Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Congress "Financial Market Regulation after the Crisis – An Interim Assessment" of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group on June 29, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

1 July 2011 · Congress "Financial Market Regulation after the Crisis – An Interim Assessment" of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group congress on financial market regulation in Berlin on June 29, 2011, offering an interim assessment of post-crisis reforms.
Main themes
Financial market regulation, European debt crisis, banking crisis management, political decision-making under uncertainty, economic stimulus programs, CDS and derivatives oversight, international regulatory architecture, financial stability, sovereign debt, crisis prevention
Duration
~36 min
88th percentile
Words
4,362
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Sentences
190
88th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
11.9
44th percentile
Syntax
3.19
71st percentile
Vocabulary
1.98
8th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 68%67%
  • Institutional 21%21%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Geopolitical 5%5%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

190 sentences in 41 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen,

dear Mr. Flosbach,

dear colleagues,

dear guests of this remarkable congress,

I believe that when you look at the program: You could not gather the professional world better. When you consider the timing: The congress could not come at a more opportune moment with regard to the decisions we still need to prepare for. In this respect, congratulations on the location and timing of the event. However, the question of what I can still contribute as Chancellor – timed between statements from the Finance Minister, the experts, and other panels – is not so easy to answer. Mr. Flosbach suggested that sometimes it is not bad if something is said twice. I may not be able to spare you that now, but the topic certainly moves us sufficiently.

I will start with a brief remark on what Mr. Ackermann just said at the end. Personally, as someone who is not a trained economist, I tend to follow your argumentation, which is presented not only by you but by many others. However, in my political work, I have rarely experienced that alongside an event like this and alongside this argumentation, there is a group that holds completely opposing theses, which also claims to represent the professional world. You can imagine that this situation is extremely difficult for us as politicians who have to make decisions now. Not a day goes by when we open a non-economic newspaper without reading that we must finally have the courage to come to a proper restructuring. We have highly wealthy economic institutions and advisors telling us that it all makes no sense anyway, who do not hold the thesis that buying time and bringing about calm could also be a reasonable solution, and who repeatedly argue that one should not throw good money after bad, which is downright absurd.

I can tell you: Here in the German Bundestag, no member makes decision-making easy for themselves. But finding the right answer amid these conflicting messages is really not easy, especially since it also involves dimensions that we usually only deal with in connection with the overall budget of an entire year for the federal budget. Otherwise, political disputes tend to revolve around two million, five million, fifty million, or five hundred million euros; perhaps it is sometimes about one billion euros. But the billion has, since 2008, become a sort of standard unit in certain areas; and it was not so for us before.

With that, I also take a look at what has dramatically changed. I have not forgotten that during my vacation in the summer of 2007, the current President of the Bundesbank sent me a text message – "The IKB is in trouble" – and I asked just before the start of an opera in Salzburg: "What is the IKB?" That was not exactly a demonstration of my detailed knowledge, but the IKB had not been conspicuous until then; it had functioned well. That was my entry into a completely new engagement.

Then there was the banking crisis, peaking at the end of 2008. Then there was the crisis of the real economy – I had not heard that term until then, unlike "financial economy" – during which we were convinced that massive economic stimulus programs needed to be implemented. Then came what was foreseeable for those who thought a step further, namely that at least some of the states could not actually bear these massive stimulus programs. Thus, a debt crisis of some states arose, which posed completely new challenges for us, especially in Europe.

This means that parallel to what we must do for the regulation of financial markets, we are constantly dealing with further developments of the crisis – also in current daily events. We are always working on eliminating the sins of the past while simultaneously creating the architecture of the future. This is also extremely difficult when you cannot yet look back and do not yet know how the new instruments will work. I hope that we will at least know a little better about the CDS in the future. In this regard, a uniform international regulation still needs to be fully completed. One of the lessons is that we can no longer say: We know who holds the bonds, but we have no idea who has the insurance on them; that could be completely different entities; unfortunately, we cannot report anything about that.

I say: We will master this crisis. It has not yet been overcome in all its facets. But this crisis must not repeat itself in this way for the foreseeable future; otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to guarantee political stability; and not just for us. That is the real task that everyone must know who wants to operate in a stable country. Therefore, I also understand that you extend your hand to us, but do not want to do so gladly. But I say: If you want to continue working in stable countries, then extend it to us; and extend it to us a little gladly. Because we all want the world to develop reasonably as a whole.

We have learned in this financial crisis – and this is, by the way, a positive effect – to think much more globally. This is something that the economy had learned much earlier. This has now also become much more ingrained in us as members of the Bundestag and as political actors. We know better today about international interdependencies. Now, when it comes to dealing with the past, the question is: How is it with burden-sharing? If we cannot redistribute the burdens of the past, then we at least need to have some security regarding the distribution of burdens in the future.

