Speech delivered at the central event for the 25th Anniversary of the Victory of Girón, held at the "Karl Marx" Theater, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

19 April 1986 · Central event for the 25th Anniversary of the Victory of Girón · "Karl Marx" Theater, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a commemorative event at the Karl Marx Theater in Havana on April 19, 1986, marking the 25th anniversary of Cuba's victory at the Bay of Pigs.
Main themes
Bay of Pigs victory anniversary, CIA-backed invasion defeat, Cuban revolutionary preparedness, imperialist aggression, counter-revolutionary destabilization, historical memory and documentation, U.S. government culpability, Cuban militia and armed forces, Cold War geopolitics, media suppression of invasion news
Duration
~140 min
99th percentile
Words
16,834
99th percentile
Sentences
562
99th percentile
Readability
46
53rd percentile
Grade
14.0
66th percentile
Syntax
3.30
82nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.23
56th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 61%59%
  • Economic 17%16%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

562 sentences in 194 paragraphs

Distinguished guests;

Relatives of the fallen combatants in Girón;

Veterans of Girón;

Comrades:

When the events of Girón took place, approximately half of the current population of our country had not yet been born; many, now adults, were children. But some millions of people remember those events perfectly, which were experienced by our people with great intensity.

In these days, our press has spoken abundantly about everything that happened at that time.

I perceive that although there are many interesting testimonies, an exact, precise, and comprehensive history of that battle has not yet been written. Sometimes —from what we remember— there are dates that get confused, despite the fact that it was only three days: things that happened on the 19th are presented as having happened on the 18th; some that occurred on the 20th —subsequent events— are presented as having happened on the 19th. And so on. Perhaps some historian, or a group of historians, after 25 years and taking advantage of the large number of written testimonies, from then and now; also taking advantage of the possibility of being able to interrogate many of those who participated, may be able to reconstruct, with the utmost precision, everything that occurred.

The international press has also spoken a lot in these days about those events, stimulated by the fact that the 25th anniversary is being commemorated. Some news agencies have expressed that certain institutions that participated in those events have not yet been able to recover from the defeat.

The aggression of Girón had its antecedents. As early as December 11, 1959 —December 1959!— the head of the Central Intelligence Agency proposed to the government of the United States the plan to destroy the Revolution. And on a date as early as March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower ordered the organization and preparations for the aggression. Naturally, we did not know this at that time; we learned it later, when the very authors and participants recounted the history of their misdeeds.

Before Girón, a whole program of destabilization had been carried out, acts of sabotage, assassination plans, organization of armed bands, landing of weapons and explosives, or parachuting those weapons; even before Girón, imperialism had managed to organize numerous groups of bandits in the Escambray, practically in all the provinces of the country there were armed groups organized by the CIA. There were hundreds of counter-revolutionary organizations in the country; whenever three or four, or even two or three counter-revolutionaries gathered, they created an organization. That was the CIA's style: to promote as many organizations as possible, although some of them were stronger and preferred, which they actually used in their activities.

Two days before the bombing, the store "El Encanto" was burned in an act of sabotage; there the worker comrade Fe del Valle died.

On the 15th, at dawn, they launched the air attack; the night before they tried to carry out a landing in the province of Oriente, in the Baracoa region. And on the 17th, they launched the invasion.

To explain the imperialist defeat, in one way or another, much has been written, especially from that side, by journalists, agents of the United States government, former CIA members, American politicians; however, for us, the facts are very clear.

The mercenary invasion did not surprise the country, it did not catch us off guard, despite the fact that all the news agencies —and here you have a good proof of the seriousness of the information from the transnational news— received instructions from the President of the United States not to speak or publish any news related to the preparations for the invasion, which many people already knew about. The main newspapers, including the "New York Times," which on that occasion betrayed its reputation as an objective newspaper, received instructions not to disclose any information about the invasion preparations. Therefore, through the press, through the wires, there were no indications of what was going to happen; but through other means, through the background, through the practice already acquired by the revolutionaries from very early on to guess what the enemy was going to do, we perceived the imminence of the attack. It cannot be said that we knew the exact date, but we perceived a whole series of symptoms of what was going to happen.

We had worked intensely in the weeks prior; the effort to organize and prepare personnel was enormous, hundreds of thousands of people were organized, trained, and armed in just a few weeks. The weapons were arriving at a rapid pace and arrived in a timely manner. We can say that a few weeks before the invasion, a large number of pieces of ground artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-tank artillery, tanks, and self-propelled guns arrived; and we had managed to gather hundreds of thousands of weapons, most of which were socialist, since our attempts to acquire certain lots of weapons in Western Europe were sabotaged at the beginning.

Some Western countries sold us the equipment but did not sell us the cannons. One of the ships carrying a cargo of rifles and ammunition, "La Coubre," was sabotaged; dozens of workers and soldiers died in that typical sabotage, classic of the CIA. Never again, despite the fact that perhaps thousands of ships have unloaded weapons, did any explode; logically, a ship loaded in a port in Western Europe, the CIA could easily sabotage it, so that when a box of ammunition was lifted, it would explode.

We did all the studies and that could not explode by chance. Grenades, of which there were some there, were dropped from planes at different heights, at thousands of meters, and none of those boxes exploded. It was clear that it had been sabotage organized from the outside, and organized sophisticatedly to provoke a double explosion, because it was really a double explosion; after the first, a few minutes later, when many soldiers and workers were helping their comrades, the second explosion occurred, which made that sabotage much bloodier.

The weapons received on the eve of the aggression were not stored in warehouses for many days. The entire process of organizing battalions was accelerated. At that time, the largest unit that our Armed Forces had was a battalion: heavy battalions, light battalions, as we called them, depending on the armament. A whole program of training cadres, of training personnel, was carried out, an accelerated program; because there was a handful of technicians, Soviet and Czech specialists, but that program of preparing personnel to make use of all those weapons was a long program. The first batteries were supposed to be ready after several months, and we already had armament for hundreds of batteries; the circumstance was special, the situation was one of emergency. In the same camps where the first batteries were being trained, we spoke with the militiamen and told them: what you learn in the morning, you have to teach in the afternoon. We recruited thousands and thousands of combatants to train them as gunners, we chose volunteers from the various already organized units.

Ciudad Libertad became a huge camp, other places too; around Mariel, La Cabaña, everywhere there were tens of thousands of men preparing in the weeks leading up to the attack. That was fundamental, not a minute was lost. This allowed that on the day of the attack, with more or less preparation, all the weapons had personnel ready to use them. You will understand that in such a short period of time, it was impossible to rigorously prepare that personnel, but they knew how to handle the weapons; the rest was provided by the courage, heroism, and goodwill of the workers, the militiamen, and the soldiers.

The tanks had also just arrived, the tankers had only a few weeks of preparation; they already knew something about tanks, from the experience gained trying to handle the very tanks that the tyranny had left in our country.

Measures were taken at the airports, always thinking that there could be some surprise attack. Anti-aircraft batteries were installed to protect the planes, the planes were dispersed.

On the night of April 14 to 15, we were standing, in the General Staff that we had improvised in an area of the City of Havana, waiting to see what was going to happen in Oriente, whether the landing would take place or not, when at dawn the planes flew low, precisely over where we were, heading directly towards Ciudad Libertad. Not a minute had passed, perhaps half a minute from the moment we saw them fly low, until the moment they began to fire rockets and machine guns on the Ciudad Libertad camp. But we could also appreciate the incredible speed with which the militiamen operating the anti-aircraft batteries began to fire at the planes; I believe that not even 20 seconds passed from the moment they received the attack until the moment they began to fire, even effectively. Thus began the first combats, with a surprise attack, using planes with the insignia of our Air Force, painted in the same way. We were surprised in those seconds when we saw them pass, we wondered where those planes were coming from, we had no news of that, and they were enemy planes disguised. It was strange that they had launched the air attack about 36 or 38 hours before the main attack; perhaps they thought they would deceive us with the landing they attempted to carry out that night of the 14th to the 15th in the Baracoa area; they were waiting for them there, if they had landed, they would have lasted, really, very little.

But they would not have deceived us by carrying out that landing with a force of 200 men in Baracoa. For us, it was still a mystery what they were going to do with that numerous mercenary force, which was known to be trained —the whole world knew that— in Guatemala and other places: how they would employ it, whether they would use it in small groups to try to create many fronts, or concentrate it in one point —we preferred that they concentrate it, because we could solve the problem much faster—; nevertheless, we had taken measures: months before, a great cleanup had been carried out in the Escambray, which had reduced the total number of bandits in that place to less than 10%, with the participation of militiamen from all over the republic, but fundamentally from the City of Havana; around 50,000 men participated in that cleanup, acquired training, walked through the mountains, and gained experiences that would later be very useful in the battles of Girón.

But we had taken measures in case they decided to disperse that force into many groups, and in all the places on our coasts of possible landing we had placed, at least, a platoon, in all possible landing places!

We also analyzed the possibility that they would try to create around Cuba a kind of Taiwan; that they would want to seize, for example, what is now called the Isle of Youth, previously known as the Isle of Pines, where there were, by the way, thousands of counter-revolutionaries imprisoned, because many of those bandits captured in the Escambray were imprisoned there, there were no other places to take them, and many saboteurs, counter-revolutionaries, were also there. We had to foresee the possibility that they would try to land at that point, free those counter-revolutionary prisoners, and occupy a piece of national territory to establish a provisional government.

