Speech before the European Intelligence College

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

5 March 2019 · Inaugural session of the European Intelligence College · Paris, France

Context
Macron addressed the inaugural session of the European Intelligence College on March 5, 2019, urging stronger European security and intelligence cooperation amid growing threats.
Main themes
European intelligence cooperation, European security and defense, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, autonomous European strategic capacity, European intervention initiative, democratic interference, NATO and transatlantic relations, European institutional reform
Duration
~26 min
76th percentile
Words
3,078
76th percentile
Sentences
133
76th percentile
Readability
40
37th percentile
Grade
13.3
60th percentile
Syntax
3.27
79th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 63%56%
  • Institutional 21%18%
  • Ceremonial 13%11%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 12%

133 sentences in 38 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen Ministers, Mr. European Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament, Senators, European Parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen Ambassadors, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Prefect of Police of Paris, Madam Secretary General of Defense and National Security, ladies and gentlemen Coordinators, Directors General and Heads of Intelligence Services, gentlemen Prefects, ladies and gentlemen.

I am very pleased to be with you this afternoon to open the work that will follow and after several hours already of joint work and the inaugural session of this intelligence college in Europe.

Eighteen months ago, at the Sorbonne, I called on European states to build together a Europe of security and defense.

A Europe that protects.

And I started from a double observation, the first: that of the inflation of threats facing our continent, ever stronger, ever more numerous, ever more unpredictable, and I know how familiar they are to you. The second, that of a Europe that, because it had been built, fundamentally sheltered from the upheavals of the world and the tragedies of history and to repair it, and because it had long placed its protection in the hands of the United States and NATO, had not taken sufficient control of the issue of its security. And to formulate, on behalf of France, concrete proposals to organize this Europe of security and defense, all the more necessary as our American ally, precisely, expressed its desire to undertake a strategic withdrawal, some would say, the certainty of a fair share paid by each, others would say.

Eighteen months later, the observation of the inflation of threats facing Europe has unfortunately been confirmed. Better than anyone, you know them; better than anyone, you know our continent is under attack. Attacked by powers that no longer hesitate to interfere in the democratic life of our nations, to use their position in the European market to wage a data war. Attacked by increasingly hybrid threats, targeted by ever more violent cyberattacks aimed at our administrations, our businesses. When it is not, as in last September in The Hague, the headquarters of international organizations based on our territory. Threatened by terrorism, the fall of the territorial caliphate, which we all rejoice in, clearly does not mean the end of ISIS, nor the end of this threat. More profoundly, it is the very grammar of international relations that Europe has never ceased to promote, one that wanted a country to honor its commitments made in agreements or treaties signed, one that established that a state does not attempt an assassination on foreign territory, which today seems to be falling apart. Many certainties in which we lived until now, many behaviors, many good relations in which we had settled are today profoundly called into question. The threats are therefore present, pressing, perhaps even more so than we could have imagined. But for the first time, the response of Europe is also taking shape.

At the Sorbonne, I emphasized that Europe must equip itself with an autonomous capacity for action in addition to NATO. In addition to the European Defense Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which was then in gestation, and which since June 2017 has continued to grow and structure itself. I put on the table the idea of a European intervention initiative with one goal: to establish a common strategic culture to anticipate crises, to prepare for them, and tomorrow to intervene together. I still hear what I was told then, "it will never happen." "Sixty years ago, the European Defense Community already failed. Go ahead, propose. All of this is utopian." We get used to this tune, sometimes even we hear it again.

Yet last June, nine states, including the United Kingdom, chose to join this initiative. They have already been joined by Finland. I then insisted on the need to act more strongly in cyberspace along two axes. First, to ensure that the major Internet platforms remove their terrorist content that corrupts the most fragile minds and is clearly the breeding ground for violence. Secondly, to equip Europe with a global cyber strategy to prevent, counter, and respond to the attacks it faces. Once again, the results are there since the European legislation imposing the removal of terrorist content is on the verge of adoption and that the European Council approved last autumn a cyber plan providing for the upcoming establishment of a European agency with extensive competencies. On the subject of the creation of a European prosecutor's office, significant progress has also been made since about twenty member states today support this initiative, which will be operational in November 2020. And France, I want to say it clearly here, will not relent in its fight for the future prosecutor's competencies to include counter-terrorism. Many things, including the most unthinkable, have been done to ensure that Europe transforms, adapts to the evolution of these threats. All of this has not obviously stopped the evolution of these threats and their progression. But our response is there, Mr. Commissioner, gentlemen Ministers, particularly, which has begun to provide a concrete reply.

But building the Europe that protects was also, I emphasized at the Sorbonne, to give ourselves the means to progress on what is the foundation of the security of our states and one of the keys to their sovereignty. I want to speak, of course, about intelligence.

