Speech delivered at the Constitutive Act of the Militia Units of Territorial Troops of Granma Province, held in Guisa, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

20 January 1981 · Constitutive Act of the Militia Units of Territorial Troops of Granma Province · Guisa, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed the constitutive ceremony of the Territorial Troops Militias in Guisa, Granma Province, on January 20, 1981, coinciding with Ronald Reagan's U.S. presidential inauguration.
Main themes
Territorial Troops Militias formation, Cuban revolutionary defense, response to Reagan administration threat, imperialist aggression, military organization and structure, revolutionary consciousness, production and defense, socialist solidarity, Cuban sovereignty, homeland defense duty
Duration
~67 min
96th percentile
Words
7,958
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Sentences
286
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Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
13.3
60th percentile
Syntax
3.19
72nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.24
58th percentile

Translated from Spanish

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  • Geopolitical 79%78%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Institutional 5%5%
  • Economic 4%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

286 sentences in 94 paragraphs

Dear comrades of the Territorial Troops Militias;

Dear comrades from Guisa, Bayamo, Granma, and Cuba:

The movement triggered around the purpose of constituting the units of the Territorial Troops Militias as soon as possible is a new and undeniable demonstration of the energy and revolutionary consciousness of our people, of their will to resist, defend their conquests, and translate into concrete achievements their slogan of production and defense.

The essence of the complex current international situation lies in the fact that today a new Government has assumed the Presidency of the United States, whose main figures have made statements that virtually place them at the forefront of the most reactionary sectors, which encourage revenge and seek to restore imperialist dominance in the face of a world and realities that reflect very profound and essentially irreversible changes.

Therefore, today, January 20, 1981, while there in the United States, with the pomp and glitter characteristic of decaying empires, in defiance of the millions of unemployed and helpless people and the uncertainty in which many millions of people currently live in that country, a Government that represents a threat to peace and to the most vital interests of the great majority of the people of the United States takes office; here, with the modesty, austerity, simplicity, human warmth, patriotism, and the spirit of solidarity of the workers, in a climate of effort, work, creation, and struggle against backwardness, against underdevelopment, against the aftermath of oppression, animated by a national consciousness to advance the country for the well-being of all, to consolidate our achievements for the benefit of the masses, and determined to preserve what we have, what we have conquered, and the future we are forging, with full confidence in the future, in the strengths and moral reserves of our people, with the support of the world revolutionary movement, of the socialist community, of the best of humanity, we constitute the units of the Territorial Troops Militias of Bayamo and Guisa.

Thus, throughout our country, with the patriotic and revolutionary conviction that summarizes the oath you have taken today, this process of the Territorial Troops Militias advances, which will give our defensive system greater depth and solidity. That is our response to imperialist threats.

Our combat experience and that of other brotherly peoples are present in the steps taken for the organization of the Militias, especially to determine their structure, armament, designation, and combat missions.

In the Report to the Second Congress of our Party, we presented essential aspects of the Territorial Troops Militias. Today we would like to take this opportunity to make some organizational considerations.

We conceive the Territorial Troops Militias as an additional force, constituted voluntarily and selectively, made up of men and women, workers, peasants, students, anyone capable of fighting and not integrated into the Reserve of the regular troops or in Civil Defense. With the constitution of this force, the principle that the defense of the Homeland is a right and a duty of all Cubans, men and women, is fulfilled, a principle that we now manage to concretize in an organic way.

In the Territorial Troops, young workers, peasants, and especially students who have not yet been called to Active Military Service will also find their combat positions; workers, who due to their role in production cannot leave the factories, and our heroic and battle-hardened revolutionary women, who have always demonstrated their capacity, tenacity, and bravery.

