATO's 60th birthday becomes clear. We should never forget this historical dimension, even if it is in the past – especially not us in Germany.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, living in peace and freedom in reunified Germany and in Europe has become quite natural for us today. But this naturalness should not creep too much into our thinking and actions. For it is and remains a treasure to live in peace and freedom.

For peace and freedom, no organization has stood as clearly and reliably as the North Atlantic Alliance over the past 60 years – especially in difficult times. I think the memory of the wall and barbed wire is enough for us to say today, across all party lines: Germany owes much to NATO and the solidarity of our allies.

Despite all the truly significant problems, we can state in this year of anniversaries: Reunified Germany is celebrating 20 years of German and European happiness.

President Sarkozy and I have been convinced from the very beginning: Few places symbolize the meaning and purpose of European and Atlantic peace policy as much as the bridge over the Rhine. Right there, where Germans and French faced each other as bitter enemies for centuries, we are now united in close friendship and committed to peace on our continent.

For the first time, Germany and France will jointly host a NATO summit. This is also concretely linked to a series of joint, future-oriented steps between our countries in security policy.

On the sidelines of the Security Conference in Munich, President Sarkozy and I agreed that in the future, the Franco-German Brigade will be stationed in both countries. In light of our history, it is a truly admirable gesture from the French President that German soldiers, as he said in Munich, are invited to France. Thank you very much for that!

In recent days, President Sarkozy has brought his country back into NATO's integrated structures. This is a step by France whose significance we cannot overestimate. It is a commitment to a NATO in the 21st century. At the same time, the French presidency last year, together with us, advocated for strengthening European security and defense policy, because we see these two points – European security and defense policy and the transatlantic alliance – as part of a common line and a common direction.

For the Federal Government, a strong Atlantic security partnership and a European security policy are inseparably linked. I predict that this interconnection will become even more pronounced in the coming years, perhaps even must. We are, of course, pleased that on the occasion of this NATO summit, the newly elected American President Barack Obama will be in Europe and Germany for the first time as President.

At the Munich Security Conference in February, I said: The transatlantic partnership means that we analyze together, decide together, and, whenever possible, also act together. We Europeans are aware, on the one hand, of the magnitude of the challenges and the urgency of the crises, whether it is the Middle East conflict, Afghanistan, or Iran's nuclear program. On the other hand, we are equally aware of the opportunities that lie in a trusting and strong transatlantic partnership when it has to prove itself in concrete politics.

What can we expect from this NATO summit? First and foremost: NATO needs to adapt its strategy to the new challenges; for the current strategic concept of NATO dates back to 1999. Since then, we have gained a wealth of new experiences. Representative of these are September 11, 2001, and the subsequent ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Therefore, the summit must mandate the revision of the strategic concept to make it clear: NATO is not only satisfied with looking back on a 60-year success story, but is also ready to redefine its course for the future. At its core, it must be about strategically connecting the essential tasks of the alliance.

At the center of the alliance will, of course, continue to be the commitment to the solidarity of the member states. An attack on one member is an attack on the alliance as a whole; that is the agreement. This agreement remains the essence of the alliance. This commitment to solidarity today requires new measures, different steps than before, for example, operations outside the alliance's territory. This new strategic concept must connect to this operational reality: it must represent and unfold it and draw the consequences from it.

This new operational reality requires a new understanding of security and the establishment of security. We call this new concept – I believe it is accepted across party lines – the fundamental principle of interconnected security. This fundamental principle of interconnected security must find its way into the strategic orientation of the alliance.

I believe that the example of Afghanistan makes it clear to everyone that success is only possible if NATO, with its military means, is part of a comprehensive and coherent approach to stabilize the country. This approach includes the full range of civilian actions and measures for the good development of the country. This fundamental understanding that we have now developed in Afghanistan will not be an isolated case in the future, but must become the strategic common good of NATO, that is, the alliance.