I had proposed then that a network be established, it was called “academy,” within which the services of different states could dialogue and exchange or through seminars, training could establish a European culture of intelligence. Once again, many doubts were expressed: "these are sovereign prerogatives that states will never agree to share." And ultimately, you are here today. Senior officials from the 30 European countries, from 66 domestic, foreign, and military intelligence services to exchange on topics as concrete as the link between intelligence and decision-making processes, the continuum between domestic and foreign intelligence.

I want to sincerely thank you warmly. I want to thank all those who made this event possible: the national coordination of intelligence and counter-terrorism, the French intelligence services, and the ministers who have authority over these services. I want to particularly acknowledge the representatives of Germany, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, whose presence this month, when Brexit is to occur, constitutes a strong symbol and who have agreed to take charge of the preparation and facilitation of the workshops.

I also want to tell you that beyond the subject of intelligence, your presence here speaks to something profound, that even in a sector marked by secrecy, by very deeply rooted national cultures, the European sentiment is there, vibrant, useful, deemed necessary. Many believe that Europe is dying from those who want to divide and destroy it. I believe, for my part, that it is also dying from those who, in a way, have given up on nurturing this desire for Europe that animates many of us. That is why France will always take the initiative to advance, to build this concrete Europe, of which you are the perfect demonstration today.

In terms of intelligence, solid foundations already exist.

The

bilateral cooperations between European states are numerous, often longstanding, and I must say, under your collective oversight, always fruitful.

They are certainly unknown to the general public by definition, and I am pleased about that, sometimes even to the decision-makers themselves. But it is precisely because they function fully and prevent every month, every week, a terrorist attack, a cyberattack, an aggressive espionage operation from occurring. These bilateral cooperations between states, between services that are formed to protect against common threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and are often in reaction to dramatic events are immensely valuable. The European peoples have been able to see this every time terrorism has struck on our soil or when, just recently, it was necessary to pool investigative forces to clarify the circumstances of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. In no case does the creation of this college aim to call them into question; quite the contrary. These cooperations constitute the foundation from which we must build the future.

Then there are the intergovernmental forums, the Bern Club around internal issues and judicial cooperation in 1971; the TREVI Club on terrorism and radicalization in 1960; the Vienna Club around the movement of people in 1979. European states early on felt the need to exchange to better understand the major contemporary issues. These clubs have had varying fortunes, to put it mildly, but all, by bringing together governments, senior officials, and operatives, have allowed for significant results, whether in terms of understanding threats, transferring techniques, or exchanging know-how. And so this culture of clubs, of concrete cooperations, also constitutes a valuable asset.

Finally, there are, Mr. Commissioner, dear Julian King,

the integrated European bodies.

It is in the military domain, the military intelligence division of the European Union's General Staff; it is in the field of external intelligence, the IntCen, this center placed under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, which relies on open sources, on the EU's representations abroad, and on intelligence shared by state services to provide strategic analyses. And then there is Europol, an organization originally intergovernmental but which since 2010 is a community agency and also contributes, in its relevant field, to the exchange of information.

From this panorama, one could legitimately say that it is rich enough, that the cooperations and structures are numerous enough to add an additional tool with this intelligence college in Europe. I believe the opposite.

I believe precisely that bilateral cooperations, intergovernmental clubs, community structures will be even more effective if we establish, among the different intelligence services, a shared culture. If we succeed in intelligence, as we are doing and promoting in the military field, in truly developing a common community.

For what is the situation today?

We have structures sedimented by history, but we do not have the foundations. We have the tools for analyzing information, but what is lacking is the upward flow and sharing of said information with decision-makers. On the one hand, because there are times when we do not trust each other between states, between services, and it is legitimate because the culture of discretion is part of the DNA of intelligence personnel. On the other hand, because often our norms, our categories, our databases are different because, fundamentally, we do not speak the same language. And this need for coordination, even informal, especially first informal, is immensely useful. That is why the objective of this intelligence college in Europe is precisely to remedy this situation. It is to weave links between our states, our services, and the European institutions; it is to finally equip ourselves with what I usually call a common grammar. This does not mean that intelligence will no longer be a sovereign prerogative tomorrow, no. It does not mean either that we want to strive for the uniformity of our practices, our organizations, our know-how. I think that would be a lost cause at best, counterproductive at worst. On the contrary, our diversity is an opportunity to face an uncertain world whose threats are protean. But we must shape a mutual understanding and a shared trust because it is a matter of the effectiveness of our services and therefore of our ability to anticipate crises and, if necessary, to manage them. It is simply a matter of the security of our peoples.

That is why I am pleased that you have collectively taken up this project of the intelligence college in Europe.

