Speech delivered at the Commemoration of the Centenary of the Baraguá Protest, "Julio Antonio Mella" Municipality, Santiago de Cuba,

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

15 March 1978 · Commemoration of the Centenary of the Baraguá Protest · Santiago de Cuba, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed compatriots in Santiago de Cuba on March 15, 1978, at the centenary commemoration of the 1878 Baraguá Protest against surrender in Cuba's Ten Years' War.
Main themes
Protest of Baraguá centenary, Cuban independence struggle, Ten Years' War, Antonio Maceo's defiance, revolutionary heroism and honor, Cuban national identity, historical memory, sacrifice and perseverance, Spanish colonial military power, political and military organization of independence movements
Duration
~99 min
98th percentile
Words
11,826
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Sentences
496
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Readability
47
54th percentile
Grade
12.5
52nd percentile
Syntax
3.19
71st percentile
Vocabulary
2.35
83rd percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
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  • Geopolitical 60%58%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Social 13%12%
  • Institutional 11%11%
  • Economic 3%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
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  • Not in focus 3%

496 sentences in 145 paragraphs

Dear compatriots:

To make a profound historical analysis of the Protest of Baraguá, it would have required the time that we have not had in these days of much work. Therefore, we do not intend to deliver a lecture here nor to make a historical assessment of those events. We come here to express our deep recognition, our affection, and our admiration for that glorious historical event, and to share some ideas and impressions of its importance and the circumstances in which it occurred.

What would that day, March 15, 1878, a hundred years ago, have been like? They say that that morning, before the conference, the day was foggy; but it seems to us that in many ways it would have been a day similar to today. Perhaps many more mangoes, which today do not exist due to the effects of time, neglect, and perhaps even the advance of the large sugar plantations established here by foreign monopolies. But undoubtedly there was a sun like this one, mountains like those visible on the horizon, and men representing our people, like the men who are here this afternoon.

A few minutes ago we observed the pioneers who will reenact the Protest of Baraguá after this event. They are children from a school in the "Mella" sugar mill. And as we watched them—some representing the Cubans, others representing the Spaniards—we said to ourselves: more or less like these children were at one time those men who wrote such a brilliant page in the history of our homeland.

Why does the Protest of Baraguá hold such extraordinary significance in the history of our country? And what was the Protest of Baraguá? What is and what will always be the Protest of Baraguá?

Cubans had fought heroically for almost 10 years. It can be said that nowhere else on this continent did a people fight so heroically and for so many years, under such difficult conditions, for their independence.

When the English colonies in North America—now the United States—liberated themselves, they received help from other nations; armies from other nations came to help them, in a vast territory. When the nations of Central and South America fought for their independence at the beginning of the last century, they all fought together, starting the battle when the Spanish metropolis was occupied by the French army, and they were able to establish states and independent countries in the midst of war, organize armies, and receive external help.

In what such different conditions did our people fight in 1868! An island, without any external help, without any supplies. If anything, one can speak of scarce landings of arms, sent with great sacrifices and difficulties by emigrant citizens who were abroad. And it was not a group of countries that fought against Spain, but a single country, a small island, with a population that did not reach a million and a half inhabitants. And that people faced one of the greatest military powers of that time, without supplies from anyone, without help from anyone, and sustained that war for 10 years.

If when the struggle began in 1868 there were 13,000 Spanish soldiers in our country and the Cuban combatants never exceeded the figure of about 8,000, by the end of the conflict there were barely 4,000 Cubans against 100,000 Spanish soldiers.

That struggle did not culminate in independence. The patriotic movement suffered—we cannot say a defeat—a significant setback.

Many causes can be considered for why, under those circumstances, our people were unable to conquer independence. Perhaps it is easier now to judge the facts; perhaps it is easier to play the role of critics. From a distance, it can be seen that, for example, when the Cubans rose up in arms, they had absolutely no military or political experience. The organization they gave to the army and to the Republic in Arms was complex. Perhaps it was not the one that best suited those circumstances. In the midst of the war, they developed a Constituent Assembly, something truly extraordinary and noble. From that Assembly emerged a form of republic, a government, a chamber of representatives. And perhaps that form of organization was not the most suitable for organizing and directing the war. But at that time, those were the knowledge they possessed, the prevailing ideas, and each of those men imagined they were fulfilling their revolutionary and patriotic duty in the most complete way.

The national sentiment was not truly forged. And it was precisely that Ten Years' War that contributed to definitively consolidate a national spirit. At that time, there were still many localisms. It was difficult to mobilize forces from one province to another, from one jurisdiction to another. The leaders of the different armed bodies in each region were often something like champions or caudillos of those combatants. And the patriots faced those realities, with a strong regionalism, a strong localism, that hindered the progress of military operations.

Political problems also arose. Ambitions emerged in some leaders, confusion arose among some patriots. And thus painful events occurred, such as the dismissal of the Father of the Homeland, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. And that was not the only event. In 1875, military uprisings occurred in some regions, such as that of Lagunas de Varona, at the precise moments when Máximo Gómez was invading the province of Las Villas and needed reinforcements to continue the march of military operations. And the efforts that the Cuban command made to gather those forces that were to support Máximo Gómez were one of the factors that contributed to the gestation of the Lagunas de Varona uprising in 1875. And later, when the Spaniards, making a last and supreme effort, sent powerful contingents of battle-hardened troops to our country to advance from West to East and counteract the invasion of the patriots, painful events arose, such as the virtual expulsion of Máximo Gómez from the territory of Las Villas, as a result of the pronounced localism of some leaders in that region; in addition, new military uprisings, such as that of Santa Rita, at the very moments when Martínez Campos' troops were approaching in their offensive to the province of Camagüey. That uprising led to the indiscipline and insubordination of entire units, and to the desertion of numerous combatants, precisely when the enemy, stronger than ever, advanced on Camagüey.

Those circumstances created a truly critical military situation. The enemy this time, with a better understanding of the character, strength, firmness, and heroism of the Cubans, did not resort only to force; they were implementing a different policy. Alongside military effort, they applied measures that were completely different from those that the Spanish military leaders had applied for almost the entire war.

Our Mambí Army no longer had that iron discipline, that exemplary respect for the commands, for the revolutionary principles adopted by them, for the constituted Revolutionary Government. These factors extraordinarily weakened our forces at the most critical moments and facilitated the enemy's plans.

In the region of Camagüey, demoralization arose, which, combined with the lack of resources and fatigue, and in some isolated cases with betrayal, created the conditions that led to what was called the Pact of Zanjón, that is, peace without the independence of Cuba.

Despite the fact that the patriots had approved a law or decree establishing the death penalty for anyone who approached their ranks with proposals for peace without independence, circumstances were created such that even that decree was abolished, and contacts were made that determined the subsequent steps by virtue of which that agreement was reached.