It is often said that the banks and the financial world were to blame for the crisis. We cannot make it that simple for ourselves. There were no political frameworks – I do not want to go into detail here – that were designed in such a way that they could lead us consciously and knowingly into a crisis. The management of the housing market, renting houses, and selling houses – that is something that has been done for centuries. But what was ultimately done in this area, for example, in the United States, was a deliberate growth stimulation program on credit. Therefore, one cannot simply say to those who took advantage of the opportunities that it was bad. It was bad, but one must also tell those who failed to implement regulations or deliberately did not do so: You contributed to that. In this respect, the question of blame is, so to speak, divided between politics and the financial world.

But it is now important – at least for me, that is the lesson from the crisis – and we have repeatedly said this: Every financial center, every financial product, and every actor must be subject to regulation in the future. The interesting thing about this is: This must happen worldwide.

The first question that must be asked is: Who actually makes such global political decisions and where are the institutions that can really do that and also monitor it? Therefore, it is very encouraging that we immediately expanded the G20 format to heads of state and government during the banking crisis, that representatives or presidents of international organizations such as the IMF, OECD, World Trade Organization, and ILO are involved in this G20 group, that it has been possible to develop this G20 relatively unobtrusively so that the relevant regions of the world are represented in it and what is decided can also be carried forward to their regional groups, that the IMF has been strengthened in tendency, and that the Financial Stability Board has done outstanding work regarding various regulatory issues.

When decisions from the realm of recommendations, since the G20 is still not a binding institution, move into the realm of implementation, we naturally return to the level of national responsibility. Then we first experience that certain principles of financial market supervision are treated quite differently – from the United States to Europe – and that there are still some gaps worldwide that one could exploit if one were determined not to submit to these regulations. Since we always hear that on the one hand we need a "level playing field," as it is so nicely called, but on the other hand, we cannot conduct substantive coordination on the regulation of hedge funds with the American Congress, we face a rather complicated political problem: On the one hand, we have our idea of what is right, and on the other hand, we must make compromises if we want to create a common competitive field. One can certainly observe: The more important the financial center, the greater the influence on the respective regulation. Then it may ultimately turn out that Germany could feel disadvantaged in this regard. Because we are in the moral dilemma of either doing what we consider right or seeking the internationally smallest common denominator and then being accused of not having done something here.

I believe that some things have been excellently accomplished. The speed of negotiations on Basel III was remarkable. However, since even Basel II has not been implemented in the United States to this day, one must of course ask whether it will be implemented as quickly as it was negotiated. If one implements it down to the last savings bank and the other only for its five largest banks, then a common competitive field has not yet been created. Therefore, I advocate for much better cooperation of national parliaments, for example, with the House of Representatives of the United States and also with the European Parliament. It is not enough for just governments and heads of state and government to sit together; we also need decisions at the parliamentary level. This will not yield immediate success, but if one wants to act globally, then one must intensify these contacts from my point of view.

We have done quite well in Germany and also as a pioneer, when I think of the restructuring law for banks, which is also a model for Europe. It is right to design the bank levy in such a way that it can be used to remedy any damages in the future. Some in Europe may want to use it for budget consolidation or other purposes. Therefore, I believe it would be good to create a security fund for the future. But one must also say: If Basel III were to be implemented consistently everywhere, then we would have even greater security because we would not even allow damage to occur in the first place.

Regarding the entire question of how the restructuring of banks looks, there are still significant gaps worldwide. We have begun to close these gaps in the G20 process, but it will still take a while until concrete implementation in all relevant nations. We will be told – the year 2011 is approaching its halfway point; and the next G20 summit will take place in the fall – at some point in 2012: Since 2008, you must have made some progress in regulating such matters. The time to really create such regulations is therefore running out.

I believe that transparency regarding the CDS must be increased. What one cannot quickly answer – I say this completely unbiased – is the question: What displacement effects are now arising? We know the banks; good. We have learned that something must also be done regarding hedge funds. That has become more difficult, but progress has been made in Europe. We have better supervision; also good. But what products are now emerging as displacement effects, regarding which we again have no clear overview of what is happening, and regarding which we need more transparency? How does one actually create a self-regulation so that all products – including those that are newly created and which we cannot yet define – are subjected to review based on certain criteria? In this regard, one must certainly be careful that we do not one day wake up with completely new products and be pleased that none of our banks are affected, but that negative effects on the real economy still arise.

