Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the stability assistance for Greece before the German Bundestag on July 17, 2015, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

17 July 2015 · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on July 17, 2015, seeking approval for stability assistance for Greece following the Euro summit crisis negotiations.
Main themes
Greek debt crisis, Eurozone stability, European solidarity, Greek bailout negotiations, Syriza government and Tsipras, rule of law in Europe, community of responsibility, EFSF program, Greek referendum, trust between EU member states, European unity
Duration
~17 min
58th percentile
Words
2,067
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Sentences
95
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Readability
47
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Grade
12.9
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Syntax
3.04
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Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Translated from German

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 42%39%
  • Geopolitical 31%28%
  • Institutional 23%21%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

95 sentences in 34 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

Days have passed in Europe that are hardly surpassable in drama – not only because of the seemingly endless discussions in the Eurogroup of finance ministers and at the Euro summit of heads of state and government last weekend, which I have never experienced in this form before. But these days are, of course, especially dramatic for the country that has occupied so many of our thoughts and discussions: Greece. Let us just imagine for a moment what it would mean if, back home in Germany, pensioners were desperately queuing in front of closed banks waiting to receive 120 euros in pension per week. Then we might get a sense of how dramatic the situation in Greece is, how much was at stake for this country as well as for Europe when the heads of state and government of the 19 members of the Eurozone came together for a special summit last Sunday.

Dear colleagues, before we evaluate the outcome of this Euro summit, we must recall the initial situation. On January 25 of this year, the Greek people elected a new government led by the overwhelmingly strongest party, Syriza, with Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras at the helm.

He won the election essentially with two campaign promises:

firstly

, with the promise to end the previous European approach of solidarity and personal responsibility to overcome the European sovereign debt crisis, secondly

, with the promise that his country would remain a member of the Eurozone.

It was obvious that these two campaign promises were in some contradiction to each other. It was therefore precisely this contradiction that would form the core of all discussions in the following months – until Monday morning. The new government faced 18 other governments in the Eurogroup at the beginning of the year, all of which were also democratically elected, with partly completely opposing campaign promises and political convictions, but with a common effort: No matter how great the political differences, we are committed to ensuring that Greece can remain a member of the Eurozone; for the euro is much more than a currency, it stands like no other European decision for the idea of European unity. The euro represents that Europe is a community of fate and is characterized as a community of law and responsibility across party lines.

For this to succeed, we need two things. On the one hand, it holds true: Pacta sunt servanda. This means that if European treaties are to lose their validity, this happens through unanimously made amendments and ratification processes. It does not happen by individuals simply declaring these treaties null and void due to national elections; for we are a community of law.

On the other hand, Europe needs the ability to compromise just as much as a person needs air to breathe; for we are a community of responsibility. In this specific case, this means: Enormous personal efforts from Greece are met with enormous European solidarity.

The further story is quickly told: On February 20, the Eurogroup decided to extend the duration of the second

EFSF program until June 30. The time until then was to be used to successfully complete the program. That failed. Instead, we experienced that Greece unilaterally ended the negotiations on this, that it did not meet its obligations to make timely payments to the IMF, that the second aid program expired on June 30, which removed the basis for all proposals related to the successful completion of this program, that Greece scheduled a referendum for July 5 on these no longer existing proposals, and that the Greek government campaigned for a "no" vote, which the Greek people followed very clearly with 61 percent.

It is evident: The result was a pile of broken pieces. With it, the most important currency of cooperation, including the cooperation of states, was lost between Greece and the other members of the Eurogroup: reliability and, consequently, trust. Now the only question was: Is this irreparable? More importantly: What can we do?

Three

options were available:

Firstly

. We bend our treaties and rules so far that they are worth nothing anymore. This would have been the case if we had simply cleared the path we have been persistently following since 2010, if we had abandoned it and replaced it with a debt and transfer union – completely regardless of whether the European treaties prohibit a debt cut, a haircut, or not, completely regardless of what the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court mandate. Such an approach would mean the end of the community of law in Europe, and therefore it is not acceptable to us.

Secondly

. We give up and do not make one last attempt to overcome the differences with Greece, but we watch as the country bleeds out, and the people can no longer access their money. Chaos and violence could be the consequences. Such an approach would mean the end of the community of responsibility in Europe. It is not acceptable to us. The entire federal government has viewed this in exactly the same way: This is not acceptable to us.

This path is, by the way, clearly distinguishable from the path of a so-called timeout, which cannot be decided against Greece at all, but only with Greece and, by the way, all 18 other members. Neither was the case: neither were all 18 others willing, nor was Greece willing. Therefore, this path was not viable.