The circumstances were extremely critical, extremely difficult. The undeniable fact is that on December 21, 1877, the Spanish command determined the cessation of military operations in the region of Camagüey and subsequently extended that period of cessation of military operations until the agreement or Pact of Zanjón was reached.

The country was truly already without authority, and at the last moment that chamber resigned, and a committee was formed that in the early days of February discussed and agreed to peace without independence; an agreement that, in a more or less official manner, since no document was signed, took place on February 10, 1878.

Meanwhile, what was happening in the province of Oriente? In Oriente, magnificent revolutionary leaders had developed, as in other places on the island. The struggle had begun in this province; Máximo Gómez can be said to have been the teacher of magnificent Cuban fighters. Here emerged distinguished generals such as Calixto García—who could not finish the conflict because he was captured, not without first attempting suicide—and many other leaders; but among them, Antonio Maceo stood out as one of the most brilliant.

Maceo, a man of very humble origins and also black—in an era when racial prejudices were very strong in our country—due to his virtues, exemplary conduct, merits, courage, and capacity, in those difficult conditions of his origin and in the circumstances of our society at that time, began to stand out, began to shine. But one of Maceo's most extraordinary merits is that he never allowed himself to be carried away by vanity, ambition, or prejudice. He fought against all imaginable obstacles and was always characterized by being an absolutely loyal soldier, disciplined, respectful of the laws, of the revolutionary principles, of the superior commands, and of the legitimately constituted revolutionary authorities.

Never in those 10 years could it be said that Maceo committed the slightest act of insubordination, despite his frankness, his sincerity, his courage to express his opinions and points of view, to criticize what was wrong, to support what was just. And much less did Maceo participate, but on the contrary, he energetically condemned, with harsh qualifiers, those seditious acts that some military leaders committed and that would cost the Revolution dearly, such as the events of Lagunas de Varona or the Santa Rita Uprising, to which he was invited to participate, leading to a historic letter of energetic rejection and condemnation of the authors of those events.

But that example of Maceo, that impeccable conduct in all aspects, became a doctrine, a true school for the Eastern fighters. And in those principles were formed the leaders, officers, and soldiers of the troops that were under Antonio Maceo's command.

Thus, the Revolution, in a large part of the region of Oriente where Maceo commanded, remained strong, remained intact, remained free of discord, divisions, indiscipline, and seditions. And it must be said that the role of the man, that is, the role of Maceo in those circumstances, was decisive.

And when the storm that would liquidate the Revolution, or would liquidate the revolutionary hopes in that war, was approaching, Gómez and Maceo tried to counteract those events, and they tried to devise a way to give the appropriate response to the military campaign and to Martínez Campos' policy. But it was precisely at the moments when Gómez and Maceo were together to develop these plans that the battle occurred in the Mejías pasture of Barajagua, which resulted in the serious, almost mortal wounds of Antonio Maceo, on August 6, 1877.

Thus, Maceo first had to survive under incredible conditions, with numerous wounds; he had to be preserved from capture by his comrades-in-arms who, with a small escort, for weeks and weeks evaded and faced the enemy's efforts to try to capture General Antonio. But that period of severity and convalescence lasted several months, the months that were precisely critical, when the circumstances that led to the Pact of Zanjón were being gestated.

In the early days of January, several months after that battle, Maceo's health had already recovered, and he was again at the head of his troops. But at that time, the Eastern patriots were facing a great shortage of food, arms, and ammunition.

What did Maceo dedicate himself to in those days, when a ceasefire had already occurred in Camagüey, which he was unaware of? He dedicated himself to fighting; and to fighting to supply himself, especially with arms and ammunition. And it was precisely in those days, on the eve of the Zanjón, when a ceasefire already existed in Camagüey and in other regions, that Maceo carried out some of his most important military actions.

He dedicated himself to attacking the Spanish supply columns, making good that principle that revolutionary arms, under certain circumstances, must be taken from the enemy. His forces, in 15 days, eliminated two convoys and two battalions of battle-hardened Spanish troops. And Maceo himself personally participated and directed operations in three of them, which have been much remembered in these days. A supply column was advancing from Palma to Florida; on the route between Palma and Victoria, Maceo's forces attacked the Spanish convoy, defeated the escort, and seized the supplies and ammunition that convoy had: 50,000 bullets. This occurred on January 29.

Four days later, or six days, that is, on February 4, a column of Spanish troops clashes with Maceo's forces. But the extraordinary thing is that at that moment Maceo was not on horseback. It must be said that in those final days of the war, the patriot forces had neither horses. Part of Maceo's force had been sent the night before to another point, and Maceo was left with 38 men. With his 38 men, he repelled the attack of the column and surrounded it. And it is incredible, but truly incredible, that with only 38 men he practically wiped out the Battalion of Hunters of Madrid in one day, which, according to historical data, suffered 260 dead and 70 prisoners, many of them wounded. That happened on February 4, 1878.

Three days later, with the weapons, supplies, and bullets acquired, they encounter another Spanish battalion, one of the most veteran, one of the fiercest: they surround it, fight for more than three days against that battalion, and defeat it. It is said that only 25 men from that battalion escaped unscathed: the others were dead or wounded, and the few who were saved were due to the reinforcement of a powerful Spanish column that came to their rescue. Maceo and his forces had just defeated the famous Battalion of San Quintín, one of the best Spanish units, in the battle known as the Camino de San Ulpiano. Thus, in two battles, the one at the Llanada de Juan Mulato and the one at the Camino de San Ulpiano, he wiped out these two Spanish battalions in less than a week; the first with 38 men, since the bulk of his forces had been sent on another mission, and the other with the entirety of his forces. But they were two impressive battles, and two great Spanish defeats.

Different battles are mentioned, and all have their importance. Palo Seco is mentioned: it was a great battle, it was a cavalry charge by Máximo Gómez that, like a lightning bolt, fell upon the Spanish troops and wiped out a battalion. Mal Tiempo is mentioned, during the invasion; a machete charge by Gómez and Maceo, together, that wiped out the Spanish battalion — I believe it was called the Battalion Canarias. But history, at least the one we studied in another time, did not speak enough about those two very important battles of Maceo, of extraordinary merit given the moment and the circumstances in which they occurred.

Now, the painful thing, what surprised and deeply hurt Maceo and his forces, was the news that, at the very moment they were finishing the battle of the Camino de San Ulpiano, the Pact of Zanjón had just been signed in Camagüey. And Maceo, indignant, bitter, wondered what his men would say, what his companions would say, what the wounded would say, how he could justify to his dead, those he had lost in those battles, if at that precise moment peace was being signed without independence.

And that peace without independence had really been made without consulting all the forces, since Maceo's forces, one of the most important in the Revolution, had not been consulted.

It was these factors that determined a conduct, an attitude, and a gesture that mark one of the most extraordinary patriotic feats of our wars of independence, of our revolutionary fighters, which was the Protest of Baraguá.

