Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the event of the Foundation for Order Policy on February 23, 2011, in Freiburg:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

26 February 2011 · Event of the Foundation for Order Policy · Freiburg, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the Foundation for Order Policy in Freiburg on February 23, 2011, reflecting on Ordoliberalism and the Social Market Economy amid post-financial crisis challenges.
Main themes
Social Market Economy, Ordoliberalism, Freiburg School, state role in economic order, international financial crisis, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, Ludwig Erhard, regulatory policy, competition and freedom, economic framework and guardrails, responsibility and individual freedom, lessons from crisis
Duration
~46 min
93rd percentile
Words
5,535
93rd percentile
Sentences
250
93rd percentile
Readability
48
57th percentile
Grade
11.9
43rd percentile
Syntax
3.08
58th percentile
Vocabulary
2.04
16th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 58%57%
  • Institutional 22%21%
  • Ceremonial 9%9%
  • Geopolitical 7%7%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

250 sentences in 60 paragraphs

Dear Mr. Gerken,

dear Mr. Ehlers,

dear, esteemed Erwin Teufel,

dear Mr. Stächele,

Mr. Mayor,

ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased to be here this evening, and I will, Mr. Gerken, certainly not be able to fully meet expectations, as a real politician always stands in a natural tension between what needs to be done daily and what would be scientifically desirable, with even scientific opinions on what is politically required sometimes diverging.

However, in light of the topics you mentioned in your introductory remarks, it is certainly right and good to talk about the economic challenges we face today and how this fits into the history of the Social Market Economy. And to do this in Freiburg is, of course, always a special challenge. Geographically – I hope the Mayor will forgive me – Freiburg is rather on the edge of the Federal Republic of Germany, but in terms of regulatory policy, it is indeed a central place; no question about it. Your foundation also reminds us of this, as it fortunately upholds and keeps alive what founders and important thinkers of the market economy have created.

I gladly accepted your invitation so that we can also discuss how we can draw the right lessons from what we have experienced in recent years and what that means for us today. Throughout the international financial and economic crisis, one thing has become clear: the state as the guardian of order has experienced a renaissance. Yet, the further we distance ourselves from the crisis, the greater the danger that we will return to business as usual and stop drawing some important lessons from this international crisis, which, after all, has not been seen in such severity for decades. Because we have come out of this crisis relatively well, and because we have significantly mitigated the effects of this crisis through various state interventions, it seems, in retrospect, that it was not so dramatic after all. Only a look at the debts of municipalities, states, and the federal government reminds us that something must have happened. I can only strongly advise us not to return to business as usual too quickly.

In such times, it is particularly worthwhile to reflect on the approach of the Freiburg School around Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm. The renowned economists demonstrated great foresight when they formulated their ideas as early as the late 1930s and defined the creation of a legal framework as the most important task of the state. This framework is supposed to guarantee free competition for the benefit of all citizens. However, this framework must be created. It serves as something like guardrails in the world where market forces can unfold.

I do not want to speak at length about the underlying view of humanity. It is a view that trusts the individual, that assumes that the individual is born for freedom, and that this understanding of freedom is oriented towards responsibility. With this view of humanity, it is possible to create a market order. This view of humanity has been very revolutionary because it first granted every single person the same rights and duties in this market order.

The guiding principle at that time was "State planning of forms – yes; state planning and steering of the economic process – no." That is, of course, very exciting: Where does form end, and where does the economic process begin? But it sounds good and right at first. This concept later became known as "Ordoliberalism." The title "ORDO" of the yearbook that Eucken and Böhm founded in 1948 still reaches us today. I thank all those who keep this alive.

In the late 1930s, the liberal ideas in Germany had no chance of implementation. However, after the National Socialist dictatorship, they found political resonance. Ludwig Erhard is credited with connecting the ideas of Ordoliberalism with the ideas of Christian social teaching and then very boldly and successfully transforming the whole thing from a theoretical concept into a practical economic order. We now call this the Social Market Economy, which is more than just an economic order; it has become a societal order for us. The central values are freedom and responsibility. Growth and social justice go hand in hand.