I would wish that the so-called real economy would care at least as passionately about the regulation of financial markets as we do in politics. I am surprised that it does not or does not do so to this extent, and I sometimes wonder: What are the interdependencies between those who need loans and those who grant loans? But ultimately, the business world must decide that for itself. In any case, real economic institutions, that is, companies, were also strongly affected by the financial crisis.

Germany has experienced such interconnections through its export orientation, which is indeed a good thing, in a particularly pronounced way. I repeatedly experience in the European Union that because many countries are not nearly as export-oriented, the sense of pressure and global competition is not sufficiently present. Therefore, it was important that we learn more beyond financial market regulation that makes us more stable for the future.

On one hand, the competitiveness of Europe is at stake, and on the other hand, there is the question of the distribution of the burdens of crisis management. I do not want to go into the burden distribution too much right now. I believe it is absolutely right and necessary that we try to achieve more and more burden-sharing among economic actors over time. It cannot be otherwise. There are insurance necessities everywhere, so that in the end, taxpayers do not have to pay for misdevelopments. I understand that this must be learned. But I believe that if we do not apply a bit of pressure, then less rather than more will happen. In this respect, it is a balancing act that we are undertaking now. Therefore, I am also convinced that we are doing well to talk to all those affected.

But I also say very clearly: As politicians, we must have the ambition to set the framework for design and that we are not always driven by some market forces. This has always been the fundamental view of the social market economy. Ludwig Erhard created the law against competition restrictions against the BDI and thus enforced the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. If he had asked German big industry, this law would never have come about. Therefore, we must indeed have the political strength to say what we consider necessary. When I say "we," I also see the great difficulty that this cannot be done only nationally and not only European, but that a global agreement must be achieved and global institutions must be in place. Therefore, I believe that the further development of the IMF is truly of great importance in this regard.

Now I return to what we have done in Europe beyond pure financial market regulation and what we will continue to do. First of all, this is a sharpening of the Stability Pact in a comprehensive form, which I consider absolutely necessary. We politicians must accept that we have also tolerated developments that fundamentally indicated difficulties in the first test case. If you look at the price competitiveness of the Eurozone countries and their development between 1998 and 2011, it was not only visible since 2010 or 2011, but it could be clearly recognized in its trend in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. Such a thing must never happen to us again.

Germany probably entered the Euro with the Deutsche Mark overvalued and was subjected to a significant structural adjustment right from the start. We accepted and embraced this. For us, nothing changed in the interest rates. The others suddenly had our interest rates and thus a lot of power and opportunities to spend money rather than save it. There were also the nice structural and cohesion funds from the European Union. And already, the child had fallen far into the well. We will also have to think carefully about what we actually invest our money in the cohesion fund for the next financial outlook in Europe. For a while, it was certainly right to initially focus on infrastructure with the structural funds. But once everything possible has been built, one creates more of a real estate bubble than doing anything to improve the competitiveness of the respective country. This means we also have to deal with several critical issues.

Paradoxically, we are experiencing – I have not seen anything like this in my years of political activity – that many countries in Europe carried out many structural measures last year. These are countries that belong to the Eurozone, countries that are now under IMF programs and do not belong to the Eurozone, or countries that saved themselves before the IMF by doing everything the IMF would have told them to do on their own and without necessity. These are many countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and – let’s assume it and hope so – also Hungary.

We have had many discussions. At the beginning, the debt crisis of the Euro was essentially due to an attack by speculators. In the meantime, the understanding has grown that whenever speculators want to attack, they must have a point of attack, and it is best not to give them one. In this respect, labor market measures, social measures, many other reforms, and also comprehensive privatizations have been initiated. If you look at what the Portuguese government is doing now, if you look at what Spain and Greece have done, then it is more per unit of time than what has happened over many, many years.

It would be a shame if we pretended within this process that what was built up over ten or twelve years could now be eliminated within twelve months. As someone who comes from the former GDR, I must also remind you that even we needed a long time after reunification, with the best specialists, to improve competitiveness, carry out privatizations, and do many other things. This means that the factor of time does not simply mean throwing good money after bad money, but it means necessary time to really carry out certain adjustment measures. But it must now be ensured that this also happens.

Above all, it must be ensured that we do not fall back into the same rut as before in the future. The European Union has made an important contribution with the "Agenda 2020." For the first time in the Council of Heads of State and Government, we are now dealing twice a year with how competitiveness looks. When one receives the guidelines for one’s country, there are few escape options. I hope that this will really lead to an increasing convergence of competitiveness, but please – this sometimes does not make Germany popular, but I think it must be said – not oriented to the average of the European Union, but, if possible, to the best within the European Union. Our role in the world markets is not such that we are unchallenged running ahead with a further lead, but rather that we have many competitors and a tremendous amount of competition.