We had also foreseen the possibility that they would land in the Trinidad area, near the Escambray, and that area was undoubtedly among the places considered in their plans, but the great cleanup of the Escambray a few months earlier apparently led them to change their minds and, fundamentally, because we had greatly strengthened the Isle of Youth; there were thousands of fortified and well-armed combatants there, making it impossible for the island to be occupied by a mercenary invasion.

Measures were also taken in Trinidad, at the airport, on the coasts; the area was considerably strengthened, so that the possibility of them landing there was excluded. They were the ones who then had to solve the problem of where they would land if they decided to use all the forces together.

The prior bombing did not destroy all our planes, only some, thanks to the measures that had been taken. Even when the invasion occurred on the 17th, there were still more planes than pilots; there were about 8 or 10 planes left —those are the data we need to clarify— but there were only about seven pilots, not many more; I do remember that there were more planes than pilots.

The airports were further reinforced. Some theorists, coffee-and-milk strategists of imperialism, have said that one of the reasons for the failure was that the second bombing in San Antonio did not take place, to destroy the planes that we had left. But we had anticipated that as well; the airports were reinforced with many anti-aircraft defenses, the planes received greater protection; moreover, the essential thing is that before dawn on the 17th, once the landings in the Playa Larga and Playa Girón areas had been confirmed, the planes were already in the air, heading towards the Playa Larga and Playa Girón areas. They would not have found any planes on the ground; that was deliberate, because we anticipated the possibility of a new attack on our small air bases and our insignificant aviation.

When the news of the landings arrived, which we received around 2:00 in the morning when we were trying to rest for a few hours after days without sleep, upon waking up and being informed that landings were taking place in Playa Larga — I believe that was the first reported point — we headed to the command post.

How did we realize that this could be the main direction? As news continued to arrive about the landings in Playa Larga, where there had already been fighting with the militiamen guarding the place, and also about landings at Playa Girón, our first deduction was the following: They were indeed going to try to occupy a piece of national territory; a strategy that made a lot of sense, because it was not to be assumed that any mercenary expedition would defeat the people of Cuba; this had to be the beginning of a mechanism to organize a U.S. intervention through the OAS. That was crystal clear; they already had the devices created to form a government, they already had the organized group, they already had the leaders, they already had the president, the ministers, the chiefs, everyone, a government that would immediately request the support of the OAS. It was not to be assumed that with a mercenary expedition, even if it were 1,500, 5,000, 10,000, a hundred thousand!, they could defeat the people of Cuba; thus, it was clear that it was about setting up a device to implement foreign intervention.

The idea that hopes for success were based on a popular uprising is not believed by anyone, not even by those who asserted it; and if they really believed that at any time, it is proof of how misguided they were. But that was not the program, that was not the plan. Perhaps there was some hope among those who organized that mercenary expedition, but what they did was not to help an uprising; it was clear from the very first moment that they were going to seek a piece of territory — it was very clear to me. If they could no longer attack the Isle of Youth, because it was very fortified; if they could not land in Trinidad, a territory that could be defended in both directions, because the roads between the mountains that provide access lend themselves to defense, and join with the bandits of the Escambray, then it was clear that the territory that lent itself to that was the south of the Ciénaga de Zapata, since it was a piece of territory separated from the rest of the country by a swamp that is between eight and ten kilometers wide, more or less; a swamp that only had three points where it could be crossed: between Australia and Playa Larga, between Covadonga — further east — and San Blas, or between Yaguaramas and San Blas. There were three access points that were easy to cut off and defend.

When the news of the encounters of the platoons, from Playa Larga and Girón with the invaders, arrived, we clearly realized that it was the right place to carry out what they could no longer do in the Isle of Youth or in Trinidad, that the attack was coming from there, and all the necessary measures were taken; the first units were immediately ordered to be sent to that area.

It was clear that if they landed there, we had to guarantee at least the access of our troops through one of the three roads, and we tried to secure the one that was closest. We did not care if they seized a piece of territory in addition to the other two roads; at least one had to be in our hands, and that was the mission given to the School of Militia Leaders in Matanzas and to two battalions that were in that area: to guarantee one of the roads.

The necessary troops began to move to combat the enemy, but it was not one hundred percent of our troops; it was a small percentage of the total forces of the country. But units of tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft, and infantry began to mobilize in that direction, although still acting with due caution; anticipating the possibility that they might land at other points; even admitting, in theory — because one must always consider the different risks, even in theory — that it could be a distraction maneuver. But as the hours of the morning passed, with no further news of landings at other points, the idea was being confirmed that the enemy's main blow was going to come from there; also for that reason, before dawn, the planes were in the air and heading in that direction.

However, what definitively confirms the idea that the main blow was coming from there is when, at dawn, they drop paratroopers to take the road from Yaguaramas to San Blas; Covadonga-San Blas, Australia-Playa Larga, precisely in the swamp area. And indeed, they took the other two roads, but on one of them they were awaited by the militiamen. That is to say, at the entrance of the swamp, on the Australia-Playa Larga road, those who landed there by air could not occupy any position; those who tried to do so further south on that same road did not have time to reach the positions, and one of the three roads remained in our hands. That was very important. I believe that in any case we would have crushed them, even if they had the three roads, and that the tanks would have run over them, as they did in some places. But, of course, as I have said on other occasions, a straight road of 10 kilometers, in the middle of the swamp, which cannot be bypassed at all, becomes a kind of Pass of Thermopylae, easy to defend, very easy to defend, especially if one has tanks, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and a supposed air superiority, which is what the enemy believed. And indeed, they had it in terms of the number of planes and spare parts; they had a great air superiority, around 30 planes; we had around 11 and only 7 pilots. The secret lay in how those planes were employed.

The Pentagon's and the CIA's calculations seemed rational, that the famous brigade, with its tank company, its numerous anti-tank weapons, its artillery, its paratroopers, etc., very well trained by the CIA and the Pentagon, could hold that piece of territory. The launch of the paratroopers convinced us; indeed, there was no longer the slightest doubt about the main blow; it became clear, and then the objective of the Revolution was to give them no time at all, to give them no respite, because we could not give them time to consolidate a piece of territory and transfer the provisional government, which was already constituted and with the suitcases there in Miami waiting to land in Girón.

The curious thing about all this is that they chose the place, which if rationally could have characteristics similar to Trinidad or the Isle of Youth, easy to defend, they landed in one of the places we knew best; we knew it almost as well as the Sierra Maestra; because the Revolution, which took care of the most remote and poorest places in the country, not for military reasons but for social reasons, had already built in such a short time two tourist centers and three roads in that area. The curious thing, without a doubt, is that the three roads had been built by the Revolution just like the airport in Girón. We knew that area inside out, so a quick and precise response plan could be developed; of course, we could not specify how many planes the enemy had; we had to be careful about that, to avoid mistakes. And there was no doubt about what we should do with our planes; the mission of our planes was to sink the mercenary fleet.

So, even while their planes tried to strike our troops and support their troops, our planes focused on sinking the mercenary fleet, and indeed, two or three hours later, all the ships were sunk or fleeing; that famous fleet with its auxiliary ships did not last even three hours. The Yankees had been protecting them all the way for several days, they escorted them with aircraft carriers and destroyers, etc. and yet, they lasted there off Girón and Playa Larga as long as a meringue at the door of a school.

They could not hold out there; even the ship with the command and communications post was sunk by the accurate shots of our aviation, which, by the way, also shot down some enemy planes that morning. Of course, our troops could not be given protection at that moment. Around 11:00 in the morning, or between 10:00 and 11:00, two planes were assigned to support the battalion of militia leaders to cross the road towards Pálpite. It was the only moment when the planes were taken off the fleet to support our forces so that they could consolidate at that access.

However, there was a great movement of enemy planes; we could not know if there were 20, 50, or 100, who knows how many planes the United States could mobilize! That is why the troops were always accompanied by many anti-aircraft batteries, and during the day, instructions were given, especially to the artillery and tank units, not to exceed the limits of Jovellanos, so as not to bring them closer during the day to the area of operations. But when night began to fall, a torrent of artillery, men, and tanks marched towards the combat. Of course, there were not many tanks at first, because at that time there were only trucks to transport five tanks; those were already advanced; the others were moving along their axis, along the roads, having to cover more than 200 kilometers, but they were getting closer; there was plenty of ground artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, all the necessary infantry.

The enemy was not given a minute of respite, not a minute! That is an important principle. At 64 hours — because it was 64 hours; they say 72, less than 72, but they really landed around 2:00 in the morning of the 17th — and around 6:00 in the evening of the 19th, there was no organized resistance left; they were in total disarray. They were not given a minute of respite.

For sure, forces were sent in the remaining directions; but the bulk was going in the direction I mentioned.

We wanted to reach Girón that same night. Flavio recounts in one of his narratives the instructions he had, because he was in a tank, in one of the first four tanks that advanced on the enemy, and he says they had to reach Playa Larga, continue to Girón, and then march towards San Blas. He adds that all this had to be done in one night.