The structure of the Territorial Troops Militias is formed based on small units and units up to the battalion and regiment level at the municipal and provincial scale, where their leadership will reside. In each province and municipality, to strengthen the work related to the Territorial Troops Militias, officers from the FAR have been designated, attached to the presidents of the People's Power. All units of the Territorial Troops Militias will integrate, under a single idea, the defense plans of the armies from which the combat missions will emanate. In some regions of the country, especially in those densely populated localities or with particular characteristics, units of different designations will be constituted and prepared, such as formations to participate in the construction of fortifications, obstacles, and other engineering works; communications, repairs, supply, chemical defense, and other combat support services. As for the regiment commanders, who are more complex units, their leaders will be officers of the FAR who have the training and experience for command. The rest of the personnel for the Territorial Troops units will be chosen from among the members of the units themselves, based on the qualities demonstrated by the comrades. In all cases, these comrades will receive immediate training, which will be systematized as circumstances allow. In fact, intensive courses have begun to be developed in the academies and other military training centers of the FAR, where basic knowledge is acquired.

Regarding the training of the units, they will be trained through combat preparation classes in free time, study meetings, and other forms of instruction.

The Territorial Troops Militias are born just as the popular armies created by the Cuban people have historically emerged: they are born like the Mambí Army, like the detachment that stormed the Moncada, like the Rebel Army, and the Militias themselves of the early years of the Revolution.

This is the profound political meaning of the national campaign around the collection of the necessary funds to cover all expenses without affecting the country's development plans. This process recalls those days when collections were made in various ways to acquire weapons and planes and agricultural implements to promote the Agrarian Reform, and it also recalls the most legitimate militia traditions.

In the first militia units, the combatants armed themselves as best they could; those first formations were a true showcase of the production of light weaponry. At first, the militiamen obtained their weapons as they could, then came the uniforms and the standard armament, legislation was enacted regarding the possession of weapons, and currently, there is no longer the possibility for everyone to acquire them on their own. Nowadays, we do not have weapons for 10 million Cubans; nevertheless, we must all prepare, organize, and train, as the Rebel Army did, because if the weapons today are not enough, tomorrow they may be plentiful, for the enemy brings them, and we will know how to seize them.

In reality, everything indicates that the sums raised, especially due to the systematic nature that the commissions impose and the competitions established between municipalities, allow us to aspire to total self-financing of the institution, which, in addition to weapons, needs facilities for the training and preparation of personnel, shooting ranges, polygons, warehouses, instructional material, and campaign equipment in general.

Among the main missions of the Territorial Troops Militias, both in peacetime and in case of war, is to replace and complement the regular units of the FAR whose combat readiness so requires. Due to their knowledge of the terrain and their mobility, the units of the Territorial Troops will be particularly effective in the fight against air landings, to confront diversionary groups, to participate alongside regular troops in combat actions, to secure the movement routes of the FAR units, to guard and protect factories, workplaces, bridges, railways, road junctions, and installations of all kinds, and to carry out irregular warfare missions in the case of occupied territories.

Militias are as old as wars of aggression, they are the quintessential resource that peoples resort to in order to confront them, they are a force especially suitable for defense, they are workers fighting for their factories, neighbors defending their neighborhoods, citizens safeguarding their property, the property of the people, and upholding their convictions and ideals.

The strength of the Revolution —it is good to reiterate— lies above all in the people, in that we have a firmly established Party closely linked to the people, with mass organizations capable of fulfilling their mission, with prestigious government institutions whose competence systematically improves, with a developing economy and with modern Armed Forces and reserves that, due to their number, organization, level of equipment, campaign training, effectiveness, and combat experience, constitute a formidable force.

The Territorial Troops Militias are called to support and ensure the missions assigned to our glorious and undefeated Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Our military doctrine, developed over years of intense work, responds to the demands of contemporary combat, to the probable nature of the enemy's actions, to the characteristics of the theater of operations, and the organic structure of the FAR and the conception of our entire defensive system are adjusted to it.

We are a threatened country, moreover an island, hence from the point of view of the defense of the country, we define as most important the defense against landings, which is expected to be resilient, active, staged throughout the depth of the national territory, and skillfully combined with vigorous and timely offensive actions.