The success of NATO will increasingly depend on its ability to network its military instruments with various partners, such as other organizations involved in political crisis resolution. NATO must define this relationship. It does not simply stand above these organizations, but is part of an interconnected security, for example, with the United Nations, with the OSCE, with the European Union, or with the African Union, as well as with civilian forces in development policy or with non-governmental organizations. This may sound simple, but it is comparatively revolutionary, both on the side of those conducting military operations and on the side of those engaged in the civilian sector. Therefore, this must be implemented, developed, and then brought to life.

I would like to add: The strategic concept must also clearly outline the limits of the alliance's sphere of influence. I see no global NATO. The alliance is and remains primarily focused on the collective security of the North Atlantic partners. However, this does mean that it must secure security, if necessary, outside its alliance territory. But this does not mean that states around the globe can become members; rather, this will be done by member states from the transatlantic area.

Now, as always, some warn against discussing the strategic concept too intensively, as different views of the allies may emerge. I believe we should not be afraid of this; the alliance can already draw on a strong tradition of reform. Many important suggestions have been taken up from outside in the past. We should take this path again this time. Therefore, the Federal Government advocates that the Secretary General be supported by a group of distinguished experts in the development of the new concept.

We need an unobstructed view of what is strategically necessary, and it must be clear from the outset that NATO must also make its structures fit for the tasks of the future. Unlike during the Cold War, when the essential point was deterrence, and NATO forces fortunately did not have to become militarily active, we now have operations to manage in which military activities are necessary. When you hear the complaints of the NATO Secretary General about how difficult it is to gather equipment and similar resources, it becomes clear that such a strategic concept must also fulfill very practical tasks.

The tasks arise equally in Europe and America from the new challenges we face. We must today think about the parallelism of difficult, often regionally destabilizing conflicts, the dangers of transnational terrorism, increasing proliferation risks, the security policy implications of environmental problems, the securing of our energy supply, or questions of access to limited resources. Neither America nor Europe can master these challenges alone. No country in the world can solve problems alone today. This must be the foundation of our cooperation.

Because these challenges are so diverse, it is of course also NATO's task to do everything possible to ensure that as much prevention is carried out in the world as possible, so that we do not reach the point where only military means can help. This is also a very important approach.

Our future security and our life in peace and freedom will therefore depend crucially on two things:

first,

on how closely we Europeans shape our cohesion with North Americans, and second, on whether we can jointly shape the major future issues of the global economy, security, and the environment.

Against this background, the decision to revise NATO's strategic concept will be the overarching task of this NATO summit. The strategic concept is to be completed by the next NATO summit. So it will not be an endless task.

In addition to the development of the strategic concept, there are also four other things that I would like to mention here.

First:

Afghanistan – we all know – is the most important current test for NATO. Let us keep in mind just two numbers: NATO currently has about 70,000 soldiers in various operations, of which around 50,000 are deployed in Afghanistan. Next week, we will hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of the ISAF troop-contributing nations and representatives of other organizations engaged in Afghanistan in The Hague, to give this topic ample space at the summit of the alliance. We expect, above all, insights into the new strategic lines in the United States' Afghanistan policy. For me, our fundamental goal remains clear, by which we must also measure success: Afghanistan must not again pose a terrorist threat to our security, that is, to the member states of NATO. That is the task. We must work together with all other partners and organizations that are active there, and above all with the Afghans themselves, to ensure that the country can permanently provide for its own security.

We should remember: Afghanistan, as a country with unstable state structures, was the starting point and breeding ground for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Because there was no functioning state there, this was possible. This is where our engagement for Afghanistan originated; for it threatened our security, the security of the member states of NATO.

Now we know that we must build effective state structures. We know that this requires determination. But we have also experienced that it requires more patience than we may have initially imagined. I will advocate at the summit for the two essential principles of our presence to be realized even better.

On the one hand, NATO must further intertwine its engagement with that of other organizations. I therefore explicitly support – as does the entire federal government – the work of the UN representative Kai Eide for better overall coordination of all civilian activities. There is still much to be done here. We should continually encourage the United Nations that this is of crucial importance. Our principle remains correct: There will be no lasting security without reconstruction, and there will be no reconstruction without security.