Perhaps Flavio and some of the readers imagine that this was too much. I am absolutely convinced that it was not misguided, nor exaggerated. Moreover, I am absolutely convinced that it could have been reached in Girón, at least, by the morning of the 18th; there was no need to wait until the 19th.

The enemy resistance was strong there, in Playa Larga; but — as I told you — we knew that territory like the back of our hand. When we saw the resistance they were putting up in the direction of Playa Larga, we were planning a simple, elementary flank movement, through a kind of narrow path, but one where motorized vehicles could pass, where tanks could pass, that is between Soplillar and Caleta del Rosario. We were waiting for the tanks that were coming along their axis to organize a flank movement to the left, to surround Playa Larga from the west, divide the mercenary force in two, and advance quickly, still at night, towards Girón. The enemy would possibly have encountered the tanks in Girón before dawn.

A battalion was also sent by land towards Cayo Ramona, to similarly divide the enemy between Girón and the roads they had occupied in the direction of Covadonga and Yaguaramas.

It was at that moment when, in my opinion — we would need to specify more data, the exact time when the remaining tanks arrived — I was contacted from the Command Post in Havana and informed that an enemy landing was taking place to the west of Havana. I found all of that very strange. I said: Do they have enough forces after the effort they are making here, after having launched the paratroopers? Do they have another army to launch to the west of Havana? I asked if it was certain, if it was verified, and I was informed that it was verified, that our forces had already made contact with the enemy.

This took place around 1:30 in the morning, when we were waiting for the tanks. Then, upon hearing the news that the enemy was indeed landing from the west of the capital, that it had been confirmed and contact had been made, I decided to immediately move to Havana. I truly regret this very much, since I believe that, despite how exaggerated the idea might have seemed, with the other tanks heading towards Girón, that plan could have been fulfilled. Now historians will have to speak with the tankers of that unit and other participants to clarify, but I had to leave for the capital.

I left a comrade at the Command Post of the Australia, who did not have much military experience, but I gave him all the instructions: Do not stop this movement, this operation. I returned, arriving at dawn. There was no highway like the one we have today, which reduces travel time so much; by car, the journey took three to four hours. Our vehicles had no means to communicate with Havana; we could speak by phone from a fixed point, from a location, but we did not even have radio communications at that time. And upon arriving at dawn in the city of Havana, I found with disappointment that the news of the landing was false.

I thought that in the west of Havana, a great battle would really take place. I said: Well, it will be even worse for the mercenaries if they land. Because in Havana we had the bulk of the forces, we even had naval forces: two frigates that we had armed against aircraft, we had saturated them with anti-aircraft guns; in Havana, our small aviation could have participated better, it was closer; the navy could have participated, and many more forces, many more combat means than those heading towards Girón.

Upon arriving here, what was confirmed was that there was no such landing, in reality. I will always feel the pain that that flank operation on the left could not be carried out that very dawn.

The enemy, which was putting up strong resistance at Playa Larga, retreated at dawn under the pressure of our forces; but it could retreat! It could join those who were in Girón. Otherwise, they would have been divided into two parts, with the simple expedient of cutting off the road along the route that I knew perfectly well.

And what had happened? The Yankee squadron simulated a landing in the areas of Cabañas and Bahía Honda. Indeed, they had simulated a landing; it is now known that they used electronic means and even created the entire impression of a landing and battles there with electronic means. That help provided by the Yankee squadron allowed the mercenaries to stay there for 30 more hours than they should have; they should not have lasted, at best, 48 hours. If they stayed for 64 hours, it was due to that maneuver and simulated landing that the Yankees carried out.

On the 18th, in light of the resistance being offered in the area of Playa Larga or in the direction of Playa Larga-Girón and the fact that all mercenary forces had gathered in Girón, we decided to accelerate and intensify the offensive through Covadonga and Yaguaramas; as a consequence, on the 18th, there was heavy fighting in that direction, because they also put up resistance, a desperate resistance — perhaps they were waiting for the Yankee aviation and fleet to intervene.

Also, on the 19th, we fought hard in that area as we advanced. I believe we had two or three helicopters at that time, which we used for troop transport. We positioned a small force east of Girón, several kilometers away, which advanced on land and received bazookas transported by helicopters; the helicopters were also used to transport a company of bazookas, which was to be positioned on the road between San Blas and Girón to cut them off there as well, since they were putting up resistance with tank support in San Blas. All those movements were carried out. They were actually ambushed with the group that was placed east of Girón towards Cienfuegos. That force was instructed to remain silent, not to give any signs of life, and to ambush along that road by the sea. That became a kind of trap where all the vermin that fled in that direction to the east, where there was no fighting, would be collected.

In reality, there was no idea of assaulting Girón on the same day 19, of continuing the enemy resistance; the idea was different. We already had 10,000 projectiles, 10,000 projectiles of howitzer and 122 mm howitzer, and the idea was to pound them completely with artillery that night of the 19th and assault the position on the 20th at dawn.

By noon or early afternoon, I was moving from the command post in Havana towards San Blas, and of course, as I said, I had no communication in the car, I had to stop from town to town and call by phone. I think I was calling Havana from Jovellanos, more or less, or from a nearby town, and I was informed that there was a new landing of mercenaries, that the aviation had detected many boats among the Yankee ships and Girón. I was left thinking. I really said: A landing at this hour, at this hour a new landing? I already knew that the forces advancing from Playa Larga were very close to Girón, just a few kilometers away, and that the others had already recovered the roads and were advancing from the north. I told the comrades at the command post: No, it is not a landing, it is an attempt at evacuation, it is an attempt at evacuation!

We instructed the aviation to use all means and to target all those boats that were heading towards the coast. We continued towards San Blas; we asked Pedrito to please use the artillery to the maximum and attack both the position of Girón and the sea area between the coast and the Yankee squadron; we could not allow the mercenaries to escape. At that moment, the objective was already to prevent them from escaping.

Of course, that entire battle was fought in view of the Yankee squadron and a Yankee aircraft carrier. No one knew what they were going to do, or what they would do; but no one was frightened by that. In fact, when some destroyers approached, they aimed the 85 mm cannons at them. I remember that when we arrived at Girón, the first tanks that were there, already at night, were placed on the shore of the sea facing the Yankee squadron, which had all its lights off. Occasionally, they would turn on some spotlight.

The entire battle of Girón was fought in view of the Yankee squadron and its aircraft carrier. I believe that this also gives a measure of the bravery of the fighters of Girón.

The news that an evacuation attempt was taking place, which was supposed to be a new landing and I was sure it was evacuation, was what determined us to continue operations and take Girón that same day, to prevent the mercenaries from escaping. That was indeed what was done.

When analyzing those events —and I repeat that I believe some historian, or a group of historians should make a thorough and precise compilation of everything that happened, the time each thing happened, since the lack of communication between the different units was also a serious problem—, I remember that after arriving at Girón, Pedrito's artillery, which had not received any information, continued bombarding those of us who were there. So I can imagine what the mercenaries went through, given what we went through with that bombardment; every time a barrage came out, the ground shook when they fired, it was not known where the barrage corresponded, whether to the sea or to the land. We were under bombardment from our own artillery for a while.

The lack of communications, the final orders, when we mounted four commanders, each in a tank, upon hearing that the road between San Blas and Girón was intercepted by a group of mercenaries with anti-tank guns; the lack of communication with the other forces advancing from Playa Larga prevented us from knowing exactly what was happening, and as it was getting dark, those tanks were ordered to speed over the guns. They came out and marched at full speed. It seems that the mercenaries, upon hearing the noise, or at some earlier moment, had already abandoned that position and the tanks reached Girón. What happened there was a cannon shot between two of our tanks, and almost a collision with the troops that advanced from Playa Larga.

There were many such incidents, unfortunately, due to the lack of communications, of adequate means of communication between the units and the dynamics of the situation. But that was not an obstacle to success nor did it serve as an excuse for the different forces to stop fulfilling their missions. Later, other incidents occurred, which have been discussed; I did not intend to speak so extensively about this, but a little with the desire to refer something to the new generations and to the millions who were born after Girón, I have extended a bit.

All those operations lasted —as I said— 64 hours. The demoralization of the enemy was total, absolute. The next day, a great effort was made to collect weapons and prisoners. The mercenaries were so demoralized that while collecting prisoners heading east, and pushing a bit those who remained scattered over there to fall into the trap of our troops that were situated in that direction, at a certain moment a strong gunfire broke out ahead; and it was that, despite my warnings, a tank that was with us advanced and ended up colliding with our own force. They told me: "There is a group offering tenacious resistance." I said: "Tenacious resistance on the morning of the 20th? I doubt it, it is very difficult." In any case, we sent a mortar and some force over there. Those who were ambushed, already accustomed, I can say spoiled in that task of capturing every prisoner who passed by there —the day before they had captured a mercenary company, or at least two platoons with a tank—, saw another tank that looked like theirs and also fired a bazooka shot. Another encounter among us. Fortunately, the bazooka shot was not fatal and some shots were exchanged, until —still no one knows how— they realized that they were not enemies. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but that was the tenacious resistance that I was informed some mercenaries were offering; a strange thing, because all this has its psychology, has its laws, and when demoralization comes, it is total. Those mercenary forces become completely demoralized, isolated groups do not offer resistance, neither tenacious, nor soft, nor of any kind. That is the mentality of mercenaries or of those who do not have a deep and just cause to defend.

