Speech by President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron at the Conference of Ambassadors and Ambassadresses 2019

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

27 August 2019 · Conference of Ambassadors and Ambassadresses 2019

Context
Macron addressed French ambassadors at the 2019 Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, reviewing G7 outcomes and outlining France's diplomatic priorities.
Main themes
French diplomacy and foreign policy, G7 summit success, geopolitical recomposition, security, sovereignty and influence, international order, France's role in Europe and the world, Sahel and Libya crises, climate and social agenda, multilateralism, counterterrorism, diplomatic strategy
Duration
~136 min
99th percentile
Words
16,296
99th percentile
Sentences
737
99th percentile
Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
12.0
44th percentile
Syntax
3.08
58th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 50%46%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Economic 12%11%
  • Social 11%10%
  • Environmental 8%7%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 2%2%
  • Not in focus 7%

737 sentences in 101 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen, presidents,

Mr. Prime Minister,

Ladies and gentlemen, ministers,

Ladies and gentlemen, parliamentarians,

Ladies and gentlemen, ambassadors,

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends.

I hesitated a lot about coming to give a speech before you today. Nevertheless, I wanted to honor a tradition, and I wondered if it would not be preferable to focus on the G7 that has just concluded, thinking that the only risk I faced was ultimately being below the results achieved, of what we collectively managed to do, but I believe that this shared moment before the work you are going to undertake has its usefulness.

First of all, because this is the third time we have met in this format, and it is good to have follow-up, and ultimately doing it after this G7 that France has just organized gives us even more meaning. First, to tell you that the success of this G7 is yours, that of the diplomats who organized it, of the elected officials who supported it, of the teams who, with great professionalism within the State in many ministries, were involved. The part of insufficiency, of relative failures, falls back on us collectively as heads of state and government because we have not advanced sufficiently.

Finally, there is a part of true success that has been carried by this French team and that is yours. And I wanted to deeply thank you for that today. The preparation over months by the General Secretariat of the presidency. The work of all the ministries. The securing of the event, its good organization, the involvement of all the vibrant forces and elected officials have allowed us to present this image of France and to have, for the first time in a long time, a G7 that took place in calm, and I believe a useful G7. The future alone will tell if this G7 is a complete success because we will see how the results obtained can be reinforced or not. But already, I believe I can say that what has been done is your work and that it is a success.

I also believe that this G7 is part of a deep approach, coherent with our strategy. That of placing France at the heart of diplomatic action, I will return to this in a moment, and ultimately in line with what I have been able to tell you over the past two years. And before speaking before you, I reread my last two speeches to the ambassadors, which each time revolved around this triptych of security, sovereignty, and influence. It remains perfectly valid, and obviously all the work that has been done over the past two years in the fight against terrorism, actions in each of these areas, I believe is reinforced, and this strategy that we have been implementing for two years is coherent and has indeed been reflected in this summit. Rereading these speeches also led me to a lot of humility because many things we expected to advance quickly two years ago are still in progress, and many things from two years ago are still unfortunately valid when we talk about the Sahel, the Libyan crisis, or many other issues. Nevertheless, I must say, one thing strikes me, and I wanted to share it with you before going into detail, it is that everything is interconnected.

The Prime Minister will return when he speaks before you on the transformations carried out in France by the government, the meaning they carry, and I believe, the continuum they constitute with diplomatic action. But I am struck every day by how much the action that is yours is becoming increasingly important for our fellow citizens. I believe that this is the deep soul of our country, and it is also the transformations of the world that lead to this. We are still a country where, unfortunately, and we have condemned it strongly, we will destroy the offices of elected officials or attack elected officials because we sign a free trade agreement with Canada. We are a country where pride is tangible when we receive the whole world and achieve results like yesterday. The relationship with the world, I believe deeply, nourishes the nation. And so, I do not want to see our exchanges as a discussion that would somehow be separate from the rest of the course of our lives but rather in the deep coherence of what we are doing, whether it concerns the social, climate, or economic agenda. All of this is deeply interconnected. That is why, in everything, I wanted to quickly share with you a kind of quick overview of the world and its disorders and, in this context, our priorities. Because I believe that this is what must deeply inspire our action in France, in Europe, and internationally.

We are all experiencing this world together, and you know it better than I do, but the international order is being shaken in an unprecedented way, but above all with, if I may say so, a great upheaval that is happening, perhaps for the first time in our history, in almost all areas, with a profoundly historical magnitude. It is primarily a transformation, a geopolitical and strategic recomposition. We are undoubtedly witnessing the end of Western hegemony over the world. We had become accustomed to an international order that, since the 18th century, rested on Western hegemony, presumably French in the 18th century, through the inspiration of the Enlightenment; probably British in the 19th century thanks to the industrial revolution; and reasonably American in the 20th century due to the two great conflicts and the economic and political dominance of this power. Things are changing. And they are being profoundly shaken by the mistakes of the Westerners in certain crises, by the choices also made by the Americans in recent years, which did not begin with this administration but which lead to a revisiting of certain implications in conflicts in the Near and Middle East and elsewhere, and to rethink a deep diplomatic and military strategy, and sometimes elements of solidarity that we thought were intangibles for eternity, even if we had established them together in geopolitical moments that have, however, changed today. And then there is also the emergence of new powers whose impact we have probably long underestimated.

China at the forefront, but also the Russian strategy, which must be said, has been conducted with more success in recent years. I will return to this. India is emerging, these new economies are also becoming powers not only economically but politically, and they see themselves as some have written, as true civilization states, and they come not only to shake our international order, to weigh in the economic order, but they also come to rethink the political order and the political imagination that goes with it, with a lot of strength and much more inspiration than we have. Let us look at India, Russia, and China. They have a much stronger political inspiration than Europeans today. They think about the world with a real logic, a real philosophy, an imagination that we have somewhat lost. And so all of this comes to deeply shake us and reshuffle the cards. I am not, of course, talking about the emerging Africa, which is confirmed every day and which is also reflected in a deep recomposition, and I will return to that as well. The risk in this great shift is also coupled with a geopolitical and military shift; we are in a world where conflicts are multiplying, and I see two main risks.

The first is that these conflicts are increasingly causing civilian casualties and changing nature. Look at the theaters of operations around the world. And the second thing is that savagery has resumed, and here too, the order on which our certainties and our organization sometimes rested is disappearing. We are abandoning arms control treaties that also came from the end of the Cold War, every day in innocence and silence. All of this should raise profound questions for us. First, we must acknowledge that the habits and data that were ours are no longer valid. And then, it should lead us to question our own strategy because the two who today have real cards in hand in this matter are the United States of America and the Chinese. And then, we have a choice regarding this great change, this great shift: to decide to be minority allies of one or the other or a bit of one and a bit of the other, or to decide to have our share of the game and to weigh in. At the same time, we are experiencing an unprecedented crisis in the market economy. And I think this crisis is at least as important, and it somehow doubles what I have just described. This market economy, which was conceived in Europe by Europe, has gradually drifted over the past few decades.

First, it has become deeply financialized, and what was a market economy, which some had even theorized at times by talking about a social market economy and which was at the heart of the balances we had thought, has become a true economy of cumulative capitalism where, it must be said, first financialization and then technological transformations have led to an increased concentration of wealth among the champions, that is to say, the talents in our countries, the large metropolises that succeed in globalization, and the countries that carry the success of this order. And so the market economy, which until now, through the theory of comparative advantages and all that we had wisely learned until then, allowed for the distribution of wealth and which worked wonderfully for decades by uniquely lifting hundreds of millions of citizens out of poverty, has plunged back and led to inequalities that are no longer bearable. In our economies, France has experienced this deeply in recent months, but in fact, we have been living it for years and worldwide. And this market economy produces unprecedented inequalities that, in essence, also deeply shake our political order.

First, they come to challenge the very legitimacy of this economic organization. How can we explain to our fellow citizens that this is the right organization when they do not find their share in it? But this also questions the balance of our democracies. Because, ultimately, we have also lived since the 19th century in balances where individual freedoms, the democratic system, and the continuous progress of the middle classes with the market economy constituted a kind of tripod on which we advanced. When the middle classes, who are the foundation of our democracies, no longer have their share, they doubt, and they are legitimately tempted either by authoritarian regimes or by illiberal democracies or by the questioning of this economic system. In any case, in very profound paradigm shifts on which we have not been engaged until now. And so, this crisis can also lead to closures, which some decide, which France did not decide in the spring of 2017. But this temptation is always there. It must lead us very deeply to know how we can rethink balances in this system that is not just a French system but a European and global one, and how we can make the openness, which I believe is essential, good for our country, in line with our values and our DNA, while regaining our share of control. And ultimately, what the Brexiteers proposed to the British people, which was a very good slogan: take back control of our lives, of our nation. This is what we must know how to think and act in an open nation. Take back control. The time has passed when we explained to our fellow citizens that offshoring is the order of things, that it is a good thing for you. Jobs go to Poland or China, to Vietnam, and you will find the... we can no longer explain this story. And so, we must find ways to weigh in globalization but also to rethink this international order.