Thus, it has been possible to repeatedly harness the innovative power of competition for broad societal progress with the Social Market Economy. It created a coalition of the strong with the weak; one could also say: a way to resolve seemingly antagonistic contradictions, for example, between capital and labor. A very successful societal order has been founded on this in our country. The economic order has thus become a societal order. Ludwig Erhard's credo was "prosperity for all." The truly astonishing thing was that this did not remain just a theoretical concept, but that it also materialized in practice. With all due respect for regulatory policy ideas – if you want to convince the citizens, the majority must pass a practical test. Otherwise, you will not gain their approval.

In the meantime, the Social Market Economy has proven itself in Germany over six decades. It has formed the foundation for the difficult reconstruction after the Second World War in West Germany. It has kept the promise of prosperity. This has given it a high attraction on the other side of the wall, where I grew up, namely in the former GDR. I believe that the success of the Social Market Economy is also responsible for the fact that the people in the former GDR did not forget the idea of freedom, but rather worked towards the end of the division at the end of the 1980s. This was only possible because the economic order of the planned economy was significantly weakened. It can be debated why it took until the end of the 1980s for this to happen. I believe it has a lot to do with new possibilities in information and communication technology and the development as a knowledge society, as we call it today.

Today, people in Germany can generally live in freedom and take advantage of the opportunities that freedom offers. This allows us, despite all the problems we have – we must never forget this – to enjoy a standard of living that most people in the world envy us for, as well as a social cohesion that most people also envy us for, and, by the way, a path towards sustainable economic practices, on which many countries have not yet progressed as far as we have.

Even in the international financial and economic crisis, our economic order has proven itself. We experienced a significant decline in gross domestic product of nearly five percent, in Baden-Württemberg even more: over seven percent. But in 2010, we also saw growth that was the highest since reunification. Thus, in some areas, we are already back to the economic strength we had in 2008. Perhaps the most successful aspect is that the number of unemployed last autumn fell below three million, reaching the lowest level in 19 years. That is what matters to people. The number of employed has grown to over 41 million. We have never had such a high number of employed. This also accounts for the current success of the economy.

However, the crisis has also revealed significant weaknesses. I would like to mention two examples:

First:

We had to acknowledge that the regulatory framework for the financial markets, to put it kindly, had not kept pace with their development. To put it unkindly, one would say that it was virtually nonexistent. And when I say "had not kept pace," I mean: neither with the type of products that emerged nor with the internationalization of the financial markets.

Second:

It is also true that all previous guidelines, for example, the Stability and Growth Pact in Europe, have not been sufficient to prevent the growth of public debt. It has – this has been true for Germany since the first Grand Coalition in the late 1960s – always lived beyond its means, and every year a different justification has been found for why, at least at the federal level, more was consumed than was earned.

One of the most fatal errors in this context was, by the way, that growth was placed above all else. Growth was, so to speak, the ultimate goal. All other goals, such as balanced budgets, had to be subordinated to it. Therefore, I also say very clearly that I follow with great skepticism all the movements at the international level that are now again emphasizing that we need growth at any cost, even if that is associated with debt, which would then be an acceptable side effect.

There are therefore significant gaps in the regulatory framework that we must close. This requires a type of cooperation that we have not yet developed as far as we need to. We must find common regulations at the global level between different nation-states that bind us all equally. This means we must further develop national economics into a global economy with principles that are recognized worldwide as much as possible.

Now, it is very exciting for me that this very idea is already found in Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm. In the preface to the first edition of the ORDO yearbook, that is, in 1948, they write: "Comprehensive international cooperation will become a necessity in light of the fact that the establishment of a workable international order of the economy is no less necessary than in the national sphere." I must say: That was far-sighted and has then, however, obviously not been pursued with full force for a few years; this proves to be not entirely simple.

