Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the event of the German Atlantic Association e.V. as part of the 54th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association on ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

10 November 2008 · 54th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association

Context
Merkel addressed the Atlantic Treaty Association's 54th General Assembly in Berlin, near the Brandenburg Gate, on November 10, 2008, discussing NATO's future strategic direction.
Main themes
NATO strategic concept, transatlantic alliance, German reunification symbolism, NATO 60th anniversary summit, new security challenges, counterterrorism, asymmetric threats, failed states, international cooperation, US-Europe relations, Brandenburg Gate symbolism, NATO expansion of tasks
Duration
~31 min
84th percentile
Words
3,727
84th percentile
Sentences
200
89th percentile
Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
11.5
39th percentile
Syntax
2.91
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.19
46th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 69%65%
  • Ceremonial 16%16%
  • Institutional 10%10%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

200 sentences in 58 paragraphs

Dear Secretary-General, dear Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,

dear Mr. Hunter,

dear colleague Karl A. Lamers,

dear Parliamentary State Secretary, dear Christian Schmidt,

dear colleagues from the German Bundestag,

Excellencies,

ladies and gentlemen,

the Atlantic Treaty Association is now meeting for the fourth time in Germany. A warm welcome from my side as well, and a heartfelt thank you to the outgoing president, Mr. Hunter, and congratulations to his successor.

I believe we need to continue the active work in this association. We owe Mr. Hunter our gratitude for his good services and for the many valuable contributions made within the Atlantic Treaty Association. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter, and best of luck, dear Karl A. Lamers.

The conference is taking place not only in Germany but also at a symbolically significant location, as has just been mentioned: near the Brandenburg Gate. This gate, which was closed for decades and has now been open for almost 20 years – to be precise, for 19 years and two days – will remain a symbol in the future, a symbol of the freedom of this city, of the reunification of my country, of the overcoming of the division of Europe, and of the fact that all of this was possible because our North American friends committed themselves to Europe in a lasting and reliable manner after the horrors of two world wars.

This has, of course, also changed my personal life significantly, as I stood only on the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate over 19 years ago, so I did not get very far. Until the point where the Adlon is today, one was not allowed to pass. Therefore, it is always moving to see how the embassies are establishing their homes around Pariser Platz, how everything is being newly created here – a symbol of a more open and freer world.

It was therefore very important to us that on July 4 of this year, the American embassy also returned to this square. We know that we want to tackle the next challenges together with our American friends. The United States of America has elected a new president. It is, of course, eagerly anticipated how things will progress on all the many issues we need to work on.

I just discussed the agenda of the problems to be solved with the NATO Secretary-General. I will touch on some of these shortly. We look with great openness, high expectations, but also great seriousness at our future cooperation, in which there are indeed enough problems to solve. Therefore, it is good that on the 60th anniversary of NATO on April 4, 2009, we can also look back on a number of NATO successes that give us the strength to boldly address the problems of our time on this foundation – to boldly address them certainly in the spirit of cooperation, in the spirit of knowing that today no country can solve the problems of the world alone, that we depend on working together, but that everyone must also contribute to the solution.

We will celebrate 60 years of NATO on April 3 and 4 in Strasbourg and Kehl, in the heart of Europe, at the German-French border – at a border that stood for centuries for military conflicts and which today, with the Peace Bridge in Kehl, is a symbol of what we have achieved in Europe and of which we can also be proud.

What can we expect from this summit? Of course, an assessment will be made. We know that the Atlantic Alliance has been and is the guarantor of peace and freedom in Europe. And it should remain so. But we also know: There are a multitude of new challenges and dangers. Therefore, we must clarify the future role of this alliance, our alliance.

The last strategic concept of NATO is dated 1999, thus predating the emergence of the terrorist challenges we face today. I therefore consider it important to mandate a new strategic concept at the next summit that clarifies where NATO's tasks lie in the 21st century.

Now, this will not be as easy as it sounds, as there are, of course, a multitude of questions to be answered in this context. These questions require very clear answers. How can we optimize the protection of our own territories in the 21st century, also mobilizing joint forces to accomplish this task? What strategic concepts arise for the alliance from past experiences with asymmetric threats and in the fight against transnational terrorism? This is certainly one of the core tasks for which we need to analyze past experiences.