The ground troops, the Navy, and the DAAFAR have the means and the necessary preparation to carry out the operations and combat actions that correspond to them. The units of the Territorial Troops come to be the ideal complement to this scheme that ensures the defense of the country from the most distant accesses to all points inland. There will be no corner of our land unguarded, there will be no place where the enemy does not find tenacious and firm resistance, there will be no fronts; for a combatant, whether from the Regular Troops, Civil Defense, or the Territorial Troops, the front will be wherever the enemy is. But the defense of the country is not an exclusively military phenomenon; it is, above all, a set of political and economic measures aimed at creating the necessary conditions to face all dangers and achieve victory. Among these measures, the increase in production is of vital importance, with a view to providing the country with everything necessary and accumulating reserves of food, fuel, and raw materials. Producing and saving makes us stronger and creates conditions for greater security. Producing more now will allow us to better face, if the case arises, the stages in which production inevitably decreases as a result of aggression. This allows us to respond to the slogan that, in the event of aggression, would constitute the basic task of all the institutions of the country and of all Cubans: production for defense and work for victory.

For this process to proceed successfully under such circumstances, the participation of numerous factors is necessary; first of all, the bodies of the central administration of the State, the People's Power Organs, and the mass organizations, which must play an important role in locating labor resources to replace in production the mobilized personnel, and above all the Party, which will direct the entire set of activities and resolve countless practical problems in each place.

At this moment, as we are immersed in the process of constituting the Territorial Troops Militias, we want to emphasize that it is necessary to continue paying full attention to the regular units of our Armed Forces and their reserves, which constitute the fundamental core of the country's defensive potential. We must continue strengthening the combat readiness, training of their personnel, and the improvement of their cadres. If necessary, we must first complete the regular units, transfer to them the resources from the economy that have been planned, and from there complete the rest.

It is impossible to gather in this place with you, the combatants of Regiment 603 and the combatants of the Guisa Battalion, men and women; to gather with the people of Guisa in this historic setting, near the Sierra Maestra, without evoking history.

The experience of our homeland, since the nation emerged, since the first struggle for independence began in 1868, until today, through more than 100 years, demonstrates that a people cannot neglect its defense. That is the most constant lesson of our history. In 1868 we could not defeat the enemy after 10 years of struggle, although, certainly, if on that occasion our people did not achieve victory, it was fundamentally due to subjective factors, the unfortunate divisions that arose within the ranks of our mambí army and our nascent Republic. As Martí said: "More than the enemy, divisions defeated us." And divisions have defeated us more than once in history, except in this final stage of our Revolution. Then, history taught us another lesson: the need to be united above all; and it was the close unity of the revolutionary forces and our people that gave, starting from Moncada and especially from January 1, 1959, the invincible strength that characterized our Revolution.

In 1895 our people again launched into the patriotic war, and if then we did not achieve full victory, it was due to external factors (APPLAUSE AND EXCLAMATIONS OF: "Long live free Cuba!: Long live!; Long live the Armed Forces!: Long live!; Long live Fidel!: Long live!"). The metropolis was stubborn in not recognizing its defeat and led to the intervention of the United States, and then almost 30 years of heroic struggle were frustrated by the presence of an imperialist foreign power, which had the luxury of directly occupying this country for four years, only to leave us with a puppet government at the service of its interests. The imperialist power imposed naval bases on us and also an amendment to the Constitution, which gave it the right to intervene here whenever it pleased; that is, as long as its interests were threatened by popular struggles. Throughout these fifty-some years of false Republic, they dominated our life, our destiny, our economy; they were its owners.

Intervening directly or indirectly, or through their open participation in the political processes of the country, they prevented victory in 1933; they imposed tyrannies on us, they imposed crimes on us, they imposed corruption on us, supporting with all means: with training, with weapons to the hitmen of various tyrannies, the last of which was Batista's.

This led us back to struggle, it led us to repeat the history of 1868, of 1895 and of 1933; it led us to armed and popular struggle to achieve once and for all — and we say it this way — once and for all and forever, our definitive freedom, our definitive independence; the freedom and independence that our people needed to build their future, to work as owners of their land and owners of their natural resources, of their factories; owners of the fruits of their labor for a better destiny. It fell to our generation of those days of 1959, the privilege of finally seeing the results of so many decades and decades of struggle.

