Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the discussion event of Metzler Bank on January 14, 2009, in Frankfurt am Main:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

15 January 2009 · Discussion event of Metzler Bank · Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed a Metzler Bank discussion event in Frankfurt on January 14, 2009, speaking on the global financial crisis and Germany's policy response.
Main themes
Global financial crisis, financial market stabilization, role of the state in crisis management, trust crisis in banking sector, economic forecasting uncertainty, regulatory policy debate, international coordination, German economic outlook, public mood vs. economic reality, government rescue measures
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,310
92nd percentile
Sentences
257
93rd percentile
Readability
60
87th percentile
Grade
9.8
18th percentile
Syntax
3.00
48th percentile
Vocabulary
1.89
2nd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 73%72%
  • Institutional 16%16%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

257 sentences in 47 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen,

I had to cancel once. That was when the Financial Market Stabilization Act was just in the process of being developed. I was already afraid that we would find ourselves in such a situation again, because I know how wonderfully you prepare things here. I also want to sincerely thank you for the fact that today, in this circle, we can somehow discuss more than usual in a public event.

The circumstances could be happier regarding the external situation. Because after three successful years in which I have been Chancellor, we have now experienced a fall of shockwaves this autumn. I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that. Mr. Enste just said that things have happened that none of us could have imagined. I see it the same way.

At the beginning of the financial market crisis, there was a joke: What is the difference between socialism and capitalism? In socialism, everything is nationalized first and then ruined. – The fact that one can laugh about it already shows that it is not completely outside of reality. When you hear the reports of the last few days, then at least for the financial market sector, quite a lot is possible at the moment. I have the impression that the mood among the population is still calm at the moment – which is good – and that this mood and what one sees on the horizon, or what some representatives in both the financial world and the real economy experience, are still very far apart.

Since the order declines and also the losses in the banking sector are so exorbitant, as they have never been experienced before, it is currently hardly possible to make reasonable forecasts, because all forecasts are ultimately nothing more than an extension of the experienced with some future information. If the experience of the last months is a sharp break, then of course there is also a very high margin of error regarding what one can expect.

The most difficult thing about this matter is: it is global, it is international. This means that one's own actions, even one's own assessment of one's own financial market sector, only help to a limited extent, because no one knows what is going on with the other – this is what creates this huge crisis of trust: What is actually going on with the other? With all that one has experienced in individual cases, one must consider almost everything possible. This is, of course, a source of great insecurity.

Therefore, it is probably not reasonable to make too many forecasts and to forecast too often. In good times, one does not even notice that in Germany there is someone who announces some index or some growth forecast or some quarterly matter 15 times a month. In this respect, what Mr. Zimmermann from the DIW said – although he does not adhere to it himself when his date comes – namely that perhaps one could also remain silent from time to time, is more reassuring than hearing something different every day. But I do not want to advocate for that. We are a country with freedom of expression. In this respect, everyone can say what they think is right. But in these times, every statement is, of course, listened to even more closely, as if one could take it as a lifeline. Personally, I have become very, very cautious about how much one should take all of this to heart one-to-one.

But it is true: We have an extraordinary situation. We all need to ask ourselves now – perhaps this is the best: What can be done to regain manageable realities, and what effort is needed on our part to contribute? Every business should do this, but above all, politics should do this, because it sets the pace during this time.

What is very interesting is: At the moment, those in Germany who do not yet feel the crisis up close are the ones who bring up everything they have learned in terms of regulatory policy. That is proper and good. However, those who are in the crisis are partly giving up everything they have always considered right in calm times from one day to the next, because they are now in dire straits and say that it is now primarily about rescue. So politically – I want to address this openly here – we are dealing with an incredibly divided clientele, which is, of course, also reflected in the parliamentary space. One has such a constituency, the other has such a constituency. And thus, the perceptions are incredibly different.

Now it is about the state engaging in such an emergency situation as much as it can justify without ruining itself – we have seen this with some states, Iceland or Hungary, which are now queuing up at the IMF and so on – but contributing to the mosaic of international efforts to provide what is right for managing the international dimension as well as regarding the question: What is good for our country so that we can emerge from this crisis as well as possible – I say: even more future-proof?

To this end, we passed a first package in November shortly after the decision on the Financial Market Stabilization Act. All the measures were right, but it was not yet the full toolbox of what we need. In December, through important discussions with the actors in Germany – on the third Advent, we invited quite a large group – this toolbox of what we still need to have all options in the crisis crystallized. And exactly that we have now brought into the Bundestag, we will introduce as a law on January 28, and we will – including the Bundesrat – if all goes well, have the essentials decided by February 20.