Some important questions in this context are: What dangers arise from states that are on the verge of collapse, and how do we deal with such states? How can we address dangers where they arise, before their devastating consequences reach our countries? In what ways can we act preventively, of course – I emphasize this explicitly – also politically? What can and should the alliance contribute to securing important transport routes, that is, economic lifelines? Should it do so or not? How can cooperation between those responsible and NATO be organized? How can the alliance become even more involved in arms control and disarmament? Here, too, we have a development in the world that cannot satisfy us.

Above all, we must ask the question: What is NATO's role in a security policy that, after all the experiences of recent years, can only work as a networked security policy? This runs through all questions. For example, we know from our engagement in Afghanistan that security cannot be established solely with military means. The answer that the new strategic concept must provide must address the question of the extent to which NATO understands itself as a political alliance that considers networked security as its task – always in cooperation with development aid, with a political mandate, and of course with contractual arrangements far beyond the military. This question will certainly be discussed with great intensity. However, I do not believe that we can have a concept of networked security in which NATO is condemned to discuss only in the military realm.

I found it very good that at our NATO conference in Bucharest, we also spoke with the Afghan president, that we spoke with representatives of civil reconstruction, that the UN Secretary-General was present. This means that these forms of cooperation with multilateral institutions must be established, strategically developed, and to some extent also made binding, rather than being decided on a case-by-case basis, more or less randomly. This means that NATO must see itself as a guarantor of our collective security and thus take a firm and defined place in the concept of networked security.

I believe we have made significant progress in our dealings with Afghanistan. Resolutions have been passed in many areas. For example, it had not been written in the history books of many development aid organizations to maintain close cooperation with ISAF. This shows that the intertwining of the world can indeed acquire a completely new quality in the cooperative actions of the actors, which, in my view, must be expanded and become somewhat self-evident.

We must also ask ourselves what the relationship of NATO to its partners is. First and foremost, the European Security and Defense Policy must be mentioned. It is absolutely important to me that there is not a coexistence but a cooperation. However, we still have a number of practical questions to discuss that are sometimes difficult to understand. For example, regarding the issues of Cyprus and Turkey, it will certainly not be possible to explain to future generations that we may have taken decades to develop a reasonable, interconnected concept of NATO and European Security and Defense Policy. Failing to achieve this over decades would be a failure before history. Something must happen here so that this intertwining can be achieved more smoothly and not just negotiated laboriously from case to case. I believe, by the way, that with good will on all sides, this must and can be possible. Germany also wants to contribute to this.

I believe that with a stronger European Security and Defense Policy, we can also strengthen and want to strengthen the Atlantic security partnership. I believe that our American partners increasingly see it this way as well. This will certainly be one of the points we can discuss with the new American president, who, when this NATO summit takes place, will enter Europe for the first time as president.

We must, of course, continue to address the issue of enlargement. Regarding the enlargement discussion we had concerning Ukraine and Georgia in Bucharest, I just want to say that exactly what we agreed upon at the Bucharest summit applies. If they want it, NATO partners will agree to the enlargement. There is a strong expectation that these countries will one day be NATO members. However, given the current situation in these countries, I believe that the membership requirements are currently not met. And I do not see that changing in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we must define a path that leads us in this direction. This means there is a fundamental willingness to enlarge. But there is no right for third parties to determine who joins NATO and who does not.

We will or should also send a clear signal to Russia in the context of the next NATO summit. I repeat: We want to enter into as close and reliable a partnership with Russia as possible. We have also had many discussions on this in the European framework. The foreign ministers of the European Union, for example, decided today that – in light of the situation regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which cannot satisfy us, but also in light of what has happened on the Russian side – negotiations on a partnership and cooperation agreement will be resumed.

We have seen in the international financial crisis that we want and should be capable of acting within the G8, and therefore we also issued a statement as the G8, including Russia. I think it is of great value for NATO to talk with Russia as a partner. It is always better to talk with each other than about each other. I know that this is not entirely easy in the NATO-Russia cooperation. But if we could send a certain signal from here towards the 60th anniversary, it would be a signal of political wisdom.