At that moment, another thing happened, I was heading towards that point of the supposed combat, I was about 30 meters from the shore, along that road there are caleta grapes, some groves between the sea and the road, and I passed within 10 meters, almost from here to that door, of a squad of armed mercenaries lying among the trees. I did not see them, they saw me and recognized me; they did not shoot, we learned later in the interrogations, they were totally demoralized and I am not surprised. Not a single mercenary fired a shot from the moment they disorganized, not one!; some remained on the "Houston" stranded on the shore of the Bay of Pigs to avoid sinking, since Carreras had hit it with a direct rocket, a direct hit on the first day, it was sinking, they launched it towards the coast. There remained part of a battalion, those did not know what had happened and were still putting up some resistance on the night of the 19th. That problem was also resolved later.

I would say that the most notable thing about all those events of Girón was the bravery, the patriotism, the daring of the fighters; that was the most outstanding aspect of that battle, the behavior of all the men who participated in it, of any comrade who was given any mission: the aviation, the seven pilots —well, they wiped out the squadron and wiped out part of the enemy aviation, the one that the anti-aircraft artillery did not wipe out; the enemy aviation practically disappeared, was destroyed; the squadron was partially destroyed and the rest fled at full speed, they did not show up in those places again, and there were seven pilots, the enemy had around 30 planes—, the bravery of the tankers, of the gunners, of the operators of the anti-aircraft guns, many of whom were boys of 16, 17, and 18 years old; the infantry, the continuous advance, without stopping at any risk, against an enemy that was entrenched and had to be dislodged, with almost no communications, in which each chief often had to act at their discretion.

In the first attack in the early morning of the 18th against Playa Larga, the tanks reached the enemy trenches. One of the four tanks fell on an enemy trench; one of the five remained as a command post, and the four that advanced reached the very trenches.

The infantry advanced along a straight road at night, in the early morning, where there was no protection at all; any comrade who was given any mission fulfilled it instantly, without any hesitation. Those were the characteristics of Girón: heroism above all. Such circumstances made the casualties greater.

The enemy was entrenched, our forces had to advance through straight paths; and above all, the enemy aviation initially caused casualties because it attacked buses with personnel that were being transported, it attacked trucks with troops, on various occasions, deceiving them: they would pass by, wave, and the comrades believed it was our own aviation; they would return and machine-gun them. This contributed to increasing the casualties, to the extent that 156 comrades, including those who died after the combat, who had been wounded, lost their lives in those actions.

At that time, we did not have the number of doctors that we have today, the experience that we have today, the techniques that we have today. However, it taught us the importance of medical assistance. Had we had the medical assistance of today and the means that we have today, we could have saved many wounded who died. That is the truth. Hundreds of comrades were wounded in those combats, in which, I repeat, what stood out the most was the heroism, the bravery, the patriotism, the revolutionary spirit of the combatants.

Another event of enormous historical importance is the fact that, precisely, on the day of the burial, at the same hour of the burial of those who fell in the air attack on the 15th, the socialist character of the Revolution was proclaimed. This fact is as historically significant as the battles of Playa Girón themselves; in fact, it takes place before the battle of Girón and before the outcome of that battle.

The imperialists said that this was a betrayed revolution, when the Revolution began to make popular laws, just laws, laws, even, announced years before, because they were the laws that had been proposed following Moncada; it was the program of Moncada that was rigorously fulfilled. The reduction of rents was one of the first, the reduction of electricity rates, the recovery of ill-gotten goods; and, of course, the most important, the one that unleashed the empire's wrath, the Agrarian Reform Law, which was not a super-radical agrarian reform law. It was relatively so, if one takes into account that there were large estates, that many American companies had tens of thousands of hectares, that one had more than 200,000 hectares; a law that establishes a maximum limit of approximately 400 hectares is a very radical law. But in the world, if one takes into account the amount of land that was left to landowners in other parts, it was not a very radical law, because up to 30 caballerías were left in the first Agrarian Reform Law that was made; but since it affected the interests of large American companies, it is what unleashed the decision to wage war against the country.

It was in May 1959 that the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. Later, other laws were made, further on the Urban Reform Law was enacted, a whole set of revolutionary laws that was the content of the Moncada program; it was not yet a properly socialist program.

Of course, imperialism began to take measures against the Revolution, economic measures, to close all credits, threatened to take away our sugar quota, took away the sugar quota, gradually removing it; and in response to each action of the enemy, the response of the Revolution: American companies were nationalized, oil refineries were intervened, because they refused to refine Soviet oil. Since apparently Soviet oil is communist oil and, therefore, is different from others, the Yankee refinery could not refine communist oil; then, we demonstrated that it could indeed refine that oil: we intervened in the refinery and with the support of the workers, the Soviet oil that had arrived was refined. Even at that time, a quantity of oil from Venezuela was also being refined.

As a consequence of the laws of the Revolution, which consisted of punishing the murderers, the henchmen, recovering the money stolen from the country and the other measures mentioned, they began to say that this was a betrayed revolution, that this was socialism, that this was communism and that, therefore, it was a betrayed revolution.

Now, after the bombings following the aggression of Girón, and when our people were facing the imminence of an attack whose scale and consequences no one could imagine, at a moment when we were perhaps facing the greatest war in all our history —because no one knew how that which began in that way would conclude—, the socialist character of the Revolution was openly proclaimed, and, therefore, our people fought directly for socialism, for the socialist Revolution.

Of course, at the moment the aggression occurred and as a consequence of all the measures that were taken previously, some of them in response to the action of imperialism and in response to the action of the counter-revolution, it could be said that the socialist phase of the Revolution was already beginning; because after having previously nationalized 35 American sugar mills on August 6, 1960, as well as the oil refineries and other American companies, on October 13 of that year, all Banking was nationalized and, in addition, 383 large companies existing in the country were nationalized. When the mercenary attack of Playa Girón occurred, the Banking was nationalized, the large monopolies were nationalized, the American properties were nationalized, the large companies were nationalized regardless of their nationality; the country had regained control of its natural resources and industries. A new stage was beginning and the socialist character was openly explained; then, those men fought and died for socialism.

Let us say that for socialism fought and died all those who have fought and died in Cuba, in every historical stage —if we see socialism as what it is, a superior stage of the development of human society—, from those who rose up with Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, those who fought with Agramonte, Gómez and Maceo in the first war of independence, which at that time translated immediately into the abolition of slavery, which was as radical an act as nationalizing American properties and the large capitalist enterprises of the country; because at that time the world could not be conceived without slavery. Then, in the struggle for independence, our patriots, when they rebelled against Spain, when they called on the peasants and called on the slaves to enlist in the ranks of the Liberation Army, carried out an act of enormous radicalism for independence, for the freedom of the homeland, for justice in our country. And socialism is the superior form of justice, it is the superior form of humanism, it is the superior form of dignity and fraternity among men, it is the superior form of true freedom!

Then, we can rightly say that all those who have fought in the history of our homeland, since October 1868, also fought for socialism; only that for the first time directly and in an advanced stage of our history and the development of our society and our people, which was one of the most heroic peoples of this hemisphere, because it had to fight alone against Spain!, alone!, against hundreds of thousands of Spanish soldiers, when our population barely exceeded one million inhabitants. And they bequeathed us those heroic traditions, which were what we later gathered in 1953, when we began the last and definitive struggle for independence! Those fighters made these advances possible, made it possible that before the 100 years of that feat were fulfilled, we could begin the construction of socialism in our country.

Our people —I said— has been one of the most heroic in this hemisphere, because of its history, because of its deeds, because of what it did in the last century, but also because of what it did in this century! We believed and were sure that the people who were capable of doing what they did in the last century were also capable of doing what they did in the present century, of achieving the feat of becoming the first socialist state in the western hemisphere, a fact that, for the pride of present and future generations, took place in our country.

Also in this century, and in this hemisphere, we had to fight alone, for many years, against the Yankee empire much more powerful than the Spanish empire; and even betrayed by the vast majority of the governments of Latin America. Then, this people earned the right to fight for freedom, to fight for independence, to fight for justice and to fight for socialism.

Those who fought and died in the Escambray on the eve of the invasion, or in other provinces of the country, fighting against the bandits, also fought for socialism, and those who died in the clandestinity, those who died in the Sierra Maestra, those who died in Moncada. That is the idea, the conviction that we have. But the imperialists and the worms said it was a betrayed revolution. On the contrary, never was loyalty served more to a revolution!

In Girón —so that there would be no doubt—, our people and those thousands of combatants who were capable of so many feats, did it for socialism openly! so that there would be no doubt left to imperialism and its sycophants.

There are two great historical events.

Some journalists from the United States say they were calculating a rebellion that did not occur. There are some, even, who say: "And it did not occur because quick measures were taken with the dissidents" —the counter-revolutionary worms, as you know, are called dissidents, and they did not rise up. Indeed, many were arrested because we knew who they were, to prevent acts of sabotage, but those people were so fragmented, had so little strength in our people and were so demoralized, that not even being chickens, who get up every day, would they have risen on the morning of April 17.

Those gentlemen would not have been able to stage anything here that even remotely resembled an uprising. To carry out an uprising, one must have the people, and since when did the counter-revolutionary worms have the people in our country? They do not understand that.

