Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the celebratory event of the American Academy on the 60th anniversary of the Marshall Plan on November 14, 2007, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

19 November 2007 · 60th anniversary of the Marshall Plan celebratory event of the American Academy · American Academy, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the American Academy in Berlin on November 14, 2007, marking the 60th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.
Main themes
Transatlantic partnership, Marshall Plan anniversary, climate change and climate policy, CO2 emissions reduction, transatlantic security policy, global governance and international institutions, democracy and human rights, economic growth and sustainability, Germany-US relations, G8 presidency, Kyoto Protocol, emerging economies
Duration
~25 min
75th percentile
Words
2,981
75th percentile
Sentences
156
82nd percentile
Readability
48
57th percentile
Grade
11.3
36th percentile
Syntax
2.96
42nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.41
91st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 62%60%
  • Environmental 14%13%
  • Institutional 12%12%
  • Economic 5%5%
  • Ceremonial 5%4%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

156 sentences in 35 paragraphs

Bereich, den ich ansprechen möchte, ist die gemeinsame Sorge um unsere natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen. Wir wissen, dass der Klimawandel eine der größten Herausforderungen unserer Zeit darstellt. Die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse sind eindeutig: Wir müssen handeln, und zwar schnell. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und die Europäische Union müssen hier gemeinsam vorangehen. Wir müssen unsere Anstrengungen zur Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen verstärken und innovative Technologien fördern, die uns helfen, unsere Klimaziele zu erreichen.

Ein dritter Bereich ist die gemeinsame Gestaltung unserer Sicherheitspolitik. Die Welt hat sich verändert, und die Bedrohungen sind vielfältiger geworden. Terrorismus, Cyberangriffe und regionale Konflikte erfordern ein gemeinsames Vorgehen. Wir müssen unsere militärischen und zivilen Ressourcen besser koordinieren und unsere Strategien anpassen, um den neuen Herausforderungen gerecht zu werden. Die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik ist unerlässlich, um Frieden und Stabilität zu gewährleisten.

Der vierte Bereich, den ich ansprechen möchte, ist die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Architektur unserer Welt. In einer globalisierten Welt sind wir alle miteinander verbunden. Die Herausforderungen, vor denen wir stehen, sind globaler Natur und erfordern globale Lösungen. Wir müssen die internationalen Institutionen stärken und reformieren, um sicherzustellen, dass sie den aktuellen Herausforderungen gewachsen sind. Die transatlantische Partnerschaft kann hier eine führende Rolle spielen, indem sie Werte wie Demokratie, Menschenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit fördert.

Ich bin zuversichtlich, dass wir gemeinsam in der Lage sind, diese Herausforderungen zu meistern. Die transatlantische Partnerschaft hat in der Vergangenheit bewiesen, dass sie stark und widerstandsfähig ist. Lassen Sie uns diese Tradition fortsetzen und gemeinsam an einer besseren Zukunft arbeiten. Vielen Dank.

A major area where I see a central future task for the transatlantic partners is our shared concern for our natural living conditions. Not everything has been harmonized yet, but we are on a good path. As an example, I would like to mention climate policy. It is now important that we recognize that this is a global challenge. However, it is still undecided how we will address this global challenge. If we do so in the spirit of freedom and responsibility, then – this is my strong conviction – we will find the safest and most cost-effective path to also show the world a way to tackle this global challenge within the transatlantic community.

It is, of course, very important that we find ways to meet the task on one hand, but on the other hand, do not call our economic growth into question. I often say this – I will just briefly mention it here: The fact is that we are not faced with the choice of doing nothing or doing a lot, but rather with the choice of either causing great economic damage if we do nothing, or finding a more favorable path through cleverness with lower economic costs. I advocate for behaving wisely. I predict that our acceptance in the world will greatly depend on whether we confront these issues or not.

We have made quite ambitious proposals in Europe. However, if we look at the Kyoto Protocol, which is not so highly regarded in America, we see that we are lagging behind in fulfilling the simple reduction commitments agreed upon therein. I do not want to hide this; it is something that is repeatedly pointed out to us from the American side. But I believe that during our G8 presidency this year, we have made an important step. We said: Climate change is an issue we must address because it is caused by humans. We want to shape the time after the Kyoto Protocol under the auspices of the United Nations.

It is essential for me that the leading industrial countries play an important role here – not because they could effectively tackle climate change alone, but because if they do nothing, they will not be able to convince the emerging countries. Europe currently has average CO2 emissions of about nine tons per person per year, the USA 20 tons, China 3.5 tons, and India under one ton. We will certainly not be able to convince India and China, despite their large populations, to take on reduction commitments if we are not able to make ambitious reductions ourselves.