Simply put, Maceo and his eastern forces did not resign themselves to peace without independence. As soon as he learned of this, as soon as he was informed of the agreements or pacts of Zanjón, news he officially learned from a commission that arrived after all that had been done, from two commissioners and from a third Cuban patriot, one of the greatest patriots, Máximo Gómez, who was not part of the commission but, given the circumstances and determined to leave the country, had decided to make a stop first in the East, visit Maceo, and say goodbye to him.

Because between Maceo and Máximo Gómez there was always great affection, great admiration, and great respect. Máximo Gómez was Maceo's teacher, and Maceo was the brightest student of Máximo Gómez.

And that meeting was dramatic, in which Máximo Gómez was absolutely convinced that there were no possibilities —in those circumstances— to continue the war due to all those factors that had occurred, and Maceo was determined to continue the war. Maceo wanted Gómez to stay. He even asked him if he was going to leave him alone in those circumstances. Both were men of deep convictions, Maceo had his own, Gómez had his, and in addition, a great experience; he was the most experienced of all the Cuban military leaders and was convinced that there were no conditions to continue the war; he said goodbye and left the country.

Maceo took the necessary steps, gathered his leaders, consulted them, and formally decided to express his disagreement with the Pact of Zanjón.

Some may wonder: well, if Maceo wanted to continue the war, why did he have to meet with Martínez Campos and tell him that he disagreed with the peace? There was a very important reason: just as in Zanjón the cessation of the war had been officially recognized in the name of the armed people, Maceo wanted undoubtedly to express officially his disagreement with the Pact of Zanjón before the same chief and the same Spanish authorities.

Gómez explains that Maceo had, moreover, other intentions, that he wanted to buy time in those very difficult circumstances, and he had told him that with time many things could be done. It was then that Maceo wrote the letter on February 21 to Martínez Campos, a very intelligent letter, a very revolutionary letter, and, we could even say, a very loyal letter, in which he proposed the suspension of hostilities for four months, since he wanted to consult with all the districts of the jurisdiction of Cuba, as it was called then. And he proposed that he wanted to have a meeting, to know what advantages peace without independence could represent for Cuba; but he clearly expressed to Martínez Campos that it was not to reach any agreement, that is to say, he warned him. We are going to meet, but not to reach any agreement. We want you to explain to us what advantages there may be for Cuba with peace, without independence.

Thus, Maceo does two things: he tries to buy time; but above all, the most important thing, he proposes officially and before the same Spanish general in chief, before the same one with whom the Zanjón had been agreed, to express that he disagrees with that pact and that he intends to continue the struggle. Because the essential, the essence of the problem is that Maceo did not agree, in the slightest, not for a single second with the Pact of Zanjón; Maceo did not agree, nor did he hesitate for a single second, in rejecting peace without independence; his purpose was to reject the Zanjón and continue the war. For that, he summoned the enemy chief.

And this is very clear when reading the historical accounts of the glorious Protest of Baraguá. Maceo met with Martínez Campos —as he had told him in his letter— not to agree on anything, because nothing was agreed upon there. If anything was agreed upon in Baraguá, it was that eight days later hostilities would break out again and the war would continue.

He begins by telling him that he disagrees with what was agreed upon in Zanjón, continues by personally expressing to him, or through his most trusted companions, that what they want is independence. To the extent that Martínez Campos says that if he had known they wanted a meeting to ask for an impossible thing, he would not have met.

But there is, in the midst of this, something that has great value, because one of Maceo's aides then explains to Martínez Campos. He essentially says: "Well, you say that you cannot grant independence. Could you grant freedom to the slaves?"

That is to say, what the Cubans propose in the Protest of Baraguá, first: they want to officialize their disagreement and break the Pact. That was the number one political objective. Second: to tell him that they were breaking the Pact because they did not accept peace without independence. But they tempt the Spaniard, and they propose: "Since you say you cannot grant independence, why don't you commit to granting freedom to the slaves?"

That is to say, the two great demands in the Protest of Baraguá were the independence of Cuba and, ultimately, if there is no independence of Cuba, then there should be freedom for the slaves.

In Zanjón, freedom was agreed upon for African slaves and Asian colonists who were then fighting in the ranks of the Liberation Army. But many of the slaves and Asian colonists who had participated in the ranks of the Liberation Army had died in the battles; very few remained; while in the West of the country —I could not say exact figures now—, in 1878 I estimate that there were still hundreds of thousands of slaves, perhaps 150,000, perhaps 200,000, perhaps 250,000.

And this is very important, how in the Protest of Baraguá not only independence was raised, but also, if this was impossible, at least the freedom of the slaves or the struggle would continue, which gives it a magnitude that perhaps the bourgeoisie did not highlight in the past, limiting itself only to the point of independence, wanting to ignore this political aspect of the protest when slavery was the most important social problem of the time. The liberation and cessation of slavery were, from a social point of view, one of the most just demands of the revolutionaries in arms.

And for that reason, what a beautiful path from the moment Carlos Manuel de Céspedes frees the slaves, to the minute when Maceo presents to Martínez Campos in Baraguá the freedom of the slaves as a minimum condition for peace in our country!

That is the essence of the Protest of Baraguá. Maceo and the Cubans intended to continue the war and, indeed, agreed to break hostilities on March 23. They still had hopes of keeping the flag of independence and war high; but, when hostilities broke out, they faced serious problems. First, the demoralization that had spread in many forces, the forces of Las Tunas, of Bayamo; in Holguín there were serious problems, Manzanillo; the peace already agreed upon in the center, in Camagüey; in Las Villas the peace agreed upon, except for a group of brave men who continued fighting. Then Martínez Campos was able to concentrate all his efforts in the region where Maceo's troops operated, and he continued with an intelligent policy.

And as history narrates, when hostilities broke out on the 23rd and the Cubans encountered the first Spanish forces and opened fire, the Spanish troops did not respond to the fire; an unusual thing, they shouted: "Long live peace! Long live Cuba!" It is even said that some columns saw men falling wounded or dead, and did not respond to the fire, in Martínez Campos' political attempt to weaken morale and achieve peace, to soften those forces. There is no doubt that that policy in general softened many fighters in those circumstances. Until the first days of April, the Spaniards did not respond to Cuban fire. But the essential thing: the Spanish army concentrated entirely on the Cuban troops and unleashed an implacable pursuit. To this was added the great exhaustion of those forces, the lack of resources. And so, despite the heroic decision and firm resistance, it became impossible for Maceo and his fighters to carry on the war for much longer.

They fought as long as they had ammunition; and in the end, not Maceo, but the members of the new Revolutionary Government, anxious about the idea that in that conflict Maceo's life could be lost, due to the great value and importance that that life would have in the future for the continuation of the struggle, in a rather cunning way, to save Maceo, made the decision to assign him a commission abroad to gather resources and fighters with the purpose of continuing the war, although he really could not obtain anything abroad.