The Yankees did not even grant Calixto García the right to enter the city of Santiago de Cuba with the mambí troops. Our Rebel Army had the privilege of entering the city of Santiago de Cuba and all the cities of the country. This placed an extraordinary responsibility on our shoulders: how we would use that opportunity and how we would defend it, because the struggles did not end in 1959. The actions of imperialism in all areas to — as it is called today — destabilize the Revolution, promote subversion, sabotage production are known to all of you. We all know the crimes they committed from the first years, from the first murdered teachers, those teachers who went to teach an alphabet, to teach reading and writing in the fields and mountains where for centuries there had practically not been a teacher. The pirate attacks, the mercenary invasions, like that of Girón; the uprisings of bandits, the threats of direct interventions and other activities of imperialism forced us from the first day of the triumph of the Revolution to prepare ourselves.

We soon discovered that the weapons we had taken from Batista's army, which were a few tens of thousands, perhaps 70,000 or 80,000 — because they had quite a few, for what they used them for, because they were not in any war against a powerful nation, they were in a war against an unarmed people — those weapons were not enough when our country had to face an enemy as powerful as the United States.

From the very first moments we had to start acquiring weapons and thus, for example, those weapons that came from Western Europe arrived in our country and one of whose shipments, loaded in La Coubre, was sabotaged, costing the lives of almost 100 workers and soldiers. Of course, no ship ever exploded here again when our weapons began to be received from the socialist camp and from the Soviet Union. And since then a few ships have arrived on our shores with weapons.

Our country was not only able to defend itself, but the development of our combat capacity and our consciousness allowed us at certain moments, even, to fulfill brilliant internationalist missions like those in Angola and Ethiopia.

And now, can we neglect our defense? Now precisely? When reactionary and far-right elements have just taken power in the United States, when they have spoken and said, and have issued threats against our country throughout the electoral campaign and in publications, statements, studies and writings, and have spoken of possible blockades for any pretext; blockades no longer economic, but military, and have spoken of possible interventions here, are we going to neglect our defense? No. We are going to apply the lessons of history, we are going to apply that lesson that a people can never neglect its defense, and the 112 years of struggles of our people — I repeat — teach us that, that defense cannot be neglected.

On the other hand, we do not like being threatened, honestly, we do not like it one bit. I do not know whom they intend to intimidate with that, because it seems to me that it is a bit difficult today to try to intimidate the people of Cuba.

That proclaimed policy of threat against Cuba is what has led us to the need to double our defensive effort, to double it or triple it! to prepare ourselves to defend the country. And when we say defend the country, we mean it seriously, and we know what it is to defend the country, and we know that determined to defend the country no one will ever be able to own this land, no aggressor will ever be able to own it. Cities may be destroyed, they may be annihilated; but they cannot be taken as long as there is a fighter! Our fields, our mountains may be invaded; but they cannot be occupied as long as there is a fighter, in any of these hills, under any of those trees, or even where there are no trees! The Sahrawis fight in the middle of the desert, where there is not a blade of grass. As long as these mountains exist and as long as our fighters exist, our country cannot be occupied. But it is not enough with that disposition, but we must prepare for it.

Are we lacking a tradition of struggle? Have we not accumulated considerable experience throughout the history of our people? Have the men who today make up our most experienced cadres, both in the armed forces and in the Party and in the State, not known struggle?

When we speak here we speak with great certainty, and we rely on our own experience, on our own history. I believe that in few places like this, in few provinces like this one can one speak so appropriately about that experience.

In Granma the struggle for independence began precisely in 1868; in 1895 here too was one of the first places where combat began again. In Granma the Granma landed. And with it the 82 expeditionaries; in Granma our first struggles developed, we faced our first setbacks and our greatest difficulties; in Granma we found the support and encouragement of the people. But we were very few men. I do not know what would have happened and how long Batista's army would have lasted if we had had these troops that are here in the Sierra Maestra, those thousand and so automatic weapons that you have. Perhaps we would have had to load the rifles one by one because it seems to me that we would have run out of bullets. But we were very few. As we said recently in Manzanillo, we first managed to gather 7 rifles, and I think among all there was only one automatic, there was a submachine gun there among the seven. No, not at all, not even that. We found that submachine gun months later. Seven bolt-action rifles were what we had.

