Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the conference "Impulse 21 – Berlin Forum on Security Policy" of the Federal Ministry of Defense and Tagesspiegel on November 10 ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

10 November 2006 · Impulse 21 – Berlin Forum on Security Policy · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 'Impulse 21 – Berlin Forum on Security Policy' conference organized by the Federal Ministry of Defense and Tagesspiegel on November 10, 2006, in Berlin.
Main themes
German security policy, Bundeswehr foreign deployments, transatlantic cooperation, White Paper on security policy, asymmetric threats, civil crisis prevention, NATO, soldier misconduct in Afghanistan, conscription and civil-military relations, globalization and security, multilateral partnerships
Duration
~41 min
91st percentile
Words
4,959
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Sentences
239
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Readability
42
41st percentile
Grade
12.5
51st percentile
Syntax
3.03
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Vocabulary
2.06
20th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 73%67%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Ceremonial 8%7%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

239 sentences in 52 paragraphs

Dear Minister, dear Franz Josef Jung,

ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to include all excellencies, members of parliament, and state secretaries, but I want to mention one of those present in a very special way: General Jones, the NATO Supreme Commander for Europe. He will soon be handing over his position.

General Jones, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the years of your service. You have made significant contributions to transatlantic cooperation. We Germans will always remember what you have accomplished. Perhaps I may also say that we have always regarded you as a friend of Germany.

German security policy has been the subject of central discussions in recent weeks. Therefore, the timing of this conference under the title "Impulse 21" is very well chosen. Unfortunately, the discussions have not only focused on the actual security policy challenges. We also had to talk about the misconduct of German soldiers abroad. I would like to emphasize once again: The Federal Ministry of Defense has clarified the matters without delay. The Federal Minister of Defense is rightly reviewing what we can improve in the training and leadership of our soldiers, what we should change. Because we want to do everything we can to ensure that incidents like those in Afghanistan do not happen again.

But I say very clearly: These incidents do not represent the entire Bundeswehr. Our soldiers perform an extraordinarily good service abroad under difficult and very dangerous circumstances in the vast majority of cases.

The Bundeswehr as a whole has gained great respect worldwide in recent years. This is due, on the one hand, to its high professionalism and, on the other hand, to the manner of its appearance. This has one cause, one reason: The Bundeswehr is – supported by conscription – firmly rooted in our society. Our Bundeswehr soldiers are citizens in uniform. They represent our country and thus bear an extraordinarily great responsibility. Therefore, it is right – as we have done today again in the Bundestag regarding Operation "Enduring Freedom" – to strive for as broad a consensus among the factions as possible. Because the greater the support in the German Bundestag, the greater and broader the foundation of the represented society that supports this mission. It is right that we do not make this struggle easy for ourselves, because the Bundeswehr soldiers risk their lives in these missions.

That is why it is also so important that we continually become aware of the fundamental principles of our security interests or, where they change, that we consciously acknowledge these changes and clearly define them – not only in insider circles but especially in society. The conference today is an extraordinarily good opportunity for that.

You all know: After twelve years, the Federal Government has adopted a White Paper on Germany's security policy. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to all who contributed to it, especially to the Federal Minister of Defense. Because I know that this White Paper has been an important concern for you, dear Franz Josef Jung, since the beginning of the government's work. In times of change, we need determinations of our security policy. What applies to the White Paper also applies equally to the supplementary action plan "Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Peace Consolidation." To burden this group here with the details of the White Paper and the action plan would be to carry owls to Athens. But I want to take the opportunity to highlight once again the core of what is formulated in the White Paper and the action plan. Because it is a core of general political significance.

At its core, it is about guaranteeing security in our country and for our country, preserving our prosperity, and safeguarding and protecting the values on which our society is based. These three points may sound relatively mundane. But realizing this is a matter of political work that demands more and more attention and effort from us. This applies, on the one hand, to the analysis of the security or threat situation and, on the other hand, to the preparation of possible instruments up to the ultimate means at our disposal: the deployment of our armed forces.

It would completely disregard reality if the public discussion on security policy were narrowed down to foreign deployments. We are constantly active in security policy in various ways and together with our partners – also, but by no means only, with and in the Bundeswehr. This is because we have fundamental changes in our security situation; changes that have essentially been brought about by a completely altered situation after the end of the Cold War and are due to accelerated globalization.

