Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel to the European Council on December 9, 2011, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on December 2, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

2 December 2011 · Government statement before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on December 2, 2011, outlining Germany's position ahead of the European Council summit in Brussels on December 9, 2011.
Main themes
Eurozone debt crisis, Economic and Monetary Union, European fiscal union, crisis of confidence, sovereign debt, European stability mechanisms, austerity and reform efforts, European Council summit preparation, institutional credibility, ECB and central banks, European integration progress
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,373
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Sentences
173
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Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
11.4
37th percentile
Syntax
2.91
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
30th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 36%35%
  • Economic 33%31%
  • Geopolitical 22%21%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 4%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

173 sentences in 58 paragraphs

Mr. President!

Dear colleagues!

Since the beginning of the crisis in the Eurozone, the Federal Government has been committed to managing the acute crisis while also drawing the necessary lessons for the future. This is about nothing more and nothing less than strengthening the Economic and Monetary Union. This, the sustainable strengthening of the Economic and Monetary Union, will be the central theme of the European Council next week.

To this end, Herman Van Rompuy, as President of the European Council, will present proposals. Of course, we cannot debate these proposals today. We cannot preempt him. Everyone will understand that. But I believe we can still say very clearly: What will be the guidelines, what will be the goals that we will pursue next week? The guidelines and the goals with which the Federal Government and I personally will approach the Council can be discussed in detail and concretely this morning.

The Federal Government has always made it clear that the European debt crisis cannot be solved with a single stroke of liberation overnight. There is no such stroke, no such thunderclap. There are no simple and quick solutions, especially not, as some say before every summit, the supposedly last shot. Neither is that my language nor my thinking. Managing the sovereign debt crisis is a process. This process will take years.

What is the situation today, one week before the next Council of European heads of state and government? On the one hand, we are dealing with the most severe crisis since the introduction of the Euro, if not in the history of European unification. We can follow this in the daily news. On the other hand, it is not an exaggeration to state that we have already achieved an extraordinary amount. The view of this seems somewhat obscured these days in light of the daily reports, but I am deeply convinced of it.

First:

There is agreement across Europe on the causes of the crisis. This has not always been the case. Today, there is no longer any discussion about it.

Second:

There is agreement across Europe that these very causes must be addressed in order to overcome the crisis and not to move from one crisis to the next, which would then be even worse than the one before. At this point, it is important for me that we take a moment to consider what has already happened. This also means that we must recognize the tasks that people in Spain, Portugal, and especially Greece have to solve. However, I would like to add – and this is even less noted – that those who are partly not part of the Eurozone, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Romania, must also be considered, given the sacrifices that are being demanded of the people there.

I believe we often do not realize – perhaps we cannot even realize – what contribution the people in the countries I mentioned are making to ensure that the Euro becomes a lasting and stable currency. Therefore, I would like to express my absolute respect for these efforts once again today. Because this is a contribution to a sustainable Europe.

Third:

On the way to combating the causes of the crisis and thus being able to overcome it, we have already made extremely significant progress in Europe. Anyone who would have said a few months ago that by the end of 2011 we would be initiating very serious and concrete steps towards a European Stability Union, a European Fiscal Union, and intervention rights in Europe would have been considered crazy at that time. Now, this is exactly what is on the agenda.

We are close to it. There are still difficulties to overcome, no question. But the necessity is largely recognized.

We are no longer just talking about a Fiscal Union; we are starting to create one. I believe this cannot be overestimated. Marathon runners often say that a marathon becomes particularly strenuous and difficult around the 35-kilometer mark. But they also say that the entire distance can be covered if one is fully aware of the magnitude of the task from the very beginning and approaches the entire task accordingly.

It is not the one who starts the fastest who is necessarily the most successful, but the one who knows what needs to be considered overall, that is, for the entire distance.

We have already achieved so much that we could not have imagined just a few months ago. To move forward now, we must confront the core of the crisis: the realization that while we are dealing with a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, we are primarily also facing a crisis of confidence.

There are two institutions in which trust has largely remained intact throughout this entire time, whose credibility remains unchanged high. These are, on the one hand, the courts – in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court, in Europe, the European Court of Justice – and on the other hand, the central banks, the national central banks, as well as the European Central Bank.

It is of utmost importance for our democracy to protect and preserve the credibility and trustworthiness of these two institutions, both the courts and the central banks. This is done by respecting their essence, that is, their independence, in every direction. Therefore, I will also refrain from commenting on what national and European courts and national central banks as well as the European Central Bank do or do not do in the future. However, it is of course important to point out once again: The task of the European Central Bank is different from that of the Fed in the United States of America and, for example, the Bank of England.

You do not need to say "aha" to that. This is enshrined in the treaties. The task is to ensure monetary stability. That is exactly what the European Central Bank is doing; I am deeply convinced of that.

Opposite the courts and the central bank is an area that has become evident in this crisis, which has unfortunately lost almost all trust, has forfeited it, and has nearly destroyed it over the years. This is – we must say this unflinchingly – politics.