I say this because I have the conviction, as we all do, that what matters is the basic idea of a fighter, the objectives of a fighter, the connection of the fighters and the people. The enemy was very powerful, extremely powerful, between 70,000 and 80,000 armed men. We had to live those 25 months of war, from seven rifles to the end, when we had about 3,000 men with weapons of war. Little by little the learning, little by little assimilating the experience of each day of struggle, from when we had practically none, until at the end we practically played with the enemy soldiers. Let’s say we forced them to do what we wanted them to do, in order to annihilate and defeat them. And they behaved that way, in the end they did what we wanted; they moved where we were interested in having them move, when they moved and where they moved.

Now, a very interesting characteristic of our revolutionary history is the following: I said that in the end we had around 3,000 men with weapons of war, of which a minimum were automatic. Of those weapons — the exact number historians will be able to specify someday — of those weapons, 90% we took from the enemy in combat, 90%!

We received some small shipments of weapons, small, and perhaps the largest that arrived, about 150 rifles, came after Guisa, already in the last three weeks, when our troops had already reached Santa Clara, they were dividing the island in two parts and the offensive was developing vigorously. So it will not be far from the exact figure to say that about 10% of the weapons we had at the end of the war came from outside, 90% of those we used we took from the enemies in combat. And this is very important because we knew what a weapon was worth, and our philosophy was always that: the weapons belong to the enemy army. That was the philosophy of Moncada. We went there to seize the weapons of a regiment. And throughout our liberation war that was the principle. Many times we went into combat not to kill soldiers, we went into combat to seek weapons, arming ourselves was the fundamental objective. In passing, enemy soldiers died, and it was not bad that they died, because ultimately they had to die, there was no other remedy. We did not measure the success of a combat by the number of soldiers killed. There was one occasion when in an ambush 25 of our comrades near Pilón inflicted 70 casualties on the enemy, most of them dead. They wiped out two trucks full of soldiers; but we did not seize weapons on that occasion. Other trucks were coming whose soldiers deployed. That troop was a good troop, but still did not have much experience, could not seize the weapons. We did not see it as a victory: the enemy had 70 casualties, we had none, but we had not seized a rifle. We measured the success of military operations by the number of weapons we seized. And that is how we armed ourselves.

I say this simply because it must continue to be our philosophy. Today we have weapons, quite a few weapons, so it can be said in those words: quite a few weapons, and good weapons; but they are not enough, they will not be enough for every Cuban to have a rifle. That is why we said at the Party Congress: "A rifle, a mine, a grenade, something in hand." A machete, a machete well used in a certain circumstance can be a fearsome weapon. But the enemy has weapons and we must also think, not only about the weapons we have, but about the weapons we can take from the enemy. As long as there are 7 armed men in this country, they must remember this history we have talked about, but not while there are 7, while there is only one with a rifle, with a submachine gun like these, they must remember this history. A weapon can multiply into many weapons.

Now, the enemy had weapons far superior to ours, an unlimited supply of ammunition; they had aviation, artillery, and tanks; of course, many .50 caliber, .30 caliber machine guns, etc.; supplies all they wanted.

We really had nothing but rifles and mines. Our war was fought with rifles and mines, like that, with those weapons, the vast majority being bolt-action rifles, and the mines that we made with the TNT from the bombs that did not explode. No one supplied us with dynamite or explosives. If we received anything from the lowlands, it was some wires and detonators; we didn’t need anything else, because they dropped so many bombs that with just 10% not exploding, we were supplied, we who knew nothing about aviation bombs, our people, who I still cannot explain how not one of those bombs ever exploded in our hands; the fact is that with shovels and picks they unearthed them and then disarmed them with hammers. That’s how I say it: they disarmed them with hammers, because they were not specialists of any kind, nor engineers; they were combatants who, guided by their own instincts and with great recklessness, unearthed the bombs and disarmed them, and that was the explosive we used and the one we used throughout the war. I say this because it is very important to emphasize the idea that the patriot, the revolutionary fighter, must rely not only on their own weapons but also on the weapons and resources of the enemy.

Who can fight better than you for these lands, let’s say, those of the Guisa Battalion, the peasants of these mountains who know —as the popular saying goes— "even where the mosquito laid its egg"? They know everything: the ravines, the trees, the mountains, the streams, everything, where every stone is here. What can an enemy do here against men and women like you? What can they do in the town, outside the town, or in the surrounding areas? That is the idea, that we prepare to face both regular warfare and irregular warfare, both.

