Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the reception of the Association of German Banks on March 23, 2009, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

24 March 2009 · annual reception of the Federal Association of German Banks · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the annual reception of the Federal Association of German Banks in Berlin on March 23, 2009, marking a leadership transition and responding to the global financial crisis.
Main themes
Global financial crisis, banking sector stabilization, international economic coordination, German Financial Market Stabilization Act, social market economy, globalization, state intervention in markets, leadership transition at Association of German Banks, lessons from past crises
Duration
~25 min
75th percentile
Words
2,987
75th percentile
Sentences
163
83rd percentile
Readability
57
80th percentile
Grade
9.8
18th percentile
Syntax
2.85
27th percentile
Vocabulary
1.96
7th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 65%64%
  • Ceremonial 16%15%
  • Institutional 14%14%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

163 sentences in 44 paragraphs

Dear Professor Weber,

dear President Müller,

dear Mr. Schmitz,

dear colleagues from the German Bundestag,

esteemed guests,

ladies and gentlemen,

we have gathered here today for the annual reception of the Federal Association of German Banks on a very special occasion: Mr. Müller is being honored as the president of this association. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to him!

The "Süddeutsche Zeitung" once said of you that you are a "gifted communicator." I wholeheartedly agree.

First,

I have mostly understood what you have told me.

Second,

I found that you have articulated much that is reasonable, good, and important for the community of our country, and you have been an important voice, namely the voice of the Federal Association of German Banks.

You have long-standing experience as a banker, you have done important work as the association's president, and you care about corporate governance in our country. This means you have devoted a lot of time to the common good and entrepreneurial activity. For that, a heartfelt thank you! I suspect that there is still much awaiting you. You will not be bored in the future either.

Now we meet to also welcome a new president today. Dear Mr. Schmitz, all good wishes to you! We are ready for intensive and good cooperation, as is tradition. Here’s to good discussions in hopefully less critical times!

The last time I was with you was in 2006 on the occasion of your annual reception. This year, in 2009, much is different than it was back then. In the meantime, over the last few months, we have experienced a crisis of the international banking system, the international financial markets, and also a crisis of the international economy, which affects all parts of the world. Germany cannot exempt itself from this, especially since we, as the world champion in exports, are of course closely intertwined with international mechanisms.

We are experiencing in these months that globalization will provoke entirely new political actions and mechanisms that will become much more normal for us after this crisis than they perhaps were before, and which we already knew in many areas. But now it has become clear how important it is to act internationally coordinated and as quickly as possible together.

The good news in this crisis is perhaps that we have now understood – if that was not already the case before – how important financial institutions and functioning financial cycles are. I still say: I would not have needed the crisis to experience this importance. But it has been brought to all our attention. The bad news is that it is a crisis that has been caused by understandable, partly already recognizable misdevelopments.

We experienced an Asian crisis in the 1990s. Some of what we are seeing now could also be observed there in its early stages. After September 11, 2001, we had a longing for economic growth not to collapse globally. Certain mechanisms were employed for this, which in turn had repercussions on financial products. Therefore, it is not the case that one could not have sensed some of this. For me, at least, it is clear that we now know enough to do everything possible to ensure that it does not come to that again. I ask you, who are active in financial institutions and the financial sector, for your assistance.

We have a lot of technical tasks to accomplish. We have completed some quickly. We have been able to prove within a week that the Federal Republic of Germany, as a federal state, is capable of acting swiftly. None of us had expected that an entire sector of the economy – in this case, the financial services sector – would come to us and say: Only you, the state, can help us now. I do not want to have that experience too often; I tell you that. We helped. And this help was provided quickly. It was coordinated internationally. It demonstrated the functionality of our community of the federal government and the states as well as the Bundestag. I believe it is a reassuring feeling that our Federal Republic of Germany is capable of acting even in its 60th year of existence when it matters.

In everything we did with the Financial Market Stabilization Act, our aim was to make the market economy more livable again and to restore its self-healing powers in a situation where the self-healing forces of market mechanisms were no longer sufficient. Nothing more and nothing less.

The origins of the social market economy essentially arose from the need to draw lessons from the world economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s, which stated that there are situations in which state action must ensure that the forces of the markets can work again. But – and I say this too – these are, of course, only exceptional situations. The goal is solely to make the mechanisms of market forces functional again.