I believe that we can show with this example how we can become somewhat independent from resource crises and much more through innovative technical responses by saving CO2 emissions and thus also saving fossil resources, and how we can simultaneously take advantage of export opportunities in emerging countries that are of utmost importance for our prosperity.

The threat to humanity and the threat to our natural living conditions lead me to the third area of challenges for the transatlantic partnership, namely security policy in the classical sense. The security situation has changed dramatically since the time of the Cold War. We have completely new conflicts. The number of nuclear states has increased – I am thinking here of India and Pakistan. The danger of nuclear proliferation has grown. We face asymmetric threats from transnational fundamentalist terrorism. The destruction of one’s own life is, so to speak, the task that terrorists take on to destroy democracies. The challenge of combating terrorism is far more difficult than the challenge of the Cold War, which we could address with deterrence. We have regional conflicts that we can no longer escape in a globally interconnected world – I think of Darfur and also the experiences in Rwanda. Furthermore, we have conflicts over resources that could dramatically intensify if we do not respond.

I believe that Europeans and Americans together have a good chance of solving such problems. One alone will rarely succeed in this world. We are dependent on finding common solutions. Thus, we are jointly engaged in many areas – I want to emphasize this: in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, with intensive diplomatic efforts regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, and in the coming days once again in the question of how we can advance the solution to the Middle East conflict. Together with our Foreign Minister, I have strongly advocated that the Middle East Quartet, and thus also the European Union, regain a role in solving this conflict, because this conflict is so complicated that one must stand on as broad a foundation as possible to have any chance of resolution.

I am convinced: We are strong when we act together wherever possible. This is the mandate of our common security. This security is also indivisible; it must be defended together.

When we talk about the alliance conditions, one might say on a day like this that despite all the hesitation in Germany, we have nonetheless made considerable progress since reunification. Germany is aware that we have taken on new tasks and new responsibilities after reunification. This is a very positive message because we are also trusted.

If we look back at how we – the Liberals and the Union – once argued before the Federal Constitutional Court about whether boats could conduct observation missions in the Adriatic, and if we see our current engagements in the western Balkans, in Afghanistan, and with UNIFIL in the Middle East, then I want to say: 17 years is a short historical time. Germany has grown significantly into its responsibilities. I am very grateful for that and would like to take this opportunity to thank our soldiers in the Bundeswehr for their commitment.

Let us return to the initial thought: Concern for our common security means taking responsibility for the preservation of freedom. Our security and our freedom can no longer simply be protected within the alliance territory; we must go beyond that.

If we want a real transatlantic partnership, we must also continue to discuss the fundamental approach to it intensively. I believe we share the overall approach in the transatlantic relationship that military and civilian measures belong together, that political, civilian, and military measures should never be separated, and that we must not focus solely on what is militarily feasible. There are indeed sometimes different directions here. But I believe we can agree that stabilization measures only work properly when they are embedded in a coherent political concept. The purpose and goal of the engagement must be defined. This means we must be as clear as possible about the time after interventions. We must not accept measures of a different quality regarding civilian actions; rather, we must place the work of diplomats, police officers, judges, and reconstruction workers on the same level as what our soldiers do. This is at least my conviction.

We in the federal government say: Without security, there is no reconstruction; without reconstruction, there is no security. This is the concept of "networked security." I think this concept should become the standard of our engagement – in Afghanistan as well as elsewhere. I see a significant task for us as transatlantic partners in coordinating our military capabilities – which we can do quite well within NATO – but also our civilian capacities. This is sometimes much more difficult because we have quite different ideas.

I am firmly convinced that we also need to learn – this would also be worth a transatlantic discussion – how the recipient countries of our measures envision their own future. The example of Afghanistan makes it clear to me time and again that we are entering a country that has a certain development behind it, which it must and wants to build upon, but which is far from what we in Europe and the United States consider normal. Before building the police, one must first talk to the Afghans about how they envision police work if they could picture their country. This approach should be discussed more strongly among us.

Amid all the difficult challenges we face, NATO remains the anchor for transatlantic responsible security policy. The task of NATO has changed since the Cold War. But NATO remains the political-military alliance built on common values and therefore also exerts great power.

European unification now brings with it that we must, of course, build and strengthen our own European security and defense structures. However, these must be compatible with NATO structures; they must not contradict them. Therefore, it is very important that we ensure that European security and defense policy does not become a competing event to our engagement in NATO.

It is, of course, the case that we still have a lot to learn when we look at the situation in Kosovo or Afghanistan with a clear eye. Whenever Europeans want to establish a police mission and military capacities are provided by NATO, we currently encounter quite difficult conflicts, which are also partly related to conflicts within the member states of the respective alliance. This is not a state we can be satisfied with, as the tasks are so difficult. I hope that we can achieve a strengthening of the European position through the reform treaty and through the strengthening of the High Representative, who is also responsible for European security and defense policy.

