Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel to the European Council on June 28/29, 2018, in Brussels and to the NATO Summit on July 11/12, 2018, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on June 28...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

28 June 2018 · Government statement before the German Bundestag ahead of the European Council and NATO Summit · German Bundestag, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on June 28, 2018, to preview Germany's positions ahead of the NATO Summit and European Council in Brussels.
Main themes
NATO summit preparation, transatlantic alliance cohesion, defense spending and the 2% GDP target, Russia and Ukraine security threat, European defense cooperation, Bundeswehr capabilities, NATO-EU partnership, Iraq stabilization mission, NATO command structure reform, dual-track approach to Russia, European Council agenda, German national interest in European prosperity
Duration
~29 min
80th percentile
Words
3,420
80th percentile
Sentences
197
89th percentile
Readability
49
60th percentile
Grade
10.8
30th percentile
Syntax
2.82
24th percentile
Vocabulary
2.01
12th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 45%42%
  • Institutional 26%24%
  • Economic 15%14%
  • Social 9%9%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

197 sentences in 80 paragraphs

Mr. President!

Dear colleagues!

Dear guests!

On July 11 and 12 of this year, the NATO Council will meet in Brussels in the format of a summit. The focus will be on the successful adaptation of the alliance to the overall changed security situation in recent years. The starting point for these changes was the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the unfortunately ongoing destabilization in eastern Ukraine. But the threat of terrorism, the effects of civil war, and failing states also made the landmark decision of the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 necessary.

First:

The alliance's response and defense capabilities should be significantly increased.

Second:

Our Eastern and Central European allies should be reassured, and at the same time, we want to remain open to dialogue with Russia.

Third:

All allies wanted to increase their defense efforts. The issue of defense spending has led to intense discussions—not only here in Germany but also in Germany.

Let me remind you: The decision to approach the two percent target by 2024 was made in light of a new quality of the threat to Europe and was also endorsed by Germany. There was unity in Wales. This requires a fair and necessary contribution from Europeans in the alliance. By the way, in my firm conviction, this fundamental question is about nothing more and nothing less than the future preservation of the transatlantic alliance.

In the meantime, we can look back on four years of successful adaptations. All allies have increased their defense budgets, in some cases significantly. We have done so as well. We owe this to the security of our country and the operational capability of our armed forces. This is also reflected in the 2018 budget, which we will discuss in the second and third readings next week, and in the 2019 budget.

The alliance's measures for reassurance and for strengthening the defense and deterrence capabilities of the alliance have been implemented. The Bundeswehr has made a significant contribution to this. This shows that the alliance can adapt collectively and in solidarity to a changed security environment.

Further decisions are to be made at the upcoming summit.

First:

NATO's command structure will gain more responsiveness. Two new headquarters will be established, one in the USA and one in Germany, in Ulm. This is also an important German contribution.

Second:

At the same time, the readiness level of the already deployed troops of all allies should be increased.

Third:

The summit will decide on a training mission to build functioning armed and security forces for Iraq, thereby responding to a request from the Iraqi government.

We also have a significant interest in the long-term stabilization of Iraq, not least to provide refugees with a perspective for returning to Iraq. I also hope—here I find common ground with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg—for a continuation of our dual-track approach towards Russia. We must strengthen our capabilities, but our offer of dialogue to Russia remains.

We also expect that cooperation between NATO and the EU will be reaffirmed and intensified, for example, through flagship projects such as improving cross-border military mobility and through the fact of structured military cooperation. Lastly, complemented by a European intervention initiative, Europe has positioned itself much more consolidated and will thus be a better and more efficient partner in the transatlantic alliance in the long and medium term. The efforts we have made in European defense strengthen the European pillar of NATO, and when we Europeans become better and stronger in defense, it benefits everyone.

It is no secret that the transatlantic alliance is currently also enduring tensions. However, we are convinced that this alliance remains central to our common security, for we owe our security to the credibility of Article 5. This, however, always also depends on the reliability of allies and thus also on our own efforts. We owe this, by the way, to our soldiers. They deserve to have the necessary equipment. This is a matter of trust in political leadership.

