Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel to the European Council on March 21 and 22, 2019, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on March 21, 2019, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

21 March 2019 · European Council · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on March 21, 2019, ahead of the European Council summit in Brussels to outline Germany's position on Brexit.
Main themes
Brexit and UK withdrawal from EU, Irish backstop, extension of exit deadline, Northern Ireland and Good Friday Agreement, orderly vs. no-deal Brexit, EU-UK future relations, European Council meeting, European Parliament elections, EU internal market integrity, science and research cooperation, security cooperation
Duration
~33 min
85th percentile
Words
3,967
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Sentences
189
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Readability
51
65th percentile
Grade
11.2
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Syntax
2.96
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Vocabulary
1.93
4th percentile

Translated from German

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 38%38%
  • Geopolitical 36%35%
  • Institutional 18%17%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

189 sentences in 55 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

Dear colleagues!

I would also like to warmly greet the representatives of the French Parliament and assure the Federal Government that we want to work closely, willingly, and trustfully with the newly established Parliamentary Assembly, which we also approved in the Bundestag yesterday.

Today and tomorrow, the last regular European Council before the European elections in May is taking place. One question – which we all follow every day – has particularly kept us on our toes in recent days and weeks: How will the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union take place? Unfortunately, I must tell you today that even eight days before the formal exit of Great Britain, we still do not have a definitive answer to this question.

British Prime Minister Theresa May requested two things in a letter to Donald Tusk yesterday:

First.

A positive decision by the European Council on the document agreed upon with the Commission in Strasbourg, which deals with the so-called backstop and its interpretation. I believe I can say here today that we, as the European Council, can comply with this request, at least from a German perspective.

Second.

The request to postpone the exit date to June 30, 2019. We will discuss this question intensively today among ourselves, the 27 heads of state and government. We can fundamentally agree to this wish if we receive a positive vote on the exit documents in the British Parliament next week. However, we must pay attention to the specific date – June 30, 2019 – as we have the European elections at the end of May. This means that the future and legality of the European elections must be taken into account; however, we can certainly speak positively about a short extension.

We will conduct deeper discussions about our behavior in the event that there is no positive vote or no vote from the British Parliament next week. Then we will keep open the possibility of another meeting of the European Council before the exit date.

I remain convinced that we need an orderly solution to the exit of Great Britain. This is not only in the interest of Great Britain – this is being discussed in Great Britain itself – but it is also primarily in the interest of Germany and the 27 member states. I am convinced that the central problem, which is essentially at stake, ultimately has to do with the question of Ireland, with the relationship of the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and that it always comes back to this difficult issue: How can we ensure the integrity of the internal market in light of the future relationship between the European Union and Great Britain on the one hand, if there is to be no customs union – as the British Parliament has decided – and at the same time fulfill the so-called Good Friday Agreement, which excludes border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland?

That this is not an easy task is obvious. But if one wants an orderly solution, one must also focus all efforts in the remaining days to make this possible. I believe that important and, in my view, sufficient steps have been taken through the exit documents, especially the addition from Strasbourg.

Regardless of the outcome of the exit, we primarily aim for good and close relations in the future; I have often said this here. This applies to foreign and security policy, in which cooperation with Great Britain in NATO and the United Nations should continue to be very intensive. And when we as Europeans think about improving our capacity to act in foreign and security policy within the framework of NATO and the United Nations, the United Kingdom must always be part of our considerations.

This also applies to cooperation in internal security; the Federal Minister of the Interior has repeatedly pointed this out. We have a very close and trusting cooperation.

This also applies to cooperation in the fields of science and research, where close and fruitful relationships have developed over the past decades. International research centers such as the CERN in Geneva or the International Space Station (ISS) show us day by day what we can achieve when we work closely together.

The fact remains: After the exit of Great Britain, relations with Great Britain will not be as close as if Great Britain were part of the European Union. But the door for close cooperation in friendship and mutual benefit is wide open on our side.

As much as we are working towards an orderly solution, we have been preparing for weeks and months for the possibility of an unregulated exit of Great Britain. A multitude of measures have been taken at the European level and at the national level, including here in Parliament. At the European level, regulations have been established to ensure air and goods traffic between the European Union and Great Britain even after an unregulated exit. Erasmus students should be able to continue their studies without restrictions. British citizens should be exempt from visa requirements for short stays in the EU 27.

