SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

9 November 2022 · Naval ceremony aboard the amphibious helicopter carrier Dixmude · Harbor of Toulon, aboard the Dixmude, Toulon, France

Context
Macron addressed French military leadership aboard the amphibious carrier Dixmude in Toulon on November 9, 2022, presenting the National Strategic Review underpinning future military programming.
Main themes
French defense strategy, national sovereignty, war in Ukraine, military rearmament, hybrid warfare, strategic review, NATO and EU security, high-intensity conflict, cyber and digital threats, military budget commitments, geopolitical rivalries, armed forces modernization
Duration
~43 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,120
92nd percentile
Sentences
213
90th percentile
Readability
39
35th percentile
Grade
13.7
64th percentile
Syntax
3.27
80th percentile
Vocabulary
2.25
61st percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 61%55%
  • Institutional 13%11%
  • Ceremonial 12%11%
  • Economic 8%8%
  • Social 5%5%
  • Environmental 1%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

213 sentences in 58 paragraphs

Madam Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Minister of the Armed Forces,

Mr. Prefect,

Ladies and Gentlemen Parliamentarians,

Mr. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,

Mr. Secretary General for Defense and National Security,

Mr. General Delegate for Armaments,

Mr. Secretary General for Administration,

Gentlemen Chiefs of Staff,

Mr. Director General of the National Gendarmerie,

Madam Director General of International Relations and Strategy,

Gentlemen General Officers,

Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Petty Officers, Soldiers, Sailors, Aviators,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am pleased to see you here, in the harbor of Toulon, aboard this beautiful amphibious helicopter carrier Dixmude, where I sent you my wishes in January 2018. November 9 is not an ordinary date. It speaks of adversity and courage, of vision and sovereignty. It is the anniversary of the death of General de Gaulle. The courage of the moment, the vision of the future, that is indeed what I have come to talk to you about today.

For although this vessel is surrounded by sheltered water, the majestic harbor, Mr. Mayor, on a calm day, let us not be mistaken, the time is not one of calm, but of stormy weather. War is in Europe, with its risks of escalation, its licenses, its global effects. It crowns a decade of desensitization to violence, of the extension of confrontations to all areas. It also marks an unprecedented leap into the hybrid universe, which is certainly as old as war, but which some powers have managed to integrate and amplify harmful practices in the digital age. The aggression against Ukraine, finally, risks foreshadowing broader geopolitical rivalries in the future that we have no reason to accept with fatalism and that we do not intend to endure passively.

These developments, however, are not new. We had correctly identified them in the Strategic Review of 2017, and again in 2021 during its update. We had identified the adaptation efforts to be made to ensure our protection and our sovereignty in the new spaces of conflict: the exo-atmospheric space, the informational and cyber fields, the aeromarine spaces, and more recently, the seabed; and to face the return of what is called high intensity, as well as to stand up to hybrid threats.

The commitments made following this analysis and its update have not been insignificant. It is a true rearmament of the Nation that we decided five years ago. And it is a particular satisfaction for me to tell you today: these commitments have been kept. They have been kept thanks to your work, your commitment, thanks to the parliamentarians. And I thank the presidents of the relevant Committees for being here and for having also ensured, along with all the engaged Parliamentarians on these issues over the past few years. But from the bundles to the execution, to the last euro, the commitments made have been honored. They have been, and the draft budget law for 2023 attests to this. I am proud of it, and our armed forces deserve it. This effort is vital and must continue because we also know that for many of our capabilities, it was a necessary repair, but we must now build the future.

Because what is at stake in Ukraine is not simply an illustration of trends already at work: it is a massive acceleration and, in some respects, a clarification of other aspects. Through these tens of thousands of deaths, its rigors, its scale, through its technological developments with new weapons trumpeted but not always proven and old ones that have found new lethal uses. Finally, because this war also clarifies the state of the world in which we are: the weakening of norms and taboos, the intoxication of appetites. It qualifies this dangerous moment where the old balance is contested, and the new has not been reached.