I am aware of the ambition of what I am saying, and it will not happen in a day. But I am aware of the necessity of this thought and this approach at the French and European level. Otherwise, we will fall.

The third great upheaval we are experiencing is obviously the technological revolution. It is unprecedented. That of the internet, social networks, now artificial intelligence, is primarily a tremendous globalization of intelligence, technological progress that acquires unprecedented speed. But it is also a globalization of imagination, emotions, violence, hatred, which also contributes significantly to the savagery of the world we experience every day. It is a profound anthropological change that affects our democracies, and it is also a new space that is forming before our eyes that requires us to rethink rules, an international order that does not exist today. And I believe very deeply that this technological revolution leads to economic but also anthropological imbalances that we must think about, on which we must act, otherwise we would have, if I may say so, an untimely diplomacy and thus run the risk of becoming quickly obsolete. Others, moreover, have seized this before us. They have made it a tool for destabilizing democracies and for influence.

Finally, we have the great ecological upheaval. I believe very deeply that this is accelerating profoundly. We have been aware of it for several years, and France has pursued effective environmental diplomacy with results such as that of COP 21, which everyone still acknowledges, and that of the Paris Agreements. And we see that this issue is accelerating today, whether it concerns climate change or the fight for biodiversity. It is accelerating because the effects of our past collective inaction are now being felt in our societies, our economies, and everywhere in the world. And it is accelerating because our fellow citizens are aware of it, much more so, and are urging us to act. And it is also accelerating because the consequences of this great upheaval are present every day. And these consequences are real geopolitical crises. Climate disruption and the great ecological upheaval lead to profound regional imbalances, to deep migratory phenomena, and also accelerate the great demographic upheaval that destabilizes our world. And so, you see, all these great upheavals are happening at the same time. And you know all this. But I think we need to put it back into perspective, not just to acknowledge it but to try to see how we must act usefully at this moment.

Saying it is one thing; what part do we have to play? We can choose to be spectators, commentators. And I could stop at what I just said. And fundamentally say: we will continue the same action in France and the same diplomatic action in this context. This strategy of caution or the continuation of habits can indeed be followed without considering that we are being cautious. If we continue to do things as before, to put it differently, whether we are a business, a diplomat, a minister, a President of the Republic, a military officer, all of us here in this room, if we continue to do things as before, then we will definitively lose control. And then, it will be erasure.

I can tell you this with certainty. We know that civilizations disappear, countries too. Europe will disappear. Europe will disappear with the erasure of this Western moment, and the world will be structured around two major poles: the United States of America and China. And we will have the choice between dominations. We can pretend to forget it. We can do it very well. We have already done it for a long time on many subjects. We will explain that we are sovereign. We will fight to maintain jobs in our country by making shaky compromises with groups over which we can no longer do anything. We will try to have environmental policies in our country or on our continent, but it will already be too late since we will no longer have control, and things... This is the line of the steepest slopes. There is another strategy, that of adaptation. This consists of saying: we must fundamentally run faster in the face of this changing world. So we will try to do something vaguely about ecology, but we must adapt to this order that is moving faster, make reforms to catch up with others simply by trying not to really change, not to really weigh in. This is an intermediate scenario that will quite quickly, in my eyes, lead us to the same result. I even think it will lead us to the same result, with the consequence of a profound reaction, a rejection from our population because we are not a country that likes to adapt. So, sometimes even the failure to want to change the world in order not to adapt, but we do not like to adapt.

I believe that France's vocation, which corresponds to the necessity of the present time, is to try to weigh on this world order with the cards that are ours, not to yield to any fatality, but to attempt to build a new order, in which not only would we have our place, but our values, our interests could fundamentally have a place. And so, I believe in only one thing. It is the strategy of audacity, of taking risks. This means that everything we are doing and everything we will do may not succeed. And there will be many commentators to say that it is not succeeding at certain moments. This is not serious. What is today deadly is not to try, given everything I have just said. It is the strategy of audacity, of vision, and it is to try to rediscover in this context what profoundly characterizes the French spirit and, in my eyes, to refound what is profoundly European civilization. I believe that this is what must be our objective in our country, in our European strategy, and at the international level.

The French spirit is a spirit of resistance and a vocation for the universal. A spirit of resistance means not yielding to fatality or to the adaptation of things and habits. It means considering that when things are unjust, we can, because we give ourselves the means to do so, and therefore that we give ourselves the means to be stronger, that we make the reforms to do so, that we regain economic and productive muscle.

We can make things move, but we do not yield to the ambient order for good reasons, and we manage to rediscover what our deep values are. And I believe that what has always characterized Europe, what is the common thread of our vocation, is a true humanism. And I say this because it is no longer a given. And if we go in the direction of the steepest slope, and if we continue to see the world as it is going and as I have described it, this European humanism will disappear. The United States of America is in the Western camp, but they do not carry the same humanism. Their sensitivity to climate issues, to equality, to the social balances that are ours does not exist in the same way. There is a primacy of freedom that characterizes American civilization very deeply and that also explains our differences, even if we are deeply allied. And Chinese civilization does not have the same collective preferences, to speak discreetly, nor the same values. We are the only geographical space that has placed man with a capital M at the heart of its project during the Renaissance, at the time of the Enlightenment, and each time we have had to reinvent ourselves. I believe that given these upheavals, this is the project that is ours and that must again be ours. And so, it requires on the major economic, industrial, and climate issues to have this approach and this demand with ourselves and with others. And therefore, to have an educational, productive, social, and ecological project that is rethought in our country. This is what we are currently doing, but we cannot do it alone because, as true as socialism in one country does not work historically, humanism in one country does not last long. And we need to be able to irrigate it in Europe and internationally. And this is where the coherence of our agenda must hold.

This humanist project is at the heart of the government's agenda by reinvesting in humanity through the educational, social, and health project, by making the reforms that allow us to have a true productive project, and by having this essential ecological transformation. This is, I believe very deeply, what must animate us. And with this, to collectively know how to rediscover, and I take my part and I measure the unfinished nature of my remarks on this point. But we must rebuild on this basis a collective narrative and a collective imagination. That is why I believe very deeply that the project that is ours must be assumed as a project of European civilization.

The project of European civilization cannot be carried by either Catholic Hungary or Orthodox Russia. And we have left it to these two leaders, for example, and I say this with great respect, go listen to speeches in Hungary or Russia; these are projects that have their differences, but they carry a cultural and civilizational vitality, which I consider erroneous but which is inspiring. And so, we must find through this European project, which I believe is also a deeply French project, a source of inspiration for our people. It is the spirit of the Renaissance, it is the spirit of the Enlightenment. It is the very deep spirit of this French humanism that we have always carried, invented, and that we must reinvent today. What does this mean? It means that all the subjects we often discuss must not simply be technical subjects. They must contribute to an imagination that we must carry, to a true project of civilization of this new frontier, where we place women and men very deeply at its heart. I obviously measure the ambition of such a project. But I believe it was important for me to share this conviction with you today because this is what must deeply irrigate the action that is ours and the continuum that is ours every day. And fundamentally, the new alliances that are ours, this project requires, of course, to have a demand in terms of human dignity. Those who today in the world defend the rights to freedom at the risk of their lives turn their eyes towards us. And when I speak of a European civilization project and of this French project, this is also what I mean. We have rediscovered the sap of this demand and know everywhere in the world without calling into question the sovereignty of any country.

Defending the strength and vitality of human rights that have weakened so much in recent years. We have returned to what David Miliband, in a recent conference, called the age of impunity. Twenty years ago, we would have all said here that human rights had an unstoppable trajectory, that everyone would come mechanically to democracy with the same values as ours. Look at the situation we are in. In some countries, sometimes in Europe, in terms of the retreat of rights, independence of justice, threats to defenders of rights, look at where we are everywhere in war theaters. So our responsibility in this context, and I believe in this capacity to revitalize the spirit of the Enlightenment, is to be essential actors in carrying a new demand in terms of human rights, to carry a new demand so that our democracies and our values are defended everywhere. In theaters of operations to fight against impunity and defend civilians and humanitarians, to defend everywhere the defenders of rights, to also work as we have done again in recent weeks for an internet that respects democracies, freedoms, and the balances that are ours. But defending this European civilization, having this objective of carrying it at home and in the world also requires in our very deep diplomatic action to have an educational, climatic, democratic ambition, to be able to rethink very deeply the balances of the market economy as we have begun to do, and to have a cultural agenda that also constitutes the heart of this ambition and this spirit. To achieve this, I would like that, in the coming months and in continuity with what has been done for two years, we can collectively act around five priority axes.