Thus, Maceo left without making a pact with the Spaniards, without making peace, he went abroad at war with the Spaniards. The Spaniards, logically, preferred that he could leave; it seemed more convenient to them, even though Maceo did not make peace with the Spaniards, and reserved the right, with all freedom and loyalty, without having to breach any commitment, to continue in the future with the liberating war of our homeland.

It must be said that he truly left our people a gigantic, infinite legacy with that attitude.

In recent days, our press has spoken about all these events. It is said that Martí said that Baraguá was the most glorious. Martí did not say it that way. He said what appears on that sign: "The Protest of Baraguá, which is one of the most glorious in our history". He could not say absolutely that it was the most glorious, because many glorious events had occurred. And who can doubt that October 10, 1868, was an extraordinarily glorious event? And it is not a matter of comparing one glory with another, one date with another. Without October 10, there would have been no March 15; without Yara, there would have been no Baraguá; but without Baraguá, Yara would not have been Yara!

What can be affirmed is that with the Protest of Baraguá, the patriotic and revolutionary spirit of our people reached its highest point, its climax, its summit; and that the flags of the homeland and of the revolution, of the true revolution, with independence and social justice, were placed in their highest position.

Analyzing history is not easy; making historical judgments is not easy. There is talk of whether it was possible or not to continue the war, of whether the war could have continued without the Zanjón. It is difficult to answer that question. One would have to go much further back: whether the Cubans could have won the war of 1868 or not. Because the war begins to be lost not on that day, February 10, not two or three months before the Zanjón; the war begins to be lost years before the Zanjón, the war does not even reach its full development because the way the country was organized in arms was not the most adequate.

Martí reflected a lot on this in the years that followed to give the new war the most appropriate organization that could lead it to victory, drawing on the experiences of the great war from 1868 to 1878.

The war begins to be lost perhaps with the dismissal of Céspedes and the problems and divisions that it created; the war begins to be lost in Lagunas de Varona, the war continues to be lost in Santa Rita, the war is lost with the numerous acts of localism and insubordination; the war is lost due to the lack of support for Máximo Gómez's invasion towards the West, the war is lost due to a set of factors.

That war could have been won; theoretically, that war could have been won. But one thing is to see the problems in theory and another thing is to see the problems as they develop among men; one thing is theory and another is practice, another are the facts. And what theory did our patriots know when they started their war of '68? What scientific principles that are clear today? What military techniques that only the struggle itself and the long years of experience and reflection on historical facts can teach us?

Those patriots carried out their effort with the best good faith in the world according to the experiences they had and the prevailing ideas, both political and military, at that time. If this had not happened, and that, and the other, and who knows how many things, the war would have been won. Could the struggle have continued if the Pact of Zanjón had not occurred? Perhaps the struggle could have continued, perhaps. But who would dare to affirm it with full authority?

Today any of us thinks that if we had been in those circumstances, we would have continued the struggle. Today we are here with all these experiences, with all this new culture, with all this knowledge. That three men can resist. We defend a principle: that as long as there is a man with a rifle, no one should surrender. We defend the principle that as long as there is a man with a rifle, the war has not been lost. But it is us now, we who have received such a valuable historical inheritance, such great experience, a culture, a philosophy, a series of principles, and we can proclaim it in that way, and not only proclaim it, but even do it. But can we compare the conduct of those men with ours? We cannot, nor do we have the moral right to compare it, nor can we therefore feel superior to them in any sense. The conditions were extremely difficult when the Zanjón occurred, in all aspects: those Cuban troops had no military supplies of any kind, it had been five years since an expedition had arrived from outside; those Cuban troops had no clothing, no shoes, hardly any food, no weapons, no ammunition, they no longer even had horses. When the cavalry paraded here, it reminded me that in the days of Baraguá, Maceo no longer had a horse; for months Maceo's troops had no horses, they were on foot. In Camagüey, where at the beginning of the war of '68 there were more than 350,000 heads of cattle, there was nothing left, neither cattle, nor horses, nothing.

If you ask a revolutionary today, today! a child of this Revolution, if under those conditions it was possible and necessary to continue fighting, he will logically say yes. And that is correct, it is correct. But the revolutionary of today has a different education, has different principles, has a different spiritual, patriotic inheritance. Imagine those compatriots, many of whom were illiterate, in those circumstances, in those conditions.

That is why we must be very careful when making these historical analyses. We must think that many of the men who thought differently at that time were great patriots. Example: Máximo Gómez. Máximo Gómez is not to blame for the Zanjón, not at all; and it can be said that he has nothing to do with the Zanjón. We would say that he was a victim of mistakes made during the war, and a victim of the Zanjón. But he came to the conclusion that under those circumstances, it was not possible to continue fighting. Some reproached him for not preventing it. But what happens is that Máximo Gómez, unfortunately, had throughout his life the complex of being a foreigner, the complex of not having been born here, when he should have considered himself Cuban, one hundred percent, a thousand percent, from the first day he took up arms in favor of Cuba's independence. And he fought for 10 years, and was the most brilliant leader and teacher of Cuban leaders. However, when the Zanjón occurred, he considered himself Dominican, believing that he had no right to interfere in Cuban affairs and that it was the Cubans who had to decide that. Not only that, even in 1895, when what we could call the mediated republic finally triumphed, and the flag could be raised and it could be said that we were an independent country —which we all know today that we were not—, even under those circumstances, Máximo Gómez still felt the complex of being a foreigner. And what man did so much for our homeland as Máximo Gómez? And alongside Máximo Gómez, dozens, hundreds, thousands of fighters went through the bitterness of the Zanjón who later distinguished themselves extraordinarily in the war of 1895 to carry forward the struggle for independence.

So we must be very careful when exalting and highlighting in all its worth, in all its extraordinary magnitude, the Protest of Baraguá, to be careful, to be cautious and to be objective in our judgments regarding the other Cubans who in those unfortunate circumstances did not have the vision, nor the spirit, nor the depth, nor the sharpness, nor the genius of Maceo. I believe it is correct and necessary to conduct serious studies on these issues, and it will be done, because the new generations, with much more preparation, with much more culture, will delve into all these problems of our history with the greatest depth. Now, let us be careful when making the moral assessment of those men. Let us enter history, but first let us take off our hats before entering the history of our patriots.

Theory is one thing and practice in the reality of life is another. We must think that the peoples and men who make history do not carry a little book in their hands, guiding themselves by the little book to make history. Today, politics in all senses is much more scientific, thanks precisely to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, who taught us many things and many truths and many social laws by which we can guide ourselves. Our generation, as we have explained on other occasions, had the privilege of being able to rely on those laws and on all the experience, the enormous experience of the history of our homeland. This is important. When we investigate history, we must be as objective as necessary, as honest, as sincere, and as critical as necessary; we must be objective, not subjective, not analyze the men of that time with the mentality of now and the principles of now, and be careful with the adjectives, for a scholar could well arise and say that Máximo Gómez was a traitor, because he judges Máximo Gómez in the Zanjón and for all this, without taking into account the objective realities of what Máximo Gómez was and meant.

