Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the NATO Summit on July 8-9, 2016, in Warsaw before the German Bundestag on July 7, 2016, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

7 July 2016 · Government statement on the NATO Summit in Warsaw before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on July 7, 2016, delivering a government statement ahead of the NATO Warsaw Summit to outline Germany's positions on Alliance security challenges.
Main themes
NATO Warsaw Summit 2016, collective defense and deterrence, enhanced forward presence in Eastern Europe, alliance solidarity, Russia's actions in Ukraine, European security architecture, hybrid threats, NATO enlargement, Baltic states and Poland, terrorism and instability in the south, Readiness Action Plan, Germany's contributions to NATO
Duration
~26 min
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3,073
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Sentences
153
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Readability
38
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Grade
12.8
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Syntax
3.04
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Vocabulary
2.29
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Translated from German

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

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  • Geopolitical 86%86%
  • Institutional 5%5%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
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153 sentences in 46 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

We Germans owe our life in peace, freedom, and prosperity to the European post-war order. This order is based on the validity of international law, respect for territorial integrity, the recognition of state sovereignty, and the right to freely choose alliances. These principles have always been a central concern of all German governments in their actions. They are expressed not least in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In this final document of the CSCE summit in November 1990, the 35 signatory states, including the then Soviet Union, commit to – I quote – "the right of states to freely determine their security arrangements."

Since then, the peoples of Eastern Europe have also been able to participate in what has been a constitutive canon of the North Atlantic Alliance from the very beginning. This explicitly includes the freedom to choose alliances. On this basis, in 1949, the first twelve states came together to assure each other mutual assistance. And even more: In the desire for peace, freedom, and security, these states committed themselves to peacefully settle international disputes.

Each of the 28 member states today was able to decide sovereignly and freely about its membership and to commit to the same goals and values of our community. This applied in 1999 to the admission of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, as well as in 2004 to the admission of Bulgaria, the three Baltic states, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and in 2009 to the most recent admissions, namely Albania and Croatia. This process of inviting all transatlantic partners to freely choose to be part of this community is not over. We are not closing the door. I am therefore pleased that Montenegro will soon be part of this community.

When the heads of state and government of the Alliance meet tomorrow in Warsaw, it will be at a time when the security situation in and around Europe has changed significantly. In the east, Russia's actions in the Ukraine crisis have deeply unsettled our eastern allies. When the validity of law and the inviolability of borders are called into question by words and actions, trust is, of course, lost. This has particularly unsettled our alliance partners in the east. They therefore require clear reassurance from the Alliance.

But we must also note a dramatic deterioration in the security situation south of the Alliance territory. The civil war in Syria, the collapse of state order in Iraq and Libya have facilitated the spread of terrorist groups. Additionally, criminal smuggling gangs are trying to exploit the suffering of so many refugees and displaced persons for profit.

All of this presents a whole bundle of challenges. That is why the Alliance already decided on initial measures at its summit in Wales in September 2014 to enhance the defense and response capabilities of the Alliance. The sum of these measures – summarized under the heading "Readiness Action Plan" – will make the Alliance faster, more responsive, and more ready for deployment, for challenges in every direction and of every kind, that is, in a so-called 360-degree approach.

In particular, the new NATO rapid response forces, the so-called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, which can be quickly deployed throughout the entire Alliance territory, and the establishment of reception staffs with our eastern NATO partners are expressions of our lived alliance solidarity. They are just two examples of this package of measures.

Germany is making a substantial contribution to these measures. I am very grateful to our Foreign Minister and our Defense Minister, as well as to the Bundeswehr, for this contribution. This makes it clear that for us, the fundamental principles of the European security architecture remain unchanged even in times of new challenges. The alliance solidarity from Article Five of the NATO Treaty is a central pillar of this architecture. This solidarity must and will also be visible and credible in the future.

At the NATO summit beginning tomorrow in Warsaw, we will therefore complement the first adaptation measures of the Alliance decided in Wales. Elements will be added to ensure that the deterrence and defense capabilities of the Alliance are sustained and secured in the long term. At its core, it is about enabling a stronger NATO presence in the Baltic states and in Poland, that is, as it is called in NATO language, the so-called enhanced forward presence. This is important because we in the Alliance have found that it is not enough to be able to quickly deploy troops; it is also about being sufficiently present on the ground.

Therefore, the planning foresees a multilateral composition of presence. For each of the three Baltic countries and for Poland, an ally will take the lead to ensure NATO's presence there. This approach explicitly includes the response to so-called hybrid threats, that is, scenarios similar to those that Russia has employed in Ukraine, where the classic boundaries between war and peace are deliberately blurred.

For this reason, we will also make decisions on the cyber dimension at the summit. We will politically commit to strengthening national cyber defense capabilities and define cyber as an additional operational domain alongside land, air, sea, and space. The Federal Minister of Defense has already initiated corresponding measures in the organizational structure of the Bundeswehr.

