PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON THE OCCASION OF THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE G5 SAHEL SUMMIT.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

9 July 2021 · Joint press conference at the end of the G5 Sahel Summit

Context
Macron addressed a joint press conference with Niger's President Bazoum following a virtual G5 Sahel Summit on July 9, 2021, outlining France's evolving military strategy in the Sahel.
Main themes
G5 Sahel summit outcomes, French military presence reconfiguration in the Sahel, counterterrorism against Al-Qaeda and Daesh, international commitment to the Sahel, Takuba Task Force, MINUSMA mandate renewal, France-Niger bilateral relations, European partnership in the Sahel, democratic transition in Niger
Duration
~22 min
71st percentile
Words
2,673
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Sentences
111
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Readability
40
35th percentile
Grade
13.7
64th percentile
Syntax
3.10
60th percentile
Vocabulary
2.41
91st percentile

Translated from French

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 83%82%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Institutional 5%5%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

111 sentences in 19 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I would like to greet all of our interlocutors who are on the other side of the cameras, whether they are in France, Niger, or in the Sahel region.

I am pleased today to have with me President BAZOUM, President, partner, and friend. This is his first visit to France since his election, which has been praised for its exemplary nature, but it is by no means the first time we have had the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas, and the past few months have been active in this regard for us. But I want to take this official opportunity to pay tribute to his predecessor, President ISSOUFOU, whose courage and commitment I once again commend, to honor the vitality and strength of Nigerien democracy, for you have together succeeded in the first truly democratic and free transition. And I really want to thank President BAZOUM for accepting this invitation, which coincided with the holding of a virtual G5 Sahel summit, and truly congratulate him for his actions over the past few months. I believe they are noticeable to us, to the partners in the region, and to the Nigeriens.

A remote meeting was held a short while ago, which I was invited to, that allowed the partners of the G5 Sahel and France to discuss our priorities and the evolution of the situation. I will let President BAZOUM elaborate on the results and decisions of this summit, to which France was invited regarding the modalities of transforming our military presence in the Sahel. As you know, I had the opportunity to speak the day after the N'Djamena summit and more recently on the eve of the G7 about the logic and objectives that are behind this evolution. Since that date, intense work of coordination and consultation has been carried out with our African partners, obviously primarily with those in the Sahel, but more broadly across the entire region, with our European partners engaged alongside the Sahel, also through EUTM training missions, logistical cooperation, or their participation in MINUSMA, and consultation with all our international partners.

I note that this work of consultation and explanation has not only reassured our Sahelian and international partners but has also consolidated their choice to engage in the Sahel. In this regard, the conclusions of the European Council on June 24 indeed renewed the commitment of the member states to contribute to the EUTM operation and the Takuba Task Force. New states have even joined Takuba. I will mention here Romania, which has decided in recent days to join Takuba. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council has just unanimously renewed the mandate of the United Nations Force, MINUSMA, in which several European partners are also engaged. This was on June 29. The combination of these decisions clearly demonstrates the continuity of international commitment to the Sahel.

In parallel, and even prior to these consultations with our international partners, we have been conducting an in-depth dialogue with our Sahelian partners for several months, who are obviously stakeholders in these developments. These exchanges began at the start of this year in the context of the discussions we held in preparation for the N'Djamena Summit. They have continued relentlessly to this day and the meeting we just had in the context of this G5 Sahel summit. I will let President BAZOUM confirm this observation, but I believe I can say that these exchanges have allowed us to converge on the meaning, opportunity, and modalities of the evolution of our military presence in the Sahel.

The meaning of these evolutions, of the reconfiguration of our presence, is primarily the maintenance of our commitment to the Sahel. I want to say this clearly. We remain committed to the Sahel because we are asked to do so by the states in the region. This is an obvious fact that tends to be overlooked and that must be constantly reiterated. France does not intend, let alone wish, to remain engaged indefinitely in the Sahel. We are here because we are asked to be, and for a duration that will never exceed what we are asked. This request for support from France was reiterated during the summits in Pau and N'Djamena. It also emerged unambiguously from the exchange we had this morning. The meaning of our presence, as I already stated in my speech in Ouagadougou, has nothing to do with the military interventions that France has conducted in the past on the African continent. We have changed worlds as well as software, and our military action is a response to a global threat that transcends the African continent, but whose main targets and victims today are the African populations, particularly those in the Sahel.