I will not cover here all the geographical fields and all the subjects; do not hold it against me, and do not consider that silence is disinterest. It reflects concern for our collective balances, and I am already afraid of being too long. So know that this length will not mean exhaustiveness, but there are five important things I would like to tell you after quickly explaining how I see this world order and fundamentally our objective in this context.

The first thing is that to achieve this objective in this disorder, I believe that what we must do very deeply is to play our role, fundamentally, as a balancing power. A balancing power means acknowledging that we are a great economic power, an industrial power, even if we have lost, when I look at the last decades, on many points, that we have to rebuild and that we must rebuild to remain that power. This is the heart of our national and European agenda, and we are a military and diplomatic power that remains. We are on the verge of becoming indisputably the first European army through the investments we have decided, through the military programming law, through the quality of our soldiers and the attractiveness of our army. And today, in Europe, no one has this vitality, and no one has decided on this strategic and human reinvestment. This is an essential point to be able to weigh. And we remain a great diplomatic power, a permanent member of the Security Council, at the heart of Europe and at the heart of many coalitions.

But when I say that we must be a balancing power, it means that we must somehow have the freedom to maneuver, mobility, and flexibility. We are not an aligned power. I say this here with great emphasis. We have allies, we are Europeans, and we must work with our European partners while respecting them. We have allies in every region of the world, and we have an important ally in the United States of America in strategic and military terms. But to put it simply, we are not a power that believes that the enemies of our friends are necessarily our enemies or that we should refrain from talking to them. And I believe that is the strength of France. Therefore, we must have our own strategy because this strategy serves our interests and, ultimately, our usefulness in the concert of nations, as the last weeks and days have shown.

This role of a balancing power is what we must play in major crises and conflict situations. I do not want to detail all of them here. I will speak of one: Iran. We saw it in recent days in Biarritz, creating the necessary conditions for de-escalation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Economy and Finance involved in this matter conducted an extremely fine work over two days, but after several weeks and months of initiatives, to try not only to weigh in on this situation but to build the conditions for de-escalation and a solution. Regarding Iran, we know well that France was not the initiator of the famous JCPoA. It even rightly hardened the conditions in 2015. But we find ourselves in this situation having signed a treaty. The one who initiated it decides to withdraw. And where, fundamentally, the divergences that were establishing between us could lead to an escalation in the region with terrible results. I believe that our role in this type of conflict is, on the one hand, to ensure the coherence of the major powers. This is what we did at this G7 by issuing two clear messages for the first time acknowledged by all.

No one around the G7 table wants Iran to ever acquire nuclear weapons, and everyone is committed to stability and peace in the region. This means that everyone will also refrain from behaviors that could threaten this peace and stability. And on the other side, we have tried to act to bring Iran more to the negotiating table and avoid a de-escalation linked to the absence of discussions between the two main parties. We have achieved initial results; they are fragile, we must be very humble, but they allow for a possible path in bilateral discussions with Iran with economic and financial compensations, as well as additional demands, which have at least allowed for short-term de-escalation and the possible conditions for useful meetings. We did this in connection with the support of our European partners, and by fully playing this role of a balancing power. And to be able to play this role effectively in major conflicts or as we did around the G7 table, we need to fully express, if I may say so, this form of indispensable independence of our diplomacy and strategic autonomy, which requires rethinking our relationship with certain powers in depth. So I know that, as some foreign theorists would say, we also have a deep state. And so sometimes the President of the Republic says things, moves, and says something, then the collective tendency might be to say: ‘He said that, but we know the truth, we will continue as we have always done.’ I cannot recommend that you follow this path. First, because it is collectively ineffective since it discredits the words of the President of the Republic and consequently discredits the words of those who represent him. But above all, it deprives us of the capacity to act. And so in this capacity to rethink major relationships, there is our relationship with Russia.

I know that many of you have sometimes built your careers by handling files that have led you to have distrust towards Russia, sometimes justifiably. And we have structured this relationship since the fall of the Berlin Wall in this distrust through a succession of misunderstandings. I have no naivety in wanting to revisit this relationship. But I have some obvious truths. We are in Europe, and Russia is too. And if we do not know how to do something useful with Russia at some point, we will remain with a deeply sterile tension. We will continue to have frozen conflicts all over Europe. We will continue to have a Europe that is the theater of a strategic struggle between the United States of America and Russia. And fundamentally, we will always see the consequences of the Cold War on our soil, and we will not create the conditions for the profound project of recreating European civilization that I mentioned earlier. Because we cannot do that without rethinking our link with Russia very deeply, very deeply.

I also think that pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic error because we push Russia either into isolation that increases tensions or into alliances with other major powers like China, which would not be in our interest at all. At the same time, it must be said that our relations have been structured and documented by distrust. Cyber attacks, democratic destabilization, a Russian project today that is deeply conservative and opposed to the European Union project, openly. And all of this, in fact, was woven together in the 1990s and 2000s when a series of misunderstandings played out and when Europe probably did not play a proper strategy and gave the impression of being the Trojan horse of a West whose ultimate goal was to destroy Russia, and where Russia built its imaginary around the destruction of the West and thus the weakening of the European Union. We are at that point. We can lament it, we can remain in this positional war, but it is not our deep interest. Our interest is also not to be culpably weak towards Russia and to consider that we should forget all disagreements, past conflicts, and start to rekindle, no. But I think we need to rethink this grammar very deeply.

I believe we need to build a new architecture of trust and security in Europe because the European continent will never be stable, will never be secure, if we do not pacify and clarify our relations with Russia. It is not in the interest of some of our allies, let’s be clear on this subject. Some will always push us to have more sanctions because it is in their interest. Even if they are our friends. But it is not ours very deeply. And I believe that to achieve the objective I just mentioned, which is to rebuild a real European project in this world that risks bipolarization, to succeed in forming a united front between the European Union and Russia, thinking fundamentally about these concentric circles that are structuring Europe up to a new relationship with Russia, is essential. And so we need to do this, and that is what I told President Putin last week in Brégançon, to move forward step by step. You will have every day evidence not to go in this direction. There will be every day because actors on both sides will try every day to threaten this project, including on the Russian side, because there are many actors in the services, in the economic forces, who will try attacks, provocations, and will try to weaken this path.

We must be uncompromising when our sovereignty or that of our partners is threatened. But we must strategically explore the avenues for such rapprochement and lay down our deep conditions. It is about breaking the frozen conflicts on the European continent, it is about rethinking together the control of conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, because look at the situation we are plunged into. We are in a Europe where we have left the issue of armaments in the hands of treaties that were established before the end of the Cold War between the United States and Russia. Is this a Europe that thinks about its destiny, that builds? For my part, I do not believe so, so we need to have this dialogue with Russia. The end of the INF Treaty obliges us to have this dialogue because missiles would return to our territory. The third issue is that we need to think together about a space strategy. By the way, in our history, we have been able to do this, and on the space issue, as far as I know, our main allies are not American. We need to think together about a strategy on cyber, we are very far from it.

Today, attacks are daily, but we need to be able to expose ourselves to it publicly without naivety, to exchange on this point, and to tirelessly try to rebuild a trust agenda. And we also need to have a real strategic discussion to build the conditions for technological sovereignty, I believe this very deeply, in industrial terms lato sensu. None of this is obvious, none of this is easy, and you will have every day the evidence not to go in this direction. I ask you not to yield to provocations, to always defend our interests, our sovereignty, to remain strong, but I believe very deeply that we also need to deeply reshuffle the cards in a frank and demanding dialogue with Russia. And I want us to pursue this axis because it is essential to succeed in obtaining results and a real European strategy.

This is what the Ministers of Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Armed Forces will do when they go to Moscow in a few days to resume the 2+2 dialogue. This is what we are pursuing through constant dialogue with President Putin, and we will set up this working group to advance on this common architecture. And obviously, one of the decisive issues to be able to move forward in this direction is our ability to make progress on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, thus the implementation of the Minsk agreements. In this regard, recent discussions have allowed us to see concrete advances that will lead us, together with the Chancellor, to propose in the coming days a new summit in the Normandy format.

