Closing of the round table on the future of European competitiveness.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

13 November 2024 · Closing of the round table on the future of European competitiveness · Collège de France, France

Context
Macron spoke at a round table on European competitiveness hosted at the Collège de France on 13 November 2024, following presentation of the Draghi report.
Main themes
European competitiveness, Draghi report, innovation gap with United States, private and public investment, over-regulation, strategic autonomy, market protection, domestic demand, Donald Trump election impact, EU-China trade tensions, tariff policy, European growth model
Duration
~51 min
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Words
6,148
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Sentences
268
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Readability
50
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Grade
11.8
42nd percentile
Syntax
3.06
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Vocabulary
2.05
18th percentile

Translated from French

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 69%68%
  • Institutional 11%11%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Geopolitical 7%7%
  • Technological 3%3%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

268 sentences in 40 paragraphs

Philippe AGHION

The election of D. TRUMP could act as a stimulus and accelerate the implementation of the DRAGHI report, but some express concern that D. TRUMP will complicate matters by dividing Europeans. What do you think?

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you very much. Thank you, Philippe. And thank you for the welcome at the Collège de France, and thank you to Mario DRAGHI for taking the time to come after having made this report in which I believe I can say we fully agree. And fundamentally, what is described in this report, what I truly believe, and what you have shown in the first part of this exchange, is that we have a growth model that, for nearly 30 years now, creates less wealth per capita than the United States of America. And the figures are there to show it, and it is a problem, because in addition, we have a much more generous social model and we are a continent that is aging, well. And so, if we leave it at that, we have a decoupling that has begun and will increase. There are several elements that justify this, but very clearly, there have been more innovations made on the American continent, well, in the United States of America, and this innovation has spread much more quickly throughout the rest of the economy than it has with us. This is still the main explanatory element of all this. And when we look, I believe that in recent years, we have rather made decisions in the right directions, but we have probably done so a bit too late; in any case, we are not doing it fast enough and still not at the right scale.

But if we look at Europe, to put it very simply, we are under-investing, both public and private, and especially in private investment in the differentiating research elements. We are over-regulating; we have rather increased this over-regulation compared to the Americans. We protect too little, and that is what we have been trying to push for 7 years with this agenda of strategic autonomy. But fundamentally, we have always behaved as if our market was a regulatory element, but we do not protect it. The Americans and the Chinese protect their market. And, lastly, we have sacrificed our domestic demand a lot. This is a debate that is perhaps less present in our European conversation, but we have, in fact, made macroeconomic policy trade-offs more generally that have favored export-driven models, whereas the Americans have much more protected their domestic market and its demand component.

Which means that for us, when exports stall, it is even harder. Does the election of Donald TRUMP correct one of these points? Can we think that, naturally, the United States of America will reconverge towards us on these different points that explain this differential? Quite the opposite. They will increase them, since there are rather directional points, what we know of what he has already done, what he said during the campaign, and the ideology that underpins his actions, it is rather that they will continue to invest massively. And the figures are there to show it, by the way: the position of American stock market capitalizations, the government's willingness, the pro-innovation policy. Secondly, he will not over-regulate. In any case, that is not on the agenda. And it is rather an administration that will deregulate; it has started, and the announcements from the last few hours seem to indicate that this is the case, in an agenda that is, by the way, totally uninhibited in connecting deregulation and business, by the way with governance rules that would not be possible for us, to put it mildly. Thirdly, will they protect less? No. And they will even enter, and this is everything that needs to be seen, into a tariff tension that will be greater.

Now, I am not dramatizing this; this approach is bipartisan. And I remind you that in recent years, the BIDEN administration had suspended the tariffs we had, but it had not canceled them. And if we take the Inflation Reduction Act, it is probably one of the most protectionist packages we have seen in recent decades for cleantech, and which was also very aggressive towards European value chains. And so we have an administration that will continue to protect the market very strongly, at the risk, by the way, of dismantling the value chains between Europeans and Americans. And one of the points that Mario mentioned implicitly, which is very important to me, is to know how we will be caught in the trade war with China. Because one of the things could be: tariffs for everyone. The other could be to force Europeans, fundamentally, to separate more quickly from the Chinese. And to say, we impose very high tariffs on China, but if you are more complacent, we will impose tariffs on you. And it is at that moment that there will be a risk of division among Europeans according to sectoral interests and the different countries. Some being very exposed to the Chinese market, saying: I am a bit afraid to exit this market too quickly, while others who will be more dependent on the American market will yield more quickly to the pressure that the American federal government can exert. But we are entering a very clearly tariff war universe. And I have already said this several times, but in my eyes, since the Inflation Reduction Act, I consider that the two major economies have decided to no longer respect the rules of the World Trade Organization. This is a fact, so we must not be naive.