On the other hand, it is particularly important to further strengthen the self-responsibility of the Afghans. For me, this primarily means that we must hold the Afghan leadership even more accountable, so that they do everything, but truly everything, to govern their country well and efficiently, to combat crime, and above all to tackle the unspeakable drug trade with all their might. This is an expectation we have of Afghanistan.

As an alliance, we will do everything to ensure that the upcoming elections in Afghanistan proceed well and successfully. I explicitly welcome the fact that the American government is now also involving Pakistan in its strategy. I would like to remind you that the Federal Foreign Minister initiated this during our G8 presidency. However, it will now be very important for us to find the right balance between the aspects that must be strategically coherent between Pakistan and Afghanistan, without forgetting that not all problems of Pakistan are also problems of Afghanistan. They remain two different countries.

I also welcome the American approach to focus more on good development in the regions of Afghanistan. This fits well with our concept already practiced in the German area of responsibility in the north, which connects security with the strengthening of local and regional developments, as the Defense Minister made clear during his last trip.

I want to emphasize one thing in this context: With our previous achievements in Afghanistan since 2002, we Germans can truly hold our heads high within the alliance. The federal government and the Bundestag have already decided in recent months to further increase the troop strength of the Bundeswehr within the framework of our valid mandate in the north. In police building, we remain committed to further strengthening our contingent. Beyond the security sector, we remain engaged in Afghanistan with significant resources and important projects, as we have been for years. I will emphasize this at the summit with all due urgency. I believe we can be proud of our achievements.

At this point, I would like to explicitly thank all the soldiers, police officers, development workers, and diplomats. They are doing an excellent job in their difficult and dangerous tasks. We bow before those who have suffered serious injuries or even lost their lives in Afghanistan. I believe I speak on behalf of all of you when I say this.

In recent weeks, a debate has been held about with whom we can cooperate in Afghanistan and with whom we cannot. My view is that we can work with anyone who unequivocally renounces terror, violence, and cowardly attacks against representatives of the international community. We must work more closely with those who want to rebuild their country, who respect the essential principles of the rule of law, whatever they may call themselves. This applies especially to the regional tribal leaders. However, those who oppose reconstruction, who threaten with violence and terror, and who trample on essential human rights cannot be our partners. We must consistently combat them together with the Afghans.

Secondly:

An important topic at the summit will be the alliance's relations with our partners in the east, particularly with Russia. We want to welcome two countries, Albania and Croatia, as new members at the summit. I am confident that the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia will not thwart our plans. I hope that the accession of Macedonia will also be possible in the near future and will no longer be hindered by a name issue. I mention this explicitly because the accession process remains important to me, and I do not want us to lose sight of it. I state explicitly: Georgia and Ukraine retain a perspective for membership. The fact that more and more countries are voluntarily seeking to join the alliance demonstrates the attractiveness of NATO.

I continue to fully support the idea that we should admit European democracies that are willing and able to contribute to our common security. We Germans know well that the free choice of alliances is a valuable asset. We must not allow others, due to their outdated thinking in spheres of influence, to block this with a veto.

In our relations with Russia, we will formally decide at the summit to resume cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. The foreign ministers of the alliance have already prepared this important step. As Atlantic partners, we rely on Russia to behave cooperatively. NATO partners and Russia face many of the same security threats. We should discuss these openly in the NATO-Russia Council in a spirit of good cooperation. I am very convinced that we have the opportunity to find common answers, whether it is to protect against future long-range missiles from regimes like Iran, or in matters of proliferation or disarmament and arms control. I will discuss these issues in detail with President Medvedev next week. We will also talk about his proposals for a European security architecture.

When it comes to architecture, one must, as the saying goes, first take care of the foundation. The foundation in security policy is always trust. This trust must be solidified, especially with regard to Russia.