It is also a matter of trust of the allies in our ability and willingness to defend. Maintaining this trust is in our national interest. In this sense, the federal government aims to increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024.

NATO and the EU are equally cornerstones of international cooperation. They provide us with stability in a changing world, and they commit us to joint partnership action. They give us hope, confidence, and also the promise of a good future. In view of the European Council today and tomorrow, I want to reiterate what I have often said in this house: Germany will only thrive in the long term if Europe thrives as well.

The fathers and mothers of the Basic Law already formulated it in the preamble of the Basic Law: "[...] Inspired by the will to serve peace in the world as an equal member of a united Europe, the German people has given itself this Basic Law." That was the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany, and we stand in this tradition.

The upcoming European Council has a broad agenda: the future of the economic and monetary union, innovation and digitalization, the issue of competitiveness, the multiannual financial framework from 2021, the topic of security and defense of our external relations, and, last but not least, migration. These topics essentially concern all the major global challenges of our time, and Europe should provide as unified a response as possible to all these major global challenges.

Coordination with France is traditionally important for this. I would therefore like to sincerely thank everyone who helped prepare a good Franco-German agenda for today's and tomorrow's council during the preparation of the Franco-German ministerial council last week.

A special thanks goes to the Federal Minister of Finance, who contributed through many hours of negotiations.

It is not only about a strong and stable monetary union. Tomorrow, you will vote here in the Bundestag on the final part of the Greece program.

This program has challenged us immensely, as have other rescue programs for Eurozone countries. But overall, we can say: The euro is stable today, the programs have ended, and the countries have become more competitive.

This has been a good piece of work and a good piece of European solidarity in our own interest.

However, there remains a need for reform in the economic and monetary union. That is why we have agreed with France to continue working on three points.

First:

We must advance the further reduction of risks in the banking sector and complete the banking union. After that, we want to develop a common safety net—I emphasize: after that—for the resolution of banks.

Second:

We want to—this is also what we agreed in the coalition agreement—develop the European Stability Mechanism into a kind of European Monetary Fund.

It is about independent monitoring of programs, being able to assess the economic situation in member states, in order to recognize crises earlier. As a result, we will have greater independence from the International Monetary Fund. The participation rights of the German Bundestag—this is what we agreed in the coalition agreement, and this will remain the case—are unaffected by this.

Third:

—and this may be the most difficult—: the competitiveness of the euro countries. Because if convergence is not given, if the differences in competitiveness are too great, then it is difficult to maintain the stability of a currency in the long term. That is why we have agreed to develop an additional euro area budget within the framework of the European Union—we have called this an "investment budget" in the coalition agreement—starting in 2021, parallel to the medium-term financial outlook, to the next stage, in order to additionally increase convergence and stability for the countries that share a currency. In doing so, the performance of the best must be the benchmark, not the average of all.

With these agreements, we are implementing nothing more and nothing less than important cornerstones of the coalition agreement. Of course, it applies: Everyone must adhere to the agreed rules; each member state is responsible for its own budget; liability and control go hand in hand; there will be no debt union;

Stability and growth are interdependent. Therefore, we will debate the German-French proposals on Friday, that is tomorrow, at the European Council in a format of the 19 member states of the euro area plus those who wish to participate in this session.

Also beyond the economic and monetary union, we need strategic concepts for the future of Europe. This concerns the question of our economic performance. Germany and France have proposed to do much more, especially in the area of innovations. I cannot elaborate on this today, but we all know: Digitalization and artificial intelligence are challenges where Europe is not where it should be. We will not catch up as individual member states; rather, we must act together to become strategically innovative again.