Others have said, perhaps with a little more logic, that it was due to the fact that the laws of the Revolution were popular. I am very glad that they said that the laws of the Revolution were popular! that expropriating or confiscating from the landowners, from the capitalists, from the owners of large companies and from the Yankee monopolies, are very popular laws! But I also tell you that those popular laws, very popular, are socialist laws and are communist laws!

Then, I ask myself why so much anti-socialism, why so much anti-communism, if the laws that socialism and communism make are popular laws, are just laws, are laws for which the people are willing to die. With that, they confess, without realizing it, that what has nothing popular, nor just, is capitalism, is the exploitation of man by man, is the latifundism, are the imperialist investments and all those measures to exploit the people, to keep them uneducated, abandoned, without medical assistance, without employment many times, wrapped in corruption and vice. That is what they are confessing when, seeking justifications, they say that the people did not rise up since the laws were popular! We are very glad that they recognize it, because that is what the strength of the Revolution is based on, on the justice that its laws and measures entail, on the justice that the social changes entail.

Of course, things as odious as begging, prostitution, racial discrimination, illiteracy and all those ills of capitalism, and even more so of capitalism in the underdeveloped world, cannot be, under any circumstances, popular. We are glad that they recognize that socialism puts an end to all those calamities.

Many lessons can be drawn from Girón. It would be impossible to enumerate them all, nor do I intend to do that; but I do want to point out something that, although I have mentioned it on another occasion, should not cease to be repeated on a day like today: the importance of Girón does not lie in the magnitude of the battle, of the combatants, of the heroic deeds that took place there; the great historical significance of Girón is not what occurred, but what did not occur thanks to Girón!

I do not refer to the fact that capitalism would have returned to our country if they had succeeded in consolidating their beachhead, because they would not have been able to establish capitalism in our country again! I am sure of that! Not because it prevented a plan that would have turned our country back into a Yankee colony, because I am convinced that this country would never have returned to being a Yankee colony!

The significance of Girón lies in the price we would have had to pay for our Revolution, the price we would have had to pay for socialism, if the Yankee plan had succeeded and they consolidated a beachhead.

At that time, the events of the Vietnam War had not yet occurred, nor the imperialist defeat in Vietnam. And we here, in the proximity of the United States, isolated, without any logistical possibilities, would have had to fight the battle of Vietnam in our own country, with a population much smaller than that of Vietnam, in a piece of territory much smaller than Vietnam and without borders with any socialist country, but rather with the United States, the aggressor country.

How much would that battle have cost our people, if their plans had succeeded, if they managed to bring that government that was ready with their bags next to the plane! It is a shame that they did not reach Girón; they would have also fallen among the entire mercenary group and we would have had all those big shots, the entire Council of Ministers.

We said that we would have had to be the first to face what Vietnam later faced under different conditions. Because, were they going to subdue the people again? Were they going to bring capitalism? Were we going to surrender?

In Girón, two things operated; the tactic employed was a combination of the experience we brought from irregular warfare with elements of conventional warfare, all the type of movement that was made in the enemy's rear. We came from the Sierra Maestra, we already knew that experience; we were not totally inexperienced.

The country was armed; I already said that we had hundreds of thousands of weapons, and a people willing to fight and die. Could they have disarmed that people? Suppose they had been able to consolidate the beachhead; could they have occupied the entire country —the plains, the mountains, the cities— without fighting? Would they have taken away our 300,000 weapons? They would not have been able to take them from us. And who could be more convinced of that than us? If we had gone through the experience of the Sierra Maestra, if we had stayed there with just a few rifles, if we faced a huge army of 80,000 men armed. And we resumed the fight with seven rifles, the ones that the group with Raúl had and the ones I had, seven rifles! against a huge army. Could they take the seven rifles from us? The seven rifles multiplied many times and continued to multiply.

The specialty of the Cuban revolutionaries was to fight with the enemy's weapons. When the war ended, more than 90% of the Rebel Army's weapons were weapons taken from Batista's army. Precisely our philosophy was to fight with the enemy's weapons. Imagine! Even if the Yankees and their OAS lackeys had intervened, could they have disarmed us? Never! A terrible war would have broken out in our country; hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Cubans would have died; but they would not have been able to subdue us, I am sure that, in the end, instead of 300,000 weapons, we would have had a million weapons. And let the Yankees know that from now on, that is what awaits them if they invade our country.

Girón meant that those who fell there preserved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Cubans, saved the lives, perhaps, of millions of Cubans. We would have achieved victory anyway, but at a terrible cost and also at the price of the total destruction of the country. That is one of the lessons we must draw from Girón; it is one of the things that new generations must understand and must always know, the indelible merit of Girón.

But Girón also had other ramifications, which highlight the cost to humanity that these imperialist adventures can have. As a consequence of Girón, of the defeat suffered by imperialism, of its resentment, of its humiliation, ideas emerged in the U.S. government aimed at a direct aggression against our homeland, and to seek revenge and the destruction of the Revolution through that route. This led to the measures that later originated the October Crisis and that nearly brought the world to a nuclear war. You see the significance of the irresponsible acts of imperialism that, through Girón and the defeat suffered there, almost led the world to infinitely greater tragedies. That is another of the lessons, the unpredictable consequences of the irresponsible acts of imperialism.

Girón also teaches us about the perfidy, aggressiveness, and voracity of the imperialists, their way of acting, their characteristic style.

Many will remember that after the bombing on April 15, they said that it was attacks from our own Air Force that had rebelled, and so stated the representative of the United States at the United Nations, the great lie!, calmly. It is still not known whether the man knew what he was saying or if he was deceived, because they deceived their own people.

At that moment, the head of the American delegation was Stevenson, a politician who had some prestige in the United States, who was seen as a liberal man, and they made him say that —he declared it—, so you can see the methods of imperialism, the style of imperialism: treacherous, surprise attack, at dawn, with planes that bore the insignia of the country, see what degree of perfidy.

But not only did Girón demonstrate the aggressiveness and perfidy of imperialism; before Girón, they had organized a similar plan in Guatemala and had overthrown the democratic government of Arbenz; except that in Girón, the only mistake they made was not realizing the diversity of circumstances in which they carried out that adventure and in which they tried to carry this one out.

After Girón, they intervened in Santo Domingo, with tens of thousands of soldiers, to crush the revolutionary struggle of the Dominican people.

After Girón, they carried out their bloody and brutal war in Vietnam, which cost millions of lives to that heroic people.

After Girón, they promoted the intervention of the South Africans in Angola, to try to prevent the MPLA's victory.

After Girón, they promoted the reactionary intervention against the Ethiopian Revolution.

After Girón, they carried out countless aggressions against Arab countries and against the Palestinian people, through Israel.

After Girón, they intervened wherever there was a revolution, organized dirty wars wherever the people fought against genocide or feudalism, both in Kampuchea and in Afghanistan.

After Girón, they organized their dirty war against Nicaragua, mined its ports, promoted the formation of mercenary bands, which have committed all kinds of atrocities and crimes.

After Girón, they supported the genocidal government of El Salvador, which has cost the lives of tens of thousands of Salvadorans. They supported the genocidal government of Guatemala, which has cost that country, after the intervention against the Arbenz government, more than 100,000 lives, and among the victims, tens of thousands of disappeared.

After Girón, they intervened in Grenada.

After Girón, they intervened in Lebanon, machine-gunning, bombing, and killing Lebanese.

After Girón, 25 years later, they just attacked Libya. This demonstrates the aggressive, perfidious character of imperialism; everywhere with the same method, the same lack of scruples, the same total absence of morality. That teaches us what imperialism is: perfidy, aggressiveness, voracity.

Imperialism today has the peoples of Latin America by the neck, plunged into the worst of crises, with a public debt of almost 400 billion dollars, high interest rates, dumping, protectionism. Imperialism is insatiable; that is what Girón also demonstrates to us, what they did here was to recover their properties, to restore their capitalism, to reappropriate the natural resources of this country; for that same reason, they have waged wars everywhere. That is also another of the important lessons of Girón, an unforgettable lesson.

And to understand what that imperialism is, the role it plays against the peoples, the role it plays against the hopes for peace of humanity, the role it plays against the interests of Latin America, one did not have to read Marx, or Engels, or Lenin, because all these events I have mentioned occurred long after those visionary men died, and they objectively teach the Latin American peoples who divides them, who exploits them, who keeps them in underdevelopment and poverty, who intervenes, who conspires against their independence. These are lessons we must reflect on and that help us understand the phenomenon of imperialism.

Precisely in these days, when the 25th anniversary of the victory of Girón is celebrated, on the very April 15, the empire again launches its claw through a surprise attack, a treacherous attack against a small Arab country, a small country of the Third World; the brutal, shameful, criminal, terrorist attack carried out against the people of Libya. We have witnessed what has just occurred; do we want a greater example of perfidy and aggressiveness?