I want to say: There is an incredibly reassuring willingness to cooperate between the federal level, state level, and municipal level in these months. This is something you do not experience in normal times, but which is currently very, very important for our country. Because the federal government does not have the possibility, for example, to invest as much in infrastructure as we can invest in small, manageable, and also verifiable contracts at the municipal level.

We can expand many barracks, energetically renovate our own buildings; yes, okay. But when you take money in hand, if you want to stimulate the construction industry, then it is certainly more reasonable to focus on the schools that have not yet been renovated and thereby also give people a signal: If we have to incur so much debt, if we have to undertake new activities, then best where we can really use it for the future and where it is partly regrettable that after 60 years of the Federal Republic it looks the way it does. As we are now, it will be immediately said: Yes, but if the teachers are missing and the kindergarten teachers are missing, it all makes no sense. I say: One can also do both things. But if the school looks bad, it makes no sense either, and that is why it is right.

So we have now made decisions, of course also taking into account other experiences from America and elsewhere, and passed a package of measures to try to mitigate the crisis somewhat and shorten its duration. We cannot undo it. We do not want to create that impression either. But we hope that through such a package of measures, we can encourage others to walk a bridge with us so that at the end of the crisis we do not stand with a multitude of scattered skilled workers who have taken their entire expertise, all that we consider our treasure, elsewhere. The capabilities of the industrial sectors cannot simply be brought back overnight. There are decades of experience involved, and therefore one must try to build bridges in a manageable way.

What are our approaches now?

The first approach has been mentioned: A shield, a guarantee shield. This is not about nationalization. That was also, if I may say so cautiously, a somewhat hysterical debate. In the federal states, it is quite common for state governments to step in to a certain extent to save certain businesses for a certain time; for example, in Hamburg: Nivea/Beiersdorf. This has also been done in Lower Saxony. That does not always have to be wrong. But at the federal level, we do not have this intention. No one needs to be afraid that we are somehow pushing for that. We are just experiencing astonishing things.

Now we have a guarantee shield, such as we have not had in this size before. It is also just an offer. No one has to go there. This offer relates to the situation that it is currently hardly possible to obtain capital for long-term investments, at least not under conditions that ultimately justify the investments. If that is the case and if it is recognizable that it would have been much cheaper at other times, then one must certainly ask whether one can enable such things through a guarantee. We can discuss this later. It is currently hardly possible to place bonds for large companies and not also get that again under difficult conditions. We must, of course, be careful that we do not get further into a spiral of declining demand that increasingly tightens our necks. That is why we are making this offer.

We know and have been told that when the banking landscape gets going, we must, of course, be careful not to make it more difficult for the patient to learn to walk by providing a wheelchair. This means that it will require very clever balancing. When the banking business gets going again, we must not take so much risk away through our state offers that the banks say: Oh, well, we will go to the federal government and secure ourselves, then we do not have to do any other business anymore. – We are aware of that. But we also cannot, with our eyes wide open, completely forgo this instrument when the banks are not yet ready or liquidity is tight in the private markets.

One can play with many screws. It is always a question of how much one secures. For example, in our 15 billion euro package, we secured 90 percent of the risks for medium-sized businesses. This will need to be discussed. You do not need to worry, because then Ms. Kroes will already talk to us about it if we do not talk about it ourselves. She will ensure that things do not get distorted in Europe.

This brings me to a second point. We Germans must, of course, be careful – I keep saying this; especially in Parliament – that we are internationally networked. For example, there are incredible imbalances between the behavior of the European Central Bank and the behavior of the Fed. What I do not want is for companies to relocate their headquarters to America because they can get loans there so easily and no one asks, and money is printed down below after the risk has been taken away above, while we dry out and starve our people here. This must also be taken into account. This means that we will now have to talk very quickly with the new American administration about how we must come to fair conditions worldwide. Otherwise, it will always become more and more difficult to do the right thing.