We have the keyword of asymmetric threats for this. Such threats come from individuals who are willing to risk their lives for goals that we do not share. The difficulty is that the classic deterrence mechanisms no longer work in the face of these asymmetric threats. I do not want to say that the conditions of the Cold War were manageable, but in a way, we had found a methodology – that of deterrence – that could be applied very successfully and was rewarded with the victory of freedom in many parts of Europe and the world. The fact that representatives from Slovakia are here today is, for example, a reflection of this completely changed situation.

We must continually make it clear to people what danger these new threats pose, what danger comes from weapons of mass destruction and corresponding delivery systems, especially what it means when such weapons of mass destruction are passed on uncontrollably. And we must point out what it means when terrorist groups take root in unstable states or when relatively stable states support such terrorist groups. We must not delude ourselves: There is a part of militant Islamism that has set itself the goal of destroying the Western world. This is not some abstract threat, but unfortunately a concrete threat that we must confront.

We have devastating regional conflicts, pressing poverty issues, especially on our neighboring continent of Africa, and streams of migrants. We know that distribution conflicts over increasingly scarce resources, as well as environmental problems, can lead to greater unrest and violence. This concerns oil and gas, climate change, and drinking water. All of these are causes of conflicts with very high potential for violence. No country can shy away from this list, which could go on indefinitely. Germany cannot shy away from these changes and their causes either.

From the broad spectrum of causes of threats, it can be seen that the security situation is characterized by one thing: high complexity. Complex situations can, in most cases, not be managed through one-dimensional measures. Complex security problems require complex precautions, measures, and responses.

If we still try to grasp what the common characteristic of all the described challenges is, we find: All of this does not adhere to state borders. The problems concern us all – the Germans as well as our neighbors, partners, and allies. No one can escape these problems. Just as the dangers know no borders – this is my firm conviction – the responses must also transcend national borders. No country in the world can master the dangers alone. Therefore, German security policy is always also partnership-based policy. German security policy cannot be conceived as national policy. That is why it is of great importance that we have had a common European security strategy on our continent for several years; a strategy that is deliberately open to partnerships, foremost with our Atlantic allies. A completed European security strategy would be completely misguided in light of global challenges. Therefore, I say: NATO is and remains the most important guarantor of our security. We also want the European security structures to be strengthened not as a contradiction, not as a counterweight, but as European structures.

If one considers, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which we will celebrate next spring, that the starting point for the Treaty of Rome, which dealt with economic issues, was a failed initiative on defense issues, one can see that many things have been on the agenda for a very long time. One can also see that Europe has not always found it easy to find the right answers to the respective threats.

NATO remains the center of the security policy dialogue in the Atlantic area within the framework of European security and defense policy. I believe that we Europeans can contribute a lot of value to this Atlantic dialogue. If I were to answer the question of what we can contribute, I would say: It is the combination of coordinated civilian and military capabilities. We cannot exclude any of these components. We believe that this combination of civilian and military capabilities has very important characteristics.

It is now important that we improve practical cooperation between NATO and the European Union. This is not an abstract problem, even if one might say that it should actually work properly. However, the various conflicts and memberships sometimes make it not as simple in practice as one might imagine. We will soon and concretely be faced with a case, namely the question of Kosovo, where we will have, on the one hand, a civilian mission of European security and defense policy in the areas of internal and justice policy and, on the other hand, a continued NATO mission in Kosovo. Woe to us if we have nice headlines about the cooperation of ESDP and NATO and practically fail to achieve what is necessary in the case of Kosovo. We will therefore have to work and learn at this point and coordinate the missions well.

We also need good cooperation between the European Union and NATO in Afghanistan. With regard to the summit in Riga, I also want to say: We will not be able to avoid, when discussing the problems of Afghanistan at the NATO summit in Riga, conducting discussions that are not purely military. Here too, it will become evident that the success of building Afghanistan can only result from a combination of various means and possibilities. That is why I already said very loudly and clearly at the Security Conference in Munich: NATO is not just a military alliance. It is a values alliance and thus also a political alliance. We must not impose restrictions on the discussion that could ultimately call entire missions into question.

In addition to the cooperation between the European Union and NATO, we will of course also continue to engage in neighborhood policy. It is important to further develop our relationship with Russia. Here too, very interesting developments have taken place in recent years, including in cooperation in various missions, which I believe we should bring much closer to the public; they are often only known to experts.