We need to be more coherent and effective in foreign policy. Germany will now also use its opportunity to work as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to advance European coordination on international issues, first and foremost with France. Due to current events, we will also have to discuss trade issues. The European Union has imposed tariffs in response to the tariffs on steel and aluminum that we do not accept. We consider these tariffs imposed by the United States to be unlawful; however, we want to engage in dialogue with the United States—how we engage in dialogue needs to be discussed among ourselves—in order to avoid further tariffs and thus further steps towards a trade war. I believe this is in the multilateral, common interest of the United States, Europe, and many other countries around the world.

Of course, we will also—this is why today's government statement is particularly important—discuss the topic of migration, and that will be this evening. We are—not to mince words—not yet where we want to be.

The Common European Asylum System, which we actually wanted to adopt this June, will not be able to be adopted at the Council of twenty-eight. Of the seven legal acts that would be necessary, five are more or less unified; but there is still political consultation needed on two important ones. The first is the Asylum Procedures Directive. That sounds so simple; but it is about nothing more and nothing less than having equal standards for granting asylum in all European member states. The second is the so-called Dublin IV Regulation, which is the further development of the currently applicable Dublin III Regulation, which also includes the solidarity distribution of migrants and refugees among the European member states.

Now many say: The European solution is not coming; we have been waiting for three years. I would like to take this opportunity to say that this is, of course, not true. Everyone in Europe agrees: It is about reducing illegal migration, combating traffickers and smugglers, and, when we talk about an exchange between the countries of origin and the European countries, making legal agreements between states.

By the way, we have had good experiences on the European continent when we declared the countries of the Western Balkans to be safe countries of origin, which enabled the return of people who had no right to asylum, and in return made work permits possible for jobs available in Germany. This system works very well overall. This is already one of the agreements we have managed to achieve.

In 2014, we had about 200,000 incoming refugees in Germany, 400,000 from 2015 until August. We then projected 800,000 by the end of the year. In the end, it was 890,000.

I want to refer once again to September 4, 2015, around which many discussions are taking place today, which was by no means a unilateral action. By that time, 400,000 refugees had already arrived. There were many in Hungary. The Hungarian Prime Minister asked the Austrian Chancellor for help. Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann called me. The foreign ministries coordinated because a Foreign Ministers' Council was taking place at that time. We said: In an exceptional situation, we will help. – That is what we did. In retrospect, I still consider that to be the right decision.

In this exceptional situation, Germany temporarily waived the transfer under the Dublin procedure. This is the so-called right of self-entry. It has been challenged before the European Court of Justice.

There was a ruling in the summer of 2017 that it was politically possible and therefore not legally questionable. This was clearly established by the European Court of Justice. Then, in connection with the very high number of incoming refugees, the question of rejection at the German border arose. The Federal Minister of the Interior said at that time: No. In such an exceptional situation of about 8,000 to 9,000 incoming refugees every day, even the EU treaties provide for the possibility of unilateral national measures to restore law and order. We did not make use of that. But this exceptional situation no longer exists today. Today we have a completely different situation. The number of incoming refugees is significantly lower. Therefore, the legal situation is again exactly as it was before September 2015, namely European law taking precedence over German law – with the exception that we have something now that we did not have before 2015, namely relatively long-lasting controls at certain points along the German-Austrian border.

How do we see that the circumstances have changed? The decline in sea arrivals in the Aegean has been 97 percent since 2015, and the decline in sea arrivals in the central Mediterranean is currently 77 percent compared to the same period last year.

This underscores

two things

– these are European efforts –: First, the effectiveness of the EU-Turkey Agreement, which is now widely regarded as a model agreement, and also a NATO activity in the Aegean, and second, that we have shaped the European mission Sophia with various steps with regard to Libya.

The

first

step was to help people in need. The second step was to say: We are training the Libyan Coast Guard. This Libyan Coast Guard is now in a position to rescue people in Libyan territorial waters. Therefore, I want to say at this point: There is an obligation to allow the Libyan Coast Guard to do its work, and there is no right to simply act in place of the Libyan Coast Guard. Libya also has a right to protect its coasts.

By the way, I would like to thank Italy and Malta especially for the training of the Libyan Coast Guard.