When Máximo Gómez left Camagüey and arrived in Jamaica, he was received almost as a traitor. Who? The Cuban emigration; those who were not in Camagüey, but were in Jamaica. And it must be said that Máximo Gómez and his family went hungry in Jamaica, and that he had to work for food and 10 cents. Of course, 10 cents then was a little more than now, right?, but he had to work for himself and his family for 10 cents.

But not Máximo Gómez. When Maceo arrived in Jamaica, he was received almost with the same attitude. Ah, because Maceo had left on a Spanish ship. Maceo could not swim to Jamaica, that was unquestionable. Maceo did what he had to do, everything he had to do, and went to fulfill a mission, and he could only leave under those circumstances, taking advantage of the moment since he had to pass through Jamaica. Like Lenin, before the Bolshevik Revolution, and also acting with all the audacity and courage that characterized him, he passed on a German train towards his homeland. This was later used to attack Lenin by the counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries.

But many people from the emigration received the patriots, Máximo Gómez and Maceo, with that spirit. That is why we must not become a kind of historical emigration, which now begins to judge, with the ideas of now and the criteria of now, the problems of then.

We are absolutely in favor of investigating, analyzing, and conducting scientific studies of the history of our country, but let us not act with the spirit of emigration when judging the men of that time. Let us be careful in analyzing the objective factors and the subjective factors, and let us not impose judgments on any of those men based on today's criteria and today's subjective factors.

For our generation, this one that is here, younger, less young, more mature, it was a great privilege, a great luck, a great fortune, that we have been able to count on examples like this that we commemorate today. Because it must be said that our generation received the inheritance, the spirit of all that those generations did: the inheritance of Céspedes and Yara; the inheritance of Agramonte, Calixto García, Máximo Gómez; the inheritance of Maceo, the inheritance of this singular and extraordinary event that was the Protest of Baraguá; the inheritance of our struggles for independence, the experience of all previous generations. Because in the revolutionary fighters of our time, that was very present, and the Protest of Baraguá was very present; the idea of not surrendering, the idea of never giving in to defeat. That was very present.

We had our setbacks, hard ones; we had them at Moncada. Ah, but we never gave up. The fighters of Moncada never gave up, never accepted defeat. It was the spirit of the Protest of Baraguá. In prison, no fighter was ever humiliated, never accepted defeat. It was the spirit of Baraguá. After the Granma landing, the setbacks were great, but very great, they could seem insurmountable; but no one gave up. Those who survived decided to continue the struggle. It was the spirit of Baraguá!

Of course, when we were left with just a few men, one could also ask: was it possible to continue the struggle or not? Perhaps in theory —pay close attention—, a scholar, a great scholar, would have concluded that the struggle could not continue. Now, we were not great scholars, we were men fighting, and we had the conviction that the struggle could continue. We continued the struggle and achieved victory.

Now, those moments cannot be compared with the moments of the Zanjón.

Others may draw the conclusion, perhaps, that if they continue fighting, they will achieve victory anyway. I do not dare to affirm it, I do not dare to affirm it.

I would dare to say that any of you and any of us would continue fighting and would die, if necessary, calmly! Because dying is also a victory when one dies for something just! And because it is known that behind those who fall, others come. And because, as Mella said, "even after we are dead, we are useful, because we serve as a flag!"

When we were left with just a few, there were great potential human and material forces in the country. We were just starting. And it is not the same when you start to ignite a great bonfire than when you try to ignite the ashes of a bonfire. When the Zanjón occurred, what remained in our homeland were the ashes of a gigantic bonfire; in 1868, no, all the forces were in potential, human and material.

That is why, whatever the subsequent experiences may be, we must be very respectful of the effort of those men to be just. Because I sincerely believe that 10 years, under the conditions in which the Cubans fought, is no small thing, nor is it easy at all.

We were 25 months; they were 120 months fighting. There are similarities in our struggle with their struggle, in the sense that we also did not receive weapons from outside, in that we also fought to seize the rifles and bullets and ammunition and everything from the enemy. Ah! But in those 25 months, when the hardest days of the early times had passed, when we had already been in the mountains for six or seven months, or a little more, and we had some strength, we were no longer starving in the mountains. Because there were many herds of cattle all over these plains, around the Sierra Maestra, and we not only supplied ourselves, but we also supplied the entire civilian population blockaded in the Sierra Maestra with the herds of cattle that were in the surroundings. But there was cattle. I imagine it was the same in the plains of Cuba — in Camagüey, in Las Villas, in all those parts — when the war began. In the end, there was nothing.

There are other very hard problems, and it is that the Cubans were with their families in the countryside, with their parents, their wives, and their children. And the Spaniards, with different types of forces, were ravaging, burning houses, murdering, violating women, killing them, killing children, parents, and everyone. The Cubans who were in that war with their families not only risked their lives, but with their lives, they risked the lives of all their closest and most intimate beings.

And so they were with their families exposed to death for 10 years, because many of the children of the military leaders were born in the wilderness. And those men have a great merit before history; they made an enormous sacrifice.

Our generation now is a privileged generation, which inherited the effort, the experience, the work of all the previous generations, from 1868 to today, in the struggles for independence and in the republic, the mediated republic, the neocolonized republic, years that were also very hard.

That is why we are a privileged generation, but we also have very great obligations, because we have to continue building this history and we have to continue carrying forward this revolutionary march for future generations.

We know today what our people are and what they mean and the moral values of our people, because a homeland, a revolution, a revolutionary consciousness, socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism, is a moral value, it is a revolutionary consciousness in the people. It did not arise in a day. It was born and developed over more than 100 years.

There was also a form of internationalism in our wars of independence, because there were many Dominicans and nationals from other countries who came here to fight alongside us. And we have mentioned today one of the most notable, who was Máximo Gómez. In our revolutionary war, when the problems were still simply national, when the issues of internationalism were not raised, we had Che, who was another illustrious and outstanding internationalist fighter. Now we have that immense treasure, that extraordinary heritage that allows our people to be what they are today, and of which they also feel justly proud.

This centenary has coincided with many things. It has coincided with March 5, the date of the founding of the Third Front; it has coincided with March 11, the date of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Second Front. And many other 20th anniversaries will be commemorated this year. That is to say, the centenary goes hand in hand with the 20th anniversaries. They go hand in hand. When the Protest of Baraguá reaches its 110th anniversary, the Third and Second Fronts will also commemorate their 30th anniversary. They go in tens. When the 25th anniversary of the Moncada is celebrated, the 125th anniversary of Martí's birth will also be celebrated. They also go hand in hand. In fives, in tens, and in hundreds, as if the numbers wanted to express, with their symbolism, the close relationships that exist between these events.