We also want to intensify the security policy dialogue with other partners, for example in the Asian region with India or Japan. Here too, one can see, when looking at the problems on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea, when looking at the issue of Iran, that today, in light of global challenges, we can no longer simply exclude regions from strategic cooperation. Otherwise, we would make great mistakes or burden ourselves with unnecessary problems in regions that lie within our own area of interest.

It is important to strengthen the security policy forums of the United Nations: the Security Council, the mechanisms for disarmament and arms control. All of this means for German security policy: Our interests will need to be defined even more than before in a partnership-based manner in the future. We must strive for common European and Atlantic positions. The experience is: When we act together, we can make a difference. If we do not do this, we have also recognized what bitter lesson we must learn from it.

Partnership-based security policy – it is easy to say this in this hall – of course also means respecting joint procedures and decision-making mechanisms in practice. Those who have spent time in the councils of the European Union know how laborious finding compromises can be. We in Germany are used to this anyway, as we have spent a lot of time in the tough negotiations between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat as a federal state. I understand the impatience of some who ask: Why must we impose all this on ourselves? From my personal experience, the search for compromise is always worthwhile when, in the end, there is a result that is supported by all.

We will face the question in many places: How much patience, how much willingness to compromise do we bring to the table? This does not mean, of course, that decisions can be postponed until the end of time. For threats have the property that they can eventually become real. We still have much to learn regarding speed. But I also say: From a European perspective, from a German perspective, the desire and intention not to refuse the search for compromise will be an essential part of our security policy efforts.

We already have a high level of integrated staffs and NATO Response Force units in NATO today. With this, we now have forms of cooperation with which we can operate in very complex contexts and at the same time – I want to emphasize this again – we need decisions in the parliamentary area that must be made by our national parliamentarians. This means that the understanding of the complexity of security policy requirements must, so to speak, be part of the basic knowledge of politics so that decisions can be made in Parliament within the necessary timeframe in each individual case. Other partner countries do not know this necessity. But I believe that with these decision-making mechanisms that we must handle in Germany, we also have a foundation on which we can send our soldiers into the necessary missions.

We Europeans are guided by a comprehensive concept of security, which means: foreign policy, development policy, and defense policy. Civilian and military options form – as I said at the beginning – a unity. Therefore, modern security policy today will always involve the deployment of police and judicial forces abroad. Added to this are the support of non-governmental organizations and cooperation in the cultural sector – that is, the entire area of development aid and the area of foreign economic cooperation. This means: In my firm conviction, the conflicts we face cannot be managed with purely military means. Therefore, the conclusion in the White Paper is also "networked security." Others have described this with "hard power" and "soft power." The terms are fundamentally unimportant. What matters is that we have a common understanding of the necessary security policy measures.

The practical examples of these considerations show that the concrete challenges fit very well with the concept of networked security and that the concept of networked security is also reflected in all the conflicts where we need solutions.

We have known the Middle East conflict for many decades. None of us knew at the beginning of summer how the situation would escalate. We know that our relationship with the Arab-Islamic world depends significantly on whether we will be able to make progress, political progress, in resolving this conflict in the coming years. Stability in the Middle East is therefore, on the one hand, in our own interest due to regional proximity, but also because of the fundamental conditions of the Arab-Islamic world. The situation has been further exacerbated by the conflict in Lebanon. One should also consider the regional contexts, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Also, in light of the fact that we Germans have a very special responsibility for the right to exist of Israel due to our history, we must, of course, try to take on responsibility at this point.

With our participation in the UNIFIL mission, we have engaged in this region for the first time. We support sovereign Lebanon with Resolution 1701. We want there to be a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinian territories. This means we need a thriving coexistence of the countries in this region. After just a few weeks of the UNIFIL mission, we already feel: A military stabilization alone is not the solution to the problem. It is one component, but without progress in the political process, this military mission will not bring success in the region. Therefore, we owe it to the soldiers who are deployed there to do everything possible to advance the political process in parallel.

We see from the federal government, together with the partner countries of the European Union, the necessity to revive the Quartet. Germany will take over the presidency of the European Union in a few weeks. We will do everything we can to make progress in the context of this Quartet in the Israel-Palestine conflict with our partners – this is not easy; some have memories of laborious negotiations, but it is the opportunity for the European Union to also take responsibility in this process.