Here in this esteemed house, we have also initiated many measures to cushion the greatest hardships. For example, British citizens who have found a new home with us should be able to continue to live and work here legally. We have resolved questions regarding health insurance in both countries and significantly increased our personnel capacity at customs to avoid bottlenecks in the processing of goods.

I would like to say today on behalf of the Federal Government: Even though we have already taken the most important emergency measures, we will, despite these measures, continue to strive until the last day – I say: until the last hour – to ensure that this emergency planning does not come into effect, but that we do everything in the remaining, admittedly few days to achieve an orderly joint solution.

As painful as the exit of Great Britain is, we still have a lot to do and must focus on it – as we have done in recent years – to engage with the future of the European Union of the 27 member states in a world that is clearly reorganizing itself ten years after the Lisbon Treaty, ten years after the financial crisis, and thirty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

New economic powers from Asia, led by China, are presenting new challenges to our way of doing business and acting; I would say: fundamental challenges. We are experiencing that multilateralism is increasingly under pressure. The system of multilateral cooperation has brought us an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity in recent decades, and that is not up for negotiation for us. We continue to base our work on multilateral cooperation for the benefit of all.

Europe has a firm place as a shaping peace power in international politics today. However, Europe's role will increase in the coming years. Europe is a bastion of democracy and human rights, despite all the challenges we also feel within the European Union. Europe is a place where minorities are protected from persecution. Europe means freedom to speak, and it also means being able to say, write, and believe what everyone considers right – of course within the framework of our legal order.

On this basis of values, Europe has made two great promises to its citizens in the past, which it must also keep in the future: on the one hand, the promise of prosperity and on the other hand, the promise of security.

In light of global dynamics, it is no longer a given that we can easily keep these promises. Therefore, it is logical that the debate about our promise of prosperity is an important topic of today's and tomorrow's European Council.

We can say that ten years after the end of the international financial crisis, Europe as a whole is again in a better position. Unemployment is at a low, even though far too many people, especially young people, are still without work. Public debt has overall slightly decreased. For Germany, we can at least state that we have fallen below the 60 percent mark of debt in relation to gross domestic product.

In recent years, the economy of the European Union as a whole has grown. We have seen growth in every single member state of the European Union for the past two years, even though the outlook has recently become somewhat clouded. So we see that the development is heading in the right direction. But I say very clearly: This is not enough to keep up with or even define the world leaders in many areas.

Two areas stand out here. The first is that we must do everything to strengthen our common currency. Much has been created here; a lot of work has also been done. I would like to thank the Federal Minister of Finance for that. We have made progress in the banking and capital markets union, but now it is about completing it quickly. And for us, of course, it holds true: Without risk reduction, there can be no risk sharing.

But the conscious commitment to a strong euro is more than a financial matter; it is understood outside of Europe as a signal that Europe is ready to stand together, that Europe is ready to truly live the internal market, that Europe wants to present a united front.

You know that the finance ministers have succeeded in making significant progress on the Eurozone budget to further strengthen our competitiveness and convergence. The starting point for this was the German-French agreements.

We are continuing to work resolutely with a number of member states on the introduction of a common financial transaction tax. However, the history of creating this tax is anything but simple. And it shows: If we do not have global agreement on certain things, it is also very difficult to implement them locally in the European Union. Nevertheless, we now have the chance to take a first step. Thanks again to Olaf Scholz for that!

In addition to strengthening the currency, the second point is to ensure that in the age of digitalization, we not only maintain jobs in Europe but also create new ones. It is undisputed that the European industry is the key to this. It accounts for 80 percent of our exports and represents 30 million jobs in the European Union. But it is also undisputed that this industrial base is facing great challenges.

Much today is defined by the management of large data volumes, big data, and artificial intelligence. This will determine what the products of tomorrow will look like. But only a small part of European companies is determining the course of events. Too many innovations are coming from the United States and Asia. We need to catch up in fair competition.

Of course, our industrial base relies on small and medium-sized enterprises. But the truth is also that, in view of platforms, the economy, and others, large players are necessary to achieve market power and give small and medium-sized enterprises a chance to develop. Therefore, we will discuss strategic questions of industrial policy at the European Council tomorrow. Germany and France have made a proposal for this. Many other member states have also submitted their ideas.