In light of these events, comrades, our representative at the United Nations declared, in a strong denunciation before the Security Council, that the authors of these acts were the legitimate heirs of Hitler, and the representative of France, who was presiding over the Security Council, felt it was his duty to protest against that statement from the representative of Cuba. The illustrious representative of France protested. And, of course, Mr. Vernon Walters, the representative of the United States at the United Nations, declared himself moved, we could say, melted with gratitude towards the representative of France for opposing that comparison. And I ask myself: Why be scandalized? Why close one’s eyes to the facts and realities? I have the deep conviction that Reagan is as unscrupulous, as opportunistic, and as irresponsible as Hitler.

And he is still, potentially, more dangerous than Hitler; Hitler did not have nuclear weapons, Hitler did not possess that arsenal of aircraft carriers, bombers, submarines, battleships, rockets, electronic weapons, and sophisticated equipment of all kinds for destruction and death. Compared to what Mr. Reagan has with what Hitler had, they could seem like bows and arrows or spears; compared to the destructive potential that Nazi Germany had with the current destructive potential that the United States possesses! Even if Hitler had wanted to, he could not have brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war; he could not carry out adventures that could mean the extermination of humanity.

What have they just done in Libya, what have they done?

Incredible, unusual, practically all norms have been violated, all precedents have been broken. They have just openly confessed that the objective of the bombing of Libya was the assassination of the leader of that country, the assassination of Khadafi.

The "Washington Post" stated today that, according to Pentagon officials, "they hoped to catch him" —I quote verbatim. The U.S. Secretary of State himself stated on the other hand that one of the objectives was to eliminate the soldiers most loyal to Khadafi who were in that barracks and promote a coup.

We knew that the United States had planned the assassination of political leaders of other countries —poisoning plans, personal attacks, all kinds of methods and plans recognized by them—, barbaric and brutal methods and plans to settle political differences in today's world; but what had not occurred until now was the precedent that the government of one of the most powerful countries on Earth would use its armed forces, its most sophisticated bombers, to attempt to assassinate the head of state of another country with which it is not even at war, in a treacherous and surprise attack, executed in the early hours of the morning. Because the incredible thing, what they can no longer hide, is that the attack against Libya had, first of all, the purpose of assassinating Khadafi. They did not take into account at all that his family was there; they knew with absolute precision that his family was there, that Khadafi's wife and children were there. They launched dozens of planes to pulverize the exact site where they were; they were also not concerned about putting the lives of the civilian population and foreign embassy personnel in Tripoli at risk; they unleashed a deluge of bombs on populated areas.

It is said that of Khadafi's children, the youngest, a 15-month-old girl, died in the bombing, that other children of Khadafi were injured; the aggressors themselves, in televised footage, have proven that they directed the attack against Khadafi, against Khadafi's residence, where Khadafi and his family were. Nothing more repugnant, nothing more brutal can be conceived. This has no precedent in contemporary history.

Why be scandalized, why be astonished, why be embarrassed that it is said that Reagan is a legitimate heir of Hitler? As far as I know, from the history of World War II, there is not even a precedent there for what Mr. Reagan has just done, nor is there a precedent for such great shamelessness as they have shown by confessing that those were their objectives. They are so cynical that, as the "Washington Post" declares today, they already had a statement prepared in advance to explain that Khadafi's death was accidental; and one of those bloodthirsty pilots declares boldly that he is frustrated because they could not fulfill the mission of assassinating Khadafi, although I suppose he does not feel so frustrated since they assassinated part of his family.

These facts, I repeat, have no precedent. How far are we going to go down that path? What are Europeans astonished by? How does the bombing of Tripoli, carried out by Reagan, differ from the bombing of Warsaw at the beginning of World War II; from the bombing of Amsterdam; from the bombing of London? How do they differ? And why were Hitler's acts, when challenging a power more or less equal in strength, more ignoble than the acts carried out by Reagan when bombing the capital of a small Third World country? Do Europeans not know how those adventures led to those tragedies?

It is true that France suffered —as its representative said— greatly from the claws of fascism; but other peoples suffered even more than France, such as Poland, which lost 6 million, or Yugoslavia, which also lost millions of people, or the Soviet Union, which lost twenty million men, women, and children!

For our part, we fully support and stand in solidarity with the statements of the representative of Cuba in the United Nations Security Council.

How do Reagan's methods differ from Hitler's methods?

Hitler initiated undeclared wars, with surprise attacks from his bombers at any hour of the day or night.

Reagan, surprisingly, attacked Grenada, surprisingly mined the ports of Nicaragua, without a declared war in either case; surprisingly, treacherously bombed Tripoli in the early hours of the morning, to eliminate the Head of State and his family, against all norms and all traditions, even against the laws of war. His methods of systematically using lies to try to justify his actions, seeking any kind of pretext, whether for the crimes committed in Grenada or for the crimes committed in Nicaragua or the crimes committed in Tripoli, are Hitlerian methods. The way he grossly manipulates public opinion to seek support for his policy using mass media is Hitlerian methods. His constant exaltation of chauvinism, of vulgar patriotism, are Hitlerian methods. His arrogance, his overbearingness, his contempt for international public opinion and especially for the peoples of the Third World, which even reflects a racist connotation, are unmistakably Hitlerian. That is Reagan's behavior, so I really do not see the differences.

Right now, following the bombing of Tripoli, it is said that polls reflect 77% support from the American public for that action, while the rest of the world, everyone, even British public opinion, despite the fact that the English government was dragged into Reagan's adventure, is against that aggression; when world opinion, practically unanimously, is against what has been done, we find the phenomenon that a majority of the American people supports it. The same had already happened with Grenada.

Of course, we also know that when Hitler occupied Austria, the vast majority of the German people, poisoned by chauvinism and fascism, applauded the annexation; when Hitler initiated the war with a fabricated pretext, invaded and occupied Poland, the vast majority of the German people, poisoned by militarism, fascism, and chauvinism, which are essentially the same thing, applauded; and when Hitler invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France, and occupied the territory of those countries, the vast majority of the German people applauded those crimes of Hitler, just as today the American people applauds what happened in Tripoli and Grenada.

Where is the difference? If there is any difference at all, it is that Hitler did not have such power and, therefore, did not pose the danger that this administration of the United States does with its equally irresponsible and unscrupulous actions.

I believe there are many coincidences for them to be merely the product of chance.

Comrades:

In our country, the Party Program is currently being discussed among the entire population. At the end of the year, in a special meeting, the delegates to the Third Congress will analyze and approve that Program. The conditions under which this great Program will have to be fulfilled are not easy; indeed, the conditions under which we have to fulfill our economic plans: the plan for the year 1986, the five-year plan, and the prospective plans, are not easy at all. On a day like today, we must also reflect on these matters. There are circumstances, some arising even after the Congress, that make the task more difficult, although not unachievable.

Our country, at the end of last year, suffered the blow of nature, the hurricane that laid low 70% of our sugarcane, which made the harvest much harder and more difficult. Despite the great effort made by our workers, undoubtedly, in the final results, our sugar plans will be affected by no less than half a million tons at a minimum; and if it does not rise to a million or a million and a half, it is due to the effort of our sugar workers.

But we did not only have the hurricane, paradoxically, and even, incredibly: the drop in the dollar has affected us.

Many will wonder: How is it possible that the drop in the dollar affects Cuba? Precisely the imperialists wanted to lower the dollar now, and they wanted to lower it because they have a huge trade deficit, and to be able to compete with the Japanese and Europeans —among the major capitalist countries they agreed— measures were taken that lowered the value of the dollar.

It is that for us, who sell sugar and all our export products as is universal practice priced in dollars —if sugar is at four cents, it is four cents of dollar—, when the dollar drops in value, the prices of those exports also drop; but fundamentally, the prices of what we import from the convertible area increase, since we cannot import from the United States, we import from Japan or we import from Europe, then we acquire fewer German marks, fewer French francs, fewer British pounds, and fewer Japanese yen for a dollar. With a ton of sugar, we acquire fewer products in those countries. If we imported from the United States, this situation would be favorable, as the dollar becomes cheaper. For our blocked country, these paradoxes occur, where we suffer some consequences, along with other Third World countries, when the dollar is high, such as high interest rates, and the bad consequences when the dollar is low.

But not only that, another astonishing thing: the drop in oil prices is affecting us considerably. Quite simply: we also export oil, a part of our production; and everything we save from what we import from the USSR, we export.

I had the opportunity to talk about this following the Energy Forum, what it meant in convertible currency to save a gallon of fuel, a barrel, a ton, cent by cent. In these years, and thanks to the enormous efforts of saving, while sugar prices remained extraordinarily low, one of our main sources of income in convertible currency was oil exports, hundreds of millions of dollars. With the reduction in price, we have been affected practically by two-thirds of the value of oil, failing to receive hundreds of millions of dollars; thus, hundreds of millions of dollars in convertible currency!, which largely undermined the enormous effort of saving that we had been making and that we must, even more so, continue to make.

All this that I am mentioning about oil occurs just a few weeks after our Congress. This increases the difficulties of the country. This forces us to make an even greater effort.

Why do I mention these issues here, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary? Because now we are not fighting against mercenaries, we do not have mercenary invasions; however, we have another type of mercenaries, or people who play the role of mercenaries, sometimes even people who are usually called good, people willing to fight for the Revolution if there is war, but who do things that go against the interests of the Revolution, that go against the Revolution, and many because they do not even have a deep revolutionary consciousness. All this obliges us to make an effort.