We need a concept for the reconstruction of Lebanon. The strategy in Lebanon includes diplomatic, military, police, and development policy instruments. We Europeans have thus taken on responsibility in a region whose conflict resolutions are certainly among the most complicated. Therefore, I want to make it very clear: We will not achieve this without the United States. I believe, moreover, that complicated missions are rarely manageable if one thinks one can do without the other. This means that transatlantic unity – in all these components, by the way – will be extraordinarily important. We all experience, whether it is about the Middle East conflict, the Iran issue, or North Korea: We are being watched closely to see whether there are cracks within the international community and especially the Western community – then we are weakened – or whether we are making joint efforts.

A second example I would like to mention: The deployment of the Bundeswehr in the Congo. Even there, a year ago, we did not think that a military engagement in this region might be necessary. Europe has responded to the United Nations' request to stabilize the first democratic elections in the Congo in 40 years and to contribute to making them possible. I believe we can already say today, based on the previous course, that the presence of European troops in the Congo has helped to maintain stability in the country. This process of conducting the election has been preceded by a long engagement of Europe in the Congo. The military component is not the first here, but has essentially come at the end of a long process.

I say clearly and unequivocally: We have been asked for a limited mission and we also perceive this mission as a limited one. We have the firm intention to complete the mandate as planned. But we also know that in the Congo, ultimately, what matters is how the political situation in the country develops. Therefore, it would be completely misguided to take the political focus away from the Congo with the withdrawal of the troops. A long process will also be necessary here to lead the Congo towards reasonable development.

We must – as shown by the migration problems that particularly the EU member countries Spain and Italy are struggling with – leave no stone unturned to try to solve the problems on the ground. We will also, building on the British G8 presidency, address the topic of Africa again as a key issue of our G8 presidency. This is not about charitable arguments, as it was sometimes seen in the past, but again about tangible interests of Europeans regarding Africa. I believe we are right to not leave the engagement for Africa to China, but to also show our flag here.

Therefore, together with the Portuguese – we have for the first time a trio presidency from Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia, to bring some continuity to the actions of the European Union – we will prepare an EU-Africa summit that creates the necessary conditions for Africa to have a reasonable chance to develop as a continent, focusing on governance, government capability in Africa, and fair treatment of resource reserves.

A third example: The Balkans. The Balkans is an area where we Europeans paid for our lessons by experiencing that we were not able to resolve the conflicts at our doorstep alone, but could only do so with the help of the United States of America and NATO. We have achieved great successes here, if one reflects on the time from ten or twelve years ago. But it remains necessary to take measures to create a calming situation; a situation that also clearly shows that we need political sustainability.

It has already been possible to significantly reduce the Bundeswehr contingents in an improved security situation. Our mission in Macedonia has ended. I think back to how difficult my faction found it to agree to this deployment, classifying it as one of the more dangerous ones. At that time, we would have believed anything, except that this would be a deployment that would end very quickly. Nevertheless, we know that there are still significant problems to solve in other areas. Here, too, it is of course the case that the question of how things will proceed with Kosovo is something that depends significantly on Mr. Ahtisaari and his mediation efforts. We also feel here that a solution must be found not only for Kosovo but also for Serbia that is acceptable in the region.

We have decided to reduce the contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But here, too, we have a parallel political process that is stabilizing, but is by no means so stable that one should not closely monitor developments. Therefore, our missions in the Balkans will, in my firm conviction – I want to state this explicitly – only be successful if we give the countries in the Balkans a European perspective. Anything else would lead to the military component needing to be strengthened again. This would ultimately be much more expensive than if we take the opportunity to open up this European perspective; however, by also setting conditions. The European perspective cannot be offered at no cost. We are a community of values. I believe we have also been able to gain very good, very interesting experiences here. Fortunately, the European Union is an attractive union from the perspective of many who seek this European perspective.

The greatest danger to our security remains undoubtedly international terrorism. Therefore, we remain particularly engaged in Afghanistan within the framework of "Enduring Freedom." I want to say at this point: We, as the Federal Republic of Germany, of course also have a strong interest in stabilizing the situation in Iraq and getting into a reasonable process here. We also feel: One cannot avoid a conflict as a single country because all things are interconnected. Therefore, progress must also be made there.