We must always remember here that this threat has a name, that of the two major terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda and Daesh, and their ramifications in Africa and the Sahel, which have made Africa their main theater of offensive and growth today. We know these organizations. They have struck several continents, including ours, and even our French soil. We are not unaware of their agenda, but while they disguise it under a rhetoric invoking morality and good governance, they deceive no one. We know in reality that this agenda disregards the fate and dignity of African populations and is not limited to the horizon of occupying a territory or a capital. Our enemy, these terrorist groups today in Africa, is an expansionist, ideological project whose control of a Sahelian territory is just a step. And its daily reality is closed schools, women deprived of all rights, murdered teachers, ousted prefects, obstructed public services, maintained misery, hundreds of thousands of displaced populations, and the establishment of a social order degrading human rights. And whether it is the role of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region and the actions you have taken in recent weeks to counter these effects I have just mentioned, or the presence of Daesh or Al-Qaeda throughout the Sahel, this is indeed what we are talking about. Our Sahelian partners do not want this project and lose lives every day in this confrontation. This fight is not only theirs. History, the tragedies, the attacks we have experienced on our territory teach us that this fight is also ours, we, the French and Europeans. That is why we fight alongside you and will continue to do so until the ultimate sacrifice of the lives of our own soldiers. It is also for this reason that we remain committed.

But remaining committed also means adapting. Since the decision to intervene in Mali in January 2013, the forms and modalities of our support to the Sahel countries have undergone several evolutions. We have regionalized our approach, refocused our action on the three-border area, strengthened the civil pillar of our commitment, and created the framework for a coalition to facilitate the engagement of other partners. Our action has thus gradually been integrated into an increasingly internationalized and increasingly partnership-oriented framework with the countries of the region. Sahelization, internationalization, these have been the evolutions of the last three years in this theater of operations. For example, the share of our operations conducted jointly with our Sahelian partners is now significantly higher than the share of operations we conduct autonomously.

Today, we are embarking on a new profound evolution of our engagement in the Sahel. Why this movement? First of all, because the successes we have achieved allow us to do so. And this is the primary driving force behind this transformation. In the last months of 2019, the two terrorist organizations I mentioned attempted to replicate what they had tried at the beginning of the 2010s, namely to establish a territory under their complete control, which could then serve as a platform for projection. This project of territorial entrenchment was thwarted, prevented by the concentration of efforts and forces that we decided upon during the summit in Pau. Thanks to this military resurgence, an additional re-engagement of the French armies to better organize our coordination with our Sahelian partners, we were able to collectively regain control of these territories. The challenge now is to gradually bring as many services as possible to the populations in these areas. This is the meaning of the civil resurgence we decided upon during the N'Djamena summit, in which Niger, I must emphasize, is particularly invested. This is the very meaning of the actions carried out in several areas by the Nigerien President.

The second driving force behind this evolution is the very evolution of the nature of the threat. Learning from their failures, our adversaries have today abandoned a territorial ambition in favor of a project of disseminating the threat. Not just in the Sahel but across all of West Africa. The most pressing illustration of this paradigm shift is the pressure exerted by terrorist groups in the areas bordering Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. This offensive unfortunately foreshadows increased pressure on all the Gulf of Guinea countries, which is already a reality. In the face of this pivot towards terrorist organizations, the mistake would have been to keep us in a framework that no longer corresponds to either the geography or the dissemination of the threat.

The stabilization of the border area and the retreat of terrorist control over this region now opens up the possibility for us to implement, without further delay, the reconfiguration of our presence, according to modalities agreed upon with our Sahelian partners and allies. This reconfiguration will begin in the coming weeks. A map will be distributed here that will allow you to clearly visualize the direction we are heading. Indeed, in line with the imperative to stem the spread of the threat to the south, it will result in a reduction of our military footprints further north. These closures will take place over the second half of 2020 and will be completed by the beginning of 2022. Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu will thus be progressively deactivated.

Our military presence in the Sahel will revolve around two missions. The first will be to continue the neutralization and disorganization of the high command of the two enemy organizations. The second mission will focus on supporting the strengthening of the armies in the region, which has already begun through several historical missions, but we intend to further intensify. We will carry out these two missions around several organizational axes.