We have established the border protection agency Frontex. It is not yet adequately equipped, but it is working. It must be developed into a real European border police, which then has even more powers and possibilities.

Asylum numbers in Germany have decreased – we cannot be satisfied with that yet; I want to make that clear – but they are also lower this year until the end of May compared to last year. To make it clear: "We do not want a repeat of 2015," we have agreed on a number of measures in the coalition agreement, as well as a target figure to be aimed for, in order to keep the issue of integration capacity in mind.

We have now regulated family reunification for those with subsidiary protection; there is no longer a legal entitlement, but a certain number per month. We have agreed to establish AnKER centers to increase efficiency – because we naturally need national measures. I really want to appeal to all the Prime Ministers and all the states to implement this part of the coalition agreement as quickly as possible; because this has been negotiated jointly by the coalition with the federal states.

I want to emphasize: The Federal Minister of the Interior has, after looking at the situation in his new position, rightly compiled the points where further action is needed. When such a terrible, shocking event as the murder of Susanna occurs and it turns out afterwards that administrative court proceedings have not taken place for a long time, then we cannot accept such a state – just as little as we can accept the state where bodyguards of bin Laden have been staying here in Germany for years.

Therefore, there is a need for action. It is always about order, control, effectiveness, and sustainability.

It is about our internal security, and it is about the internal security of the entire European Union. For this, national measures and also European measures are necessary.

It is so important to establish the AnKER centers because we are experiencing a situation, especially with non-entitled asylum seekers, at the moment of distribution to the municipality, where it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage returns.

Therefore, we must improve, and in three dimensions. This also played a role at the meeting of heads of state and government from 16 countries last Sunday. Everyone said: First and foremost, it is about the external dimension. It is about the question of how we can combat smugglers and traffickers. The following principle must apply: If we want people from Africa, who in most cases do not have asylum rights, to no longer come to Europe at the cost of their own lives, by paying a lot of money, and with the support of criminal structures, then we must also talk to African states about how we can manage returns and perhaps also prevent people from first crossing the desert and then risking their lives. We must talk to the people. We must not just talk about African states, but we must try – as with Turkey – to reach agreements with African states that are also in their interest, for example regarding legal study places and job opportunities. This cannot be done without the involvement of Africa; otherwise, it will not be successful.

Whatever we do, we will do it in cooperation with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration. We will strengthen border protection; I have already spoken about that. This is the second dimension.

The

third

dimension is: We will also need to strengthen, better organize, and manage so-called secondary migration.

Because two things must apply. The first is: Those who seek protection in Europe cannot choose the country within the European Union in which they apply for asylum. We are all in agreement on that.

Secondly

, we cannot leave the countries where all arrivals take place completely alone. That is the crux of the Dublin III Regulation.

Therefore, we need further development. Therefore, as long as this cannot be done with 28 member states, we must consider how we can reach better regulations in a coalition of willing countries. My maxim in this regard is: not unilaterally, not uncoordinated, and not at the expense of others, but in conversation with partners. That is exactly what we have been doing in recent days and what I can report on after the Council. This is certainly not a perfect solution, but a start for managing and organizing secondary migration, which will also need to be worked on further afterwards.

That is how we have always worked. The EU-Turkey Agreement is also not a unilateral measure, but a coordinated measure. I hope that we can now secure the second tranche of the additional three billion euros at the European Council, so that we can truly say: We are helping Turkey to cope with the challenge of over three million Syrian refugees. Despite all the criticism of Turkey, this is a tremendous achievement that Turkey is accomplishing.

Similarly, Italy has a right to better funding for the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Here, too, there is a lack of money, and that must also be improved.

It is therefore necessary to continue working on this. I will do that in the coming hours and then, of course, report on it at a crucial point, primarily in the coalition.

Europe has many challenges, but the challenge of migration could become a question of fate for the European Union. Either we manage this, in such a way that people in Africa and elsewhere believe that we are guided by values and that we rely on multilateralism rather than unilateralism, or no one will believe in our value system anymore, which has made us so strong. And that is why so much is at stake.