So, in this context, for me, the American election does not change the deep observation made by the DRAGHI report, which I share, which I mentioned at the Sorbonne a few months ago, which is at the heart of what we have pushed in recent years with Thierry, the outgoing commission, and the ministers who are here and who have carried this agenda. Simply, it is a moment of acceleration, and I think that the longer we wait, the more, in fact, we will have impossible dilemmas to solve, because the gap continues to widen. And so, we have no choice but to be even more united, but to implement as quickly as possible major choices on the single market, on financing, on some industrial and innovation policies, and on a trade policy as we have started to do, as the Commission has started to do with electric vehicles.

Philippe AGHION

Shouldn't we also involve the United Kingdom, which is not part of the European Union but which we can sense a desire to get closer to us? Or should we remain at the level of the European Union?

Emmanuel MACRON

We always want to go faster, and we must go much faster, the risk being to underestimate the value of unity. First of all, what makes our Europe strong is its single market. And the single market is not just an alliance of consumers; it must now become the heart of an industrial policy. And if we do not value it that way, there is little chance that we will succeed. And that is what we have started to do in recent years. So I do not see any inevitability. Simply, if we divide, we lose that advantage. And the risk, if in the next 2 years we do not have concrete results, is that some countries may be tempted by singular adventures, indeed, with the United States of America. So, I think that the preference should go to collective action because that is what allows for effective action.

First of all, what do we need to do? We need to protect our market, as I said. This is not protectionism, but when we have economies like China that, for 10 years, have been over-subsidizing certain segments of their economy and reach a level, in many segments, of overcapacity, they are dumping their overcapacities onto our continent. If we do not protect our market, not to create distortions in relation to the WTO, but simply to restore rules of fair competition, we have no chance of having an industrial policy. And if we are not united, we have no chance of resisting an unfair tariff policy that could come from the United States. So, the defensive trade policy is done at the level of the single market. That is the first point.

Defensively, it is very important. And we are starting to take responsibility for this with the famous question of Chinese electric vehicles. But that is only the beginning. Because the real question, if we take electric vehicles, is the European content. It is not simply the vehicle itself. And there, we are going to enter a phase where, very quickly, we need to define what European content is, how we measure it, how we protect it. Otherwise, very quickly, within six months, our manufacturers will go source Chinese suppliers and will have circumvented the rules that we ourselves will have put in place. This is a real policy that is, by the way, very comparable to what the United States of America is doing with NAFTA and defining a regional content and, so to speak, protecting it. So, we need to have homogeneous rules with others, and they will be effective if they are made at the level of the single market, that is to say, the 27. Because if we do it with just a few, it will not work, since we operate on these services at 27.

The second element is the single market itself. One of the very well-described explanations in Mario's report for our insufficient competitiveness is that we have not fully realized this single market and that, fundamentally, we do not make it a true domestic market that allows a company that is created in Europe to immediately have a domestic market of 430 million consumers and not have to manage 27 rules. And so, we must enter an agenda that is at the same time an agenda of simplification, which is to say how we better integrate the major sectors on which we have decided to work together. And then, how we do not enter the logic of the single market in sectors that we had kept aside until now. I am thinking of two major sectors, namely energy and telecommunications. And by the way, this is probably one of the explanations for our current dysfunctions and lack of competitiveness, because we had kept energy separate from the single market, which means that we have very national models and we have very deficient interconnections, which is one of the reasons why we are paying too much for energy today, in any case, that we have a market that has largely malfunctioned. And when we look, we have today a telecommunications market that is not really integrated at the European level, which consequently has a much lower capacity to invest than in the United States of America.