First, a counter-terrorism dimension with, as you can see on these maps, the continuation of the action of the Task Force Sabre. Then, it will be reinforced by a partnership dimension of combat to specifically address and strengthen the fight against terrorism by supporting the actions of our African partners with joint operations. The fight against terrorism will therefore continue around the Task Force Takuba, whose recognition in the conclusions of the last European Council and in the new mandate of MINUSMA illustrates the deeply European and multilateral dimension.

The Task Force Takuba will therefore have a mission to combat terrorism. It will be part of a close partnership and will be coordinated from the command post in Niamey with the armies of the G5 Sahel. It will have a framework nation, a lead state, France, and will aggregate several partner nations. We already have, alongside France, nine European partners. We have solicited several other non-European partners and we are seeking African partners for support missions. The map here reflects the current scope of the Task Force Takuba mission. But the discussions we had today with President BAZOUM allow us to expand this and to have a roadmap that - we will work on it in a week - would obviously allow for an increased role together in this combat partnership and fight against terrorism as well, in Niger. France will maintain a significant contribution within it, accompanied by the Italians, Danes, Portuguese, etc.

Alongside this fight against terrorism, there is the mission, as I said, of strengthening the armies in the region. In this regard, we will focus our support through two dimensions: a cooperation dimension to train, equip, advise the partner armies. The second mission is the strengthening of the armies in the region.

The cooperation dimension, as I mentioned, will be strengthened and will particularly rely on the existing operational military partnership framework at the regional level in West Africa. It will be implemented in synergy with our partners and with international missions, especially the EUTM. In addition to preparing for operational engagement, it is about building defense tools capable of training, educating, and managing soldiers over the long term, maintaining equipment, and also acquiring skills. Therefore, we will need to continue to scale up in this cooperation dimension through the EUTM and complement it with bilateral cooperation that we will undertake with all the nations of the G5 Sahel. We will support this transformation of defense tools with advice and command support, and thus with partnerships and human cooperation over the long term.

There will also be a reassurance dimension, which you can see represented on this map, to remain permanently able to intervene quickly in favor of allied or partner forces thanks to our air capabilities deployed from Niger. Our partners will also benefit from the maintenance of certain essential capabilities in Mali — health, aeromobility, rapid reaction force — and Chad will remain a key element of our framework with the maintenance of a significant air and ground presence also oriented towards cooperation with the Chadian armed forces. And so you see, this support for the armies in the region will have a cooperation and training component and a reassurance component with Niamey, which will be very strongly reinforced, if I may say so, by the air forces that will be stationed there, the central command of the Takuba Task Force, and the command of coordination between Takuba and the joint forces of the G5 Sahel. This transformation, this evolution of our framework, will be implemented in the coming months. And it is the one that seems to us to best respond, of course, to the evolution of the threat. With the agreement of President BAZOUM, whom I thank, this new framework, as I mentioned, will be coordinated and commanded from our elements present in Niger.

In due course, therefore, once this process is completed, Operation Barkhane will be closed. This transfer of command will take place while maintaining our existing military presence, as I mentioned, in Chad. In parallel, as you can also see represented on this map, we will have a regional cooperation effort since French forces in Côte d'Ivoire and all French forces supporting the region can be mobilized, as we did, by the way, in the early 2020s, which is consistent with the widening of the threat, as I mentioned earlier. I remind you that at the Pau summit, we decided, during the military surge, to mobilize several hundred personnel who were present in Abidjan to join Barkhane. It is in this same spirit that we will continue to have regional support and security in support of the framework I just mentioned.

Ultimately, this transformation responds to the need to adapt to the new posture of terrorist groups, to support the region's assumption of responsibility, and to thus reformulate the framework and objectives of our engagement in the Sahel. It is, of course, about preventing two terrorist organizations from making the Sahel and West Africa their new ground for expansion and entrenchment, but it is in no way about substituting ourselves for the responsibility and sovereignty of the states in the area to fulfill their security missions and services provided to the populations. These are the few elements following these consultations and after the presentation that the Chief of Staff of our armed forces and I were able to make this morning before our partners, which I wanted to report to you. I will now give the floor to President BAZOUM, thanking him again for his trust, his commitment, and his presence today in Paris.