This means we have today – more than in 1948; it was already recognized in 1948 – the task ahead of us, above all, to create an international regulatory framework. This applies particularly to the financial markets, as they do not exist solely on a national level. Therefore, national solo efforts, unless one only wants to achieve a certain localized effect, do not lead anywhere. An effective regulatory framework can only be anchored at the international level. In this context, the handling of systemically relevant entities is particularly important, especially with systemically relevant financial institutions in the financial markets.

One must say that, in light of the crisis we experienced, interdependencies became clearly visible. Lehman Brothers will stand for this effect for the foreseeable future. In light of this disaster we experienced, the willingness to cooperate at the level of heads of state and government in a G20 format suddenly emerged, grew, and was also implemented. There is a concern that, the further we move away from the acute crisis, the more the willingness to take joint steps within the framework of this G20 will diminish, and national thinking will gain ground again. However, we have agreed on a whole bundle of measures, which I do not want to detail here, that provide a regulatory framework for the international financial markets that is significantly better than before the crisis, but still not sufficiently good. Therefore, further work must be done under the French G20 presidency.

In light of the crisis, we set out to regulate every financial product, every actor, and every financial center. We have made significant progress; I will only mention the term Basel III, the capital adequacy of banks. In the past, it would have probably taken between seven and ten years to negotiate something like this. However, today it was possible in a period of far less than a year. I could mention several other things.

Nevertheless, I must say – and I say this quite candidly – that it has been very important to me that we not only engage in crisis management, not only create a certain regulatory framework for a financial system, but that we are also able to develop a charter – as I have called it – for sustainable economic practices in the G20, thus agreeing internationally on principles of economic activity. This proves to be a very, very thick board, as any type of regulatory framework is repeatedly seen by different states as a brake on growth and not as a guideline for the unfolding of market forces. The question arises: Where is a regulatory framework a brake, and where is a regulatory framework, so to speak, the necessary form needed to allow market forces to unfold?

One must say: Ludwig Erhard was indeed someone who took on a lot of resistance in order to shape the framework and the guidelines. The fact that the German middle class is today the backbone of our economy has a lot to do with his law against the restriction of competition. If you had asked the BDI back then, it would have responded with a clear answer, marked by many exclamation points: Never. The fact that the possibilities for a company to take a dominant market position are restricted has led to many companies being able to flourish, and more market participants being able to participate. This means that a regulatory framework is absolutely necessary.

We therefore still have the task of finding an international regulatory framework. France, with President Sarkozy, now has a very ambitious agenda for the G20 presidency – the first agenda to be addressed after the acute crisis management. Here it will become clear to what extent there is a willingness to think about, for example, a global currency system, for example, commodity management, for example, global governance, as they say, that is, to think about government action or decision-making. There are still significant cultural steps to be taken.

We in Germany have, through our membership in the European Union, so to speak, gone through a cultural process that makes it seem quite normal for us to cede certain competencies to an entity outside our own nation. All EU members have ceded national competencies to Brussels. These are enshrined in the contractual foundations, now in the Lisbon Treaty. Other countries like China or the United States have never ceded competencies from their own national jurisdiction in their history – in the sense that they must do something that an international entity outside their own borders demands of them without having a veto right. I will narrow it down a bit: The WTO is perhaps one of the few examples where this can occur, albeit with sanctions, but in the United Nations, for example, the USA and China have a veto right; and in the IMF, the USA has a de facto veto right.

When one considers that an institution like the IMF could perhaps become the entity that globally oversees the system of currencies, the system of economics, the system of financial market regulation, it naturally presupposes that one feels in some way committed as a nation-state to the guidance of this institution and does not simply accept it as a nice commentary on national policy and otherwise do what one thinks is right at home. That is why I say: Whether it is about economic policy, whether it is about financial market regulation, or about environmental issues – we can see the same with China, for example, in the area of climate protection – if we want a global regulatory framework – I am firmly convinced that we need it for a sustainable, reasonable development of the world – then this is also connected with the willingness to cede national competencies.