And when you look at the innovation of the last 30 years, it has first been driven by the large Telcos, because simply, there were as many Telcos in the United States of America as there are in France. So, there is something that was not working. So, the single market is an important point because it restores the capacity to invest. In this context, one of the points we must address at 27, and if it does not work, can be done with a few, is the financial sector. And the union of capital markets is a key point. We will probably come back to this in the discussion, and I think it is one of the points on which we can advance very quickly. And if within 18 months we do not have results at 27, we can say that at that point, we will do what we call "enhanced cooperation" because we cannot delay this. There is a European aberration on this subject. We are the continent that saves the most, and we are the continent that invests... Well, if I take the three plates: China, the United States, us, we have the most savings and we are the ones who invest the least in innovation, risk, more broadly capital. This is an aberration that is linked to the fact that we do not have a true integrated capital market and especially that we have rules today that have become inadequate for this purpose.

After that, there is the whole industrial policy. We can go very quickly and innovate. We have done this in recent years with the famous Community Interest Projects, the PIEC, on which, on hydrogen, on batteries, we have had real European projects, on semiconductors, to name just a few, we have decided on major European projects, we are putting in money and we are going for it. And I believe that now, on quantum, on cleantech, on artificial intelligence, on major defense projects, it is this approach that we need to have. Now, regarding the British in this matter, everything that touches on the single market, I want to say, by nature, we cannot give it to them. Otherwise, welcome to the club. But we must be very careful not to give them free rider rights, because otherwise, the cost of leaving the European Union no longer exists, and we will find ourselves with series of Brexits. So, we need coherence. In terms of research, however, we can have more integrated policies; we just need clear elements of reciprocity. But here too, I think we need to go much stronger and much further. So, in prioritizing things, I still think there is a great incentive to be united, and therefore there is an agenda to be chanted with the European Commission, but this requires having a Council that gives much stricter orientations and timelines.

And two things, Mario spoke about qualified majority. I am also a great promoter of it. In truth, on all these subjects, we are already at a qualified majority. The real problem is that we have a bias that has existed for years, which is that of geographical return. Because as soon as there is a qualified majority that exists, all countries, and sometimes the largest ones, have shown this in recent years, they bring things back to the European Council, at the level of heads of state and government, to effectively revert to unanimity. So, we have, through our governance, killed the spirit of the treaties ourselves. What does not work on the major research projects, innovation, and industrial choices that you mentioned, which we continue to discuss with Mario, is that there will not be 27 champions and that there will not be, on the major choices we make, a geographical return in each country, I would even say in proportion to the share we contribute. And the real misunderstanding is there. And so, we must also accept to have an approach fundamentally of the best athlete, to make a poor translation of an Anglo-Saxon formula, or at least to assume that we say we want one or two champions in Europe, for example in quantum or in AI, for example on the issue of cyber. There is a European agency that selects perhaps 10 projects independently with the best academic experts, etc., and we assume that we may have a significant attrition rate and that there will be one champion who survives, who will be a very great European champion. And it may be in Poland, and that will not be a problem for France and Germany. But this approach does not exist today. Because today, as soon as we put money into one, including in a so-called federal or European project, we look at our geographical return. And so, in international competition, we kill our competitiveness. This is the whole difficulty we had with Ariane, to compare Ariane with SpaceX. We had a lot of lead. Simply, we make rockets, but it’s the same for missiles, etc., by passing components 6 to 10 times across borders to ensure that there are so many hours of work in Germany, so many in Spain, so many in France, so many in Italy, etc., when on the other side, you have someone who tells you, I disrupt all production models, and where it required very large factories in 4 different locations, I do it in a garage as we don’t even know how to produce cars. So, we need to succeed in adapting our governance and our deep political choices to this reality.

Philippe AGHION

I return to the capital markets, the report indicates that on average, the countries of the European Union do not manage to transform savings into innovative investment. The report mentions the Swedish model, can we draw inspiration from it? The report also proposes to relax the securitization of bank loans, are we not going to generate financial instability?

Emmanuel MACRON

No, just in two words on the capital market, Mario reiterated it, and to make it clear for everyone, our model of financing the economy of continental Europe is the exact opposite of that of Anglo-Saxon economies; that is to say, about 70%, indeed, of the financing of our economy goes through institutions, banks, and insurance, only 30% through capital markets. And so we were very dependent on these intermediaries who were the banks and insurance when, through products or directly, they went to the capital markets.