This began

firstly

with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union itself, when construction errors were allowed that have gradually and then increasingly caught up with the Eurogroup and are now catching up with full force. This certainly did not happen with malicious intent, but it is a fact that cannot be denied.

Secondly

politics has lost trust over the years because it has not applied or has only partially applied or even diluted the principles laid out in the Stability and Growth Pact since the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. That we all in Europe have now resolutely decided to finally stop this is the important, encouraging interim assessment we can make today.

Because we are arguing and struggling in Europe over details, but no longer over the whole, no longer about the fact that politics must restore what it has itself called into question for the lasting overcoming of the debt crisis: its credibility and trustworthiness. It must do this by, on the one hand, finally finding ways to adhere to and implement already decided measures, and on the other hand, being willing to create a Fiscal Union with strong intervention rights in Europe through changes to the foundations of cooperation, such as treaty amendments, at least in the Eurozone.

The adherence to already decided measures currently applies to the summit decisions of October 26, 2011. The goal of the package put together in the German Bundestag at the end of October 2011 with a large majority is to create a viable solution for Greece and to prevent the crisis from spreading to other Euro states. The finance ministers were able to make important progress at the beginning of the week. The new government in Greece has committed itself across party lines to implement the agreed reform program. This has cleared the way for the disbursement of the sixth tranche.

Now it is about negotiating the new program as soon as possible by the end of the year. This includes the involvement of the private sector. I want to remind you that in the week of sessions before the summer break, we voted for the first time in principle that we need a new Greece program. Now we are approaching the last week of sessions before Christmas, and I think it is not too much to ask that all actors finally try to negotiate this new program.

Italy is also tackling the major challenges and is thus taking on its responsibility for its own good future as the third-largest economy in Europe, as well as for the future of the Eurozone as a whole.

At the European Council on October 26, 2011, we also decided that systemically important banks must hold more capital buffers. This is necessary to strengthen confidence in the stability of the European banking sector. Here too, I hope that the European banking supervision will announce the decision quickly so that security can also be established in this area.

The day before yesterday, the EU finance ministers also adopted principles for a coordinated provision of liquidity guarantees for banks; because only if the refinancing of banks is secured can the banking sector adequately provide the economy with credit.

The adoption of the guidelines for the EFSF, including its effectiveness, allows us to significantly increase the effectiveness of the Euro rescue fund. Here too, I say: I do not advise us to speak poorly of the EFSF, but we should realistically do what is possible with the EFSF, and we have discussed this extensively here in this house.

Because the current crisis in the Eurozone is primarily a crisis of confidence, we must, in addition to combating the causes of this crisis – excessive public debt, lack of competitiveness of some Euro states – eliminate the fundamental deficiencies in the construction of the Economic and Monetary Union. If we do this, we will also show that we not only see the burdens of the crisis, but that we understand this crisis primarily as a turning point for the better, as an opportunity for change, and that we are indeed learning from it. These are very simple lessons: rules must be adhered to; their adherence must be monitored; non-compliance must have consequences. National responsibility and European solidarity are interdependent.

To prepare all of this, a multitude of discussions are taking place these days. This afternoon, the Austrian Chancellor will be with me. I will be calling nearly all my colleagues, of course also the President of the Council and the President of the Commission. The French President gave an important speech yesterday. We will coordinate on Monday regarding the stance we will take to the Council.

We have achieved a lot. We have improved the deficit procedure as far as this was possible within the framework of the existing treaties. You remember the so-called Sixpack that we passed here. But to really gain trust, we must go beyond that. Where we currently have reference values, we will need legally binding limits in the future. There must no longer be any political leeway when it comes to determining whether these limits have been violated or not. There must be real automatic mechanisms.

Only in this way can trust, which has been violated sixty times, be regained.

Euro states should be more closely accompanied and effectively supported in overcoming their difficulties in the future. At the same time, we need effective responses to continued rule violations so that we can enforce responsible budgetary management in the interest of all. In this regard, the European institutions, especially the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, must play an important role. This can be done without the German Bundestag losing its budgetary sovereignty. Because it is about adhering to the rules that we have set for ourselves. The automatic sanctions or the automatic intervention rights only take effect when these rules are violated. What happens within the jointly agreed European framework will, of course, still be reserved for each member state.

Credible intervention rights must be distinguished from a common European control over national revenues and expenditures; I want to state this explicitly here. As long as this is the case, a common liability for the debts of others is also unthinkable.

That is exactly why the discussion about so-called Eurobonds is now also becoming irrelevant. Because whoever still does not understand that Eurobonds cannot be used as a rescue measure against the crisis now has not understood the essence of this crisis.

It is also not possible under our Basic Law to have a European institution control and determine the revenues and expenditures of a budget.

As long as this is not the case, we have the situation that a common liability would not correspond to that. Therefore, the discussion about Eurobonds is superfluous.

Let us imagine that such a thing existed, that we would not need to introduce Eurobonds at all because they would arise on their own. That is precisely what is interesting about it.