But even in Afghanistan, where we are directly engaged, we feel that simple measures alone will not yield success. We have an important and quite demanding task in northern Afghanistan within the ISAF mission of NATO. We have the firm will – I say this again for the entire federal government – to continue to fulfill this task with high professionalism. I believe that we can only solve the question of Afghanistan, the task that lies ahead of us, in partnership. Therefore, I would also like to express my gratitude for the fact that our soldiers could always rely on being helped – especially by our American allies – when they were in a difficult situation. But I must also add that Germany has also repeatedly provided support in southern Afghanistan within the framework of the mandate when requested in emergency situations.

This means for Afghanistan, beyond military tasks: the core of the solution – and we feel this there very much – must be a coherent political process. Military stabilization supports this process. Economic development is of crucial importance. On the one hand, we know that our ideas often take longer to present the advantages of a freer life to people in other countries. On the other hand, we experience that nothing is as important as the success of economic aid, the building of infrastructure, and the functioning of state institutions. When we talk about Afghanistan today, part of the problems, in my firm conviction, is that both the establishment of institutions and the visibility of economic improvements for individuals are still not sufficiently guaranteed; and if they are, then in areas that we cannot accept at all, for example in the area of drugs. We must face this soberly and ensure – as difficult as it is – that we do not just give money and hope that it will somehow work out, but also provide the necessary infrastructural support to achieve visible progress.

When one sometimes follows donor conferences and inquires after one or two years about what has happened on the ground, one must see that it is too little. For the individual person in their family situation, with their children, with their problems, what matters is not what billions have been pledged in London or other places, but what water pipes have been built, what schools and training opportunities are available. That is what ultimately counts for the people.

In addition, there is a point where the West can certainly do more, because in these regions, time is even more important than it is for us. It may be interesting that it takes twelve years to obtain a building permit for an airport in Berlin, but that is a time span in which much has happened in Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Congo, and many other areas of the world that we can only painstakingly reverse. European tendering procedures for development aid are characterized worldwide by the fact that they are not considered short-term, but generally take too long. We must also address this problem, because we cannot subsequently bridge these time periods solely with military components. That cannot be the task.

We must and will continue to face the task in Afghanistan. It is not as simple and straightforward as we might have thought, but the consequences of failure would be unimaginable. Therefore, Germany stands here in a comprehensive sense to its responsibility.

The complexity of security policy challenges shows one thing: the Bundeswehr is engaged in its missions, heavily engaged. But I want to explicitly express my extraordinary thanks to all those involved: the Bundeswehr is meeting the demands placed upon it.

We know: We are the economically strongest, the most populous country in the European Union. We have been given the chance to be accepted as an equal member, as a reunified country in the community of Western values. Looking back 50 years, this is anything but a given. Looking back 20 years, we did not even believe it.

Yesterday, in the Bundestag, on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the fall of the Wall, an East German colleague pointed out that she had started saving ten East Marks a month at the age of 15 to take a trip to America upon reaching retirement age. I was similar. Although I was not quite as consistent in saving, I also planned a trip to America for my 60th birthday – the retirement age for women in the GDR was 60, for men 65 years. We felt privileged in terms of freedom. In any case, one could not have imagined all of this even 20 years ago.

This gain, of being an equal member in the community of values of the West, has of course also brought us new duties, new expectations. Therefore, I want to emphasize once again at this point: Of course, we must confront this new situation, and of course, we must talk to people about it. The Wall was torn down faster than the recognition of the new challenges could take place. But I want to tell you on behalf of the Federal Government: We will face these challenges, and we will be a good partner. In this sense, I would like to thank the Federal Ministry of Defense once again for allowing this Berlin Forum on Security Policy, from the perspective of the Ministry of Defense, to take place here today in Berlin as a comprehensive security forum.

I wish you good and honest discussions. There is no point in avoiding the facts. What is important is the basic attitude towards these challenges. The basic attitude for me is that we live in a country, that we live in a union, the European Union, that we are united as countries in NATO, which have a way of life, a lifestyle that is worth defending – to be defended with military components, but not only with military components.

The defense of our way of life will also consist of explaining why we love the values to which we are committed, why we fight for them. Our societies must also learn to articulate themselves perhaps more clearly, more distinctly, and more intensely again, because what the founding fathers of all the alliances in which we live have achieved must be fought for again and again from generation to generation. If we do this, I believe we will be partners in the world who can earn respect and who, with the fundamental idea of tolerance towards others, will not only endure but also promote and wish for the development of all others.

In this sense, I wish you good discussions.