The third point: That we have expanded the guarantee framework with this shield is intended to ensure that healthy companies can continue to develop. We must also offer, if the order situation is poor, to help a bit with short-time work. We already enabled short-time work for 18 months in November, and we have also simplified a lot, even for small businesses, for self-employed professions, for those who have only one or two employees. That is all possible. But we know, of course, that if you have to pay 40 percent of the social security contributions as an employer even in short-time work, that this can never last for 18 months. This means we have now expanded it by offering to cover half of the social security contributions in short-time work. The Federal Employment Agency currently has a cushion. We can use that for this; I consider that justifiable. And we will cover 100 percent of the social security contributions upon request if qualification is offered.

Now we want to see how this is taken up. An entrepreneur brought me this idea – Mr. Leibinger from Trumpf. He told me: Let’s not let the people sit around. We have so much qualification to do. We need to make people fitter for globalization. So let’s offer that. – Of course, we will see if the companies can also make a small contribution to the qualification. We also need to ensure that this does not get out of hand and that nonsense is not done. But in principle, this is an exciting and interesting idea that can also create motivation.

This is a core part of our measures. I do not know of any other European country that does it this way. I know that others are looking at this now. This can be of great value for our highly specialized industries – especially the automotive industry and the chemical industry. But my greatest concern is that if we, for example, incentivize public infrastructure investments and do much more there, then when people in skilled labor sectors become unemployed, a displacement competition could quickly occur, where the less qualified are pushed out and the well-qualified get jobs that could also be done by the less qualified, and we could end up in a very changed landscape.

The third pillar of our package is the infrastructure program – I spoke about that – and the fourth is the relief block. We are now putting another 50 billion euros into play. "Into play" is well said, because we do not have it. We are therefore borrowing it on the capital markets. This has become a highly delicate operation. The more states take with their nice ratings, the more difficult it becomes for any private entity to borrow anything at all. This means that on one hand, you are encouraged to do something, and on the other hand, you are tightening the already scarce liquidity. But I believe Germany is not yet at the forefront of the movement, so what we are doing is still justifiable. By the way, we have a total state deficit of minus 0.1 percent this year. So we are starting from a balanced basis. Many Europeans envy us for that.

So we have 50 billion euros in this package of measures, in the previous one and everything that came into effect on January 1, 30; and of the 50, 18 billion will be used for relief. Now, of course, one can act as follows – I think I did it this way too when I was in the opposition: One says at the beginning of the speech that the debt situation is a mess, and in the second part, one talks about how it would be right to provide more relief. If you are now the Federal Chancellor, you somehow get it all served together and must also be able to add and subtract. This means that it all sticks with me in the end. That is why we have decided on a balanced mix: about 18 billion euros for additional investments in the next two years, 18 billion euros in relief, and then a number of other measures, which I will say a bit more about shortly, and of course the funds from the Federal Employment Agency. This can quickly become a similarly large block due to higher unemployment and short-time work.

In terms of relief, we are targeting contributions and taxes equally. It is now said that this is a coalition compromise. Of course, it is a coalition compromise. I can reveal to you: even within a party, you have to make compromises. If you then have a sister party, once again. And then you have to make a compromise in the coalition again. But I suspect that even at the Metzler bank, compromises have to be made from time to time, because different opinions naturally come to light. A compromise is not inherently a bad thing.

In terms of tax relief, there is the well-recognized problem of cold progression, which hits very hard due to the shape of the tax curve. Since we also had salary increases last year, this is a serious problem. Then there is the valid argument that 40 percent of the German population does not pay taxes, that those who do not pay taxes are perhaps more likely to be the ones who would immediately stimulate demand. With contributions, the contribution is paid from the first euro of earnings, so a reduction in contributions always has a different effect than a tax reduction. If you want to give a signal to the contributors, but also to everyone who does not pay taxes, this mix of contributions and taxes, I think, is actually quite good.

We have now chosen an order – which can also be discussed critically – that takes into account that it may be that the upswing is not yet fully back by early 2010 and that the 18 billion euros in relief over two years – as has been said repeatedly today – will not trigger a buying frenzy. That is not the issue. We can only create trust with it; the trust that the state is more likely to give something during this time than to take something away.

This year, due to last year's wage increases, due to lower inflation or even price reductions, especially in energy and food prices, we will probably have 200 billion euros more purchasing power available nationwide. We could not achieve this with any tax relief, even if it were twice as high. But we send messages to groups that we honor their work, that we see the problem, and that we want to contribute to bringing a bit of optimism or confidence into the whole debate.