Mr. Weber, you just beautifully said: As much market as possible and as much state as necessary. – Ironically added: The bankers say how they would like it. This is the crux of the entire political debate these days: When is the market possible and when is the state necessary? There have been situations where, after six hours of deliberation on whether the state is really necessary, those who actually operate in the market urged: Now it must happen quickly. There will likely be situations again where we will say that we want to do something on the part of the state, but you will say again: No, let us do this first. I am waiting for that day because it would bring me a certain satisfaction.

In Germany and also internationally – as we have seen today with the events in the United States – there is still the situation that we need to find rescue aid for certain financial institutions. We have agreed internationally not to allow any systemic institution, as it is nicely called, to go bankrupt. This is precisely a non-market promise, a suspension of the market economy, from which consequences arise that do not fit into the mechanisms of the market economy. By making this promise, we have prevented a repeat of what once happened to Lehman Brothers. I believe there are good reasons for us to have done this internationally.

We have begun with the work of the SoFFin. The situation has developed such that things are slightly better today. But as far as the functionality of the banks is concerned, it is still not as good as it should be.

Germany is a special case. The BdB does not represent all financial institutions that exist in our country. We have a three-pillar model: savings banks, state banks – I do not want to say much about them today, except that there is still much to be done – the cooperative banks, and the area of private banks. We certainly need to discuss how we can get the cycles moving again now that there is no longer an acute existential threat and what politics still needs to contribute to this.

Certainly, the most challenging area is that of non-marketable or non-marketable assets – the so-called bad assets – which poses a significant political challenge for us. This is not only the case in Germany but also in other countries. I do not want to go into the various models now. The BdB has presented one to us. We must ensure politically that, in the interest of fairness, we do not reach a point where taxpayers bear the bad risks while privately operating banks ultimately have the good opportunities.

That is why there are countries where it is relatively easy to talk about nationalization or state ownership. I think it is good that our overall societal discussion is somewhat more cautious. But it is true: If we are to achieve a fair distribution of burdens, we cannot avoid a certain influence of the state or at least a certain promise that after a longer period, the privately operating entities must also be willing to return part of the good to the taxpayer if the taxpayer has helped to undertake something in a bad time.

How to deal with products that have no price is also an intriguing question – probably still for legions of doctoral students in economics. How do I form prices? I am very curious to see how, for example, the American model will work and whether it will be possible to sell the somewhat more difficult things with private incentives. These are new experiences we must make. We cannot shy away from the topic, otherwise we will have a much longer period before the banks can regain their full strength.

We need to think about how we can avoid pro-cyclical effects in this crisis, which has now also become an economic crisis. That is why I strongly advocated at the European Council last week that we not only agree on how to prepare for crises in the future with the Basel II agreement, which I otherwise hold in high regard and which, unfortunately, is not quite as appreciated by our American friends, but that we also do everything possible during the acute crisis to ensure that the already meager credit volume does not shrink even further due to the effects of Basel II. I hope that the actors will take action here. I have a heartfelt request to you: Talk to the committees responsible for this! Urge them to act quickly! We are in discussions with the Commission. Something must happen at this point because, in the coming months, this topic will be of utmost importance in my view.

We will certainly also think about – I want to add this right away – that as a counterpart, the corporate tax reform we passed has elements that are very pro-cyclical. I mention the topics of interest limitation and shell company sales. Here too, we must ensure that we do not create further burdens on an already poorly growing or declining economy. This is a task that I want to emphasize. It is currently not easy in the coalition. But you can also exert influence here.

I will always emphasize – I must also say this – that even when the Americans constantly change their accounting rules, we must strive for a uniform competitive field, otherwise we will have a very hard time in the European Union and in the European area.

We need a new financial market architecture. This will be the subject of negotiations in London at the beginning of April. I thank you for saying: No financial product, no financial center, no institution without transparency and regulation. But I believe it will also be important to find the right level of oversight. Oversight also requires globally operating actors. This is a process that many countries find very, very difficult because it involves giving up a piece of sovereignty. We Europeans are used to having part of our decisions made in Brussels. Others in the world are not. But global economic activity will require this as well.

We need intelligent rules that do not require every product to be approved by state institutions, but rather rules that balance themselves with capital protection and risk, thereby unleashing self-regulatory forces again. I believe we are on a very good path here.