Of course, the existence of the European Union is of fundamental importance so that we can at least assert certain interests with 500 million inhabitants that we consider right from the concept of the social market economy. We are expected to welcome the seven billionth inhabitant of the Earth this year. We are in Europe, in the European Union, now 500 million. We can determine some things, but certainly not everything. We must work hard to convince everyone of our concepts of a social and economic order. We can do this best if we also advocate for it in our own policy.

That is why one point for an effective international regulatory framework, which also connects back to the tradition of the Freiburg School, is the commitment to free trade and open markets. Here lies perhaps one of the great dangers that arise from the international financial and economic crisis of recent years, namely that while formally what is regulated regarding tariff barriers in the WTO is somewhat adhered to, the creativity regarding non-tariff trade barriers is quite large, thereby severely restricting free world trade. I have now been Chancellor for over five years, participating annually in a G8 or now also a G20 meeting. Each time, the participants commit to finally concluding the Doha Round at the WTO. I hope we committed ourselves in Seoul for the last time, so that we can achieve it during the French presidency. But the proof of that has yet to be provided.

I consider free world trade to be the best growth program we can possibly implement. If we truly embrace this, we will have achieved far more than we can with all development aid measures. I do not mean to say that we no longer need development aid. I just want to say: Free world trade is a huge economic stimulus program, especially for poorer countries. Therefore, we must build a corresponding international regulatory framework for our interconnected economies, but we must also, of course, set an example within the European Union in order to credibly assert our interests worldwide.

Now Mr. Gerken, in his characteristically provocative manner, has presented me with various alternatives from which I can choose.

Therefore, I would like to start a bit more generally. I believe we agree that the formation of a European Union after the Second World War was the absolutely right response to centuries of wars and conflicts between European nation-states. It is a peace project. Those like me who were born after the Second World War have fortunately not had to experience war personally. However, this is always associated with the danger that one considers what one encounters every day to be the only possibility. But a look at other regions of the world shows how difficult it still is today for other countries to conclude peace agreements and practice cooperation. I believe that the way we have integrated the Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union is exemplary for many areas of the world.

Furthermore, the European Union today is our only opportunity to bundle common interests and values that have to do with human dignity, our understanding of freedom, and our understanding of justice. And it has succeeded in anchoring the topic of the social market economy as our common European order in the Lisbon Treaty and bringing it into the international general discussion. Even the largest economy in the European Union, Germany, would have little chance if we did not present ourselves internationally with bundled interests. Therefore, the European Union, alongside its power for peace, has, in my firm conviction, achieved a second important justification in the course of globalization, which is why European cooperation is of indispensable importance to us.

In the history of the European Union, the degree of integration has been repeatedly strengthened because this project, if it stands still, is always in danger of rolling back, so to speak, into a renationalization and collapsing in on itself. Therefore, the introduction of the internal market and – a step that was also of great symbolic significance – the introduction of the euro were important steps. There were very wise people who said after the Second World War: Historically speaking, people who have the same currency rarely go to war against each other. Therefore, the introduction of the euro, alongside the monetary question, is of course also a highly political issue and a question of the depth of European integration.

We decided to introduce the euro even without a political union and thus preempted the final step of the crowning theory, not saying that we would first decide on a common currency as the crowning of the whole. This dispute has never been resolved scientifically but has been decided politically. The heads of state and government of a certain time decided to introduce the euro. The name Helmut Kohl stands for that. And I explicitly say: I believe it was the right decision. Nevertheless, this decision is associated with a number of problems that need to be clarified. The international financial and economic crisis has now confronted us in a special way with these difficulties.

The question "How much political union do we want?" has, in essence, not been conclusively clarified to this day. It has become clear during the drafting of a constitutional treaty that there are significant resistances. The result was the Lisbon Treaty, which contains parts of a political union, for example, the communitarization of internal and legal policy, which goes far beyond the internal market and envisions the creation of a zone of common internal and legal policy with majority decisions – a difficult matter for a country like Germany.

But the political union is far from being complete. The question of how far we want to bring it about has also never been conclusively answered. Europe is, to use the words of a former foreign minister, a sui generis entity. This can be described sufficiently abstractly and yet correctly. How this is filled out in daily life requires constant elaboration.