In the Party Congress, very precise lines were drawn. Harsh, sharp criticisms were made of the problems that persist; and we made the commitment to fight against those problems, to detect them one by one and combat them. We are discussing the Program, as we said earlier. Without these problems I refer to, we would have to fulfill the line drawn by the Congress, but today, with the greater difficulties we will have, it is much more important and decisive to fulfill that line. We have to be much more uncompromising against everything that is poorly done, against everything that is incorrect; we have to carry out a much more consistent struggle against problems that persist, or new problems that develop. I spoke about this with the pioneers following their 25th anniversary. With even more reason, we must address this problem before our entire population.

We do not have today the problems —I repeat— that we had 25 years ago; but we have indifferent people, negligent people, those people I told the pioneers about who do not want to struggle; irresponsible people, people who are not sufficiently demanding within the scope of their responsibilities, tolerant people. We have people who seek privileges; people who seek easy money, not coming from their work, but from shady dealings, from speculation, from illicit trade. I would not want, on a day like today, to have to mention many, of which there are some shameful ones, who in an apparently legal way have earned 100,000 pesos in a year, and even more —tell me, gentlemen, in socialism—, for I know that some painting and selling pictures or doing decorative work, mainly for state agencies, have earned even more than 200,000 pesos in a year. This is to cite an example of exaggerated incomes that do not seem to me to be the result of real work, because neither, comrades, are the paintings of Picasso or Michelangelo.

This demonstrates the irresponsibility of many officials, because it is the people's money that is invested in this way. On the other hand, some have confused self-employment with capitalism, or with the right to engage in capitalist commerce, some have confused it! Yes, we have those problems. You can imagine, that one who earns 100,000 pesos earns twenty times in a year what heart transplant doctors earn, twenty times! I have seen those selfless, modest doctors, with their salary, which can be 5,000, even up to 6,000 pesos in a year; and some individuals, engaging in shady dealings, or similar things, have earned 100,000 and more.

You also know well how critical I was of the practices of the free peasant market, when certain individuals sold a head of garlic for one peso to pocket it personally without any benefit for the people, it was not the peasant working honestly, sweating, who receives, on the other hand, all the facilities that the Revolution provides for the education of their children, for medical assistance, all the possibilities, without lacking anything; but rather people who, far from obtaining honest income by cultivating the land, enriched themselves by trading, stealing, selling at high prices, exorbitantly. This, combined with other practices such as goods that must be delivered to the state purchasing agency according to commitments for credits, inputs, and other benefits and guarantees received, and are not delivered to then sell them in the other market. That was a practice, an experience.

Some of the things that have caused these problems we have created ourselves and we must also know how to rectify them in a timely manner, because there are people who unfortunately confuse income from work with income from speculation and shady dealings, which border on theft or constitute true theft. Just as there are some of our company directors who have turned into petty entrepreneurs, capitalist types. Because the first thing a revolutionary cadre, a socialist cadre, a communist cadre must ask themselves is not whether their company earns more, but how the country earns more. From the moment we have supposed entrepreneurs who care more about the company than about the interests of the country, we have a full-fledged capitalist. The System of Direction and Planning of the Economy was not created to start playing at capitalism; and some play shamefully at capitalism, we know it, we see it. Those things must be rectified.

Just as some, by raising prices, want to be profitable and distribute bonuses charging any price for anything, that way anyone is profitable, right? Not long ago, I visited the "Ameijeiras" hospital and saw that they had some very well-maintained elevators, reinforced with stainless steel plates —I went to see a new piece of equipment we have acquired, very sophisticated, very useful, very humane, that is already working; one truly admires the effort that the doctors, specialists, and all their workers make in that hospital— and they told me: "Do you know how much they asked us to install those stainless steel plates? Ten thousand pesos, ten thousand!" In the end, they settled for 5,000. I said: "How many workers?" "No, two." "How many days?" "Fifteen days." Well, the salary expense must be about 300 pesos. The plates were from the hospital and the company that charged those prices was a state company.

One must really be shameless —I’m not talking about the workers, but those who organize these businesses— to charge thirty times the salary for a job that takes 15 days. That way, you can be profitable. We have seen that nefarious spirit.

For fixing an apartment, I don’t know what work was done there to polish, they charged the hospital 40,000 pesos.

We have already talked about this in Congress among the problems we have to combat. We also know the issues of resource diversion; we see them. Not long ago, I came across a crane —I was touring an area, looking at some issues of interest to the economy— that was there. The individual had gathered a 16-ton crane, a Japanese Kato crane, a Japanese concrete mixer, a truck to transport the concrete mixer, a water truck, all from the State, to really pour the roof of the house. He had bought a little piggy bank for those who helped him that day, beers and other things; the three trucks came from three different centers: one, the crane, from the brigade that builds the East Thermoelectric Plant in Santa Cruz —I saw it personally, no one told me —; the other truck, with the concrete mixer, came from the oil company that is in front of the "José Martí" children's city, and the water truck, from a quarry on the highway.

This one individual, by virtue of his friends and his connections, had gathered on the same day the crane, the concrete mixer, the truck to transport it, and a water truck, all of it. Just imagine how and where all the materials came from! He was building a house; we are glad, of course, that people build houses, but that they do it honestly. It is a house of 150 square meters, although this citizen's salary is 199 pesos a month, working as a warehouse manager at a gastronomy center. If he decides to sell it, they pay him up to 40,000 pesos; a buyer appears because those who steal in one way or another, those who receive abundant income not coming from work, buy either a house already built or the Capitol if it is sold to them.

So, where do those thousands of pesos come from? They do not come from work.

The State provides resources, credits to repair or build homes, offers all possibilities, has just approved a generous law that makes it possible to own the homes delivered or to be delivered, at a modest price and without any profit. What need is there to divert resources, what need is there to engage in shady dealings, whatever the needs that exist in this area, which are great?

When I was telling the President of the Planning Board about the experience, he said to me: "On Sunday, I found a crane doing the same thing, but this was a 40-ton crane."

You can imagine what we do in large construction works to pour concrete, which we lift in buckets with cranes, the most sophisticated in construction; there are people here who have such skills and such friendships, and there are so many people so lacking in control that they can use this State technique to pour the roofs of their houses. It would be worth asking the brigade and the company that build the East Thermoelectric Plant, how did they not find out that a 16-ton truck crane, bought with convertible currency, was missing for three days? Because it was taken on Friday and returned on Monday. Someone must have given a justification there to cover it up and things like that, collusion, all those things we know exist, as we know of people who seek privileges at all costs, who divert resources.

And, of course, this is a struggle. When we talk about the Party Program, when we talk about Congress and the measures, it means not that we are going to make a campaign today and forget about it later, no. We do not want to make a cultural revolution here, we do not want to solve problems through extremist methods and launch the masses against those responsible for such irritating acts. I am, however, convinced that organized and disciplined masses are the ones that can help win this battle, and among the masses, the mass of our Party and our communist youth. This also requires more vigilance from the committees, because the committee knows what is happening; if suddenly a guy starts building a super house, and then, besides, sells it for any amount of money.

We cannot adapt to what is poorly done. We cannot fall into those confusions. Can anyone here be engaging in shady dealings without the people seeing it, without the masses seeing it? We do not want to launch the masses, I repeat, against those responsible so that they themselves put an end to these activities, because we have the Party, we have the youth, we have the organizations; what we must do is carry out a systematic, serious, and tenacious struggle, pressing from top to bottom, and from bottom to top! with great force.

Our Party must be alert, very alert! We have half a million Party members, including members and aspirants, a tremendous force —if we, when we started the struggle against tyranny, had had an organization of half a million members!—; plus another half a million members in the youth, what an incredible force; the mass organizations, the millions of men and women organized in unions, the defense committees, the federation, the pioneers, a tremendous, incredible force! With it, if really well utilized, we can put an end to all those things without extremism; we do not have to fall into any extremism, nor into campaigns of a few months, no! This has to be a sustained struggle. As I told the pioneers, we must continue fighting against the remnants of the old system, against the remnants of capitalism, against the ideology of capitalism, against parasitism, against privileges, against that tendency to receive goods without proportion to the work contributed to society. We have talked about the socialist formula: From each according to his ability, to each according to his work! that formula is very clear, it is not, of course, equalitarian.

I would like to know by virtue of what miracles, or what diabolical mechanisms, an individual can earn ten times in a year what an eminent doctor, dedicated to saving lives, earns. Things are going wrong and consciences are going wrong. We must say it, consciences are going wrong! and officials are going wrong, who do not account for the money and resources they manage.

There are some who believe that socialism can be achieved without political work; well, some even believe that without physical work, there are those.

We are doing work with the hospitals in the capital, due to difficulties they had; we met with all the directors of all the hospitals, those from the Party, those from the youth, the heads of nursing, those from the union; we have been doing that work with the support of the Party. The Party in Havana has been doing very serious work on this and the results are visible; a new enthusiasm, a spirit in the hospitals is already appreciated. It is not a matter of one day; the Party meets every month —the Party in Havana— with the secretaries of the committees of the hospitals. That is political work, and with political work we can solve many things; we are thinking of some economic measures, just measures, such as taking into account the abnormal conditions for auxiliary workers. We are also studying multi-tasking, better salaries in general for the auxiliaries, as was previously done with doctors and nurses —all of that is within the socialist formula, of course; also looking at how to rationalize and better utilize the workforce, because the country could not develop if disorganization, inefficiency, and unproductivity are to be resolved by adding more people. That is fundamentally political work.