In contrast, the Anglo-Saxons are direct market players because there are pension funds, among others, that allow for these capitals to go directly to market operators. And so 70% of their economy goes through that. The financial crisis has a simple consequence. We came out of it with regulations to reduce risk. The double paradox of this regulation is that it has affected operators more than capital market players. So this regulation has mainly been a regulation of banks and insurance, the famous Basel and Solvency, and in fact, it has mainly been applied by Europeans, but not by others. And so, we come out of this crisis with Solvency II and Basel III, which over-regulate, at least, which has regulated and imposed more systemic risk, but which has placed many constraints on our bankers and insurers, and which has led us to push them out of the equity economy. And so, all our savings, which are, by structure, with us, in life insurance products, in banking products, in insurance products, are then allocated by the balance sheet of these market intermediaries, no longer at all on products that existed before, of Private Equity financing, of the market, etc., which allowed for innovation, to go into our companies and others. We have completely chased it away from that. It is massively going towards products that are rather bonds, that is to say, it buys our debt, and guess what, American debt. And so the paradox is that European savings, much more abundant than American savings, is used essentially to finance European and American debt, and as it is much less profitable, the figures of household enrichment given by Mario show it, well, it is diverted towards American market players because they are more profitable.

So, stupidity squared in our case. That is to say, we are using our savings poorly, we are letting it go to others, and moreover, it does not finance what is good for us. Because there has also been a form, it must be said, there is a cultural doubt, there is less sympathy towards what we call there, beautifully, capital markets, but which is the stock market, which is the markets, etc. And if tomorrow, in the public debate, Mario praised the Swedish model, I agree. Well, if I tell you, wonderful the Swedish model, that we find everything nice, that there are pension funds, it’s great, we will do it in France. Even I am cautious, so that’s not what I’m saying. But all this to say that it is one of the explanatory factors, and we are paying for it in the long term.

So what do we need to do? First, we may need to readjust things. And so, securitization is a bit silly, it’s a Shadokian affair. It’s like we prevented the actors themselves from investing their balance sheets in it, we create big pipes for them, it’s like in the Shadoks, big pipes that will circumvent the thing to be able to return to equity. So that’s the Shadokian pipe of securitization. That is to say, we say, since you no longer have the right to go into direct equity, we will create mechanisms that will still allow you to take this savings towards equity directly. So we can do that with 27. There have been initial consultations that have been made. It’s a good thing. Then, we need to simplify, we need to have market operators, and we have this strength in Europe, we have large operators, we need to develop them, we need to move towards the most unique operator possible to simplify things and have a common securitization platform. And then, I think we need, in the synchronization we must do with the Americans, to synchronize our regulations as well. We have a double synchronization to do if we want to be competitive compared to the Americans. We must try to push regulations that go too fast in certain areas and try to get back to the same scale. But we need to see if they decide and confirm that they will not apply prudential rules to their operators, to say: we give ourselves a little time, a little flexibility so that at least we can reinvest in equity. So those are the priority points. That’s why indeed, securitization is so important, it allows us to allocate this part. And then, there is the idea of moving towards a unique supervision system and everything that makes up a single capital market, that is to say, allowing the construction of market operators, a single capital market in Europe, which will allow us to take this savings and invest it productively in European risk, in European innovation, in startups, in medium-sized enterprises, and to finance this growth. Because why do we need this? When we take two steps back, we have financed much less. It is our private system that finances much less equity compared to what the Americans do. But the Draghi report, sorry to say it like that, Mario, in front of you, but which is consistent in this regard with all reports, says: “we have a financing need of about 800 billion euros per year.” And we can say: it’s half private, half public. It’s not completely absurd to do it. And fundamentally, these metrics are achievable if, indeed, we know how to mobilize our savings and invest it in equity, because we have more than enough to make 400 to 500 billion euros per year in equity investment in our economy, whether it’s innovation or the growth of our startups.

Philippe AGHION

When you spoke about the single market, you highlighted its importance, because one of the reasons that advocates for the single market is that it increases the rents of innovation, but there is another reason that it allows competition, which stimulates innovation. In the report, you emphasize the multiple local regulations that hinder the realization of a competitive single market, the report advocates for strengthening competition policy in Europe but at the same time an industrial policy through innovation. How to reconcile competition policy and industrial policy?

Emmanuel MACRON

I fully subscribe to what Mario just said, but fundamentally, what is our objective? We want to create the maximum wealth for the worker, the investor, and the consumer. This balance that a good competition policy seeks to achieve is articulated with an innovation policy and an industrial policy. But moreover, we have two terms that we want to add constraints to our equation. We want to decarbonize this economy, which is critical and must be added and taken into account. And we want to preserve our sovereignty, our European strategic autonomy. We want to reduce our dependencies, it must be integrated if we want to look at our other competition policies. What makes us know for several years now that our competition policy, which I believe is a solid element of the functioning of our Europe, must better integrate the evolution of relevant markets and major competitors. And so, technological evolutions sometimes change the relevant markets.