This tragic acceleration made it essential that we revise, update, our reflection. And this exercise, we conducted it after the Strategic Compass led within the framework of the European Union, and finalized under the French presidency of the latter; and the new strategic concept of NATO that we wished to launch as early as December 2019. It followed, logically, that we could propose behind it, ourselves, an update of our vision of the threat, of our strategic analysis of the world and that, at the end of this, a new programming law could mark the coming years for our armed forces.

During the summer, therefore, with the responsiveness that befits moments of gravity, solid work was carried out to develop the National Strategic Review, which is to serve as the basis for military programming. I would like to thank in this regard especially the Ministry of the Armed Forces, of course, the Secretary General for Defense and National Security, the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs for this work carried out in an exceptional time and the mobilization of all your talents. I would also like to thank the parliamentarians of the Committees consulted on this review, who were able to provide both their expertise and their experience, and allow us to enrich it.

As always, the challenge of this type of work is to avoid the pitfall of drawing lessons from the present, in a sense, for the future anterior. In the Armed Forces, we indeed program over several years, but for orientations or equipment that will structure our military tool for the decades to come. And all those who contribute to it know this well. We were alongside several of our industrialists a few days ago and I was able to measure again the temporal depth and nature of the investments. That is why, if time is at the heart of the choices that are ours and that vision requires us to make clear options, we must respond to both today's problems and those of tomorrow. But with a concern that we must have at every moment: it is obviously to keep in mind that the army of 2030 that we have to build, its women and men as well as its capabilities, must not be the ideal army that we would have wanted in 2022, but indeed the army of 2030, necessary in the face of the evolution of risks, our anticipations and the changes to be expected. That is why the work done with this NSR is so valuable.

In 2017, the army model I found was, at its core, born of 2001 and the world's shift into the fight against terrorism, of the logic of punch strikes in often permissive theaters. Not everything has disappeared from that order. Terrorism has not disappeared and we continue to fight it vigorously and it will still be at the heart of our battles. But the conditions have nevertheless changed a lot. We have repaired our armed forces, hardened the model to face today's challenges and anticipate the future. It was essential. Moreover, some of today's challenges will be with us for the long term. And, in particular, when peace returns to Ukraine, we will also need to draw all the consequences from it, that is to say, to truly build a new security architecture and a renewed framework of stability and arms control where Europe will be at the table.

But there are also the challenges of the future: the risk of high-intensity war between states, the growing tensions in Asia, the widespread use of drones, including in areas where they are still rare today, the normalization of missiles whose first effects we see in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates or Kiev, the lowering of the cyber threshold, disruptive technologies, quantum, artificial intelligence, hypervelocity and our more general environment where health risks weigh as much as climate risks. And returning from COP 27 in Egypt, no one can, nor should, downplay the security challenge that climate change also represents. It is now a world where, unlike yesterday, when we sought peace through interdependence, we now seek independence in anticipation of wars.

It is all of this that must be anticipated, that is to say, a Copernican revolution in the way of conceiving conflicts, of our geopolitics and the revolutions that have also accelerated significantly over the past five years on a technological level and that will continue to do so. Anticipating all this is a necessity to have in 2030 the armies of the decade to follow and not those of the preceding decade. And pushing the argument further, it is also what is needed to have not only the armies, but also the defense industry, the economy and the society that contribute to sovereignty. For one of the lessons of the times we are living in is that we must relearn to mobilize the vital forces of our nation, of its companies, of its women and men in the service of our sovereignty, as I have consistently advocated in recent months.

So, what is the vision that this national strategic review carries? It is that of an independent, respected, agile power; of a power at the heart of European strategic autonomy with a strong Atlantic anchorage, but at the forefront and pivot of the world; of a balancing power that assumes its responsibilities and contributes, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateralism and international law.

So in all this, there are of course achievements, confirmations of the current LPM that we will know how to consolidate and strengthen, in accordance with what I have just said, intuitions that have been confirmed over the past five years.