In all considerations – always with an eye on the security architecture in Europe – we must also ensure that NATO and the transatlantic partnership are strong cornerstones of our security architecture and that the transatlantic partnership is in no way up for negotiation. This must be clear to anyone who, for example, talks about the NATO-Russia question or the cooperation between European Security and Defense Policy and Russia. There is no possibility of dividing the transatlantic security partnership. I always say this in our discussions with our Russian partners: These attempts have failed for decades, and they will fail in the future as well. We need each other more than ever as partners in a globalized world, for example, in the great challenge of combating terrorism. The stronger we can cooperate here, the better.

So, as you can see from my remarks, there are many expectations for the NATO summit, which, by the way, will not last so long that all expectations could be fulfilled there. One topic will also particularly occupy us at this NATO summit, at the birthday celebration: Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the challenge for NATO. The solution to the question of how we can address the challenge within a concept of networked security will depend greatly on the acceptance of NATO, on the success of NATO operations, and also on NATO's reputation worldwide.

First,

one must remember that Afghanistan was the breeding ground for the attacks of September 11 and other devastating attacks in Europe as well. Essentially, Afghanistan serves as a reminder for us to pay political attention to ensure that there are as few failing states as possible, as they can always be breeding grounds for terrorist activities. This is therefore a very clear preventive challenge.

Second:

The debate about engagement in Afghanistan must not be reduced solely to the number of deployed soldiers. We have German soldiers, as well as many police officers and development workers – just like our partners and allies – in the field. As parts of a connected approach, the civilian and military forces naturally follow a logic that corresponds to the situation on the ground: No security without reconstruction, no reconstruction without security. Both are interdependent.

Thirdly:

We must not lose sight of the fact that every contribution is embedded in a comprehensive engagement of the international community and cooperation with the Afghan government. The stabilization of Afghanistan is therefore not solely a German concern, nor just a concern of the EU or NATO, but the engagement of the international community is also based on decisions of the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, it is also based on the UN Charter, particularly regarding the still necessary fight against terrorist structures. This means that we truly have a higher task here that we will fulfill.

Moreover, I want to refer once again to the fact that a democratically legitimized government of Afghanistan has explicitly requested international engagement. This is also a very important point.

I would like to fourthly express my sincere gratitude to all soldiers, police officers, development workers, and diplomats who are shouldering difficult and sometimes very dangerous tasks in Afghanistan. They deserve respect and recognition for this. I bow to all those who have suffered serious injuries or even lost their lives in these missions for our security. We must say that our soldiers are engaged in a confrontation, in a fight with an often invisible enemy. They are dealing with a danger that is different from what we have experienced so far. They must be prepared for this challenge. It is an asymmetric confrontation and therefore a completely new quality of engagement that we must continue to discuss in the future.

We should not overlook that Arab and Asian countries are also fulfilling their responsibilities in Afghanistan alongside us, even at great cost. This is a new experience for NATO in alliances that we have not known before.

For me, it is a matter of course that German soldiers and our partners exercise restraint in the use of resources and maintain the necessary proportionality. But I also want to say at this point: In dangerous situations – that is why I spoke about the new quality of this confrontation – where split-second decisions must be made, restraint is often easier said than done in the real situation. Therefore, I want to emphasize once again that we have great trust in the operational capability of our soldiers, and this trust is, in my view, fully justified.

Fifthly:

The international community has not yet achieved its goal of sufficiently stabilizing Afghanistan. This must be stated in very clear terms. This does not mean that we want to downplay what has been achieved so far – that is correct and important: Afghanistan has a new constitution, a president and parliament exist, infrastructure has improved, six million children are going to school, many young women are active in professions, and in some parts of the country, but unfortunately not in all, the security situation has improved since 2001. This is an enormous progress compared to the years of terrible Taliban rule in Afghanistan. But we must say that we still face great challenges that, in my firm conviction, can only be managed with a concept of connected security. To rely solely on military forces is insufficient.

Therefore, in the coming months – also with the new American administration – the question of how we can implement the concept of connected security will repeatedly occupy us. I do not believe that we need a new concept. There is often a public call for a new concept. I am deeply convinced that the approach of connected security is the right one. But how we apply it to the specific conditions in Afghanistan, with which forces we engage, and how we strengthen the political structures is something that certainly requires ongoing discussion and effort.