But there is a special flower, a crown, a tribute to this centenary of the glorious General Antonio Maceo, and it is the successful fulfillment of Cuba's internationalist mission in Ethiopia. It is like a great tribute that his children pay to General Antonio.

When our Political Bureau made the decision to provide the brotherly people of Ethiopia with the indispensable cooperation to help the heroic Ethiopian people save their integrity, their independence, and their revolution, it decided to assign this internationalist mission the code name of Protest of Baraguá.

We have addressed this topic. Our people had the opportunity yesterday to receive the most extensive information about how the events that led to the great victory of the Ethiopian Revolution on the eastern front unfolded.

Ethiopia may seem like a distant place; but in this world, there is no distance. Sometimes there is the distance of time and other times the distance of space.

Here we are verifying that it can be the distance in time. It has been 100 years since the Protest of Baraguá. A hundred years have passed, and here we are. What has time been but the multiplier of the heroism and glory of 100 years ago. And here we feel as close to Maceo and his glory and his deeds as if the Protest of Baraguá had been yesterday. It does not seem to us that 100 years have passed, because here today, at this moment, in this second, the Protest of Baraguá is present and alive. And in the same way, physical space is nothing for our Revolution. We feel as close, as near, and as brotherly to the Ethiopian revolutionaries as if they were here with us, in front of us; alongside Maceo, in front of Maceo. For revolutionaries in the world, distance practically no longer exists.

I told you that yesterday there was extensive information. It is good to clarify what has been traditional in our revolutionary process: fidelity to the facts and to the truth. Every citizen who read those news yesterday knew that there was not a shred of lie in that information, because it has been so since our struggles in the Sierra Maestra and throughout these almost 20 years: the truth, trust in the people, information to the people. The Revolution works with the masses, the most complete understanding with the masses and the truth. That is why not a single citizen doubted for a moment that what Granma said yesterday was the truth and exclusively the truth.

Some imperialist cable agencies have said that the Cuban people officially learned yesterday that we had given internationalist aid to Ethiopia. Well, if they want to say officially, yes, we admit it; but unofficially — and as we know how things are, and how we do them and know how to do them among ourselves — the whole people knew it a long time ago.

This also happened with the internationalist aid to Angola. The people know it, because how do we do things if not with the people? Of course, there are circumstances in which certain things should not be published officially, because if you have to carry out a complicated, dangerous operation, you have to do it discreetly, simply; you should not be shouting it from the rooftops. But who else but workers, peasants from our reserves, officers and soldiers from our permanent forces fulfilled this mission? And all the combat units knew it, and all the reserve units knew it. And there were not 1,000 or 10,000 determined, as in the case of Angola; there were hundreds of thousands of our compatriots willing to fulfill this internationalist mission.

We never do anything behind the backs of the people. And so many times, through the channels of the Party and the mass organizations, many things are informed to the masses that do not appear published on the front page of the newspaper.

What could the Party and the Party leadership do without the masses? But we are very glad to know that we have very discreet masses. Because here there are times when a secret is known by millions of people and no one but those millions of Cubans who know the secret.

That is the Revolution, that is the spirit of our people, that is the legacy of Maceo and the Protest of Baraguá. That is the spirit of 1868 and 1895 present here in our people.

We do not speak of the heroes of the past as mere tourists of history or passive observers of the feats of others. This people can speak of those heroes because it also has many present heroes. It can speak of its brave mambises because it is a people of mambises. It can speak of its past heroes because it is a people of present heroes, who fulfill their duty without boasting!

Our Revolution does not seek glory, it does not seek prestige; it simply fulfills its internationalist postulates and principles!

Of course, we could not speak publicly of our internationalist aid to Ethiopia until the Ethiopians spoke of it. As long as the Ethiopians considered it correct to maintain discretion, discretion! When the Ethiopians publicly expressed it, we were also, our Party, in a position to express it publicly. It was not going to be a secret of millions of people for all time. Now it is a national and international secret.

Well. There is no need to boast about this. Nothing is further from our spirit than to boast about anything. First of all, we must say that we deeply regret that this conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia occurred, because we did everything possible to avoid that conflict. And about a year ago, more or less around this time — perhaps after March 20, I do not remember exactly — we arranged a meeting in Aden of the leaders of Ethiopia, Yemen, and Somalia with us, to try to resolve the pending problems between Somalia and Ethiopia; to precisely avoid a war, to avoid an event that would constitute a betrayal of the international revolutionary movement, to prevent the Somali leadership with its territorial ambition and aggressive attitude from falling into the hands of imperialism. It could not be avoided.

In Somalia, there were two forces: right-wing forces, and left-wing forces, really. For many years they talked about socialism and progress to the masses; but, in reality, within the government, there was a powerful reactionary group, right-wing, in favor of an alliance with imperialism, with Arab reaction, with Saudi Arabia, with Iran, etc., and they were cornering the leftist people within the country; waving, as all reactionaries have always done, chauvinism. Because in the absence of social doctrine, and political doctrine and revolutionary doctrine, the reactionaries resort to the procedure of exalting the basest instincts of the people; and they resort, above all, to chauvinism.

History is full of examples of these cases. Fascism, what was it in Italy, in Germany? The exaltation of racial prejudices. Instead of combating racial prejudice, which is what the revolution does, fascism exalts prejudice and turns it into hatred. And that is what the fascists did in Hitler's Germany. Nationalism, territorial ambitions; racial prejudices; in the name of that, they launched into the occupation of Europe and the invasion of the USSR. Tell us: what could a German soldier be doing in Stalingrad, 1,500 kilometers deep into the territory of the USSR? And how can men be dragged into such madness? Simply, in the name of narrow nationalism, of chauvinism, of hatred between nations, of territorial ambitions.

All reactionaries, in all times, have resorted to those resources. And the right-wing faction within the Somali government precisely waved these flags: national hatreds, chauvinism, territorial claims, the idea of Greater Somalia, which had to include Djibouti, a third of Ethiopia, and part of Kenya. When all African states, with a deep practical sense, with much wisdom, have agreed on the intangibility of the borders inherited from colonialism. Because those who know Africa know that in every country in Africa there are tribes that live part of one side of the border, and another on the other side, in all countries of Africa. There are still many states in Africa that have not fully surpassed the tribal phase. And the precedent that a country could conquer by force a territory it was claiming would become a true catastrophe for all of Africa. That is why African states have said: there should be no change of borders, and much less should force be used to change borders.

But it was not simply a matter of chauvinism that determined the opportunity for aggression. Ethiopia lived many years under the feudal regime, a feudal regime that was liquidated precisely by the Ethiopian Revolution. Ethiopia is a country where 85% to 90% of its population is peasant. And in Ethiopia before the Revolution, until 1973 practically, there was even slavery. Those who were not serfs, those who were not peasants bound to the land and subjected to the landowners could be slaves.