I see positive signals, for example, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy says that he wants to bring his country back into NATO structures. We will accompany this attentively and supportively, just as we are interested in any efficiency improvement of European security and defense policy. I do not believe we need a new theoretical superstructure; rather, I believe we need practical introductions and implementations of what is desired in Europe.

From the perspective of Europeans, the cooperation of NATO with Russia is, of course, of particular importance. The NATO-Russia Council must be used as a political-military instrument. It has also been somewhat strengthened recently, for example, when we discussed the "missile defense" structures. We need Russia – this must be said – when we only look at the conflicts in the Balkans – Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina – with all the implications for other countries in the region. Therefore, the question of a stable partnership with Russia is of utmost importance.

I would therefore like to explicitly state that the consultations on missile defense systems, both in the NATO-Russia Council and the bilateral consultations between the United States and Russia, are viewed by us as extraordinarily positive. If we can achieve cooperation, Russia can gradually grow into the role of a partner after the Cold War. Times have changed. But the willingness to adapt must, of course, be present on all sides.

We need each other, even beyond NATO, across the transatlantic alliance, when I think of one of our greatest common concerns these days. That is the Iranian nuclear program. How determined and united we are, when the Iranian president continues to make no secret of wanting to destroy Israel, will be one of the decisive questions for the future. How determined and united are we in preventing Iran from pursuing a military nuclear program? That this program poses a threat not only to the region there but also has far-reaching implications, I believe I do not need to say here.

The European and American partners agree: We must work together with Russia and also with China as a veto power in the UN Security Council to do everything possible to ensure that Tehran fulfills its obligations set by the World Security Council and suspends uranium enrichment. We want a diplomatic solution. Precisely because we want it, we must also say: The sanctions process will continue if the conditions set for Iran are not implemented.

I repeat here today what I said before the General Assembly of the United Nations: The security of Israel is, for me as the German Chancellor, never negotiable. Protecting it is part of my country's raison d'état. I believe that now is one of those testing times when we must also show that we stand by these words. That is why we are scaling back our economic engagement in Iran. I believe this process is not yet complete. We must do everything we can to ensure that trade routes do not find their way back to Iran through indirect means. It must therefore be made very clear by the entire international community and by the transatlantic alliance that we have a common vital interest in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.

This brings me to my last, the fourth point. Perhaps it is one of the most controversial in the transatlantic relationship. Our dealings with Iran remind us once again that accepted decisions take place in the UN Security Council, in the UN. The question of how we arrive at quick, globally accepted decisions leads us to the question of the importance of the United Nations. I believe they are of crucial importance in a globalized world. The place for decisions of the kind we need to make in connection with Iran is the UN.

In order for the UN to fulfill this task, it needs reform. This has been in the works for 25 years now. That is longer than the Cold War has been over. If we want this reform, particularly a reform of the UN Security Council, it will only happen if the United States, just like the Europeans, have an interest in placing it quite high on the priority list. I advocate for doing so. If we as a transatlantic community were able to do this, we could certainly carve out an important furrow on the path toward a peaceful and free international order.

One thing is certain: Together we can achieve much, and against each other we can achieve nothing with great certainty. Germany is ready – that is well known – to take on more responsibility in the UN Security Council. But we are also ready to discuss innovative solutions, because in my view stagnation is the worst of all possibilities.

In my conviction, we must introduce the idea of freedom that we live by into multilateral international structures and give it enough room to maneuver. I know that this can be evaluated differently between the terms "utopian" and "visionary." But those who do not make the effort, in my view, sin against the tasks of our time. Much of what those who came before us aspired to and believed in has since become reality. If they had not done so already in the late 1940s, nothing would have come of it.

That is why I would find it wonderful if, in 50 years, we could say: The transatlantic community has contributed to the security architecture of a converging world. We need standards. We need international agreements on trade, environmental protection, the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction, on the transparency of international financial markets, and on the protection of intellectual property. In my view, there is no way around all of this.

We need to clarify the relationship between the WTO, the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. We can discuss this to a large extent among the G8 partners and then bring the results as ideas into the international organizations. I want to point out that we have made a huge qualitative leap that has not yet fully unfolded its effects during Germany's G8 presidency. This is a permanent structured dialogue led by the OECD with the O5 countries – that is, the emerging countries India, China, Mexico, South Africa, and Brazil. It will enable a new form of cooperation at the international level if it is well managed.

If we do all of this, then we have a chance to shape the 21st century with our values and to help the idea of freedom and responsibility break through.

We know that the friendly ties between Europe and the United States and Canada are unique and indispensable. There is no shortage of common challenges – I have mentioned a few. I believe they will increase rather than decrease. But we know: Together as partners, we are strong. We have experienced so much good together. We have together the freedom to responsibility and the responsibility to freedom. In this sense, let us act.