If they have a means to make the island disappear from the map, well, we will disappear, we disappear from the map; but as for conquering, subduing us, making us surrender, no enemy will ever achieve that. Imperialism cannot, simply cannot!

This place, precisely where we are gathered, reminds us of one of the boldest, most reckless actions of our Rebel Army, when at the end of the offensive, the last push against the Sierra Maestra, our counteroffensive began. The different columns left the Sierra Maestra, apart from those that had previously left to form the Second Eastern Front and the Front of Santiago de Cuba, with the weapons seized from the enemy; because when the enemy offensive began we had about 300 weapons in the Sierra Maestra, and when Batista’s great offensive ended, we had 805; we had almost tripled our weapons in a few days, it wasn’t much time, it was like in 50 days; well, the fighting lasted 70 days during the last enemy offensive. After that, all the columns had left, we had a platoon of 30 men left. We left the Sierra Maestra with 30 armed men and 1,000 unarmed recruits, 1,000 unarmed recruits; we picked up some platoons along the way. We wanted to catch the enemy company that was in the Bueycito Mines, but they escaped quickly; it was the last troop that was left near the Sierra Maestra. Later, some soldiers of the tyranny, almost a company, had rebelled and surrendered their weapons to us. We told them: we don’t want you to fight, it’s not necessary; just hand over the weapons. You don’t go fight against your former comrades, leave that task to us. And they handed us about 60 rifles.

When we arrived in Guisa, we had around 180 armed men. And in this region of Bayamo and its surroundings, the enemy had 5,000 soldiers from their best troops. So already in Guisa a struggle of another magnitude took place, and our troops were fundamentally made up of recruits, it was new personnel —our more veteran troops had gone to the different fronts— and that’s how the fighting in Guisa occurred, which lasted 10 days.

I believe this is a story known to you, but it is worth noting the fact that the battle began with 180 men against an enemy that had around 5,000 troops. And what did we have? Rifles and mines; we had nothing else. It was the first time we had to fight next to a paved road, which is not the same as placing a mine on an earthen embankment as it is on a paved road where tanks and reinforcements can also arrive more quickly. We encountered that fateful bridge that is not a bridge, it is an elevated embankment; and it is not the same to blow up a bridge as it is to blow up an embankment.

Yes, we had some mortars. But do you know how many shells? Fifteen mortar shells we had when we arrived here in Guisa, from a 81 mm mortar, which forced us to think very carefully about when to use them, because they couldn’t be fired from the very first moment.

In this city, there was a company, it was surrounded. We dedicated a minimum of forces to surround the enemy garrison and the maximum of forces against the reinforcements. In reality, the battle of Guisa was not against the company that was stationed here, it was against the reinforcements from Bayamo. They had two important roads, plus other secondary roads; it was necessary to take all the roads and position our main forces in the direction from where they would surely come: the paved road. They liked the main roads especially when they had to come in trucks and had to come with tanks.

Here the fighting began with a patrol that went back and forth every day from Guisa to Bayamo. Of course, within minutes the patrol was wiped out. There we seized the first 23 weapons; after that first combat, instead of 180 we were 203 armed men. Throughout the fighting, we seized weapons, even an intact tank in perfect condition. No one knew how to operate a tank, to tell the truth; no one knew how to operate a tank cannon. I believe that if you one day seized a Yankee tank in combat, you wouldn’t have the problems we had, because to find out how that cannon fired, we had to spend nights experimenting there; we had to put a comrade with a white horse in front to see if where that mechanism pointed, the cannon tube would go; we had to do some test shots and, well, where to aim: aim for the command post to see if those cannon shots reach there, the command post of Bayamo.

On one occasion, an entire battalion was surrounded with two tanks inside. So, the enemy not only had the Guisa troops surrounded, they had the reinforcement battalion surrounded with two tanks, and they already had to send reinforcements to rescue the battalion that had come to reinforce; they had to send reinforcements to rescue the reinforcements.