First, of course, there is our assessment of the situation which will remain solid and sovereign and which, thanks to a particular effort on intelligence, will allow us to know, understand and anticipate better. And the investments we have made to consolidate, both in human and technological terms, our autonomous intelligence capacity have proven more necessary than ever and we will obviously consolidate and strengthen them over time.

Next, there is the speed of decision and engagement. And I want to remind you here, we have a strength. It is institutional, political, organizational: the ability to decide in the moment and to implement as no other power on European soil can do. We have demonstrated this with Serval, we have demonstrated it with Operation Hamilton, we have redemonstrated it with the decisions made and the deployment in Romania a few months ago. This is a strength of our armed forces: it remains even more so in the geopolitical context I have just mentioned.

Then there is of course nuclear deterrence, this backbone of our credible, modern security, sized within a framework of strict sufficiency. It will continue to rest on simple and clear principles that guarantee our freedom of action and ensure that we will be preserved from a major aggression. It protects us from any state-originating aggression against our vital interests, wherever that aggression comes from and in whatever form. It is my responsibility to define and update these vital interests. Moreover, as I said more than two years ago at the War School, and since it is my conviction I repeat it before you, today more than yesterday, France's vital interests have a European dimension. Our nuclear forces therefore contribute, by their very existence, to the security of France and Europe. It is necessary to reiterate this here as discussions on this subject have become trivialized where we must maintain the same sobriety in doctrine to keep the same credibility. But let us not forget that France indeed has nuclear deterrence and let us sometimes refrain from dramatizing certain statements.

Our ability to defend our metropolitan and overseas territory against old, but also new threats, from deep strikes to cyberattacks, is also of course at the heart of our strategy, another indispensable confirmation. Europe is indeed no longer safe from missile strikes, drones, and we must integrate this reality. Because technology now provides adversaries, who are not always states, with the means to strike from a distance. I know, I have read that some in Europe are considering this. But the air defense of our continent is a strategic question, solidary and with multiple ramifications, which cannot be reduced to the promotion of a national industry or third-party industries at the expense of European sovereignty. It therefore deserves an inclusive, in-depth approach, based on a strategic analysis and integrating the entire spectrum of our defense. We will propose and we will contribute. We must also have, within five years, a cyber defense of the very highest global standard.

Regarding our overseas territories, which are a strength of the Nation and signify our permanent presence on several continents, our sovereign rights in all oceans. We are French, under almost all longitudes and almost all latitudes. Our continental or insular overseas territories largely reflect France's status as a global power, in the North Atlantic, in the Caribbean, in South America, in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Pacific, not to mention our poles. These lands, these seas, the French who live there and make a living from them are exposed to threats whose nature or degree call for adjusted variations of our overall strategy. We will not fail in this regard. Our determination to ensure their security in regions that are sometimes also the theater of fait accompli politics remains unwavering. It will continue to rely on our sovereignty forces, but also on the increased attention we pay to hybrid threats.

For our Europe, it will obviously remain our existential anchor, our priority universe of solidarity, and we will continue to be, if I may express it this way, both the rock and the spur. The rock of the only power equipped with nuclear weapons on the European continent, which still plays a key role in its security, and the spur to advance its sovereignty, promote its vision, develop credible defense, and thus contribute to the strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

The agenda for the profound strengthening of European defense is truly an achievement of the last five years. And our strategy, a vision first affirmed through the proposed instruments, then through achievements, has borne fruit. This is true for operations, where we have invented a new grammar with innovative format operations such as IRINI in the Mediterranean or Agénor in the Gulf. For the operational culture, more generally, that we have worked to establish with the European Intervention Initiative and its Sahelian offshoot, Takuba. The same goes for the strategic culture with the Strategic Compass, a true white paper on European defense policy concluded last March, and I will also mention the European Peace Facility created at our initiative in 2021, which today finances the transfer of military equipment, notably to Africa and Ukraine. And of course, the so-called Versailles agenda for strengthening our sovereignty, reducing our dependence, and securing our supplies. Finally, support for the defense industry through the European Defense Fund and the instrument aimed at strengthening the European defense industry through joint acquisitions. If we look at where we were five years ago, a profound mental revolution has taken place, for some of our partners, a Copernican one. But we have not yet finished the work, far from it.