In our engagement, we are guided by two central thoughts, on the one hand, Article Five of the NATO Treaty, which states:

"The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

The understanding of deterrence is meant to prevent such an attack; it is intended to help avoid a conscious confrontation. No more, but also no less. And that is a profoundly defensive concept.

On the other hand, we orient ourselves to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which we agreed with Russia in 1997 on the foundations of our cooperation. At that time, we not only explicitly renewed our support for the Charter of Paris, but also expressed our intention – I quote –

"... to develop a strong, stable, and lasting partnership based on common interest, reciprocity, and transparency."

This is part of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

We will continue to advocate for maintaining the NATO-Russia Founding Act as the basis for NATO's relationship with Russia. Because even though Russia has violated the provisions of this document through its actions against Ukraine, our values and principles are anchored in this document, which we will continue to align our actions with.

This means: deterrence and dialogue, the clear commitment to solidarity with our alliance partners in accordance with Article Five of the NATO Treaty, and the outstretched hand for dialogue are not opposites. No, they are inextricably linked.

There is also consensus among our partners in the Alliance on this. We also agree that lasting security in Europe can only be achieved with Russia and not against it. The central place for NATO's dialogue with Russia is and remains the NATO-Russia Council. It was established in 2002. Prior to that, NATO and Russia had worked together in the Permanent Joint NATO-Russia Council, which was founded on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997. In the NATO-Russia Council, NATO and Russia should come together to discuss common steps for counter-terrorism or threat analysis from ballistic missiles. It is important that this body is utilized. I am very pleased that this council was recently able to meet again, and I would like to thank the Federal Foreign Minister for his strong efforts in this regard.

It would have been sensible and good if Russia had accepted NATO's offer for another meeting before the summit beginning tomorrow, as this would have provided the opportunity to discuss the foreseeable decisions of the Alliance and to counter possible misinterpretations. However, Russia did not want such a meeting before the summit. Now the NATO-Russia Council can meet after the summit. We, for our part, have a great interest in this because we are fundamentally interested in a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia and will continue to advocate strongly for this.

Of course, the implementation of the Minsk agreements will also be crucial for further cooperation with Russia. Intensive discussions are currently taking place on this, including the preparation of local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk. Unfortunately, we must note, however, that there is still no reliable ceasefire. Therefore, the efforts of the OSCE have absolute priority here.

At the NATO summit, there will also be meetings of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the latter together with Ukrainian President Poroshenko. It would be of great significance if the NATO-Russia dialogue led to a sincere renewed effort between the nuclear powers USA and Russia to further reduce their nuclear weapons. President Obama made bold and far-reaching proposals to Russia in his speech here in Berlin, at the Brandenburg Gate, in June 2013. It would be very important if this offer were taken up. This could also open the way to real progress: to a world without nuclear weapons. That would be an important step.

Another major strategic challenge for all of us in Europe, and thus also for NATO, is of course the impact associated with the Syrian civil war, the collapse of states in Iraq and Libya, and the spread of the terrorist militia IS.

Our world today is a world in turmoil. The fanatical, Islamist terrorism of IS also threatens us in Europe. Above all, however, it brings endless suffering to the people in the region. The recent devastating attacks in Baghdad and also the attack in Dhaka once again show what inhumanity this terrorism embodies.

The terrorist acts in Brussels, in Paris, and repeatedly in Istanbul remind us that we must confront terrorism as decisively as wisely. Unfortunately, our guest today in the honor tribune, the President of the Pakistani Parliament, knows all too well what horrors terrorism can cause. This means concretely: It is a tremendous task to contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity in the crisis regions of the Near and Middle East, as well as North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a task to which NATO can also contribute. But it is not a task that can be solved by NATO alone or only with military means.

The deployment of NATO can only ever be one building block. That is precisely why the Federal Government is committed to effectively combating the root causes of flight, displacement, hopelessness, and lack of perspective. Thus, we support and stabilize the government in Iraq. We promote the negotiations of the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, and the UN Special Envoy for Libya, Martin Kobler. We lead the working group that deals with stabilization in the anti-IS alliance, together with the United Arab Emirates.

Furthermore, not least in light of the enormous scale of the refugee tragedy, we are focusing on the humanitarian dimension: at the London Syria Conference in early February as the largest single donor, as well as at the World Humanitarian Summit at the end of May in Istanbul, where we advocated for a redesign of the humanitarian system. On September 20, we will again advocate for improving the situation of refugees worldwide at a summit on refugees hosted by US President Obama in New York. Germany has taken on the co-hosting role for this meeting.

NATO, for its part, can make a concrete contribution by, for example, helping to curb the illegal and inhumane smuggling trade in the Aegean. In addition to the EU-Turkey agreement, this deployment significantly contributes to the fact that today hardly anyone dares to undertake the life-threatening journey across the Aegean, risking their lives and far too often losing them. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg advocated very early on for the Alliance to also address challenges like this in order to help overcome the crises in our southern neighborhood. We have explicitly supported him in this because the Alliance has very specific capabilities that it can deploy for exactly this purpose.