There is a very important fact, and it is that hill that had no name and is now known as the hill of Coroneaux, because that hill played a very important role. There was about a platoon of ours there; it was very close to the city. Since the enemy infantry could not pass through the road while we held that hill, the tanks could not pass; because the enemy knew we had mines, and if the infantry did not go ahead clearing the mines, the tanks could not pass because they would blow up. Right there are the remains of a blown-up tank, it was the first one that blew up there. And our infantry, with their rifles, did not let the enemy infantry pass from that hill, and those who handled the mines, of course, could hold their positions. And despite the fact that we only had rifles and mines, they, with their tanks, their artillery, and their aviation, could not pass through that road. That lasted about 10 days.

On that hill, comrade Coroneaux had about 200 trenches built, for every man he had there he made at least 10 trenches, to defend himself in different positions.

At a certain moment, the position was very difficult, it was necessary to ask for volunteers. And there were plenty of volunteers to defend the position! And among the volunteers, a squad from the "Mariana Grajales" women’s platoon. That is to say, there, on that very difficult hill, in that very difficult position, a squad of women participated alongside the men. They resisted there for the 10 days of bombardment, because in the 10 days that the battle of Guisa lasted, the enemy aviation was attacking the different positions from dawn until night; but above all they attacked that position, with explosive bombs, with incendiary bombs, with everything. The artillery heavily attacked that position; the Sherman tanks made direct shots against that position. Precisely, Coroneaux was killed by a direct shot from a tank cannon. But the position was not abandoned. And I repeat that most of those combatants were recruits.

Why did those recruits behave so well? Because there was already a tradition. That tradition of fighting against modern weaponry, tanks, and aviation was created by the first nucleus of those who remained from the Granma landing and those who formed the first columns. We became strong, above all, when the men learned to resist in a position, in a trench, the attack of mortars, artillery, and aviation; when our men learned to withstand that attack and not move from their positions, then we were strong. Because we already knew that a specific position, very important in a battle, could not be taken by the enemy; the infantry could not take it, and the use of all their most sophisticated weaponry could not dislodge our men from the position.

It was the fighters of the first columns who created that tradition. And then the new fighters, those who went to the Minas de Frío school, those who joined the Rebel Army, were faithful to the tradition; they knew that it was possible to resist in a position, and they resisted and behaved very bravely. This is the importance of studying history, of experiences; the importance of combative traditions, because a spirit is created, a morale is created, a conviction is created. And thus, the new recruits behaved as well as the most veteran soldiers; they did not have the same experience, but they behaved with as much courage as the veterans. They were, precisely, men and women like you.

I have no doubt that many of you have some experience, when I think not of the student who is 16 years old now; but of the old fighters, I am sure that in these Militias there are fighters from the liberation struggle, there are fighters from the struggles against bandits, there are internationalist fighters, so you gather experience. But for those who are completely new, for those who have not had combat experience, I remind you of this, because I know that they will be as good soldiers as the most veteran ones.

At the end of those combats that took place between November 20 and 30 here in Guisa, our forces had occupied the city, causing the enemy more than 200 casualties among dead, prisoners, and wounded; we had seized more than 100 weapons, including several machine guns, several mortars, bazookas, etc.; we had increased our strength. When we left Guisa, we were more than 300 armed men. The enemy had suffered a very strong blow, they had been very demoralized. This facilitated our further advance along the Central Highway, from Jiguaní to Santiago de Cuba. The fact is that in 40 days the 1,000 recruits were armed; of course, part of them took the place of the casualties, the dead, the wounded. In Guisa, 8 comrades died and 7 were wounded; we had 15 casualties. Now, for every casualty we had, we inflicted at least 15 on the enemy, because after the combat against the surrounded battalion, they loaded trucks with dead soldiers. In reality, we inflicted a large number of casualties.

I like the example of this battle because it is very instructive for what we are doing now, which is preparing; and above all not only preparing militarily, but also creating a mentality, creating a consciousness of what the revolutionary fighter is capable of doing, of what the people are capable of doing even in very difficult circumstances.

I brought here a supplement from Granma that has published some materials from that time, from those events, but one of the ones that moves me the most, after 20 years, is a message addressed to the comrades of Radio Rebelde; they were still up there in the Sierra, we had not been able to bring down the station, I send them a message from Guisa, it says:

"Sierra Maestra, November 26, 1958.

