Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the results of the European Council on December 8/9, 2011, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on December 14, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

14 December 2011 · Government statement on the results of the European Council of 8/9 December 2011 · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on December 14, 2011, reporting on the European Council summit of December 8-9 in Brussels regarding the eurozone debt crisis and fiscal union negotiations.
Main themes
European fiscal union, eurozone debt crisis, intergovernmental treaty, stability union, European Council results, EU member state responsibility, European solidarity, Britain's opt-out, Economic and Monetary Union reform, Maastricht Treaty anniversary, sovereign debt crisis process
Duration
~23 min
71st percentile
Words
2,724
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Sentences
148
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Readability
46
52nd percentile
Grade
11.4
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Syntax
2.81
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Vocabulary
2.16
41st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 54%54%
  • Institutional 26%26%
  • Geopolitical 16%16%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

148 sentences in 45 paragraphs

Mr. President!

Dear colleagues!

Ladies and gentlemen!

In my government statement on December 2, I stated, among other things, that anyone who had said a few months ago that by the end of 2011 we would be taking very serious and concrete steps towards a European fiscal union, towards intervention rights in Europe, would have been declared crazy. Today we can state: We are no longer just talking about a fiscal union; we have begun to create one. This was the goal of the federal government for the Council of European heads of state and government last week. We have achieved this goal. Its significance cannot be overestimated.

The overwhelming majority of the member states of the European Union have decided to make this important course correction through an intergovernmental treaty. We have decided to correct the construction errors that were made during the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union with this course correction. The path to a fiscal union in the sense of a stability union is, of course, far from complete, but it has been embarked upon, and I believe: irrevocably.

Britain did not want to join the path to a new contractual basis through a change in the European treaties of all 27 member states, at least not under conditions that the other 26 could accept. The response in this situation could not be inaction and waiting. It could not be a mere repair using existing instruments. That would have been half-hearted in this crisis and, in my view, therefore irresponsible. The response had to look different. That is why we decided to draft a new intergovernmental treaty, in which the vast majority of all 27 member states of the European Union, but certainly the 17 states of the Eurozone, will participate.

On the exact 20th anniversary of the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union by the Maastricht Treaty, we are once again making a central political course correction. We will place the Economic and Monetary Union on a strengthened contractual basis. This contractual basis is to be completed by March and then ratified by the national parliaments as quickly as possible and come into force.

A strong role for the institutions of the European Union, particularly the Commission and the European Court of Justice, is intended to ensure a close connection with the 27, soon to be 28 EU member states with Croatia's accession. The European Parliament is also to be involved from the very beginning, for example, through observers in the drafting process for the treaty.

Every EU member state that wishes to do so can join the new treaty. We want to commit to the goal of incorporating the new treaty into the EU framework as soon as possible. This path will open the door wide for Europe to a fiscal union in the sense of a stability union.

I want to make it clear: As much as I regret that Britain has not joined us on this path, as much as I regret that Britain decided against the euro 20 years ago, I have no doubt that Britain will continue to be an important partner in the European Union in the future.

Britain is this partner in many other matters: in competitiveness, in the internal market, for trade, for climate protection. We have seen this clearly once again in the climate negotiations in Durban. Moreover, Britain has a vital interest in the Eurozone overcoming its debt crisis. However, this will not happen overnight. The federal government has always made it clear that the European debt crisis cannot be solved with a single breakthrough. There is no such breakthrough; there are no simple and quick solutions.

Dealing with the sovereign debt crisis is – I cannot say it often enough – a process. This process does not last weeks, it does not last months; it will take years. This process will also be accompanied by setbacks in the future. However, what matters is not the duration of the process; what matters is whether we allow ourselves to be discouraged and unsettled by setbacks or whether we do not.

I am convinced: If we have the necessary patience and perseverance, if we do not let ourselves be discouraged by setbacks, if we consistently pursue the path towards a fiscal and stability union, if we actually complete the Economic and Monetary Union and thus rectify the founding error of the euro, then what I have formulated as the goal of our actions since the beginning of the crisis will come true: Europe will not only survive this crisis, but it will emerge from this crisis stronger than it entered it.