I can imagine the doubt that may exist when perhaps some of you are listening to me, but I ask you to move forward on this path, once again without naivety, but because I deeply believe it is the right one. And if I had to complete the demonstration, I would ask you to collectively question the strategy that Russia may have for itself.

Look at this great country; it has regained maneuvering margins through our weaknesses. For five years, Russia has taken an unprecedented place in all major conflicts; it has taken an unprecedented place because the United States of America, Great Britain, and France have been weak. We had set red lines; they were crossed, and we did not act. They understood very well, they advanced, and so we cannot ostracize while being weak: we must choose a logic. And it is not in our interest to go into a logic of the strong with our neighbor. Russia has maximized all its interests in the current context: it has returned to Syria, it has returned to Libya, it has returned to Africa, it is involved in all crisis issues due to our weaknesses or our mistakes. But is this situation sustainable? I do not believe so, and if I were in the Russians' place, which is always the question we must ask ourselves, I would wonder because this great power that invests heavily in its armament, which scares us so much, has the GDP of Spain, has a declining demographic, an aging country, and increasing political tension. Do you think that can last? I think that Russia's vocation is not to be the minor ally of China, and so we must also know that through this demanding dialogue and the conditions we will set, we must offer at some point a strategic option to this country that will inevitably pose it, inevitably, and it is up to us to prepare for it and to know how to move forward on this point.

Our role as a balancing power must also be exercised in Asia. China has changed, the world with it, and we must build the Euro-Chinese partnership of the 21st century. And our country within Europe, with Germany and the United Kingdom, has a historical role to play in this matter. So on this point, we have also laid important foundations in recent months, particularly during the visit of the Chinese President to Paris, where for the first time we assumed to have a frank, sincere, constructive dialogue but also to assume a European strategy. China has a real diplomatic genius for playing on our divisions and weakening us. That is why I wanted for the first time to invite Chancellor Merkel and President Juncker to this visit, and for the first time, we had a real strategic agenda not just Franco-Chinese but also Sino-European.

And I think it is essential to systematically integrate this European approach by working along three priority axes: an economic and trade agenda that fits within the multilateral framework but allows for comprehensive results, particularly in terms of reciprocity; this word is often forbidden in this context, but it is a reality, our companies know it all too well, and we have interests to defend on several issues, from civil nuclear to aeronautics to agri-food. A multilateral agenda focused on climate, biodiversity, and China has become our ally in this multilateral agenda, profoundly changing the game in an unprecedented way. The pact, this coalition for carbon neutrality by 2050, experienced an unprecedented moment when, on the sidelines of the Osaka summit, foreign ministers signed a strategic document in which China committed to this agenda with us, where just a few weeks earlier many Europeans still had doubts. And finally, an Eurasian agenda that allows for better convergence between the Chinese initiative of the new Silk Roads and the European connectivity strategy. This construction must be done with respect and rigor. We respect China's interests and sovereignty, but China must also fully respect our sovereignty and unity, and in this regard, the European dynamic is essential. We made profound mistakes ten years ago on this subject.

Europe, in its handling of the economic and financial crisis, pushed several states into forced privatizations without European options and methodically decided to reduce its sovereignty by handing over many essential infrastructures in Southern Europe to the Chinese. We cannot blame the Chinese for being smart; we can blame ourselves for being foolish. Let us not continue this logic. I also ask you to fully mobilize to build a French strategy in the Indo-Pacific axis, which complements this Chinese strategy.

If we want to be respected by China, we must first have a European approach, as I just said, but we must also weigh in with the powers of the region. This is essential. This means that we must first act as an Indo-Pacific power: France has over a million inhabitants in this region through its overseas territories, we have more than 8,000 soldiers, we are one of the main maritime powers in this region, among the few to conduct real military operations in the South China Sea and on these oceans. And we have underutilized this in every respect until now. Therefore, we need to revisit this region, first by acknowledging that we are a power in it, but by developing a complementary, non-confrontational alliance with this relationship with China through this Indo-Pacific axis.

I was able to announce last year in India and then in Australia. Our partners are India, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore on this subject, each on different axes according to complementary logics. But we must translate this Indo-Pacific agenda strategically. We have articulated it militarily, and we must still strengthen it, but the minister was able to present it at the Shangri-La meeting a few months ago. We must now fully articulate it diplomatically as well, by reallocating our forces that are not adapted to this agenda: our public development aid, our investments in the world where this area has not always been the most privileged, and we have not connected, so to speak, all the agendas together. But I also wish for us to articulate it in economic, climate, and technological terms. We have essential climate partners in this area because we have many vulnerable states. We also have partners on one of the important challenges, and I will return to this shortly, which is the technological challenge.

If we want to succeed in technological sovereignty and connectivity, we must act on the Indo-Pacific axis. The sovereignty of undersea cables, as well as that of 5G technologies and others, will also be built through these geographical alliances because you have many states there that have one fear: having undersea cables controlled by the Chinese and having technologies that are solely Chinese. We are allies for this strategy, and they have a real complementarity and synergy of agenda with Europe in this regard. And so this Indo-Pacific axis has a lot of synergy with what we want to do at the national and European levels.

Here are some of the major geographical axes that, in my view, allow us to constitute this balancing power beyond the crisis management I mentioned.

The second priority is to work on building European sovereignty. I have emphasized this point several times. It is at the heart of the European project that I share with many in this room. This European sovereignty is not an empty word. I believe we have long made the mistake of leaving the word sovereignty to nationalists. Sovereignty is a beautiful word. It refers to what is at the heart of our democracy and our Republic, which is the fact that, in the end, the one who is sovereign is the people. It is they who decide. But if we lose control of everything, this sovereignty leads nowhere. And it is a democratic aporia that consists of the people being able to sovereignly choose leaders who would no longer have control over anything. Therefore, the responsibility of today's leaders is to also create the conditions to have control over their destiny, the future of their peoples, in order to be responsible and act.

Europe, in recent decades, has been built as a wonderful space of openness, friendship, peace, and the erosion of sovereignty. We are the most open, the most naive market. Benevolent, but contrary to what some of my friends I met yesterday may say: we are not the most closed space in terms of trade, far from it, nor on all other fronts. And we have forgotten the thread of our sovereignty at the European level. We have not forgotten it at the national level in terms of military, economic, or other matters, but we must rethink it at the European level, very profoundly, because it is only at the European level that we can build it on many issues. Whether it concerns digital issues, climate issues, and many others.

This European sovereignty must go through an ambitious agenda that is at the heart, by the way, of what the President of the European Commission has taken from our project in her speech before the European Parliament and what we have to build for the next five years. And this agenda for European sovereignty must, in my view, also deeply include Great Britain. Whatever the outcome of Brexit, it is essential that we continue to think about our sovereignty with Great Britain. On military, strategic, and all issues. There is obviously the defense of our short-term interests, the rules that must be respected, the sovereignty and unity of Europe. But here too, history and geography have their realities. A form of determinism. Therefore, we must include it in this reflection. But European sovereignty is essential to think about.

First, on the subject of defense. Look at the progress made over the past two years. Since the 1950s, we had not advanced on European defense. It was even a taboo, even an unthinkable idea. We can have more sovereignty in defense without renouncing our national sovereignty and our strategic and operational autonomy. We have established enhanced cooperation in defense, a European defense fund, and a European intervention initiative. What have I heard when, two years ago, almost to the day, at the Sorbonne, I proposed this European intervention initiative? Nonsense, French folly, he will never succeed. I tell you this to document my invitation to audacity. Well, the European intervention initiative was signed last July. You had, for our national holiday, the signatory states around the table at the podium before our citizens and our armed forces and around the table here. Great Britain was there, Germany, all the signatories. This is something I ask you to appreciate. Finland, like Estonia, Greece wants to join today. What does that mean?

It means that the European states that were previously the most nervous on defense issues, who sometimes conceived their protection only for some in a particular relationship with Russia; for others only in relation to NATO, now consider that Europe will regain sovereignty in defense. This is not an initiative aimed at challenging NATO, but it is very deeply complementary to it because it also gives us maneuvering room and strategic autonomy. I believe that this sovereignty in military matters is essential, even in the context of tension over arms control that I mentioned earlier.