When we look at a particular market that is shaken by a usage innovation or a profound industrial innovation, there may be competitors that appear and are in a very monopolistic situation in other geographies. If we look at a relevant market based on old technologies, we will be mistaken. In any case, we will unnecessarily sanction a European industrial player. And when we see the capacity, indeed, that Chinese or American players have to become large, we can, in international competition, sometimes put brakes through our competition policies on the constitution of large European players.

So that’s the first point on which we can see that we need to adjust things. But this policy is only compatible if we go much faster on the integration of the single market. I will not repeat what I said earlier, Mario said it, that is to say, that every time, in fact, our single market is a common regulation, but in addition to the 27 existing regulations, we are very ineffective. And we do not have a true domestic single market and we do not have the capacity to go at the right speed. And so really, it’s an agenda fundamentally of simplification and homogenization. But it comes back to the same thing as what I said earlier by taking the example of innovation. It means rediscovering the very essence of the European project. It’s that we may not win everything at every stage, but the collective gain we will derive from such a policy is good for each of us. And at today’s scale of global competition, it’s key. And so indeed, that’s a key element, the more integrated single market, simplification, is the basis, if I may say so, of a good industrial policy that preserves our ability to be competitive in addition to a good definition of the relevant market. In addition to that, I would add that we indeed need to have a policy on a few sectors where we assume to have a policy of innovation and an industrial policy. What we have done on semiconductors, hydrogen, batteries, we need to do it probably on quantum, on clean tech, on health and defense. Health, we had done a bit post-Covid. But on these aspects, we know that we need common investment, the equivalent of our PIIEC.

But simply put, we need to do a lot, quickly, with the governance procedures I mentioned earlier, to have an effective innovation policy that allows us, in key sectors, to have the most disruptive projects that move forward, in connection, by the way, with innovation ecosystems, as Mario said. And then the last point, if we want an effective policy in this area, we need to be much more in our regulations, in our ability to provide horizons, market incentives, while being on technological neutrality. And I want to emphasize this point because I think it is one of the real dysfunctions in Europe, in particular, that we have had, always with the best intentions in the world, in recent years. We have made 3 or 4 regulations on hydrogen in recent years. Wonderful. We said, we are going to go all in. We created hydrogen PIIECs that worked. We said, we are going to make big projects, we are going to develop our own electrolyzers here, we are going to develop breakthrough innovation projects on different techniques. And then we made a bunch of directives to define. And since the underlying issue is your energy model, these directives were negotiated on the fragmentation of the energy market of the different nations. And so we created a hydrogen market that did not exist in Europe. But we said: we are not allowed to produce such percentages of hydrogen coming from nuclear at such times of the day or night, so much coming from… And so, we inherently built a hydrogen market that is totally fragmented and biased because we were prescriptive on the technological level. And I don’t care whether the electron that helps me perform electrolysis to produce green hydrogen comes from offshore wind in Denmark, solar in Spain, or nuclear in France. What I want is for it to be competitive decarbonized European hydrogen.

And well, that’s not how we proceed. And that is a real mistake. Because if we proceeded like that, we would be very competitive compared to the Americans or the Chinese because no one has our capacity to move as quickly. And so we need to be much more on technological neutrality. I could take the example of the car with roughly the same demonstration. And so we need to be on industrial policies that provide sectoral aid, that give much clearer market signals, but that are based on much more assumed technological neutrality.

Philippe AGHION

Regarding research, Antonin BERGEAUD, who is here, has written a paper on the role of LabEx in stimulating innovation in France, and his study shows that their impact has been very significant. Isn’t there a good lesson to be learned, by drawing inspiration from LabEx for a research and innovation policy that stimulates breakthrough innovation?