There is now, not desired by us but acknowledged, the reimbursement of the commuter allowance and improved family benefits as of January 1. On July 1, there will be a relatively good pension increase, along with an increase in Hartz IV. The tax relief will be spread throughout the year, but we will pay out the first half-year on July 1. In the next January, there will be another tax relief, so we have a permanent curve with which we can also represent this.

We have long discussed – these were probably the hottest debates – the 1.5 billion euros for the environmental or scrapping premium for the automotive industry. With such a package of measures, it is the case that since we cannot solve the problem 100 percent in reality anyway, as Ludwig Erhard said, there is always also 50 percent psychology involved. I already said when the vehicle tax was issued: Why are you getting so upset? If the industry is satisfied, if the suppliers and dealers tell us this, why do we ruin it and say we know exactly that this is not the right thing? Why do we always know better than others?

Now the automotive industry has a heartfelt wish. They believe that the environmental premium will create a purchasing incentive. Nothing bad is being done with it. A car that is at least nine years old is scrapped and one with Euro four is purchased. If the incentive does not work, then the money is not needed either. Then, of course, one says: carryover effect. Well, a maximum of 1.5 billion euros. I would say the investment is manageable in today's times. But if this brings psychological satisfaction in our key industry, then that is right.

However, I said today in the Bundestag – the automotive industry has probably not missed this – that I wish that in the future, automotive manufacturers would also treat their suppliers a bit more carefully. The suppliers are somewhat the cost reduction potential with a not so strong IG Metall. That cannot go well in the long run. Things are so specialized today that, I want to say, the suppliers and dealers are supported by the automotive industry. But we are experiencing in the chemical industry, we are experiencing in insulation materials, in various areas, that the automotive industry is of course entering many of our industrial sectors.

That is why I believe that our package is an offer that can work, but it also relies on the fact that the opportunities are taken advantage of. If someone says, I am closing my shop because I do not feel like taking a risk, that is difficult. I know that this is particularly difficult in these times because, of course, as an entrepreneur, you also have people who finance your companies, who want positive continuation forecasts, who look at global market developments. But let us be honest: who knows today whether instead of the approximately 58 million cars that I believe were built before, in three years only 48 or maybe 64 million will be built? I would not dare to make that forecast. We do not know how the crisis in China will develop, what effects that will have on emerging markets. We do not know how the American market will develop. We do not know whether the Obama program will bring anything. I am amazed that in the United States, 200, 300 billion can be spent per year; we could not do that with our approval rights. If they can do it, they should do it. But I will then see what has actually flowed out.

But today it is the case that the actions of individuals and others change reality and create a mood that we cannot all predict. If we find ourselves, with the package of measures we are offering, for example, facing the same problem with short-time work in a year and a half, then we cannot repeat that indefinitely. But not building a bridge, doing nothing at all, making no offer, I would consider grossly negligent.

One often forgets something when talking about debt: if we do nothing, it is not the case that state revenues will increase. We can only counteract to a limited extent. We are told – let us assume it is true – that if we go in with one percent of GDP, we can counteract between 0.5 and 0.7 percent. We have now gone so far with the debt that with an economic forecast between minus two and 2.5 percent in 2009, we would not violate the Stability and Growth Pact, but would arrive at a deficit ratio close to three percent of GDP. With that, we are relatively well in the European convoy. Beyond our package of measures, we are now facing the serious problem – that is why our European partners were so eager for us to do something – that other countries are in a much more difficult situation. Great Britain will be well over minus five, France also near minus five; we do not even want to talk about Greece and Italy. We are talking about a total state debt of 100 or a bit more percent of their respective GDP. Germany is at 65 percent. The Dutch were over 45 and have now shot up to 60 due to the banking crisis. The Eurozone is therefore highly strained. We must now be careful within the Eurozone that things do not fly apart too much. We must especially be careful that we do not receive worse conditions compared to other countries that also issue bonds.

This is a point that I believe we all need to discuss with the citizens. There is an incredible trust – which is also nice – that states cannot ruin themselves. But that is unfortunately not true. Therefore, the expectations placed on the state, which are sometimes expressed, must not be overstretched, otherwise the state can no longer fulfill its role. Fortunately, we are not in this situation. I do not want to paint a drama on the wall, but there are countries that are close to it. It is nice to say that now in the crisis you must spend money, and you know that in 1929/30, that was all wrong. – With regard to some European countries, I can no longer say that so lightly, because if they do that, they are not far from Hungary and other countries.