Now the following has happened: The Stability and Growth Pact has not been properly adhered to. Many political reasons have been accepted when new member states were admitted to the euro area. In times of harmonious economic development, this did not turn out to be dramatic. But at the moment of the international financial and economic crisis, in which we a) were responsible for carrying out the bank rescue, b) had to implement stimulus programs to avoid a total collapse of the world economy, it was foreseeable – my reluctance towards stimulus programs stemmed from the fact that I had already seen the next step coming – that this would subsequently lead to a strong indebtedness of the states and that this could only be managed differently by the individual states depending on their different economic strengths. And that is exactly what we have now. It does not help to get upset about the speculators in the international markets. They amplify the effects, but the solution to the problem lies in the different competitiveness and indebtedness of the individual member states of the euro area.

Now one can certainly say that all those who have always been critical of the euro now have their hour in which they are proven right – nice for them. If it pleases them, they can bask in it for a while. But in the practical life of a chancellor, this unfortunately does not help at all. Because, in my opinion, a return to the Deutsche Mark is out of the question. Those who want to think it through theoretically can do so. They will end up with a quite highly valued Deutsche Mark, which would subsequently severely restrict our export capacity. I do not even want to talk about the political consequences. Therefore, this is, for my part, something for marginal considerations at significant economics faculties, but nothing one should seriously engage with in practice.

So we have the euro, and we have been sufficiently informed by all those who understand far more than I do that the idea that someone could ever exit the euro raises so many unanswered questions that the risk is so much higher than one can justify, that one does not do it. We have no international experience with restructuring processes within a currency area, let alone with exit processes. The consequences, the chain reactions, and so on cannot be managed by anyone. – We have all been shown Lehman Brothers as an example; and that was a bank that was not even that large. Lehman Brothers was, as one says nowadays, less relevant in terms of size than, for example, WestLB once was; and that is no longer what it once was. – In any case, this kind of experiment is out of the question.

We have a common currency, which has done us a lot of good during the crisis. I ask you, those of you who are older, to remember what always happened when we had to support the peseta and the lira, as well as during the Franco-German currency turbulence. However, we have now come through this actual crisis period quite well. But now something has occurred that has put the financial system in a country like Greece, for example, under great stress due to very high indebtedness compared to the average of the euro. What do we do now with such a country?

It has been very wisely and also supported by me in Article 125 TFEU: "No bail-out" – we do not buy out a country, we do not stand for the debts of a country. At this point, it was obviously not considered what the interdependencies between the individual member states of the Eurozone mean and that inaction regarding one country can endanger the currency system as a whole – with significant repercussions for Germany or for any other member state of the Eurozone.

Now there are very interesting passages in the Maastricht ruling – I have to be very careful with Mr. Gerken here, as I cannot quote it literally; but I will say, just approximately paraphrased by a physicist who deals with the Constitutional Court –: If the stability of the Euro as a whole cannot be secured, then, says the Constitutional Court, Germany could consider whether it still wants to remain in the Euro. You would say: Correct. I say: Practically impossible. This means, conversely, we must do everything to ensure the stability of the Euro as a whole. And that is exactly what we have done now.

I have been very exposed to the accusation that I waited too long in the case of the Greek aid. Why did I wait so long? I did not wait, but it was important to me, to the Federal Government in Germany, that a) the Ultima Ratio case is present and b) an instrument is created with which Greece will certainly not remain where it is today, but will become more competitive and committed to stability.

Now, the sins of years certainly cannot be made up for in months. However, if you take a look at how we have now strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact, what conditionality – see the general strike in Greece today – has been accepted by Greece and – I also consider this to be correct – that the IMF, as an experienced international institution, is involved in the drafting of the conditions for aid and support, so to speak, as a godfather, so that the international organizations consistently set the direction for Greece, then you see that we have achieved something that was politically not possible in the Euro system until now. We have obliged nation-states to implement certain programs that will lead to the Stability and Growth Pact being adhered to again.