This is the discussion we have had in Europe. Yes, it has of course often been the case that we have waited for the last moment to make decisions. But that did not mean that Germany was not willing to show solidarity. It only meant that one really had to try to anchor the necessary structural measures in the countries. I can only say: I find it courageous what will be voted on today in Greece and hopefully voted positively, because otherwise we have other problems than those we have just discussed. I find that extraordinarily courageous. But I also find it extraordinarily regrettable that the Greek opposition cannot decide to participate. This is very regrettable from my perspective and from our perspective, as the opposition leader belongs to my party family. Without necessary adjustment and only with solidarity, the whole thing would not have been helped at all. We would all have been caught in a vortex that, while it would not have immediately led to a downward spiral of our public finances in Germany, would have cost us competitiveness in the medium term.

I also maintain: The European Commission and the European Central Bank are certainly important and also very competent institutions, but in my firm conviction, looking back on the last year, it was right to also involve the IMF in these matters, because this simply ensures that there is an international point of reference for such institutions on board and that there are not also different assessments every time when the EU makes a rescue program for a country and the IMF subsequently perhaps states that it considers it insufficient, too difficult, wrong, or something else. The markets would not have liked that either. Therefore, from my perspective, this is absolutely right.

In the Eurozone – also at Germany's suggestion – we have agreed on the so-called "Euro Plus Pact" in addition to the "Agenda 2020," to which all EU states must commit, in which the focus – as far as it can be made binding in intergovernmental cooperation – is on unit labor costs, the question of social systems, and more. This is difficult because, of course, it is not practiced how to adhere to it and whether, when one country decides on certain things, another country should do the same. But here, too, understanding is growing because we have all looked into the abyss and know where the red lines run.

This means that if the development continues as it has in the last twelve months, it will be hard, it will be arduous, it will be associated with significant risks and also with guarantees or financial commitments that we will have to decide on and that would have seemed unimaginable to us three or four years ago. But then we will have the chance to put Europe on a better and more coherent course overall. It is a very clear statement from Germany: Europe is the place where we must seek our future.

Yesterday, we held German-Chinese government consultations. In China, there are 1.3 billion people, curious and eager to learn – a country that is certainly not yet as efficient and developed as ours. We, as the largest European economy, have over 80 million Germans. If we want to assert interests against China or India in a world of seven billion people, then everything, but also everything, speaks in favor of Europe being not only a peace project but also a representation of interests with the same value basis in a globalized world.

We Germans have really benefited a lot from this Europe. We have benefited so much, also regarding the Euro, that one should not idealize the past when we all had different currencies in Europe. Nevertheless, one often hears today: Yes, when the Bundesbank was still completely alone, it ensured a regulatory purity that was otherwise not found. I would say: After all, there were constantly support purchases for this or that currency. In this international financial and economic crisis, we would have had to carry out so many support purchases that I do not even know if we would have kept up with that. Then we would probably have thought at the latest in this crisis: It would not be bad to have the same currency and then consider how to manage it. I therefore believe: The elimination of transaction costs, no more currency support purchases, and a good common internal market are already reasons enough for the Euro.

The further away one gets from Germany, the clearer it becomes what Europe has brought in terms of reputation and strength as a truly important factor in the world, that there is a second reserve currency alongside the dollar. One should not underestimate that.

Therefore, many outside Europe firstly are fortunately convinced that we can overcome the debt crisis, and secondly believe that it is also in their interest for there to be a strong Euro and a strong Europe. I could say it a bit simplistically: Just as it is good that there is Airbus alongside Boeing, it is also good that there is the Euro alongside the dollar, without us wanting to overextend ourselves.

This is now our political opportunity to make difficult but future-oriented decisions in a difficult time and not to let ourselves be fooled by an X for a U. In doing so, we will continue to be in contact with the financial community. But I also simply ask for understanding that we, who bear the responsibility for millions of taxpayers and people in our countries to ensure that they understand and participate in all this, must also be the voice that says: There must be a fair distribution of burdens, and there must be the greatest possible security that such a crisis does not happen again. This closes the circle. You also like to work under stable conditions.

I once looked into something: When you examine the working hours per employee in Europe, it may be that the difference in nominal working times is not that significant. However, when you subtract all strike times and everything else that causes disruptions, the stable countries are relatively efficient. Therefore, I believe that for the economy – both the financial sector and the real economy – and for politics, it is best to maintain political stability. That is what we are working for, but we can never achieve it alone. The social market economy has always functioned well because it has given every market participant a responsibility, and political responsibility was not the only one.

In this sense, I thank you for the congress – I spoke a bit more generally because I am not as well-versed in the details as many of those sitting here – and I wish you continued fruitful discussions.