That is why it is important that we currently have capable politics – at the federal level, the state level, and the municipal level – because this also fosters a spirit of community that gives us the strength to solve such problems, to discuss them together, and then also to say at certain points that we can no longer manage this. Therefore, the political work at the moment consists of finding a way of measure and middle.

Last point: Now we have a crisis, that is clear. In the crisis, we cannot say that we have lived beyond our means, and therefore we are not going to incur debt now. But this crisis has arisen from the recklessness of simply living beyond one’s means. I consciously start there, because this internal political and social conviction has led a bit in our case, but much more elsewhere, to allowing unacceptable risks to be taken in the financial markets.

Since the subprime issue plays a significant role in the entire financial market crisis, the starting point is something so common, so familiar, that no one can tell me they did not know what they were doing. During the New Economy crisis, I could still understand that with completely new products, completely new possibilities, some things might have been misjudged. But that when it comes to selling houses and the questions of how much the buyer earns, whether they are currently unemployed, whether they have anything in their account or already $20,000 in credit card debt, no one should have known what they were doing, and that they were not encouraged to do so because growth was demanded and because it was said that growth must come now, no one can tell me that. That then, through data processing, there were the technical possibilities to package everything so nicely, to divide it up and to split it in such a way that in the end no one knew what was inside, that must then be settled by those who buy these packages and obviously never open them. There were still good times when the West package was definitely opened and consumed. You don't do that with packages today anymore. But I think in the future, we will return to that.

The starting point was therefore a driven growth that was desired. I believe Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can tell a good story about that. It then spread. Anonymization was technically easier, and we were – as we often heard from our British friends, for example – a bit of an idiot in Europe if we did not participate in all of this. They said: Look at your real wages in Germany and then look at ours in Britain. When we then looked at the Irish, it was even better, and with the Icelandic, it was even better. And at some point, you naturally feel like you are somehow the last one who does not understand how to get ahead in the world. You cannot decouple yourself because it is global.

Of course, we then – articles are being written about this today – also made modern financial market laws under the Schröder government, because the alternative would ultimately have been that there would be no financial markets at all in Frankfurt. To be honest, I am glad that Frankfurt is still a financial center; otherwise, no one would listen to our clever thoughts at all. – It is just like with nuclear energy; if we no longer make use of it and if we no longer have it. – That is why it is good that we still have a foot in the door here, even if it is not the most significant in the whole world.

But now we must – tomorrow the British Prime Minister is coming to see me, who is leading the G20 countries this year – ensure that the rules become clearer and that there is more transparency. Personally, I do not believe that politics can create a law or regulation for every financial market product; I am far from it. But I believe that mechanisms can certainly be found to back higher risk with higher equity. That should actually be the balance. Anyone can take risks as much as they want, but they should please be able to bear their risk in the event of failure through proper hedging. That is the very simple principle that, by the way, is mastered and adhered to in all other sectors of the economy.

Now the nice idea that financial markets function quite differently from everything else in the world has burst. The smart ones among you ultimately knew all of this; some took more risks, others less. In this sense, we as a federal government will very resolutely advocate that lessons are learned from this. But that will not be enough. We will also – there will be a very, very thick board to drill – have a completely different global architecture. Today, we have a decision-making body for every security problem through the UN Security Council. But regarding the question of how to operate sustainably and sensibly, there is nothing comparable in the world.

I recently said in another context: The IMF has done it very nicely; when a developing country had a crisis, it went in and said: Raise taxes, cut spending. And when the respective politically sensible person was voted out, they rubbed their eyes in wonder and said: That is strange. But when industrialized countries have a problem, it is: Lower taxes, incur debt. So completely different advice is given. Does anyone from the IMF tell the Americans that it might be concerning that they are always frolicking around in the trillions? I have not heard anything. If it had been Mali, the IMF would have long had a clever concept of what to do.

The world will only function if we adopt the same parameters and the same standards, even if it is difficult for us in the West. I say this with full consideration because we are now in a situation that cannot continue like this, as it would otherwise take on a political dimension. If the Chinese have money and we are in debt, we should not be surprised if, in the end, we also have less political say.

I am proud of our social order, that human dignity is respected, that each individual voice has something to say, that everyone can vote, that one can choose, and that democratic majorities are formed from that. All of this is anything but self-evident in this world. If the Western orders do not manage to draw the right lessons from this crisis, then others in the world will no longer say that democracy is something particularly successful. That is why I take it very seriously that we do everything after the crisis to ensure that a comparable crisis does not happen again.