Sovereignty is also what we must rethink at our borders. I just mentioned a word because I referred earlier to demographic and migratory issues. We must be better able to protect our borders. And on this, I also ask for your extremely strong mobilization. Indeed, Europe has been experiencing an unprecedented migratory crisis since 2015, the precursors of which are profoundly different between 2015 and today. A geopolitical crisis in the Levant first, deep imbalances in Africa, and the Libyan crisis. Today, we need to move beyond the repeated management of emergencies in migration. We must establish a sustainable disembarkation mechanism based on what we agreed in Paris in July with the UNHCR and IOM, through work also by the foreign and interior ministers, which is essential. We must quickly resume the filter we initiated in Paris as early as August 2017, which yielded results.

A structured dialogue between European countries and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean to pursue four main objectives: to prevent departures and accelerate the returns of those who do not have the right to come to Europe and then benefit from asylum protection. To intensify the fight against human trafficking, which is at the heart of a battle we must have and often forget in our debates. To open access routes directly from third countries for those who have the right to our protection and to prevent those who have the right to asylum from taking all the risks and being able to benefit from this protection as close as possible and to allow those trapped in Libya to return to their country of origin with the support of the International Organization for Migration, the African Union, and the European Union.

We managed to do a bit of this during the crisis at the end of 2017, but we do not know how to do it sustainably. And I must say, it is somewhat our collective fault. Here too, we have a form, we have deep convictions, administrative, both at the Ministry of the Interior and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which makes us tend not to want to move on these issues. There are all the theories, that of the pull factor, that of... we need to revisit all these dogmas. I have been saying this since the summer of 2017. And we ourselves are not doing it. I will personally intensify my involvement on this subject because I believe it is not in our interest not to move on this point. I say this in a context where France is becoming the leading European country for asylum applications. Let us not be naive. It is not the people taking the boat in Libya that is our problem. This scene is unacceptable, unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective that we are experiencing. It is all the people who are entering everywhere into our European neighbors, who have already begun to apply for asylum elsewhere and who come because we are a country that is quite poorly organized on this front, which we are not effective or humane enough. We must intensify our work on this very deeply. Very quickly, this European sovereignty, beyond these two subjects which are borders and defense, we must think about it, organize it, to rebuild a real industrial and climate sovereignty. And I deliberately link these two words.

Europe has been remarkable in thinking about a competitive strategy. Very useful for creating more innovation, more competition, and protecting consumers. And we must not lose this quality. But we have not thought about our industrial strategy anymore. And we have built the elements of our dependence, technological industrial dependence on many subjects. Therefore, in the upcoming strategy, we need to rethink this industrial strategy, which is also linked to the climate agenda. Because the industry of tomorrow will only be compatible with this agenda. That is to say, a Europe that invests in research and investment much more massively, particularly in new industrial sectors, that rebuilds competition rules that are compatible with this industrial sovereignty and that considers that we must look at champions at the level of a relevant market, which has become a global market in all these sectors. And a Europe that decides to have a real climate and industrial strategy and therefore sets a real carbon price, high enough to encourage the transition led by our actors and a real border tariff to prevent unfair competition from actors who do not engage in the same transition.

For too long, we have played divided on this subject. It is essential to regain this sovereignty. If we want to continue to have real sovereignty on these issues tomorrow, to continue producing our power plants, our environmental climate services, our airplanes, and our defense technologies, and all our industry. It is essential. And in this strategy, I obviously include the technological sovereignty that we need to pursue.

On 5G, what is our choice? To choose between an American or a Chinese technology? I deeply believe that we must defend a true European sovereignty on this point without stigmatizing anyone. This is what we have decided at the French level through choices made by the Prime Minister with the ministers, to decide that in certain sensitive technological sectors, we needed to control the components and to avoid too great a dependence of our telecommunications operators on certain technologies.

In doing so, we have triggered a real movement at the European level, among our partners who have reconsidered some of their requirements. We now need to build a real strategy and actors at the European level. It is also an economic and financial sovereignty that we need to rethink. I was talking about Iran earlier. We can continue to proudly defend our Iranian agenda. Why do we find ourselves in this situation? Because there is a de facto extraterritoriality of the dollar. Because our companies, even when we decide to protect them, to advance, they depend on the dollar. I am not saying that we should fight against the dollar, but we need to build a true economic and financial sovereignty of the euro. And here too, we have been too slow. And what we need to fight for is truly a strengthening, a greater integration of the eurozone, a greater integration of the financial markets of the eurozone and the actors, and a capacity to build everything that truly establishes a financial and monetary sovereignty. We are not there yet, and it is essential.

It is also a digital sovereignty that we need to build. We have made significant progress on this point, a lot, with an unprecedented regulation at the European level, protecting individual data, which has been adopted by several friends. We need to go even further. To continue the reflection in terms of taxation and data protection, Europe is the right level. It is also a cultural sovereignty that is essential to carry out the project I mentioned earlier. We have successfully defended copyright, but we are carrying a much deeper project for European heritage, for European culture and knowledge, what we have launched on universities and what we have initiated for the circulation of works of art and major European cultural projects is essential, because it is through this that we can regain the strength and inspiration of the project I mentioned earlier. And it is also an element of sovereignty, because sovereignty touches on the European imagination. It is to consider that the novels, the dreams that our fellow citizens have the right to have, to read, to share, the films, the shows must be able to belong to an imagination that is ours, of artists who are ours and not simply to have the choice against imported products and imaginations that do not have our deep roots. This strategy, I believe, is absolutely essential and it must also lead to working together and reinvesting in the subject of linguistic sovereignty in Europe.

I will not return here to the subject of Francophonie that I have extensively developed, particularly in March 2018 at the Académie française. But we must see this strategy everywhere in the world, but reinvesting it at the European level is essential. We have a sense of paradox. But if at the time of Brexit we decided that for always English would be the only working language in Europe, it would be strange. I think we have a real card to play that consists of reinvesting in education to discussion forums, a real effort, to succeed in this European strategy. This strategy of sovereignty, as you can see, is complementary to this strategy of power and balance.

What I also ask of you is to reinvest in bilateral work. I have sometimes been struck to see that Europe had been left to specialists within us. We need them, and they are of immense quality. But we need to succeed in finding this articulation between the obviously indispensable inter-ministerial work on European issues that permeate our daily lives and that must be coordinated. It is coordinated by the Prime Minister's services, but I think we also need to reinvest in bilateral dialogue. It is complementary to community dialogue. It is complementary because it gives us back maneuvering margins. I allow myself to say this because it is what I have tried to do for the past two years. I have made 20 bilateral trips among the countries of the European Union in two years. I have sometimes returned to countries that had not been visited by presidents for 15, 20 years. It’s crazy. And reinvesting in bilateral action is sometimes to find that we have disinvested this relationship politically, culturally, often educationally because French is receding in many of these countries, etc. But it is above all to regain maneuvering margins in the European game. Because we manage to find alliances around the table of the Council when we have reinvested in the bilateral relationship. And I must say that Germany has been much more effective than we have been on this subject over the last 15 years. So, we must talk with all groups. We must reinvest in dialogue with the Baltic states, the Eastern states, the Visegrad group, the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and I think this is an essential element on which I ask you to re-engage very deeply.

I also think that we must succeed, I will return to this in conclusion, but to reinvest all technical subjects with a diplomatic angle. This is one of the great difficulties of our contemporary diplomatic work. Subjects are becoming more technical. And therefore, when subjects become technical, the risk is that we lose the overall vision. And so, it is only led by the technicians of certain ministries or sometimes by people who are less technical and therefore know them less. And so, the risk is the risk of a gap, sorry to enter the kitchen, but that is how we build useful results. When we talk about digital issues, if it is a generalist diplomat who deals with them, he is less effective than a digital expert. And we have tried both subjects, I can tell you, there is no comparison. However, if it is only a digital expert who deals with it in his corner in the digital sector, he loses sight of the big diplomatic vision and the interests that are ours. So, we need to find a way to marry these skills usefully. And I think that on the European subject, it is essential. And that is how we can reinvest in subjects on which we have lost a lot of ground, which are the subjects of European standards, norms, and what also allows us to define these elements of sovereignty.

And I will finally ask you to geographically reinvest in the Western Balkans. I made a trip to Serbia in July, where some of you accompanied me. I believe that the last presidential visit dates back to 2001. It’s crazy! And when I look at what we invest, for example, in cultural terms, we invest much less in public terms than in states that are much less strategic and much further away from us, while we are awaited tremendously. And having a European strategy is also thinking about the borders of Europe. Our margins, our neighbors, and countries that moreover love us deeply and where we must reinvest so as not to let non-European powers play the game in our place. Otherwise, the Western Balkans will be decided between the United States, Russia, and Turkey. Here too, Germany has a thought, and I must say, more effective and strategic than ours. I hope that we can reallocate resources and efficiency on this subject.