I ask us not to react reflexively every time it comes to industrial policy and strategic industrial policy. This does not mean that the state takes the place of economic enterprises. I will illustrate this with an example: If we make a multitude of regulatory provisions in the automotive industry, especially in the area of climate protection, if we stipulate that by 2030 the car fleets of individual manufacturers must reduce CO2 emissions by 37.5 percent compared to 2020, if we determine how trucks will develop, if we have set the CO2 emissions of each member state in the European Union for the coming years until 2030 in the non-ETS area, then we cannot simply say blindly: We will do all of this through regulatory frameworks, but we will not think about how mobility in Europe will develop and how jobs will be preserved. I clearly say: I agree with the Federal Minister of Economics when he says: We cannot just stand by and watch as large parts of the value chain are no longer located in Europe.

Therefore, it is naturally important to find industrial partners when it comes to battery cell production. We cannot just watch as we were told year after year that this might not be so important – fortunately, this opinion has now changed – but we must be proactive and break out of the classic aid framework that does not allow us to do so. That is why the European Union has sensibly defined strategic projects that we are already applying in chip production and that we can now also apply in battery cell production. National funding plus European funding can be bundled in such a way that we can really profit from the internal market and support major innovations transnationally, namely across our national borders. That is correct. Therefore, it is important that we talk about such an industrial strategy.

Otherwise, we will not be able to tap into the potential of the internal market, because otherwise everyone works alone. We will also need networking on issues of disruptive innovations. We will also need networking on issues of chip production – we have already initiated that – and also on the networking of artificial intelligence. Germany and France want to take the lead here.

Of course, all of this must be considered in light of the challenges. This also includes carbon-free production over the course of this century. The industrial sector will have to make a huge contribution to this. But to believe that regulatory law can be applied in individual areas while forming no opinion on the overall development would be the wrong way. That is why I consider this discussion on industrial policy to be extremely important.

Another major point is: How do we define our trade relations? Here we have made a number of advances. I would like to remind you of the free trade agreement with Japan. There are now discussions on the agenda with the United States of America. I say quite openly: We have every interest in the discussions to ensure that we do not introduce new tariffs, but rather that we reduce tariffs. The Federal Government is committed to this.

However, I agree with the French position: We need a measure of reciprocity. – If we do not have access to American markets in public procurement in many states, then that must have an impact on the question "Who has access to public procurement in Germany from the American side?" in a certain way.

The question of reciprocity is even more relevant when we talk about China. On April 9, there will be an EU-China summit. We will prepare for that at the European Council. This fits very well with the discussion on strategic industrial issues. Of course, on the one hand, China is a strategic partner; on the other hand, China is a strategic competitor. I am very grateful to the European Commission for drafting a position paper that clearly states in many parts concerning relations with China that we are, in a certain way, in a system competition. We rely on a socially market economy shaped by freedom; China relies on a directed state economy. Naming these contradictions does not mean that we do not want to cooperate well. One must not have any illusions that we are working in two different systems.

That is why it is important – and this has often been lacking in the past – that we, as the European Union, as the 27 member states, represent a common position towards our partners in the world. This applies to China, it applies to the United States, and it applies to every other country.

The second major promise we have made to the citizens of Europe is the security promise. I believe we all share the insight that we must take more responsibility for our own security in Europe.

The events at our doorstep show us this: whether I refer to Ukraine, where the illegal annexation of Crimea has just come back into public focus, or whether I refer to Syria and other conflict zones. In order for Europe to be able to respond to the new geopolitical challenges in the future, we must, of course, create the conditions for this both internally and externally.

In recent years, and even today, the issue of migration has occupied us in a special way. We have made some progress in European asylum policy. I want to remind you of a self-evident matter – actually – that we are finally tackling now – I thank the Federal Minister of the Interior for pushing this forward – namely the EU-wide entry and exit register, which can really be operational by 2020. Actually – I say this in hindsight – it should have been agreed upon immediately with the introduction of the Schengen area. It is clear, when we look at things today. It is actually a triviality that if you have a common area, you also know who is in it and who is leaving. But better late than never, I would say. Now it is about getting this done quickly.