Thus, the Ethiopian Revolution represented an extraordinary change for the people of Ethiopia; it liberated tens of millions of exploited peasants, the exploited masses. It does not have a very large working class, but it was also liberated by the Revolution. The woman who was treated with much oppression, with indescribable injustice and oppression, was liberated by the Ethiopian Revolution.

The Ethiopian Revolution not only liquidated feudalism but also made the decision to advance towards socialism. One of the greatest events in Africa in recent years is, precisely, the Ethiopian Revolution.

Ethiopia is a suffering country; one of the few countries in Africa that was able to maintain its independence for centuries by fighting resolutely, until the Italian fascists, wanting to have a colony by all means and with the complicity of the colonial powers of Europe, invaded Ethiopia. But Ethiopia is a people of fighters. As early as the end of the last century, they had defeated the Italians, who could not seize the country. However, in 1935, Italian fascism, thanks to technical superiority, the use of numerous means, and the complicity of imperialism, took over Ethiopia. The Ethiopians fought very hard during the years of occupation. And one of the characteristics of the Ethiopian people is their bravery, their combativeness.

In those circumstances, at the precise moment when the Revolution takes place, and not at the precise moment when the Revolution takes place, but when the most radical and revolutionary people take power, the Somali aggression occurs.

Previously, Ethiopia with its Emperor was allied with the United States, allied with imperialism. During all those years, the right-wing faction of Somalia did not think of invading Ethiopia. Why? Because they did not want to mess with imperialism. When the Revolution occurs, but is not yet fully defined, they also do not dare to attack Ethiopia.

When in February of last year the most important, most radical, most revolutionary elements, led by Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, took the leadership of the Ethiopian Revolution and declared the intention to build socialism, the ties between Ethiopia and imperialism were broken. It is at that moment, precisely, that the right-wing faction of the Somali Government believes that the opportunity has come to invade Ethiopia, because they knew that invading Ethiopia was cooperating with imperialism in the destruction of a great revolution, and imperialism would be delighted. They knew that the NATO powers would also be delighted that Somalia helped to liquidate the Ethiopian Revolution.

Today we are perfectly aware that when we met in March of last year in Aden with the Somali leaders, they already had the plan fully developed — which they later carried out — to invade Ethiopia, because they believed that this was the historical opportunity, that Yankee imperialism and the NATO countries would welcome the news of the invasion of Ethiopia with open arms.

You know that there are many revolutionary Arab countries and there is a group of reactionary Arab countries. Those reactionary Arab countries were also delighted with the aggression against Ethiopia, to destroy the Revolution. One of those countries, ruled by an antediluvian monarchy, Saudi Arabia, was one of the most interested in liquidating the Ethiopian Revolution. According to that saying: "If you see your neighbor's beard burning, wet your own." And since an emperor fell, the emperor of Saudi Arabia, or the King as they call him, was very concerned about the fall of the Ethiopian emperor.

The same was true with Iran, a reactionary ally of Yankee imperialism, a criminal and repressive government, also ruled by a Shah — Shah means king, emperor, I don’t know what that means —, a feudal monarchy as well, let’s say, an absolute monarchy, determined to destroy the Ethiopian Revolution and encouraging Somalia to aggression.

The right-wing faction, waving those possibilities, filled with hopes of receiving a flood of petrodollars from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and economic aid from NATO and the United States, taking advantage of the fact that there was a revolution in Ethiopia, imposed a policy of war and aggression. That is the great crime committed by the Somali leadership, to invade Ethiopia to destroy a revolution in the service of the reactionary countries of the area, of NATO and of imperialism.

Ah, but when the meeting in Aden took place, the Somali leaders solemnly committed themselves, swore solemnly that they would never invade Ethiopia, that they would never militarily attack Ethiopia. And in reality, they had everything planned, and in July they initiated the aggression.

But Ethiopia is a large country, it has a large population, it has soldiers and very good soldiers, which is why we initially made the decision, at their request, to send them some dozens of instructors and advisors — they could reach a few hundred — to train their units, teach them how to handle their modern weapons from another origin; because they, as the emperor was allied with the United States, had American weapons, and were beginning to receive socialist supplies in which they were not experienced.

We thought it was a matter of time to help them prepare their army, because when the Ethiopian army is prepared and well-armed, no one will be able to mess with it, you can be absolutely sure of that, no one!

What determined the need to send fighters? The magnitude and scope of the Somali aggression. Somalia had prepared for a number of years, Somalia had even been waving the flags of socialism, presenting itself as a progressive country, a country allied with the progressive world — I mean the Somali Government — and had been forming an army: it had hundreds of tanks, hundreds of pieces of artillery, planes, numerous motorized infantry brigades, and almost all those weapons and units were used at one point in the invasion of Ethiopia.

At that moment, Ethiopia had to fight in many parts of its territory against groups of counter-revolutionary bandits, led by the feudal lords, helped from abroad and against secessionist movements in the north of the country, also currently aided by the reactionary countries of the region. They created a very difficult situation for Ethiopia, there was no time to spare. If the Ethiopians had had a little time, they would have assimilated all the tanks, artillery, and other modern armaments. We would have contributed, along with other socialist countries, to the training of that personnel. But it was the critical situation created by the invasion at the end of November that led to the Ethiopian Government's request, the urgent request of the Ethiopian Government for us to send specialists in tanks, artillery, and aviation to help them, to help save the country. And that is what we did.

And our specialists — as Granma explained — began to arrive in mid-December and early January in the country, specialists in tanks, artillery, and aviation, because under those circumstances the Ethiopians did not have time to assimilate the new technique. They really did not need infantry; they have abundant infantry, if some medium units at the battalion level of Cuban infantry were sent to the east, it was more to ensure cooperation with the tank and artillery units operated by Cuban personnel, because you know the language problems and there is a certain moment when a tank unit needs assured cooperation with the infantry.

But in reality, our fundamental support to Ethiopia was from specialists. They also already have artillery and tank units, and I have no doubt that in a period of time they will have excellent personnel for handling those weapons; they have abundant soldiers, and it is easier to train a soldier in infantry than a specialist in tanks or artillery. We can also say that the Ethiopian infantry is made up of soldiers with great combat qualities, very brave, very valiant.

This collaboration became indispensable, those specialists were sent, and also — as Granma published — in the final phase of the operations, Cuban armored infantry units participated alongside the Ethiopian infantry.

It should be said — as was published yesterday — that in seven weeks practically all the occupied territory of Ogaden was liberated, which reached more than 320,000 square kilometers. The invaders had occupied 320,000 square kilometers, an area three times the size of Cuba! and from January 22 to March 14, practically all that territory had been liberated; only a few localities remained, which was just a matter of time to occupy, since the Ethiopian forces did not have enough motorized vehicles, and in many of those places they had to march on foot. So the war has practically ended on the eastern front.