Everything I have just mentioned here still requires consolidations, confirmations, and greater rigor, if I may say so, in strictly European application. But Europe is also about our partnerships with the various countries that make it up, and we intend to significantly increase these partnerships. And I would say that these partnerships are all the more feasible as many of these partners have joined us in a French approach to European defense sovereignty. It is primarily our desire to strengthen ties with Germany, of course, an indispensable partner with whom we are engaged in deeply structuring programs. Our forces are made to combine. Shared industrial excellence, of course, but also operational reality and strategic ambition. And the balance of our partnership depends, I believe, in part, on the success of the European project, and I hope that we can achieve decisive progress in this regard in the coming weeks.

I also hope that we can strengthen certain deeply innovative partnerships launched in recent years. One, for example, launched with Belgium, CaMo, which allows for the creation of strategic, operational, and capability intimacy and to move forward more clearly. And we have also tested its full strength in the deployments of recent months. We must also firmly engage new partnerships with Italy, Greece, and several partners with whom we have concluded important recent agreements, such as Croatia; and be able to propose, offer, and advance with Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the Nordic countries that are awaiting new forms of cooperation, also, of course, capability-based but operational and strategic. It will be our duty, within the framework of the exercises to be conducted, to know how to propose these innovative forms of cooperation. And I believe I can say that we are obviously relying on our own strength, our credibility, but also, to name just a few, our current deployments in Romania and Estonia. All these countries, whether allies or not, know they can count on France.

Our partnership with the United Kingdom must also be taken to another level. I wish for us to actively resume our dialogue on operations, capabilities, nuclear issues, and the hybrid domain, and to reconnect with the ambition that befits our two countries, friends and allies. A bilateral summit will be held in the first quarter of the coming year.

Finally, I do not forget the structuring role that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans will play in the coming months and years. Here too, whether members of the European Union or not, whether members of NATO or not, we will have to build new alliances with many of these countries. All these efforts will contribute to the strength of the Atlantic Alliance, even if they do not all reduce to it. The Alliance remains an essential framework for collective security. The current circumstances reinforce its relevance in its Euro-Atlantic vocation, especially at a time when the American pivot towards Asia is underway. And I believe we have been able to demonstrate in recent years that a strengthened European defense enhances NATO and does not weaken it, as some would have liked to suggest. It strengthens it, it anchors it in what is its vocation and its area of interests, and it is a key component of it, as the Rome Declaration, signed in the autumn of 2021 between the United States of America and France, clearly reminded us. In this alliance, we will continue to play the role of an exemplary ally, capable of ensuring the role of Framework Nation and contributing to the reassurance of our partners and, if necessary, to the defense of the eastern flank of Europe. This is essential for the future of the European project.

Beyond that, France has always intended to stand alongside its foreign partners. We wish to be providers of security, from sub-Saharan Africa to the Arabian Gulf, through the Horn of Africa. This also applies to the Indo-Pacific, where we proposed an innovative, clear, and profound strategy as early as spring 2018, which then inspired a European strategy a little over two years later, and where we must foster this important circle of solidarity, ranging from the United Arab Emirates, which are for us an exemplary and reliable partner in all areas, to Djibouti. We are committed to our presence, and we also have a history and a future there. Extending to India, we have been able to build new partnerships in all areas that we will continue to expand, reaching Southeast Asia and Oceania. A strategy of collective autonomy that will be valuable at a time when the world risks closing in on the great geopolitical confrontation of tomorrow. A strategy where France has the vocation both for the defense of its national territory and for its friends, allies, and partners in the region to preserve the freedom of sovereignty.