We have better protection of the external borders, we have also defined a new partnership with Africa, but we still have a lot of work to do in its implementation.

However, the truth is that we have not achieved everything. The question now is: Can there be different forms of solidarity among the 27 member states on the issue of "combating illegal migration" and on the introduction of regular, legal migration? Can member states take on different responsibilities? I say clearly: Yes. But I also say clearly: It cannot be that individual member states declare that they will not participate in a solidarity distribution of refugees at all – not at all and not in any way. So it is about principles; but of course, there can be different weights otherwise.

Then it is about our ability to act externally – I explicitly say: in cooperation with NATO and not otherwise – and the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, is of great importance. It will lead to military coherence among the member states of the European Union, especially regarding operational capabilities. It will also lead to having an arms industry and weapon systems that are not as diverse as they are today. Rather, we will develop common weapon systems for the future. This is certainly more efficient and better in terms of resource use.

Here we are in an area that concerns us all and in which it is not easy for anyone to fully accept the tasks of the future and contribute fully.

On the one hand, it is about financial resources; this has been discussed in detail. I ask that we not only focus on what we have not yet achieved, but perhaps also on what we have already initiated since the decisions made in Wales. We started at 1.18 percent of GDP. The budget draft presented yesterday forecasts 1.37 percent – this in times of growth. That is a step. One can say: "That is still not enough," but we should not demotivate ourselves. Therefore, I say: These are important steps we have taken regarding the Bundeswehr, but also regarding the trust in our work.

But I also say: We have made a commitment to NATO for 2024 of 1.5 percent. This will of course also affect the Structured Cooperation in the European Union, which has not yet met the expectations of all in the alliance. But I stand for the fact that we really keep this commitment we have made, and the Federal Government stands for that as well. This will require strength from us.

Then we have a second point. We all quickly talk about European armed forces. We talk about the fact that we must, of course, develop European weapon systems. And that will only work in cooperation. I do not want to target anyone here – it is completely undisputed that networked cooperation in the creation of future weapon systems – for example, a future tank under German leadership or a future aircraft system under French leadership – means reliability between the partners and that it must not happen that the non-delivery of a few parts renders others completely incapable of action.

Now we come to a point that I want to mention here only very abstractly – I could take copyright as a concrete example, where we are currently having a very intense discussion about Article 13 –: We make a coalition agreement at home; we write something in, we all find it right and stand by it. Now we are partners within the European Union, and now another partner comes with equally good reasons from their perspective and says: I see it differently. In copyright, France has said: You cannot exempt all start-ups from the ancillary copyright; that does not work; that would lead to only start-ups existing and no protection for creatives at all. – We said: We see that a little differently. The European Parliament, Europe, has discussed for almost a decade to arrive at an ancillary copyright. Must we, in the end, be ready to give up a piece of our positions so that others can also make compromises, or do we say: "No, once written down, coalition agreement 2018, no change"? I believe that then we cannot be good partners. That is, of course, tough, it is difficult, and we will also try to manage without the upload filters that are not even mentioned in the directive.

I say this just as much for our arms exports: If the UK or France have a different stance on how to influence Arab partners to end the Yemen war than we do, who consider a different method to be more correct, could it be that we then say: "From us, there are no parts for any product that is manufactured in the UK or France"?

These are the questions we face, and not just today. We will face them again and again. Therefore, I wish for a very fundamental debate about this in this esteemed house. Otherwise, we are seen as morally arrogant – that suits me – or we are seen as too principled, or we are seen as uncompromising. We can give as many lip service to a great Europe and how we all want to work together, but the truth is concrete. Unfortunately, this is the case in many questions.

So are we ready to strengthen this Europe? I find that everything speaks in favor of us doing so, because 60 years of freedom, 60 years of peace, 60 years of prosperity are associated with it, because Europe, despite all the problems we have, means clean air and good education for our children compared to many other regions in the world, because Europe offers the best medical care in the world, the highest standards in consumer protection and data protection, because the market economy provides people with opportunities for economic development while also offering social protection. Is it worth continuing to fight for this Europe? I say: Yes. From my perspective, there is no way to better protect our German prosperity, our way of life than in a united Europe. This determines the actions of the Federal Government.