In hospitals as in schools, we cannot be talking about profitability, because they are not economic enterprises, nor about bonuses; if there is excessive talk of bonuses, workers will be corrupted and told that things can only be done with bonuses. Admitted that within the socialist formula bonuses fit —and even cousins fit in the socialist formula — that signify the result of good work, but real good work, and not bonuses because there was a false profitability whether because prices were inflated, because 40,000 was charged for an apartment and 10,000 for a job that could have cost 500; that way anyone is profitable, that way it is easy to cover up disorganization and inefficiency by raising prices.

Also, some important construction brigades like the one in Cienfuegos, the one from CEN, must reach maximum productivity. We sent a comrade there because we started hearing talk of figures of up to 16,000 workers needed in construction, and I sent them a message that no, they had to manage with what had been discussed, 12,000; because another way to cover up disorganization and inefficiency is not keeping track of what each man does, not controlling and measuring his work rigorously, always asking for more men. And that is a good brigade, I warn you!, with very good cadres. There, workers have been given facilities: special uniforms, special work boots, special food. When I heard about 16,000, I said: No, they have to manage with 12,000, with twelve thousand! Yes, besides, construction workers are working more than eight hours. One cannot cover up inefficiency and disorganization with more men and more men, because then it’s 20,000 and then 25,000, when peak moments arrive.

I am mentioning some types of problems, and I am talking about a good brigade and magnificent builders, with whom I have certain commitments —I have them with them and they have them with me—, for the efforts we have made to improve their living conditions in general.

Many times there is a tendency, instead of going to ask the worker: "Make a greater effort, fulfill your duty" —that is, political and organizational work— to be inventing things, asking for more people; it is easier, but much more costly for the country. Our resources run out; we could not then provide them with the special uniform and special shoes if that were to happen in this case I mentioned.

There are things like these that I meditate on. Not long ago, I read in a newspaper about the problems of the textile factory in Santiago de Cuba —of which I have already spoken in Congress—, a large textile factory, with a production capacity of 80 million square meters. Recently there was a meeting there at the factory, different parties from the Party, the State, and what I read in the newspaper somewhat astonished me, because they said: We must solve such and such problems to achieve full capacity, because there is not enough stability in the workforce; we must guarantee more recreation, I don’t know, cultural things; build many more homes, guarantee the possibilities of higher education. I don’t know how many things they guaranteed; and in the end, a comrade declared —I saw it in the newspaper—: "It is very difficult to reach this goal for 1990, we will try to reach it, but it is very difficult."

I ask myself: if this textile factory were in Brazil, what would happen? There, where there are so many unemployed, so many people going hungry, so many social problems. Would so many things and so many promises be needed there for the factory to produce at one hundred percent? Is that how socialism is built? Do we believe that socialism can be built this way? And is there no appeal to the duty of the workers, is there no appeal to the obligation of the youth? to tell them: This is an underdeveloped country that has to develop; it cannot be based on offering them flying little birds, everything, for a factory to function. We must know how to call on the youth and the workers to their duty, and tell them: Produce! and tell the workers: Stabilize yourselves, reach the production parameters, work, because production must come first and then the wonders! that the Revolution has made great efforts to guarantee employment for all young people, but we are an underdeveloped country, facing imperialism and blocked by imperialism. It is not only based on promises; we must call to duty, to everyone!

I believe that on a day like today we must also mention these issues; because to have many things that are now within our reach, we have fought, blood has been shed, and many sacrifices have been made, and, apparently, some do not even know it, or have not realized it and do not know in what world they are living.

It is not a matter of coming here just to exalt our past glories, to pay tribute to the fallen; the fallen are not honored in one or two hours, in a minute or a second, or in a day every 25 years, or every year. To the fallen, to those who sacrificed for the Revolution, generation after generation, tribute must be paid every day, every hour, every minute, and every second!

What are we going to say to the mothers who have lost their children, what are we going to say to the women who have lost their husbands, what are we going to say to the children who have lost their parents or their grandparents in the revolutionary struggle —because here I see children of 6, 8, and 10 years old, relatives of the fallen? Are we going to tell them that if I don’t have a house next to the factory, I won’t go, I won’t work in the factory?

As long as houses cannot be built —and even if it is very fair to build houses next to the factory—, if we need fabric and we have, for example, in Havana the Balance Spinning Mill, which can produce up to 15,000 tons of yarn for our textile factories, ah, there is not enough stability in the workforce; we need to build houses, we will wait until we have all the houses there on the corner. Just having houses does not solve the problem, because afterwards they may have a house and leave for another job.

I believe that problems must also be resolved with morality, with honor, with principles, and it is necessary to appeal —and it would be demagogic not to do so— to the sense of duty of our compatriots and our workers.

Of course, it was poor planning to build the textile factory and not to build a greater number of houses close to the factory, knowing these problems; but the Revolution does not have the resources to solve everything at once.

I believe these are weaknesses —to which I am referring—, all those I have mentioned here. That is our enemy now, those are the ones doing the work of mercenaries, all those who seek privileges, perks, divert resources, who want to pocket money they have not earned with the sweat of their brow, engaging in shady dealings and speculation. There is plenty of that in the vineyard of the Lord. They are not the majority by any means; but we have the duty to combat them, because those minorities can only do those things when the majority is passive, indifferent, and lacks a critical spirit. And I know the critical spirit of our people, I know the qualities of our people.

This struggle is going to be long, and it will not be over in five years; we will have to fight against this tendency for our entire lives, because there are always two sides, as Martí said: those who build and those who destroy. There is a large, numerous side that builds; but there are those on the other side, where the unconscious, the indifferent, the irresponsible are located. And it does not have to be a counter-revolutionary; there are some who do not realize that this is a way of playing the role of mercenaries!

We must appeal to the honor and dignity of our compatriots, of which they have given such high proof in history.

I believe this is something very fitting for a day like today. Everything we have said, everything we have remembered, also reflects the world in which we live; everything I spoke about the Hitlerian methods of Mr. Reagan teaches us, for example, that the efforts our country is making for its defense are not in vain.

We know that in the midst of the needs for schools —that there are old schools, some in poor conditions, especially primary schools—, that we lack housing, that we lack sports and cultural centers, that we lack many of those things we want, we have to invest hundreds of millions every year in fortifications, in defensive measures; we have to dedicate tens of millions of hours of work to prepare the people. All of that costs energy, effort; these are efforts we have to take away from productive work to dedicate them to military preparation; hundreds of thousands of tons of cement, steel, materials of all kinds, and the effort of countless workers, we have to invest every year in that, in defending ourselves. It is another price that imperialism charges us!

Today, on the occasion of this anniversary and related to these reflections, we see how right we are in preparing the people for the struggle. Because we were strong, we freed ourselves from a terrible war, 25 years ago. Then, another lesson from Girón: We must be strong to free ourselves, perhaps, from a terrible war! To the extent that we are strong, that we are efficient, that we are hardworking, that we know how to fulfill all our duties, we will help to avoid imperialist aggression! Because the imperialists know, they are opportunists: where there is weakness, they attack; where there is strength, they moderate. And a people is not only strong because of its patriotism, because of the weapons it has, but by its behavior in general.

The imperialists would love for these problems and vices we have referred to multiply, because they know we weaken, because they know we would be less strong to resist.

Then, patriotism obliges us not only to train ourselves, to be part of a combat unit and to handle weapons, but to fulfill all our duties every day of our lives.

The Revolution has marched, has advanced a lot, has achieved great successes; but those who believe that the new generations do not have tasks equal to or greater than those of the Girón generation, or those that preceded it, are mistaken! They are mistaken! The struggle will be long, hard, and for a long time. These 25 years teach us that, the list of imperialist crimes demonstrates it, because we have an increasingly aggressive, arrogant, and overbearing imperialism.

This is a challenge for the whole world, for all revolutionary forces, for all socialist countries, for all democratic and progressive forces in the world: a great effort, a great struggle. No one should believe that one generation did it all; one generation did part of it, and if anything, a small part. The new generations have to do a lot, and those that come after will also have to do a lot. Those are the realities.

These are the realities to which I want to bring the awareness of our compatriots, on a day like today, that we reflect and that we can tell our heroes, our martyrs, those who had to suffer for the sacrifice more than others, that we will never allow the fruit of their efforts to be tarnished, that the fruit of their sacrifice be misappropriated or squandered; that we will fight with the same courage, with the same tenacity, with the same firmness as in Girón; that we will fight tenaciously and without respite against everything that still weakens the Revolution.

And in the face of external enemies and the danger that threatens us from the outside, to also tell our heroes and martyrs, those who gave everything for the Revolution or those who, through their sacrifice, brought pain to their loved ones, that the Revolution will not only know how to defend itself from weaknesses, from its own weaknesses, but will also know how to defend itself from its external enemies; that capitalism will never return to this country, that this country will never again be imperialist property. To tell them, finally, as Antonio Maceo expressed in an immortal phrase, that whoever tries to appropriate Cuba will reap the dust of its soil soaked in blood, if they do not perish in the struggle.

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!