Thirdly

. We make one last attempt to find out in hard, tough negotiations whether it is still possible to create the conditions for the country’s application for an aid program under the ESM to be met together in the Eurogroup with all 19 members – despite all the setbacks of the last six months and despite all the more than justified skepticism – and not at any price, but on the basis and within the framework of the European treaties as well as the inseparably connected concept of national personal responsibility and European solidarity. The federal government has chosen this path. It was the effort that drove us to find a way out of the deadlock together with Greece.

There can be no doubt: The result from Monday morning is harsh. First of all, it is harsh for the people in Greece. As correct as it is that the new Greek government bears no responsibility for the misery of its country up to its election six months ago, it is equally true that what has been destroyed since then defies description.

While Greece could expect significant growth for this year according to the unanimous forecasts of all just last autumn, now the opposite is what we read and what will likely occur. Not only in Spain, Portugal, and Ireland has the situation improved significantly through tough reform programs, but also in the first hopeful approaches in Greece – by the way, evidence against the recurring claim that it was pointless to rely on the success of our aid programs in Greece – now much is unfortunately really in disarray.

However, the result from Monday morning is also harsh for the other 18 members of the Eurozone. 86 billion euros – that is the sum currently at stake, in addition to the loans already given – that is an unprecedented European solidarity; I am deeply convinced of that. However, it is also met with unprecedented conditions, unprecedented personal contributions required of a program country: structural reforms in many areas – in pensions, in the tax system, in product markets, in administration; the firm statement of all Eurozone participants that there can be no haircut in the Euro system; the establishment of a privatization fund, which is to be used largely for debt repayment; and – this is also unique in this form, but indispensable given the experiences of the past six months – very strict monitoring agreements. For we know: Promises are one thing, actions are another; therefore, monitoring and controls are necessary. Mere declarations of intent are not enough. We will also pay attention to this in the design of the negotiations.

Greece had to make prior commitments before we could discuss and decide today on the initiation of negotiations for an ESM program, and Greece has made these prior commitments. The Greek parliament passed four reform laws the day before yesterday – by the way, with an impressive majority: on the value-added tax system, on the pension system, on the statistics authority, on the implementation of the fiscal treaty. In addition, the Greek parliament accepted the overall agreement from last weekend; this has been confirmed by the three institutions and the Eurogroup. Greece had to express its willingness to work closely with the three institutions again, and Greece has also expressed its willingness to have the IMF back in the program after the expiration of the IMF program in spring 2016, both in monitoring and in financial participation.

This brings me to my assessment and conclusion. First of all, I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to Wolfgang Schäuble, who has negotiated for hours and hours, days and nights in the Eurogroup.

The question in substance is: Based on all that I have presented to you, can I ask the German Bundestag to give the federal government a mandate to initiate negotiations for an ESM program for Greece, do I see the conditions for it, do the advantages of the outcome from Monday outweigh the disadvantages? My answer is with full conviction: Yes.

Firstly

. The principle of "performance and consideration – personal responsibility and solidarity," which has guided us since the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis, characterizes the entire outcome from Monday.

Secondly

. The alternative to this agreement would not be an orderly, because desired by Greece and jointly designed timeout from the euro, but predictable chaos. Thus, not only in the content of the agreement itself, but also in comparison to a possible non-agreement, the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages. I know that many have doubts and concerns about whether this path will be successful, whether Greece will have the strength to pursue this path sustainably, and no one can dismiss these concerns. However, one thing is my firm conviction: We would be grossly negligent, indeed irresponsible, if we did not at least try this path, if the Eurogroup did not give Greece and the Greek people the chance to emerge from the crisis with united efforts once again. Europe has the ability to do this. Europe is strong and robust, Germany is strong and robust. But we should also always remember: In the long run, Germany can only do well if Europe does well, and that applies to everyone in Europe.

This also always includes close German-French cooperation. It is not about being of one mind on all issues. On the contrary: Germany and France often have very different opinions, and not just in these days. It is rather about whether it is possible to bring these opinions, resulting from different perspectives, together. An agreement between Germany and France, precisely because the perspectives are different, often outlines the path that all others in Europe can follow. This has also succeeded here.

Mr. President, dear colleagues, the European sovereign debt crisis began in Greece over five years ago, and it now finds a new peak or low point in Greece, however you wish to phrase it. Yet the goal of the federal government remains unchanged: Europe should emerge from this crisis stronger than it entered it, so that we can jointly – that is the real reason – assert our values and interests in the extremely tough global competition in the future, and indeed as what we are: a community of fate characterized as a community of law and responsibility. When we think of all the challenges that lie ahead of us, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the refugees, the threat from terrorist organizations, foremost IS, then I can only say: We have not only decided on Greece here, but this is a decision for a strong Europe and a strong Eurozone. Much more is at stake here. Therefore, we should do everything we can to ensure that the initiation of negotiations is also associated with a successful conclusion. We do this for the people in Greece, but we do this just as much for the people in Germany.