We will also make further important decisions in Warsaw regarding this:

First

We will agree on NATO training and education measures for Iraq. This is in response to a specific request from Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi. For some time now, the Alliance has been training Iraqi security forces in Jordan, particularly in the area of explosive ordnance disposal. Since 2014, Germany has been supporting the Peshmerga in northern Iraq with weapons and training, both bilaterally and as part of the anti-IS coalition. Their successes against IS also justify our efforts in this regard. The NATO training measures are to be conducted in Iraq in the future, as Iraqi security forces, which are achieving important successes in stabilizing areas liberated from IS, need training and advice closer to home.

Secondly,

The heads of state and government will declare their fundamental readiness to support the anti-IS coalition through NATO AWACS in Warsaw. Through NATO AWACS, we can meaningfully complement the deployment of our reconnaissance Tornados in Turkey's Incirlik. While the Tornados gather intelligence on IS positions, the AWACS could ensure that the airspace is properly coordinated and monitored. Especially with regard to our Tornados, the deployment of AWACS is therefore also in our own interest; because with AWACS airspace reconnaissance, our pilots would have a better situational awareness and thus more security. As soon as the details of the operational planning from NATO are available, the federal government will, as required, inform the Bundestag accordingly.

Thirdly,

At the summit, we will transform the operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, which has existed since 2001 and is based on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, into a maritime security operation, thereby decoupling it from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This is important because it will enable a comprehensive deployment to secure the Mediterranean. The focus will be on creating a maritime situational picture, supporting states in capacity building, and combating terrorism. A structural element of this work is the ongoing cooperation between NATO and the European Union, which is already taking place very well in activities in the Aegean, for example, together with Frontex. This cooperation is fundamentally very important to us as a federal government.

Amid all these diverse threats from the south, we must not overlook the proliferation of ballistic weapon systems. One example: In clear violation of the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council, Iran is continuing to develop its missile program unabated. Unfortunately, it is by no means the case that this missile program has been terminated by the historic Vienna Agreement on the control of Iran's nuclear program. Therefore, the heads of state and government will also declare the so-called initial capability of NATO's missile defense in Warsaw, thus taking another important step to better protect the people in the alliance area.

It is extremely important for us – I emphasize this here very explicitly – that this NATO missile defense is purely defensive in nature. It is not directed against Russia. It does not affect the strategic balance between NATO and Russia. The federal government, as well as the alliance, has no intention of changing this. Our hand for transparency and dialogue regarding these alliance measures is and remains extended.

At the summit in Warsaw, we will also evaluate the existing missions and, of course, identify future tasks. Since 2003, NATO has been engaged in Afghanistan, initially as part of ISAF and since 2015 as part of the Resolute Support advisory mission, in which 39 nations are currently participating. On the one hand, we will be able to enshrine the financing of the Afghan security forces until 2020 at the summit. This is extraordinarily important to further empower the Afghan forces to take on security responsibilities. On the other hand, the alliance will reaffirm its willingness to continue the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016. The American president made an important statement on this yesterday, namely that American forces will continue to be involved with a contingent of 8,400 soldiers. This is of great importance to us. We want to remain engaged in Afghanistan to protect the people there.

The North Atlantic Alliance will also reaffirm in Warsaw the goal that alliance partners maintain two percent of their gross domestic product for defense tasks. Germany has supported this for many years – I want to point this out again, as there have been current discussions about it; this is not limited to this federal government. Therefore, in the new financial plan that the federal cabinet approved yesterday, we have provided for a significant increase from 37.1 billion euros in 2016 to around 39 billion euros in 2017.

This financial plan also provides for a further increase in the defense budget; because from 2018 to 2020, we have planned more than 2.5 billion euros in additional funding. This clearly indicates a trend reversal in defense spending, although, of course, there is still much to be done before reaching the two percent target.

The entire structure of the Bundeswehr now reflects Germany's international responsibility. Germany, together with its partners and allies, is taking on this responsibility and the ever-new tasks, always with the awareness that military means alone cannot provide sustainable solutions. It is always about alliance policy steps and wise diplomacy at the same time. That is why the federal government is engaged not only in NATO and EU missions but also in the OSCE chairmanship this year, in nuclear negotiations with Iran, in the Normandy format for Ukraine, or in the group around UN Special Envoy de Mistura.

The North Atlantic Alliance, together with the European Security and Defense Policy, forms the framework of German foreign and security policy. NATO bridges the Atlantic. It is a transatlantic community of values between Europeans and North Americans. Let me add, just a few days after the United States of America celebrated the 240th anniversary of its independence: We thank America for shouldering the main burden in many of the missions, whether in Afghanistan or in Syria, within NATO and far beyond.

NATO unites us in solidarity in an alliance with neighbors, partners, and former adversaries. The decisions made in Warsaw are intended to help us tackle the further major challenges for the benefit of the people.

Let me conclude by extending a heartfelt thank you to our soldiers who serve in many of these missions and thereby ensure our security.