The third priority I wanted to return to with you is to build a renewed partnership with the Mediterranean and Africa. I will not cover, I assure you, all geographical areas, but I want to cover a few points where I had spoken less in the previous two times and where I wanted to go further today. It is fundamentally our strategic neighborhood policy, this partnership. But it is also essential to pursue it, to relaunch it. I will not return here to Syria or Libya. I mentioned it extensively at the press conference yesterday. We are working closely on these crisis issues that are obviously our daily life, we are deeply engaged, it was at the heart of this G7 and what I could also say about it, nor will I return here before you on the peace process in the Middle East. The work on this subject, I simply say, must continue deeply and be relaunched. Why did I not decide to take initiatives? Because I think the conditions are not met on the ground. I think that initiatives that come from the other side of the world generally have little success. But I am also convinced of one thing, that the status quo does not work and is not sustainable. We have on this subject, and I have reiterated it several times, convictions, a position of France that has never been denied. I think that with some of our allies, we will need to work innovatively to find a useful solution, and we are not there yet.

I wanted to quickly talk here about the southern shore of the Mediterranean and Africa regarding this partnership. We indeed have with the southern shore and the Mediterranean historical, civilizational, cultural ties that are very deep. And Europe cannot succeed, and France above all, if we do not rethink and revisit these ties. Today, we no longer talk about the Mediterranean except through the issue of migration, this humanitarian scandal that I mentioned, where we must organize ourselves on protection issues. Here too, there is the risk of geopolitical and domestic weakening. Because when we talk about the southern shore of the Mediterranean as about Africa, we are also talking, in fact, about France. I was led to reiterate this during the commemorations in August. France has an African part in it because fighters from this continent saved our country and our freedom. And our destinies are linked, even if they are also linked by dark pages and wounds. So in the Maghreb today, of course, we are attentive to the situations, to the messages carried by the Algerian people, to the extremely sensitive situation today in Tunisia. I had the opportunity during the funeral of President ESSEBSI to express how much we were alongside the Tunisian people and nation in this critical moment. Always in respect of their sovereignty and the friendship that binds us together. We need to be able to reinvest this link in a new, balanced way. Without the trappings of either colonialism or anti-colonialism. And I deeply believe that this can go through a more vibrant dialogue between our civil societies.

That is why I wanted to announce in Tunis this summit of the two shores and thus a dialogue between civil societies, academics, entrepreneurs, and of course governments, to try to ensure that things circulate again between our two shores, given the ties that bind us, but also undoubtedly between the countries of the southern shore. What should strike us today is that the Maghreb is no longer a geopolitical reality, that the divisions are very deep between these countries, which weakens them and blocks their own development. We held a first summit in Marseille last June, and I hope that we can collectively continue this work and that all of you can be deeply engaged in seeking out what can nourish a new dialogue everywhere in these civil societies, among these intellectuals, and these artists.

I must tell you that I was struck in Marseille last June by the vitality of this dialogue when some of these countries played the game. There was an extraordinarily inspiring youth from Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania in particular, proposing to us cooperations and links that no one had thought of and that we do not hear in intergovernmental dialogue. And so I believe that this path is fruitful, and I hope we can continue it together. Our destiny is also inseparable from that of Africa. We are extraordinarily committed to it today, and we must continue to do so while trying to pursue what I have called this conversion of mutual gaze.

We are engaged in Africa on a military level; I have spoken at length about this several times before you, so I will be brief, but we continue to be engaged. We are involved in crises, the Libyan crisis that I mentioned, on which I believe a strong advance was made during this G7 by acknowledging an international conference and the inter-Libyan conference, involving African states that had previously been skeptical about this process, but with whom we are working closely. And of course, there is the issue of the Sahel. It is an essential theater of operations for our armies; it is a subject on which France, a little over five years ago, was decisive in preventing the rise of jihadism and its establishment. And without France's swift decision to intervene, without the quality of execution of our armies, things would probably not be the same today in the Sahel. Nevertheless, we are today, as we can see, in a context of destabilization and expansion of the terrorist phenomenon in the Sahel. Now, it is starting in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Lake Chad region. We must be cautious when we talk about terrorism in this region because it does not have the same characteristics as the territorial caliphate we experienced in the Levant. And these are also terrorist groups that exploit ethnic divisions and economic phenomena, and this is, if I may say so, a very specific African translation.

Nevertheless, we must support the sovereign states of this region. And so in this context, we will continue to be engaged, of course, with Operation Barkhane, with strength, being operationally mobile as we are. But it is essential that this is accompanied by a re-engagement of our African partners, which we have sought through, on the one hand, the G5 Sahel and, on the other hand, the Alliance for the Sahel, the military pillar and the development pillar, and through an expansion of this engagement of the international community and neighboring states, as we launched the day before yesterday with Chancellor Merkel and President Kaboré in this new Partnership for Stability and Security for the Sahel, which allows for the re-engagement of Gulf of Guinea states that were spectators but are beginning to see the consequences of this conflict, which enables partnerships between African states on this issue and also allows for the involvement of the international community on this security issue to help each of them.

But Africa is much more for us; it is our indispensable ally for Europe to continue to play its role in world affairs, and we have laid the foundations for the new partnership that we need to meet the great challenges of tomorrow during the speech delivered in Ouagadougou in November 2017, and it is around this that we must continue. And here too, it is an important task that I ask of you, but which I believe is profoundly essential, which is a conversion of our own action, of the relationship with our African partners, and of our methods.

First, by helping Africa in its ongoing regional and integration projects, I believe we must participate in this change. That is why we support ECOWAS in its march towards a single currency, because there have been blockages on our side and tensions on their side. This path will be difficult, and nothing is guaranteed, but I believe it would be a historic contribution from France to help West Africa achieve true economic and monetary integration on this issue. That is also why we support the African Union's project to move towards a continent-wide free trade area. That is also why, on every conflict, we have re-engaged the African Union to work with us, to take the lead in operations, and to support this strategy of having UN operations in close partnership with the African Union. That is also why I take responsibility for the fact that on the most sensitive political issues, situations of democratic and political transitions, sometimes the most complex, we have adopted a strategy of peer pressure rather than direct expression or lecturing.

Some have sometimes reproached me for silences, but these silences have never meant inaction. They have been built on meticulous strategies of alliances with other African leaders to ensure that things are done. And I believe that in the DRC, this strategy has paid off; I do not know if it has allowed for everything that was desired on the democratic front, but it has at least allowed for what was desirable in terms of alternation. And on many other tension subjects, like Togo at one point and others that will come, I think this strategy is the guiding thread that should inspire us. But I think that more broadly, what we want is to no longer have a relationship with Africa that rests on a feeling or sometimes realities of asymmetry. And so it is about conceiving our strategies with our African partners, carrying them with our African partners, and reinvesting these strategies with them and for them.

That is why we have translated the Ouagadougou agenda into sports in a very concrete way, by having a partnership with sports federations in basketball or football, with Olympic federations and countries. We have translated it into the cultural sphere, by opening this vast subject of the restitution of works of art, essential to help many of these states rebuild and rethink their own imaginaries and to do so in partnership with France. That is why we also wanted to reopen the educational subject, again on different bases. And I take full responsibility for the reform of the university that has been implemented because it has been accompanied by a responsible educational strategy.

Until now, we accepted everyone for free in France; it was wonderful, and we had a system that was fundamentally post-colonial, to use the grand words that some use. Because we said to all students in many countries, "Do you want to pursue higher education? Come to France; it’s wonderful." And we acknowledged that it was impossible, even to obtain a bachelor's degree in their own country. We have adopted a strategy that first states that higher education has a cost, and I believe that is fair. The cost we have set is 10 to 20 times lower than what Canadians, many other Europeans, or Americans pay. We have made an effort on scholarships, which means that, by the way, university enrollments are not decreasing this year. But alongside that, we have reinvested in a strategy of educational partnerships, particularly in Africa, and for the first time by opening university cycles in countries that have been our allies for so many decades and allowing certain cycles, certain first university cycles, to indeed take place in Senegal, in Côte d'Ivoire, as crazy as that may seem, by proposing and doing so in Tunisia, by proposing it in Algeria. And I believe that this is the true path of this development and partnership, that our teachers can nourish what is our educational strength, to enable educational development in these countries and to have a true strategy of alliance and not hegemony.