You have understood, this new analysis of the situation, of the threats, of our role must lead us, and this is what the coming weeks and months will allow us to finalize, to adapt the format of our armed forces, our major contracts and our major programs, our operational objectives to which all this contributes in order, on the one hand, to ensure the defense of the national territory and our nationals in all its components; and on the other hand, to be a Framework Nation, structuring around us, in Europe, in Africa, as well as in the Near and Middle East, coalitions of partner armies. This is what our next military programming will fully allow to unfold in all respects.

But in addition to the invariants that we will strengthen, there are also areas of intervention in which we will have to act very differently, others that we will have to almost entirely invent, and finally others that we must resolutely strengthen, as I committed to doing a few months ago during this year's presidential election. The first of these orientations concerns the design and implementation of this role of security provider that I have just mentioned, which contributes significantly to conflict prevention in the areas where we are deployed. The traditional forms on which this function was based, with our forces' presences abroad, sometimes perceived as challenges to sovereignty by some or used by enemy powers in the field of information warfare, we must radically reinvent them in space and time. The way to reinvent it will precisely be to build this new doctrine that I mentioned, to know how to be this innovative Framework Nation. But we must also, in the coming months, know how to profoundly change our methods.

Our commitment alongside our partners in Africa must now be centered on a logic of cooperation and support for their armies. This must translate into a lighter and more integrated arrangement with them. That is why we will launch in the coming days a phase of exchanges with our African partners, our allies, and regional organizations to evolve together the status, format, and missions of the current French military bases in the Sahel and West Africa in order to build with the interested parties a common and shared organization and instruments to support the armies of the region. This strategy will be finalized within six months after the consultations and the close and intimate association that we wish to conduct. It is essential, and it is one of the consequences we draw from what we have experienced in recent years throughout the Sahel region.

Similarly, our interventions must be better bounded in time, and this from the outset. We do not indeed intend to remain engaged indefinitely in external operations. It is also for this reason that I have decided, in consultation with our partners, to officially announce today the end of Operation Barkhane. Our military support to the countries of the region will continue, but according to the new principles we have defined with them. It will be tailored to each country according to the needs expressed by our partners: equipment, training, operational partnerships, long-term support, and strategic intimacy. It will also come, and I would dare say, especially in support of the civil efforts deployed by the African authorities to address community tensions, social and economic vulnerabilities that terrorist groups seek to exploit. Ultimately, our partnership only makes sense if it is a true partnership that responds to the expression of explicit needs from the African armies and if it complements the economic, political, and administrative partnerships in these countries.

Rethinking our modes of action applies not only to our deployments abroad but also to the national territory. In this regard, the overall economy of Operation Sentinel can continue to be reviewed in connection with other state services to ensure the freedom of action of the armed forces while addressing the new security challenges.

The second major orientation we must take is that of the field of perceptions, whose importance is growing, and which we must invest with significantly increased determination. We have thus seen how, in Africa — and I have implicitly mentioned it in the remarks I have just made or elsewhere — often at the instigation of external actors — malicious narratives have taken root, being amplified by mirror games, bots, trolls, a whole digital bestiary put to use in a very well-integrated maneuver, it must be said, by several of our rivals to challenge our security and our influence and to propagate, in addition to false narratives, an appetite for violence, manipulate civilian populations, and further increase the hybridity of conflicts. We will not be patient spectators of this evolution. We must know how to detect it without delay, hinder it, and in turn — but in the manner of a democracy — anticipate it, using it to our advantage in both digital and physical fields.

Convincing is clearly part of the strategic requirements, but we must deeply rethink our ways and means of doing so in this new context. It is up to us to promote, without pride, but without unwarranted inhibition, our cause. An attitude that would be merely reactive, even defensive, could be seen as a form of passivity. That will not be ours.