In recent weeks, we have set the course for this new Europe, for a Europe of stability, solidarity, and trust. The federal government has played a decisive role in this by demanding a balanced relationship between national responsibility and European solidarity in all measures for acute crisis management since the beginning of the crisis.

As long as the member states are largely responsible for their economic and fiscal policies – as is the case in the current treaties – it will be crucial that first and foremost everyone does their homework. Personal responsibility is the first pillar of our stability and fiscal union. We acknowledge and appreciate that important progress has already been made in this regard.

Ireland is working resolutely to regain the trust of the markets. Important structural reforms, particularly in the banking sector, are being implemented; the increased competitiveness is helping exports and growth. Portugal can rely on a broad consensus to continue to tackle the necessary consolidation and reform measures consistently. The latest data we have received from Portugal is very encouraging regarding the deficit structure.

Greece is now working across party lines to implement its commitments for consolidation and reform goals. Italy recently passed extensive austerity measures and reforms and reaffirmed its goal of achieving budgetary balance by 2013 and implementing important structural reforms. In discussions, the future Spanish Prime Minister assured me once again that Spain will continue its reform course after the change of government.

Even EU member states that have not yet adopted the euro have made significant efforts or are in the process of doing so. We must not forget one thing: The people in the affected countries are being asked to make a lot of sacrifices; that is true. They are contributing to ensuring that their countries and the Eurozone as a whole are on a permanently stable course, and for that, they deserve our recognition.

We have always said: Those who take personal responsibility can count on the solidarity of their European partners. Solidarity is the second pillar of the new stability and fiscal union.

Five elements are important in this regard:

First:

With the guidelines adopted at the end of November, the effectiveness of the EFSF is to be significantly increased, and contagion risks are to be better contained. An important decision at the Council last week was that the European Central Bank has agreed to support the EFSF with its expertise and technical capabilities. I believe this will have a very positive effect.

Second:

The establishment of the permanent crisis management mechanism ESM, which is to replace the EFSF, will be brought forward to 2012. If this happens, all member states, including us, will have to contribute capital in 2012. However, I also emphasize: Then all member states, not just the triple-A countries, will make their contribution, and a meaningful contribution, to the solidarity mechanism. This is the essential difference to the EFSF and a key factor, namely the fact that capital will then be available, also for the additional credibility of the ESM. The consolidated ceiling of EFSF plus ESM will be 500 billion euros.

Third:

The IMF should have adequate financial resources. To this end, the Eurozone countries and other EU member states are examining the possibility of providing the IMF with additional resources in the form of bilateral loans of up to 200 billion euros. Other members of the international community are also invited to participate in the increase of IMF resources in parallel. The funds are to be made available to the IMF's general account and used within the framework of the regular IMF business policy. They are therefore subject to strict conditionality. The federal government and the Bundesbank have established the modalities for this; these were submitted to the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag yesterday.

Fourth:

Regarding the involvement of the private sector within the framework of the ESM, we will orient ourselves to the practice of the IMF. In addition, all new government bonds from Eurozone countries will in future contain standardized restructuring clauses, the so-called CACs. This will underline once again that the voluntary restructuring of Greece is a special case and will create maximum clarity and predictability for investors in European government bonds.

Fifth:

In situations where the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole is threatened, urgent decisions on the granting of assistance by the ESM can be made by a high qualified majority, namely 85 percent according to the capital key. For fundamental decisions, such as the creation of new instruments or changes to the volume of the ESM, the unanimity principle will of course continue to apply. This also applies to assistance measures. They will be granted as a last resort and again only under strict conditions.

The current crisis in the Eurozone is fundamentally a sovereign debt crisis. However, it has now also become a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis of confidence for which politics – no one else – is responsible. This began with the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union itself, when construction errors were allowed that are now hitting the Eurogroup with full force. It continued when politics, after the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union, did not or did not fully apply the principles that were provided for in the old Stability and Growth Pact or even weakened them.

It cannot be overestimated in its significance that politics has finally faced the task in recent months, up to the Council last Friday, of naming this crisis of confidence unflinchingly and drawing the necessary conclusions from it. Only in this way can we ensure that, alongside acute crisis management, we also make provisions for the future so that this crisis is not followed by the next one – which would then be even worse. The provision for the future through new trust is the third pillar of the new fiscal and stability union.