This is also what we want in economic terms, the thinking of this new African partnership. The initiative known as AFAWA announced a few days ago for female entrepreneurship was conceived by Africans with the African Development Bank. We are financing it. And so, what I call this conversion of gaze means that we ourselves must act and work differently with Africans for themselves, think about their actions with them, and consider that the most cutting-edge actions should be done with Africans in Africa. And I want to give two examples: the climate transition is for me one of the strategic axes of the action we must have with Africa because they are the first victims and because they have the potential to be the main theaters of development. The so-called Desert to Power strategy of the African Development Bank and the World Bank must be at the heart of the relationship that the French Development Agency, which plays an essential role in this strategy, has with these structures, and that is what we were able to launch, for example, in Burkina Faso a few months ago and develop. And it is the same strategy with Africa that we must have in terms of innovation.

That is also why we have decided that innovation will be the major theme of the Africa-France summit that we will host in Bordeaux in 2020. It is a way of acknowledging that, in essence, tomorrow is being prepared in Africa and with Africans. I believe that on this subject, this line, which can sometimes be a fine line for us, is an essential and most effective strategy. Let us not fall into the trap of making Africa a theater of influence. There is today a Chinese strategy, a Japanese strategy, a Turkish strategy, each with its own logic, and obviously an American strategy in Africa. I deeply believe that our strategy should not be a strategy of market share and influence, of predatory hegemony that is sometimes at the heart of some of the projects I have just mentioned. No, it should be about reinventing a partnership because we have sometimes made mistakes in the past. So we can draw inspiration from the mistakes made and learn from them. I believe that this line is the only fruitful one. I will not obviously speak on this point about all the subjects, and I believe it is important to continue the strategies we have on the other continental plates that are ours.

The fourth priority I wanted to return to here, and which is for me an essential axis: is to anchor through results a diplomacy of common goods, and essentially to try to provide our share of response to the imbalances in the world and the inequalities I mentioned earlier. First, by reinvesting ourselves in the multilateral framework. It is often said when talking about a strong multilateralism. Some today want to build things outside the multilateral framework, saying: "I can do it by deciding for myself." I believe that this is not in our interest. And the great risk is that an alternative multilateral framework is built by others, particularly China, which is at the heart of its strategy. I therefore think that if we want to achieve real results in this diplomacy of common goods, we must embrace this strong multilateralism, be very present and strong in multilateral forums as we are at the UN, reinvest and be innovative in forums that are in crisis, like the WTO; that is the commitment we have made to host.

If we are not innovative at the WTO, the WTO will disappear. And succeeding in finding new allies is the framework of the initiative we will carry on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly with this alliance for a new multilateralism, or with Germany. We will gather not only European powers but also democratic powers of good will that share this vision of the world and are sensitive to these balances. I believe that this strategy is absolutely essential if we want to maintain the structures of multilateralism, fully reinvest in them, and carry their thinking, or at least nourish it. But beyond that, on many issues of common goods, we need to have results in the coming months.

The first among them, of course, is climate and biodiversity. And the essential will be played out, I must say on this point, in the coming year. A lot of things are changing. Regarding global warming, as I mentioned, we know the American position, but has it weakened our international diplomatic game? I do not believe so. We have succeeded in convincing Russia to initiate the ratification of the Paris agreements, a process that had been waiting since the signing. We have convinced India, as I mentioned, to join the 2050 carbon neutrality coalition. And so things are moving very deeply. The upcoming meetings are important. The United Nations Secretary-General's climate summit in September, the COP in Chile in December, the World Conservation Congress in Marseille in June 2020, and then the biodiversity COP in Beijing in October. On these issues, we must continue practical progress and coalitions.

First on financing: I announced at the G7 the doubling of France's contribution to the Green Fund. In total, and thanks in particular to the commitment of Germany and the United Kingdom, 4.8 billion euros have been confirmed. I ask you to seek out the contributions one by one so that the replenishment of the Green Fund is a success. The challenge in September is to reach a milestone in mobilizing all actors in the financial system so that they integrate climate risks into their investment decisions. Without this, the ecological transition will never scale up. And you know that France has had this mandate with Jamaica on the issue of financing, and so this mobilization of our entire diplomatic apparatus is essential to achieve this result. This will also be the objective of the One Planet Summit decided by us and since December 2017, which will be organized on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Beyond financing issues, we must make progress on the carbon neutrality coalition that I mentioned, which we brought to the G7 as well.

The priority is to advance at the European level according to the guidelines defined by the new President of the Commission. I remind you that last March we were two, in China in May we were 8 Europeans. We have now convinced many others, and I believe we will finish the work in the coming weeks. This will allow us to engage in a decisive dialogue on this issue, particularly with China. I mentioned that China made significant progress in Osaka on this point, and I consider that the visit I will make to China in November must continue the advances on this subject, because it has become, as I mentioned, an essential partner. We must also continue the momentum launched on concrete coalitions. I will not name them all, but at the G7 they were widely presented. Those on HFC gases, those on maritime transport, or those on textiles. These concrete coalitions allow us to address sectors that had previously been completely ignored. Textiles are the second most CO2-emitting sector. No coordinated action had been taken until now.

We have managed to mobilize industrial actors, but states must commit today to have regulatory adaptations that will accompany them. We are talking about a sector that represents 8% of emissions, 30% of ocean pollution. On HFC gases, which are infinitely more polluting than CO2, we have also initiated an industrial actor strategy involving India in a historic way. Now we need results. As for maritime transport, we know it is a polluting sector that has also committed but will also impose an agenda on us in international forums and with our main partners. On biodiversity, the urgency is demonstrated and everything is to be built. For the first time, we signed a charter for biodiversity at the G7, which is the concrete result of the first report from IPBES last spring. But we now need to outline a concrete agenda. This will be the responsibility of Marseille, and especially of the biodiversity COP in China. It is essential. But the step taken in Biarritz is a historic step. Because this biodiversity charter was not only signed by G7 members but also by countries like South Africa and India. On this subject, how can we not mention what happened in India, which led to an extremely rapid mobilization of G7 members and all the powers present, since I was able to present with President Piñera yesterday the initiative for the Amazon that we launched.

It is an initiative that responds to urgent needs by mobilizing our resources. I also thank the Minister of the Interior for reacting immediately by dispatching several firefighters who were in the region, also contributing financially because that is what can be most effective with several other countries, and especially by mobilizing us immediately through reforestation. Since the issue is indeed strategic for each of the Amazon countries and strategic for the entire planet in terms of climate change and biodiversity. On this subject, I have noted the concerns, perhaps the clumsiness of some leaders considering that sovereignty was fundamentally aggression, which I believe is a profound mistake. We are a sovereign country when we have major events; we accept with joy and kindness international solidarity because it is a sign of friendship. But above all, there are nine countries in the Amazon. There are many other countries that have requested our help, and so it is important to mobilize it quickly so that Colombia, Bolivia, and all Brazilian regions that wish to access this international aid can do so and can reforest quickly.

More broadly on these issues, we will need to conduct several reflections to pursue this agenda and carry out several actions. We see that the international framework is changing. The first is that when we talk about the Arctic, the Antarctic, the oceans, the Amazon rainforest, or the African forest that is also burning, while respecting the sovereignty of the states that have territorial competencies over these regions, we are clearly talking about geographical common goods inseparable from our biodiversity and the climate issue. We also need to build the right governance and the international framework to construct useful action. I believe this is essential. And then we need to continue the work launched, blocked by many, to build new environmental rights.

The work we initiated after the working group chaired by Laurent Fabius precisely to build this new international environmental law and the approach that France launched must be resumed. I believe we must not abandon it, and I hope we can re-engage through a new initiative French diplomacy behind this objective with strength because it is complementary to each of the actions I have just mentioned. Speaking of common goods, of course, also means talking about health. I would simply like to say that France will host in Lyon in October the replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Here too, a strong mobilization of all our diplomacy is expected. At the G7, we added nearly 5 billion euros in funding; I will announce the French contribution in Lyon, but I ask you to mobilize strongly to reach our target of 13 billion euros.

French diplomacy must also serve equality between women and men. We placed it at the heart of the fight against inequalities at the G7, but we must also pursue a true feminist diplomacy. Canada had initiated and inspired this approach; we must recognize the merit of the previous presidency. We have maintained the Advisory Council for Gender Equality and have formally adopted a legislative package in accordance with the recommendations made. This action must be continued and amplified in view of the conference we will hold in Paris in July 2020, then Beijing 2025, which will be an important meeting on this point in terms of results. The fight against inequalities is also about having a genuine educational agenda. As I mentioned, it is the continuum between our national and international strategy.