Emmanuel MACRON

I think that connects with what we were saying at the beginning, which is that the faster we can bridge the gap with the United States of America, the faster we will have a model of innovation and research that can be competitive, because we are currently paying in the differential for what we lost 20 years ago. And in truth, I will come back to fundamental research and breakthrough research later, but the difficulty we have, as Mario has reiterated the figures, when we look at research funding Europe-United States, the big differential is on the private side, because we have a sectoral specialization that has become distorted. And today, the main driver of private innovation and research funding in Europe is the automobile, as the report shows well, because we have this industrial core that has remained. And we are talking about a country that has rather deindustrialized more than its neighbors and therefore has even more sectoral biases and, as a result, has less private R&D. But where, on the American side, it is indeed the technology industries, because they have taken the train of technological transformation, that they had telcos that invested in breakthrough innovations, that they then took the train of the Internet, of these digital platforms that invest much more.

And so if today we do not take the train of innovation, we do not know how to create mid-sized players and champions in new technologies, we will continue to distort our productive fabric and have, on average, industrialists who innovate less or who will innovate in sectors that are less disruptive. I say this to point out that there is a generational effect, if I may say so, that makes it necessary, if it needed to be demonstrated, that we must go very quickly, very strongly, and perhaps in this area, to continue with the anglicisms, leapfrogging is possible. And so, if we move very quickly today on AI, on clean techs, on breakthrough industries, we can try to catch up on this delay. So, we have this private problem. Then, on the public side, there have been very good initiatives, and thank you for mentioning them here, and I also believe a lot in this approach through academic evaluation. But what works? It is when we decide, as you said, to have independent juries that concentrate resources, that follow results, and that evaluate and maintain that, and know how to close down the mechanisms that do not produce results. Well, we have a model on which we have made investments in recent years, I am talking about France, we have reinvested, but it is, I would say, a catch-up, because we had under-invested in public research, and I think we need to continue this work. For me, we are not done yet, and I say this here because we have been talking a lot for a while about innovation, technological research, all of this is only possible if the nation invests in fundamental research. And this is obviously not always finalized, it is not always on breakthrough points. I think we also need to acknowledge the context of public finances that exists everywhere in Europe, that we have here, but investment in fundamental research is one of the absolutely essential foundations to be able to have the rest and to do it with academic rules of independence. I also say this because if we compare ourselves to the United States of America, it is a point on which the French and European model is undoubtedly enviable. But continuing to have academic research that is funded, fundamental research that is duly funded, continuing, we must do it, preserving the rules of independence of this academic research, I believe, is an element not just of economic health, but of democracy. And at some point, the two go hand in hand. So that is a milestone.

Then, we indeed need to have duly evaluated programs on breakthrough research. And so there, the LabEx, there are different initiatives that have been taken in recent decades. And indeed, since 2007-2008, the IHU, what has been done with successive generations, but that does not come to substitute for the other in competition. And our universities, with our research organizations, often supported by these programs, have managed to create in recent years real clusters of teaching and research, and I read both intentionally, which I believe are truly a lever for our competitiveness and that we must continue to encourage. And then on this basis, we must indeed have the capacity to give the right signals and to encourage finalized, technological research, through this public-private link. On this, at the European level, Mario said it, I think that to move to the next stage, this is what the report proposes regarding the ERC, it is to have, at the European level, fully independent governance, much more massive resources, and to have the capacity to undertake projects at the European scale on rules that are strictly scientific and, as I said earlier, without looking at the geographical return, but simply looking at the excellence of the projects that are proposed and then accepting an evaluation over time. It is at this price that we will also be able to have truly innovative projects, breakthrough research that is funded at the European level.

And I wanted to thank Mario DRAGHI in particular for at least three reasons. The first is for having accepted to take on the responsibilities that were his in a delicate moment in the political and economic life of Italy and for having been a wonderful companion for France. The second is for having accepted to write this report when President VON DER LEYEN asked him. The third is for being now fully engaged in its implementation, since he was with us in Budapest a few days ago and he is kind enough to come here to the Collège de France. So really, Mario, a huge thank you for all of this and this contribution. And I will perhaps end on a somewhat optimistic note, because I would like us all to be aware, the report also says it, we need to act quickly, but we have the talents in Europe. We train them, they are here. We have savings, so we have capital. We have decarbonized energy that we are producing more and more, but between renewables and nuclear, we have this element, it is key. And we have a social and democratic model that is there, that holds, and that is much more demanding than in most regions of the world. If we know how to make the right decisions at the right time, that is to say now, without delay, with seriousness, speed, collective commitment, and if we know how to do it with 27, we normally have all the ingredients on the table. So there are all the reasons to be reasonably optimistic if we are clear-sighted, willing, and determined, which I believe we both are.