Thus, it remains –

sixthly

and very importantly – the goal of our mission to create self-sustaining structures in Afghanistan that ensure the stability of the country. Therefore, the building of Afghan security forces is a particular challenge and priority of our actions. The Bundeswehr is making significant contributions to this building. We are also contributing to the training of police forces.

The timeframes in which we can achieve certain successes have shifted somewhat backward because the training is taking longer and is also more difficult than we had anticipated. But the timeframe for the Afghanistan mission – I want to state this explicitly – is not determined by predetermined years, but is oriented towards achieving the goal. And that means stabilization and the possibility of self-governance in Afghanistan.

However, I also say – it is relatively easy to say this here in this hall, but I also say it repeatedly to the Afghan government: We must succeed in making Afghanistan express its firm will even more clearly that the people truly want to stand on their own feet politically. This is very important because we are not about being in Afghanistan longer than necessary, but about putting the country on stable footing. This must be the standard of what we do.

Seventhly:

We must not harbor any illusions regarding the development of political and social structures and the building of the economy in Afghanistan. We cannot impose a Western economic and social model overnight, but developments must be discussed with the Afghans. I have repeatedly tried to do this with the Afghan government using the example of police building. If we do not know what kind of police structure Afghanistan envisions for itself, then we can certainly make various offers with our different models – from America to Germany, from Italy to France, from federal to central. However, if all of this is not accepted by the people on the ground, then it is very difficult. Therefore, it is urgently necessary that we receive binding statements from Afghanistan about how a police structure for this country is envisioned, so that we do not hear after a few years: But no one ever asked us; that is not how we wanted it. That would be fatal, as I must clearly state.

This means that it remains the task of the Afghans themselves to create a stable state based on their own cultures, traditions, and values. We can inform ourselves extensively about this, we can read, learn, and acquire knowledge about the history of Afghanistan, but in the end, it requires a binding commitment from the legitimized structures in Afghanistan about how such a state-building is envisioned. Without that, we are working somewhat in vain. The Federal Republic of Germany will contribute to the building process. But we can only do so in partnership with Afghanistan.

Eighthly:

The joint reconstruction and development strategy of the Afghan government and the international community is essentially anchored in the "Afghanistan Compact." This compact sets clear targets. They must be reviewed and adjusted repeatedly. Last year, we improved the coordination of some international organizations in Afghanistan. I do not hide the fact: There are still many synergy effects to be utilized to achieve a more coordinated approach. However, much has already been done, as can be seen, for example, in how people sit together in the ISAF headquarters who previously did not communicate with each other.

Ninthly:

One of the major problems is drug cultivation. Here we face a dramatic practical, but also partly intellectual challenge. Here too, my heartfelt request and expectation to the Afghan government is that clear statements are made. Because we cannot fight drug cultivation if the Afghan actors do not express their full strength and courage to speak about it publicly. All help can be provided, but there must be an inner will to solve this problem in the country.

Tenth:

Without stability in the entire region and without a constructive role from its neighbors, Afghanistan will not achieve sustainable stability. It requires regional involvement. This is very easy to say here at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin, but in practice – when we think of Pakistan, India, Iran, and other actors – it is much, much more difficult to achieve. It is repeatedly evident, especially at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan: Only if we have a regional overview do we have a chance of success.

Germany is ready to engage in all these matters and to continue to take responsibility. We have continuously strengthened our responsibility in the three years I have been Chancellor, both regarding the overall connected security architecture and our military tasks. We also believe that another step must be taken regarding air surveillance. We have explicitly indicated this politically in connection with the adoption of the last Afghanistan mandate. I consider this to be extraordinarily important. We are also ready to continue playing our role in taking on regional responsibility – see the involvement of Pakistan. During our G8 presidency, the Federal Foreign Minister already initiated the first meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials. In the meantime, we also have groups of friends of Pakistan. Germany will continue to play its role in this regard.

With my remarks, I have shown you: You have a lot to do if you want to discuss and help us substantively to be on the right path. I wish your assembly all the best in this endeavor.

Atlantic Treaty Association – an important link in the overall discussion about the tasks of our alliance. Unfortunately, I cannot listen to the Secretary General's remarks due to time constraints, but I would like to thank him for the good cooperation. Especially regarding the question of how to proceed with Afghanistan, we are in constant close coordination. He does not always have it easy because we are all so different, but each of us is very amiable. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General. I wish you all the best.