We invested heavily last year to replenish the Global Partnership for Education with our Senegalese friends. We are committed to engaging more; we must continue down this path. It is one of the priorities of the French Development Agency, it is a priority of our action, and it must also be a priority of our operational commitment, as I mentioned earlier when talking about Africa. It will also be one of the priorities that deeply informs the reform of the AEFE that the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs will present in his speech before you, inspired by several parliamentary works written by some present in the room and which has been worked on very closely with the Minister of National Education. This will also allow us to develop the French education model, to have the capacity not only to provide the service we owe to our compatriots but also to develop teaching in French, teaching with French methods. And this strategy must continue with a real investment in the training of trainers. And I believe that wherever we invest in education, we must not be content with putting in funds or building walls; we must also ensure that we do what is necessary for quality education, and this will be part of our investment strategy. On all these issues, we are giving ourselves the means to act. I thus confirm the commitment I made to raise our official development assistance to 0.55% of gross domestic product, which will be maintained in 2022.

This solidarity investment is at the heart of our strategy; we now need to define all the levers and especially align it with the strategic priorities I have just mentioned. And that is what I will try to do at the Presidential Council for Development that I will hold at the beginning of October; the minister will then present the text that will follow.

Finally, the last priority I wanted to talk to you about is fundamentally a matter of method. If we want to succeed in truly thinking of ourselves as a balancing power, rebuilding European sovereignty, achieving results on this diplomacy of common goods, and renewing this partnership with Africa and the Mediterranean, I believe we also need to continue the profound renewal of our methods. The G7, in this regard, has been, through your work and mobilization, an illustration of this method in which I believe. This is what I mentioned earlier in a more strategic way; it is about audacity. If France and Europe do not have the audacity to revisit their thought patterns, their automatism, to reinvest in international institutions, no one will do it for us. And we are the only ones for whom immobility is deadly. Others can have a non-multilateral, unilateral, or bilateral strategy; we cannot. And so what I deeply invite you to do is to have this audacity and, in a way, this deep freedom of action in a very simple manner.

First, I think it is essential to renew and intensify — I know that many of you are doing this — the links with civil society in all the interstices of each of the countries where you represent France and where deep issues are at stake, not simply bilateral relations but the understanding of profound stakes. The meeting of artists, intellectuals, and creators expresses deep fissures in these countries and allows us to understand what the reading of political games or what we may be too accustomed to looking at does not allow us to read. And I truly believe that what our diplomatic network must bring today is that. It is an extremely difficult task; I am aware of that, but it is where our added value lies. And so I ask you to reach out to all these circles, to the youth, to listen to their ideas, their aspirations, their projects, to explain France and what our country has that is unique, attractive, and innovative, but also to understand what is at stake deeply in each of these countries. I believe we deeply need this for our diplomacy. And I think that if we want to be the epicenter of this capacity to rethink the major trends in the world and to take useful action, we must also do it with civil society, and that is where we must continue to innovate.

That is why I wanted to create the first Paris Forum for Peace last year. The objective of this forum is to bring together great thinkers, think tanks, businesses, and governments from around the world at least once a year in Paris to think about a common agenda. But this work with civil society, with intellectuals, and with academic circles from around the world is essential if we want to rebuild ourselves, to think justly about the major issues I mentioned, but also if we want to have useful action and the right channels to do so. If we were able to advance the agenda for the protection of information on the internet during this G7, it is because there was very close collaboration with Reporters Without Borders, who launched this initiative at the Paris Forum for Peace last year, and we continued the action. And so we plant seeds, we have ideas that we would not have on our own, and we pull the threads, and then we have partners for our own diplomacy.

And I believe that this work with civil society should not simply be a box to check; it is how we rebuild a deep understanding of a country, the intimate understanding of France in these countries, but also a useful action for ourselves and on the international level. Because building with the civil societies of each of these countries also gives us the guarantee that there will be an echo of our action in these countries. That is why when we talk about the Amazon, we will continue to work with indigenous peoples, with the regions, with non-governmental organizations because they will also exert pressure on governments, even when they are tempted by obscurantism. This work is the effectiveness of our diplomacy. But beyond that, what I ask of you is fundamentally to multiply intellectual boldness and operational tenacity. Do not think within frameworks anymore. I have shared some convictions I hold; I expect you to share them and to act effectively to build them. But I believe that beyond that, you must be a source of proposals; you must obviously help the leadership in Paris, the ministers, the government, and myself to rethink these balances that are in motion.

Contemporary diplomacy is a diplomacy of movement, and sometimes we have entered into trench warfare that hinders us. Be a source of proposals, have that boldness, propose every time. And also have that operational effectiveness that builds our credibility to create and bring forth initiatives that are taken everywhere and with care, both on a bilateral and multilateral level, to achieve results. And I think this is a profoundly useful element. This diplomacy of boldness and movement is essential if we want to rebuild. As I said, we have made commitments to try to convince the Americans that solving the problem of international trade is not simply about having trade wars. But this only works if we ourselves manage to reform the World Trade Organization. Fundamentally, what I ask of you is to no longer be experts but to be both knowledgeable and friends of the peoples where you are and inventors of a diplomacy to be renewed. In the emerging world, we always need technical experts, but if we have experts everywhere, we only think of the old world because, by definition, experts are only experts in what already exists. And so I need experts on certain subjects, intimate connoisseurs, but I say friends because I think that is what is needed, entrepreneurs, diplomatic innovators. And I believe that this is not simply a whim; it is what we deeply need.

And finally, and the minister will speak to you on this point, I know that the Prime Minister will return to it, many changes have also been made that have disrupted your lives, but fundamentally, we are effective when we do what? It is the deep vocation of our diplomacy when all the levers of the French state work together towards a common goal. There are many organizational issues; it is not my place to delve into them. I know that there have been many discussions about whether economic services should be within the Quai d'Orsay, outside the Quai d'Orsay, climate diplomacy this or that. I am aware of the organizational and sometimes budgetary implications that this entails. But I think what is key is that we must be effective. And so if we want to be effective, we must have a France that speaks with one voice everywhere, and that means excelling in each of these subjects, and so we must give ourselves the means to do so and work collectively. And as I said earlier, we need assemblers who carry the strategy and who are accompanied by good specialists who can be effective. If the assembler does not understand the file, they are useless; if the specialist does not have the overall strategy, they can be dangerous. As we all want to have a coherent, rather effective strategy, I think this organizational improvement is essential if we want to influence the digital agenda, the cyber agenda, the space agenda, and the agenda of major technological and industrial standards that is also at the heart of tomorrow's diplomacy. And so on this, I hope we can truly innovate.

I think that when I look at how many others do, we need organizations that over time allow us to understand peoples, countries, and regional transitions well. But we must undoubtedly have real organizational mobility so that when there are priorities, project teams can be formed and can put all their energy into the upcoming project, which sometimes leads us to revisit priorities. Let us not have an army made for trench warfare when the current war is a war of movement. This also requires us to sometimes revisit our automatism. And this does not only apply to diplomacy. It applies to the entire state. I am struck, as you are, to see how much in terms of our organizations what is sometimes a budgetary reality is for us, 95%, services that are voted on. 95% often of priorities. These are daily lives. And so, new priorities account for 5% of the time allocated. This cannot work. So we need to be more mobile.

There you have it, ladies and gentlemen. I am aware that I have been long. However, I have not been exhaustive, but I wanted, beyond the G7 of the last few days, which was a tremendous demonstration of excellence in our diplomacy, to share these few convictions and give you these few presentations. We have, ladies and gentlemen, a strong and coherent diplomacy. And I say this because it must never be forgotten. Let us compare ourselves, and we have shown it every time it was necessary to mobilize. We can be proud of it, and I want to reaffirm it here.

We also have it because we have a strong army, a strong state, and I think it is essential to continue to reflect on ourselves. But I want this strong diplomacy to serve the strategic purpose I just mentioned. In a world undergoing profound change, to regain control of our destiny. To give our people a share of mastery that we owe them and to reinvigorate this European civilization project that we have brought. On the political level, on the strategic level, on the cultural level, and on the level of imagination.

Diplomacy has an essential role to play in this matter. And this new humanism that I believe we must build and which must be at the heart of the government's strategy must also be at the heart of our diplomacy. And so, I count on you for this every day. I will be demanding as much as I am grateful. And I will always be by your side to ensure that France is at the heart of these major issues, that our fellow citizens are represented everywhere with strength, that our interests are defended, and that beyond our interests, our values are upheld everywhere.

Thank you.

Long live the Republic and long live France.