Now, it is the case that this requires – now we have the question of economic order and political reality again – significant efforts from the acting politicians. The Greek Prime Minister shows this and has shown it. If I think back a year, I would have been met with sheer horror if I had talked to the Spanish Prime Minister about dismissal protection and similar labor market issues, that nothing could be changed about that. But within this year, it has become clear that the question of a stable Euro is not only a question of debt – for example, a country like Spain has few problems – but that it is also a question of competitiveness. We have rarely discussed competitiveness in the European Council as much as we are doing now, and that at the level of heads of state and government.

When I spoke of a pact for competitiveness, I mean that the markets rightly expect that one indicates in the context of a common currency system where one wants to go economically in the next ten years, whether one wants to increase tensions among the countries or whether one is willing to reduce tensions. Now it is very important that we do not reduce tensions at the price of becoming mediocre. The question of how we can create economic policy coherence must be answered in such a way that the benchmark we align ourselves with must always be the best in Europe and not the average. That is completely clear. Germany is not very good everywhere. For example, in research spending, Scandinavia is better than we are. But we are already very good in some areas; and therefore the statement that German elements are also very visible in such a common competitiveness pact in Europe is not wrong, but we are not the best everywhere.

When one asks why the orientation must be towards the best, it is important that we keep in mind: The markets, whoever they may be, would perhaps also be satisfied if we decided today for Eurobonds. Then we would meet somewhere in the average. Then there would be few points of reference for speculation. But in my firm opinion, the average would mean that Europe as a whole would be less competitive and would get on a path that gradually takes away our competitiveness compared to other continents. This must be prevented. That is why I am also decidedly against Eurobonds, because the spreads are of course exactly the expression of different competitiveness. Therefore, the effort must be demanded that we align ourselves with the best, because otherwise Europe may be solidary, but Europe will continue to fall behind in the global comparison.

It is evident, when we take a look at the global order, that we have completely different competitive structures than we had 20 years ago, that in this international financial and economic crisis the cards have been reshuffled again and that, at present, some Asian countries – especially China, but I could also name others – have gained competitiveness. If we do not focus on this, Europe will fall behind.

The Lisbon Strategy, which the EU heads of state and government set for themselves ten years ago – we wanted to be the most competitive and dynamic continent in the world by 2010 – has clearly not worked out. The indicators that were set at that time have all not been met. The binding power of indicators has long since proven to be insufficient. At that time, among other things, it was said: three percent of GDP for research. We are working on it; we are now at about 2.8 in Germany. However, there are European countries that are at 0.9. The differences are therefore incredible. Here is also a field where we need to come closer.

I therefore believe: Economic order policy has its great hour ahead of it in the question of creating an international regulatory framework, as it was already demanded in 1948, but has not yet been conclusively established. Unfortunately, there are not Euckens everywhere in all other countries of the world, but rather completely different ideas. So we still have a lot to do.

You, Mr. Gerken, have also pointed out some order policy sins on the national stage. Perhaps we can still talk about that in the discussion. Last year, the question of VAT for hotels kept coming up. I must tell you: I did not have to become Chancellor first for the German tax system to develop somewhat idiosyncratically in terms of economic order.

I would be interested to know who, if we were to ask Walter Eucken today, would actually be right. Would it perhaps be those who say that one must not steer with taxes, that the tax system must be totally simple and must not have any exceptions, no church tax, no exercise instructor allowances, and so on? I do not want to say the word, but there was also talk of a flat rate. Is that economically correct? I just received a report today from important economic experts who said: Of course, you must also include the promotion of research in the tax benefits.

In a world where, for example, many European countries, 17 I believe, provide tax incentives for research and 21 provide tax incentives for hotels, is it appropriate as a minority to always take a great economic order path, or is it economically necessary to fit into a competitive environment where we do not have a disadvantage from the outset? This is a perennial question that occupies me when I get up in the morning and when I go to bed at night. I receive very few clear answers from science on this. I want to put that as a complaint in the room. Otherwise, I do not want to complain.