If we take a look at the situation, we find that the deficits do not lie in the rules we have for security policy in Europe, which were jointly agreed upon with Russia in the OSCE. If there is a deficit, it is a deficit in implementation, meaning in the rules that are lived and not in the rules that are written. From my perspective, some conflicts are quickly and easily solvable. I would like to remind you, for example, of the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria. Moscow could send a signal of goodwill here. That would advance us significantly on many issues.

I state explicitly: The federal government wants a good and trusting partnership with Russia. This is in Germany's interest, it is in Europe's interest, and it is also in the Atlantic interest. Russia already plays an important role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council already exist as forums. I propose that we also establish regular consultations with Russia in the context of the Common European Security and Defense Policy.

It is also in Germany's interest that the dialogue between the new American administration and Russia is revitalized. There is a chance that a close and good partnership will develop now. I state explicitly: NATO wants Russia as a good partner. We have not been adversaries for 20 years. The Cold War is irrevocably over.

Thirdly:

I explicitly support the initiatives of the Federal Foreign Minister to strengthen NATO's profile in the areas of disarmament and arms control. We made important decisions on this at our last summit in Bucharest. I hope that we can confirm and expand these. The prospects for this may be better than they have been in a long time. We can hope for progress in the nuclear field soon, particularly regarding agreements to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and possibly also regarding the American government's stance on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Allow me to make a remark here about nuclear sharing. We should be careful not to confuse the goal and the path. I remain committed to the goal of the complete abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. Approaching this goal responsibly means setting the right milestones and, above all, establishing watertight verification mechanisms to which all must adhere.

NATO has already reduced its nuclear potential by about 95 percent compared to 1989 and has lowered the readiness structures of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we note that the number of nuclear actors and arsenals, as well as the risks of proliferation, have increased worldwide. Therefore, this is one of the major security risks that we must confront decisively and resolutely. This is one of the tasks in which Germany has a fundamental interest. The federal government has therefore anchored nuclear sharing in the alliance in the White Paper because we know that it secures us influence within the alliance, even in this highly sensitive area.

In the conventional realm, maintaining the CFE system is a major concern of the federal government. Here, the Atlantic partners must jointly convince Russia of the benefits of a cooperative policy. It is therefore very important that a conference is soon held at the Foreign Office to revive and advance this CFE process. I think it is good that the Federal Foreign Minister is making this a topic for Germany so that we can push the right path forward.

Fourthly:

I also hope for progress at the summit for cooperation between NATO and the European Union. The potential for utilizing synergies is great. The respective policies, including in European security and defense policy, have been launched and strengthened. But the truth is: We must overcome a multitude of blockades. To name it directly: The unresolved conflicts between Cyprus and Turkey repeatedly lead to difficulties in every practical matter where close cooperation between NATO and European security policy would be necessary.

We should resolutely and jointly work towards making this cooperation between the EU and NATO a reality; whether in Kosovo or in other missions, where we spend hours and hours trying to solve some practical problem.

The multitude of tasks associated with the NATO anniversary summit is unmistakable. One thing we politicians should not forget: This meeting in Strasbourg, Kehl, and Baden-Baden should be able to take place in the planned form. This is thanks in no small part to those who, through their work, ensure the safe conduct of this summit. I mean the security authorities of the federal and state governments and also our French colleagues. They are working together with great commitment and professionalism. We should thank them today.

I would like to add explicitly: All those who wish to express their opinion against NATO's policies have my respect, as long as they adhere to the rules of our free constitutional state in expressing their protest. I hope they also remember that it was NATO that guaranteed peace and freedom in and for Germany for decades and thus was and is a guarantor of the right to freedom of opinion and demonstration that they enjoy today.

We want to be good hosts for the NATO summit. I therefore thank everyone involved in the preparations: the federal ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior, the state government of Baden-Württemberg, the security authorities of the federal and state governments, and especially the people in Baden-Baden, Kehl, and Strasbourg, who will certainly be good hosts.

I hope that the summit will sharpen all our awareness of the necessity of a security policy that is shaped by good partnerships in our globalized world and protects peace and freedom for all of us. Peace and freedom will also be the focus of the transatlantic community of values of NATO in the coming years and decades. Germany will contribute to this.