In reality, the cooperation between the Ethiopians and the Cubans was magnificent; there were artillery units made up of Cuban specialists and Ethiopian personnel. Within a few days, through signs and numbers, they understood each other, and the artillery group marched perfectly well. Despite the diversity of languages, a great atmosphere was created, a great combat fraternity, a great mutual trust, a great brotherhood, and the problems were resolved perfectly well.

We do not want, of course — I repeat — to use phrases that seem like boasting, that seem like exaggerated praise of our fighters, but it does seem fundamentally fair to say that the Cuban internationalist fighters were characterized by their extraordinary effectiveness and their magnificent combat qualities. It is admirable how children of our people were able to march to such a distant place and fight there as if they had been fighting in their own homeland. That is proletarian internationalism! Efficient and brave revolutionary soldiers quickly made magnificent friendships and created close ties with the admirable Ethiopian revolutionary fighters; they were received with extraordinary affection by the Ethiopian people, and I know that their leaders are very grateful to our people for this solidarity help.

The war against the invader has practically ended. Ethiopia has publicly declared that it will not cross the borders of Somalia. We find that absolutely just and correct, since the war was not made to invade another country, nor to occupy territories of others, much less; the war was a defensive war, absolutely just, to defend the territory invaded by foreign aggressors until the expulsion of the aggressors from the territory. Of course, this implies that aggressions against Ethiopia from Somalia do not recur, because it seems to us that no country would be willing to indefinitely endure being attacked from the border of another country, and not respond adequately. But we know perfectly well the sincerity with which the Ethiopian Government gave guarantees that its troops would not cross the borders of Somalia. In reality, it was not necessary from a military point of view, since the aggressive forces have been totally defeated, and we fully support that position of the Ethiopian Government.

What will happen in Somalia? It cannot be predicted. But there is no doubt that the right-wing faction, which imposed its aggressive and adventurous line on the Somali Government, has suffered a great defeat. The imperialists, of course, try to encourage this faction even in the midst of defeat, and maneuver.

But in Somalia, there are also progressive forces, leftist forces; let us wait for the coming weeks to see what happens. Of course, that is a matter that entirely concerns the Somalis, it is not a problem that concerns us or any other country.

Now, the imperialists have maintained a very hypocritical position throughout this conflict, because they knew from the very first moment that Somalia was invading Ethiopia, from July, the United States and the NATO countries knew it, they kept their mouths shut, did not say a word, were delighted, supplied weapons to the aggressors, American and NATO weapons through Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries, and while the Somalis advanced, they did not say a single word. When the Somalis had almost occupied all the territory of Ogaden, the imperialists were optimistic; ah, but when the Ethiopians began to receive internationalist help, when they began to receive weapons from the socialist camp and to receive Cuban internationalist fighters, then they raised a great scandal. At that point, they were already talking about convening the OAU, convening the United Nations, etc., etc., and talking about the need for a ceasefire. But when did they start talking about a ceasefire? Ah, when the aggressors began to lose the war.

As the Somalis advanced, they did not say a word; when things began to change after the first successful battles of the defenders, when they foresaw that the overall picture could change rapidly, then they began to scandalize and to make a great propaganda around the world, and to talk about the Cuban internationalist fighters and the Cuban troops —as they say— in Ethiopia. When everything began to turn upside down, they started to talk about a ceasefire; which they had not done for months, when the reactionary aggressors were advancing. And, of course, the Ethiopian government rightly said —and it is very correct—: there can be no ceasefire while a piece of our territory is occupied. That is precisely also our revolutionary philosophy: there can be no ceasefire while a piece of territory is occupied.

The first counterattacks developed, the offensive developed, the enemy troops were totally defeated. They had to retreat hastily, abandoning tanks, cannons, artillery, all kinds of weaponry to avoid encirclement and capture, because they were simply defeated and totally defeated. It is necessary to point out that in the retreat of the Somali troops there was no voluntary act. Because if they had stayed four more days, just four more days, practically all the troops they had there in Ogaden would have been encircled. Due to the advance, to the manner of the advance and to the maneuver of the revolutionary forces with the fundamental communication nodes taken, if they do not carry out a rapid withdrawal, the remnants of the Somali army would be encircled in Ogaden. So the aggressors had to retreat. No one can be deceived, no one at all, by saying that the Somali government had the gesture of withdrawing its troops, because if they did not do it, they would have lost what was left to them. That is the situation, they retreat by virtue of military actions, totally defeated.

That is the truth; no lies need to be told. We believe that the war between Somalia and Ethiopia has ceased at this moment, since the territory has already been liberated. I do not think the Somalis would be tempted to commit the stupidity of attacking Ethiopia again by themselves; but just as they were encouraged once, reactionary countries, NATO countries, and imperialism can encourage them to new aggressions.

We are sincere supporters of peace between the two countries. The objective of the war was the liberation of the occupied territory. We are sincere supporters of the Somali people being able to live in peace and truly march along the paths of progress and socialism. We believe that the Somali people are a people that has conditions, has virtues; as Granma explains very well, the Somali soldier is not cowardly, it must be said, it is fair to say it, they showed toughness and combativeness, undoubtedly deceived, poisoned by all that chauvinistic policy and by all that idea of Greater Somalia. So no one should imagine the Somali soldier as a weak or incompetent soldier. But he was simply defeated. The adversaries made directional errors, they did not properly assess the situations. There is no doubt that the Somali leadership made great political mistakes and some military mistakes that explain the reason for the defeat, regardless of the fact that they were trying to commit a great historical crime. The fact that the revolutionary fighters acted efficiently considerably reduced their casualties in combat. It must be said that due to the efficiency, the magnificent, the excellent preparation of our internationalist fighters, the casualties in combat were minimal.

We are also offering our collaboration to Ethiopia in the civil field. In total, among doctors, technicians, health personnel, we have been sending and most of them are there, more than 300 doctors and health technicians. The country has more than 30 million inhabitants. It is a very populated country. The sanitary conditions are very difficult. We have already talked about this on other occasions.

I do not think it is necessary to elaborate further on this point; we consider that its importance and value justify referring to it on a day like today.

Dear comrades:

Let us dedicate the final minutes of this event to the Protest of Baraguá and to Antonio Maceo, and let us dedicate to them, from the depths of our hearts, the revolutionary work.

To Maceo, to Gómez, to Céspedes, to Agramonte, to Martí, to Yara, to Baraguá and to Baire, we dedicate the tribute of our revolutionary effort, the revolutionary effort of our generation. To them we dedicate Moncada, Granma, the Sierra, March 13, Girón and the heroic internationalist missions in Angola and Ethiopia. To them we dedicate our efforts and our struggles.

On a day like today, let us resolve to move forward, as we have marched until today, enriching the pages of the history of the homeland.

Many tasks and efforts await us all. The fighters, to intensify their combat preparation; our workers, to intensify their effort in fulfilling all the goals we have ahead.

Inspired by our ancestors, inspired by events like this, inspired by Antonio Maceo, let us know how to fully fulfill our duties today!

Homeland or death!

We will overcome!