Therefore, the discussion now is not a contribution to overcoming the crisis.

It is about – this is a significant step in the construction of the Economic and Monetary Union – strengthening the authority of the institutions so that they can actually enforce the agreed European limits, specifically the upper limit of three percent and the reduction path for a debt level of over 60 percent, and this without ifs and buts. In addition to the demand for effective enforcement rights, the federal government also advocates for a right to sue at the European Court of Justice. This is all the more important as the courts – I mentioned this at the beginning – alongside the central banks are the institutions whose credibility and trustworthiness, due to their independence from political influence, have always been beyond any doubt.

A central element of the new Stability Union, the Fiscal Union, should therefore be a new European debt brake – that is one way to put it – for the members of the Eurozone. Other elements must be added: We need to create stronger and better-coordinated structures in the Eurozone. Misdevelopments must be recognized and corrected early so that crises do not arise at all. With the permanent crisis management mechanism ESM, we must create a powerful instrument that helps to avert threats to the stability of the Eurozone as a whole in emergency situations. Furthermore, we must initiate joint measures through further structural reforms, particularly in labor law in the individual member states, so that we can return to more growth. Because, of course, people will also measure the success of our efforts by whether unemployment decreases. Youth unemployment in Europe is one of the most pressing issues. Therefore, growth for the purpose of creating employment is one of the important goals, but not through borrowing, rather through the necessary structural reforms and sensible investments in the future.

In a word: We must sustainably strengthen the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union, we must overcome the construction errors that crept in at the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union, and we must complete the Economic and Monetary Union. The goal is a Fiscal Union. This includes both: a budgetary discipline of its members that can be enforced through enforcement rights and an effective toolkit for crisis situations.

Therefore, there is no way around changing the European treaties or – that would be the second-best solution – creating new treaties within the Euro group. But we are going to – I want to make this clear – Brussels with the aim of enforcing treaty changes, and in the spirit that we want to avoid a division between Euro member states and non-Euro member states. This means we will allow every non-Euro member state the option to join the stronger obligations of the Eurozone.

Because no one wants a division. Moreover: The Euro group must also remain open to anyone who wants to participate. Let us thank, for example, Poland, which has repeatedly made it clear: Even though we do not yet have the Euro, we still want to take on more obligations at this point.

Poland is also a member of the Euro-Plus Pact and has made it clear again in discussions we recently had that it wants to move precisely along this path of the Stability Union.

Our guidelines for the Council next week are therefore clear. But – it is important for me to say this this morning – they have nothing to do with some fears, concerns, or accusations that one can currently read or hear, that Germany wants to dominate Europe or something similar. That is absurd. We advocate – this is indeed correct – for a certain culture of stability and growth, but we do this in the European spirit of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl.

German and European unification were and are two sides of the same coin. We will never forget that.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in these days, when the Euro is almost daily at the center of the debate, other European issues unfortunately often fall into the background. This applies, for example, to the enlargement policy, which traditionally is on the agenda of a December Council, as it is next week. The federal government supports the EU perspective of all the countries of the Western Balkans. On the sidelines of the European Council, I will sign the accession treaty with Croatia on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Bundestag has issued its opinion on the commencement of accession negotiations with Montenegro. For us, further progress in Montenegro in strengthening the rule of law and combating corruption and organized crime is crucial. We will demand this, but we will also support Montenegro in being able to truly improve the things that need improvement.

The European Council will decide on Serbia's candidate status. Good neighborly relations and regional cooperation are part of the EU enlargement policy according to the Copenhagen criteria. We want to bring not only Serbia but also Kosovo closer to the EU in the long term and keep the EU fully functional. Therefore, Serbia's path to the EU can only go through the normalization of its relationship with Kosovo.

The EU and the federal government have early on formulated expectations in the form of concrete steps. I very much regret that Serbia has not yet sufficiently met these expectations and thus the conditions for granting candidate status have not yet been met. Serbia must also be reproached for having contributed in recent days to an atmosphere in which German KFOR soldiers in northern Kosovo were attacked and injured with firearms. I say: That is unacceptable.

Our soldiers are doing a great service there, and we are grateful to them for this service.

Europe is in the midst of its probably greatest test of endurance. As German Chancellor, I, just like the entire federal government, will do everything to ensure that Europe emerges from this test of endurance stronger than it entered it. Too much is at stake, especially for Germany and the Germans. Despite all the turbulence we have experienced recently: The Euro has proven itself. It is stable, it is more valuable than the Deutsche Mark was, and as an export nation, Germany benefits particularly from the Euro. But the Euro is also much more than just a currency; with the Economic and Monetary Union, we have reached a new level of integration in Europe.

The Euro stands for Europe's will to solidify its internal development and to face the challenges of today and globalization together. The future of the Euro is therefore inextricably linked to European unification. The path ahead of us is still long, and it is anything but easy. But I am convinced: It is the right path. It is the right path to achieve our common goal: a strong Germany in a strong European Union for the benefit of the people in Germany and in Europe.