We want to embark on the path to a permanent stability union, in which rules will be adhered to in the future, their adherence will be monitored, and non-compliance will have consequences. To this end, debt rules are to be anchored in national law, preferably in the constitutions. Binding debt rules should take effect early and thus be an important contribution to prevention.

To this end, we will establish detailed and ambitious guidelines at the European level. The goal is a balanced budget in each member state without special influences. The implementation of these European guidelines into national law can in the future be reviewed by the European Court of Justice – at the request of the Commission or a member state. This is all the more significant as the courts, alongside the central banks – the European Court of Justice alongside the European Central Bank – are, unlike politics, the two institutions whose credibility has so far remained untarnished and thus remains high.

In addition, there will be a further significant tightening of the deficit procedure itself. If the three percent deficit ceiling is violated, the deficit procedure will in the future be automatically triggered; unless a qualified majority of member states decides otherwise. This is exactly the reverse qualified majority that is currently enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. This principle of reverse qualified majority is also to apply in the implementation of the deficit procedure. This means that even the initiation of the next steps should generally occur automatically.

Member States in the deficit procedure shall henceforth commit themselves in so-called reform partnerships to detailed consolidation and reform steps. There will no longer be the sanction that primarily consists of paying money, which one generally does not have when already showing a high deficit, but in the future, it will be about binding steps that are agreed upon with the Commission and the Member State. This is, so to speak, a conditionality, as we know it today from the rescue umbrellas. Compliance with these agreements shall be monitored by the Commission and the Council. Furthermore, we have agreed to contractually anchor the procedure for debt reduction – the so-called one-twentieth rule.

We all feel: The crisis has already changed the European Union today. The crisis has mercilessly presented us with the bill for the omissions and mistakes of the past. The European Council last Friday did not respond to this with another mistake. Such a mistake would have been, for example, the introduction of Eurobonds, a quick apparent solution, but not addressing the root cause. They are not suitable as a rescue measure. Upon closer inquiry, this is also confirmed by the Commission.

The crisis has made the enormous importance of the common currency for the European project as a whole clear. The Euro has proven itself. It is more stable than the Deutsche Mark ever was. As an export nation, Germany benefits particularly from the Euro. This applies not only to large companies but especially to medium-sized enterprises in Germany. This must be emphasized repeatedly.

But the Euro is also much more than a currency. It symbolically represents the depth of European unification. The crisis has brought Europeans much closer together than ever before. This is especially true for German-French cooperation, which has proven itself in this crisis in a special way. This also applies far beyond that.

We want to create a turnaround for the better. This is precisely the opportunity that lies within this crisis. The European Council last week made it clear that the Eurozone countries and almost all non-Eurozone countries are pulling together when it comes to seizing the opportunities of the crisis and laying the foundations for a better European future.

I have felt this common determination clearly in my conversations with my colleagues. I am quite sure: This new sense of community, this shared responsibility, will remain with us long beyond the crisis. This means nothing less than that the vision of a real political union is beginning to take shape.

I say explicitly: A political union involves more than just creating stability mechanisms. A political union also includes generating growth together, and that means sustainable growth, growth that is not based on debt, growth that is future-oriented and associated with prosperity and more jobs in Europe. Therefore, an agreement like the one we made a year ago in the Euro-Plus Pact will gain additional significance.

But I also say: It will be our task to coordinate our laws more closely, even if that is not yet contractually necessary. This is certainly a moment for every national parliament to rethink and to empathize with the situation of others. But I think we should learn from the best in all areas.

Therefore, I say: Yes, it is true; we are experiencing one of the most severe crises in Europe. But it is also true: Together we have already achieved an infinite amount. We agree on the causes of the crisis. We agree that we must combat these causes in order to overcome the crisis. We agree to move towards a fiscal union. This would have been unthinkable just a few months ago. The opportunities of this crisis are – this is my conviction – many times greater than its risks. Seizing these opportunities is the historical mandate of our political generation.

The path to overcoming the crisis is long, it is arduous; but at the end of this path will stand a sustainably strengthened Eurozone and a sustainably strengthened European Union. That is the goal. It is the best prerequisite for a good future, a good future for Europe and a good future for Germany. The Federal Government is working towards this. I invite you all in this Parliament to contribute to it.