It is all of you, indeed, in your diversity, who have thought, imagined, and organized this first session. It is all of you who, for example, decided not to limit yourselves to the sole domain of terrorism to address all fields of intelligence action. It is all of you who will make the success of this college because you wanted it. However, you will allow me to mention two great principles that I believe should never leave you.

The first is a principle of sharing and openness.

Sharing is important because the original ambition is indeed to allow executives from different services to meet, exchange, build close relationships, and discuss experiences, risk analysis, and common objectives while obviously maintaining perfect planning independence. This is how a common culture is forged. But it also involves opening up to civil society because a culture of secrecy should never be a culture of withdrawal, and intelligence professionals will always grow through contact with academics, researchers, experts, and all those who, closely or remotely, participate in these "intelligence studies," which are still too embryonic in Europe. And I must say that as a consumer of these links myself, where I am, I constantly measure their importance and complementarity.

The first college in history, the one that Robert de SORBON precisely envisioned here in Paris in the 13th century, was precisely a place where specialists from different fields who normally did not speak to each other intersected. I believe that this principle of sharing and openness is good for this common culture but also for a better understanding of these international phenomena, of these new threats that are in complex mutation, where sometimes the academic field nourishes practice and where our practices can mutually enrich each other.

The second principle is a principle of outreach.

This intelligence college in Europe should not be limited to exchanges behind closed doors between senior executives and great specialists but should indeed reach all these actors in all states. Awareness sessions can thus be deployed for intelligence personnel, of course, but also for decision-makers and ordinary citizens. The European culture of intelligence must nourish the culture of intelligence in Europe. This is essential. And it is also essential for this sensitivity to intelligence, to the matter that is yours, to be taken into account by our fellow citizens, our businesses, all actors in the social field, and decision-makers. So two principles and then a horizon.

Creating an integrated European training pathway for all intelligence professionals.

Of course, this will not happen in a day. But imagine that tomorrow executives from national services could follow training in several European universities and why not one day be placed in immersion in the services of other states. If we succeed in this, if we meet this challenge, then we will have won our bet. I still see too often divergences in practices, sometimes even in analysis, between our services, which collectively weaken us. How can we be effective against such or such threat, clear or hybrid, today, if the analysis between major European countries is not quite the same, the practice not quite the same? We do not always see these differences, especially when these exchanges do not take place, but they are always seen by our enemies, our assailants, those who push the threat, influence, or counterintelligence on their side. And we implicitly decide to make either these enemies or these potentially hostile interlocutors the true arbiters of our own divisions. That is why I consider this bet to be essential. Nothing is more important than this issue of sovereignty for Europe, and that is indeed what this is about.

In the world as it is going, the sovereignty of a power, the ability of a people to take control of its destiny and to protect itself increasingly depends on the quality of its intelligence services. I do not need to tell you this; the time of the bipolar world where the enemy was clearly identified is over. The double illusion of an end of history and peace dividends is also over. Today, the threat is everywhere, and your function is one of awakening, vigilance, and sensing our time. You must therefore both identify existing threats and develop the tools to address them while also knowing how to anticipate what we do not yet know, this irreducible part of uncertainty that structures our world. Of course, this requires that each state contributes its share of effort. And you know that France has committed to an unprecedented strengthening of its human and technological capabilities both domestically and internationally. But faced with the unpredictability of the times, faced with enemies that are multiplying, who are no longer just states but private groups, faced with technological revolutions that are unfolding and accelerating, we have no choice but to unite our forces if we do not want to depend tomorrow on information gleaned by the United States, China, or Russia. We have no choice but to combine our strengths if we want to gain our strategic autonomy and ultimately our true sovereignty. And in this area as well, I deeply believe in the positive and future-oriented conjunction between national sovereignty and European sovereignty. It is not a matter of reducing what we are each sovereign in our countries, not at all. But it is a matter of noting that when this national sovereignty is combined with the spirit of European division, we weaken ourselves, above all. That is why this session is so important in my eyes, in the eyes of France, because it is a decisive step towards true European sovereignty, a decisive step that calls for so many others.

I am convinced that the collaborative working habits you are beginning to adopt today will sound like an obviousness tomorrow. I am convinced that in a few years, we will look back at this day when for the first time the representatives of the intelligence services of Europe all gathered in the same room, not so much as a historic moment, even though it is one, which I do not downplay, but as a form of astonishment at saying: "We were able to proceed differently for so long."

What begins today is, I believe, a common ambition that we must carry in our daily lives, our practices, and our strategic will: that of building this true sovereignty and autonomy of our Europe. I therefore believe, as you have understood, in the strategic importance as well as in the details of your work. I know how difficult they will be, how some will take time, and yet how necessary they are.

That is why once again, I want to renew my thanks for your presence, for your pioneering commitment to intelligence, for the security of our peoples, and for Europe.

Long live Europe, long live the Republic, and long live France. Thank you.