The idea that one could appear on a list if one evades certain requirements of the international community has already had wondrous effects as an idea. I hope that this continues and that in the end we may not need so many lists anymore.

But I believe we would be falling short if we were to say after establishing a new financial market architecture: That’s it. For me, the causes of the crisis as we have it now lie not only in the laxity and perhaps also in the excesses of the markets in the financial sector. While that is true, I also suspect that some people were very well aware of the risks they were taking. But ultimately, we must ask ourselves: What have we done politically to create a suitable regulatory framework?

I am very grateful that you reminded us that during the G8 presidency, we made timid attempts for a better regulatory framework, which were quite brusquely rejected by other actors. Behind this, of course, lay something that ultimately manifests itself in the economic imbalances of the world, namely the fact that our desire to create economic growth through certain, so to speak, easy money, which may not be entirely real and always stands a little above the actual realities, has driven us into ever higher risks.

Therefore, it is not so easy to say in dealing with the banks: Now, please do exactly what you did before the crisis, Mr. Blessing, Mr. Ackermann – and however else you are called – because we have helped you now. The bankers rightly say: If we are not to take certain risks anymore, that will have consequences; it will not be the same as it was before. This means we will have to think more deeply about what the long-term and sustainable growth forces are worldwide.

This brings me to a point that will occupy us in the coming years. I say deliberately that it will occupy us for years. We will be able to solve the problem with the banks in a manageable timeframe. But the questions of how we achieve sustainable growth, how the cards will be dealt in the world after this crisis, which countries will emerge strengthened and which will not, are still unanswered. When I say, "I want Germany to come out of this crisis stronger than it went in," it also means that we must significantly strengthen growth forces and that we must, of course, do everything we can to further develop what is innovative and creative in our country strongly during this crisis. We see in all the economic stimulus programs being launched worldwide that investments are being made very specifically and precisely in future-oriented areas. There is still much discussion needed in Germany.

In a second area, much discussion is still needed, and I ask you, who are gathered here in this room. We as politicians have to manage the crisis politically in a certain way. But above all, we have to provide answers to people whose sense of justice has been profoundly shaken. The success of this country, also the success that they can work in this country and have their home here, naturally depends on entrepreneurs, on the willingness to take risks. But it also depends on the cohesion of our community.

The social market economy has undergone many tests in recent years, perhaps two decades, because the certainties of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and perhaps even the 1980s no longer apply today. In the past, the matter was relatively clear: If my company is doing well, I, as an employee, am doing well too. With increasing globalization, this has become more and more disconnected. Many employees have already experienced: My company can be doing great, and yet I can lose my job.

Now we have experienced a second shock. This is not the shock that savings deposits are not secured – we could expect that as savers – but the shock that incredibly large amounts are necessary to support a system that has fallen into crisis. These are amounts that we have at best quantified as half or a quarter when we described an annual budget or when we talked about our gross domestic product. But these are not amounts that we have ever realistically approached individual institutions with and distributed.

At this point, of course, people are very reluctant to understand this – and I find that to be right. That is why it is so important – and this is my request to the new president, to the old president, and to all who operate in this area – that perhaps we talk about this a bit more strongly and perhaps also longer than you think, and that you also understand what a burden has been caused by the industry – what I say has nothing to do with individual guilt – by financial market actors. This is necessary to regain an understanding and a common foundation for the continuation of the social market economy. That is what I want. That is what the entire federal government wants. That is what the people who believe in this country want.

This also means that one should not let defensive mechanisms come into play with every proposal, but rather that one simply tries to understand a bit what kind of upheaval is currently taking place. This runs deep. It will not be over in one, two, or three days. You all know how the course of the crisis is. The recovery will not come as quickly as the downturn has come. It will take a long time. On this long journey, it will very much depend on those who bear entrepreneurial responsibility in this country to be willing to make this clear to those who are employed by them.

I say that I, that we all have had good experiences, that many are accepting the instruments we offer – short-time work and many others. But I also ask you – even if you think you have already said it three times: Engage in conversation with the people, engage in the debate, do not be so sensitive when you are criticized. We must also be able to endure this in politics. It can be done. One sharpens one's argumentation. Let us fight for a functional social market economy in our Federal Republic of Germany again! Without you, it will not work. That is why we need you! And therefore, to good cooperation!