Thus, influence will now be a strategic function, equipped with substantial means, coordinated at the interministerial level, with, for its international implementation, a central role for the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Finally, and without being exhaustive, today we must strengthen the moral strength of the nation in all its forms. I mentioned this on July 13 alongside you in Brienne: the time has come for a more comprehensive mobilization to collectively strengthen ourselves in the face of these historical challenges. It is, to borrow vocabulary suited to our gathering today, to move to a state of alert.

I already said a few months ago that we must pivot our economy and adapt to the new context, push our defense industry towards new efforts, and position ourselves for a war economy. The work has begun. I know of your mobilization in the exceptional circumstances we are experiencing. But in the case of a high-intensity conflict directly involving us, it would obviously play out on a completely different scale. And it is a true industrial and economic mobilization that we must already have thought through in this perspective.

The same goes for our civilian infrastructures, our networks, which we must strengthen the protection of at a time when, as seen with the aggression against Ukraine, certain powers no longer feel bound by the limitations of the law of war.

But beyond that, I also think of our ability to mobilize the Nation, local authorities, and the population on a permanent basis, in a posture of vigilance and in the event of a serious crisis. Essentially, we had a glimpse of this during the Covid crisis, which was not just a huge health challenge, but also a form of conflict metaphor. The territory is attacked from all sides, networks disrupted, logistics undermined. The armed forces then demonstrated a remarkable capacity to plan, deploy field hospitals, organize patient transfers by train, by plane, to relieve overwhelmed emergency services. They showed logistical strength, organization, responsiveness, a remarkable state of mind, and practices; but these must be shared by society as a whole. The spirit of resilience, organization, and planning must permeate our civilian ministries. From being territorial, the resilience of the Nation, a fundamentally interministerial concept, must now integrate the new threats I have mentioned, whether they are logistical, energy-related, environmental, informational, cultural, or psychological.

Because many of our enemies have integrated this, and because leaving vulnerabilities in some of these areas would undermine our ability to resist aggression or even to carry out some of the operations that are now ours; because a Nation is a whole.

If we look even deeper, it is indeed the moral forces of the Nation that must be encouraged. The moral strength of the Nation is not the sum of the moral strengths of the French; it is their product. That is why I place great importance on the development of the operational reserve, and we will also integrate it into our programming, on civic service, as well as on our grand project of universal national service. I will have the opportunity in the coming weeks to return to this in more detail. Commitment to the common good as a milestone in the journey of every woman and every man in this country, of every citizen, is an individual opportunity and a collective chance: it must be the cement that strengthens the cohesion of society and the resilience of the Nation. That is the challenge, that is our objective.

It is not about militarizing society, but rather about strengthening the spirit of resilience, its moral strength, and converging all these vital forces, military and civilian, for the defense of our sovereignty.

There you have it, Ladies and Gentlemen, in broad strokes, the ambition we set with this National Strategic Review. Much has been done, and yet much remains to be done. For after having called upon the watchers, it is now the turn of the helmsman. Indeed, on this basis, we will need to build a programming law, ensure its adequacy to the challenges, and guarantee its coherence. These are not minor challenges.

This law, which will be presented to Parliament at the beginning of next year, must depict through its articles, as well as through its tables of figures and commitments, a united, strong France, autonomous in its assessments, and sovereign in its decisions, robust and credible, respected in its status as a nuclear-armed state, a driving force for European strategic autonomy, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic space, a reliable and credible partner. A serene France for its future and master of its destiny.

But we can approach this exercise with confidence. Confidence, first of all, because of the immense value of our armed forces, and the military parade we just shared illustrated this once again. Confidence also thanks to the high quality of our defense industrial and technological base, which has shown its adaptability and competence in these difficult times, effectively spurred on by the DGA. Confidence, of course, thanks to the civilian ministry that contributes to their activity in the effort of national sovereignty. And confidence above all, in our Nation, in its moral springs, in its determination, for it is these values that make our country at the crossroads of worlds carry and will always carry high and clear its ambition.

Long live the Republic! Long live France!