"To all the boys of Radio Rebelde:

"Here I am missing you. I already have a loudspeaker, but I have no announcers."

We also used loudspeakers as a weapon of war, we surrounded the barracks and began to give their rallies to the soldiers to demoralize and surrender them.

"Soon a powerful transmitter will arrive here, but without Eduardo and you nothing works. We have a strong line of defense between Bayamo and Guisa, it’s like a Jigüe, but at the gates of Bayamo; here the fight is against tanks, but there is already one upside down. I don’t have the veterans here, but the troops are behaving well. Coroneaux is like a lion, he has opened more than 200 trenches in a firm. Picks and shovels are free."

Good people, all embracing the idea of buying many trinkets in Guisa.

"Hugs to everyone".

Everything went successfully, and the premonition about the trinkets even came true. When we entered Guisa on the 30th, the bourgeois had a few warehouses here and had all kinds of very sophisticated trinkets; they were finishing the coffee harvest, and of course, we did not confiscate anything; we must say that we bought and paid religiously. But it was the first time after a long time, practically years in the Sierra, that we had taken something resembling a city; let’s say Guisa was already a real city, a small city. And it was the first time we had that opportunity because we gave permission to the troops; we were a little over 300; they entered the warehouses and bought, they did not loot the warehouses by any means, they bought and paid. If the warehouse had been Yankee, well, in the case of an aggression, I would not be recommending buying and paying.

And precisely when we were analyzing these materials, we came across an editorial we made in the Sierra Maestra related to the Yankees or to the activities of the Yankees. I am not going to read it in full. It was during the days when Batista was looking for a pretext for a Yankee intervention here, a pretext, because they maneuvered, withdrew the garrison from Nicaro, which was a Yankee nickel industry; our troops entered Nicaro, and then they decided to send troops to Nicaro; undoubtedly, they wanted to turn Nicaro into a battlefield.

Around those days, Almeida's column had captured a jeep in an ambush; they held them for a few days, seven Cubans and two Yankees, I believe they were from Texaco; then a spokesperson from the State Department made very threatening statements. It was at that time when we constituted a very small army; at that time when those statements came out, we would be a little over a thousand armed men, and we were afraid that they were concocting — and it was not an unfounded fear — a pretext for an intervention here.

Our country did not possess the means it possesses today, the weapons it possesses today, the millions of educated, conscious, revolutionary citizens it has today; it did not know the international support it has today; we were relatively weak. But even then, we warned the Yankees not to meddle here, and we warned them in a very categorical manner.

Those statements made through Radio Rebelde on October 25, 1958, before our final offensive, ended with these words:

"It is good to warn that Cuba is a free and sovereign country. We wish to maintain the best relations of friendship with the United States; we do not want a conflict to arise between Cuba and the United States that cannot be resolved within the reason and rights of the peoples. But if the American State Department continues to be dragged by the intrigues of Mr. Smith and Batista and incurs the unjustifiable error of leading its country to an act of aggression against our sovereignty, we will know how to defend it with dignity. There are duties to the homeland that cannot be neglected, no matter the cost.

"A great and powerful country like the United States is not honored by the words and threats contained in your latest statements. Threats have effectiveness among cowardly and submissive people, but they will never have any effect on men who are willing to die in defense of their people".

Approximately 22 years and 3 months have passed since this declaration, when we were still just a handful of men. And as proof of the continuity in the line of the Revolution and the thought of the Revolution, these statements we made on that October 25, 1958, we can repeat exactly the same today, especially these words: "There are duties to the homeland that cannot be neglected, no matter the cost."

"Threats have effectiveness among cowardly and submissive people, but they will never have any effect on men who are willing to die in defense of their people".

To this, we should add a word to make it thus: "With the men and women who are willing to die in defense of their people!"

This spirit is the spirit we want for the fighters of our Armed Forces, the regular troops, the reservists, the Territorial Troops Militias, and for all revolutionary fighters.

Our strength has multiplied extraordinarily since then, and I say this with absolute calm: there is no force in the world capable of bending our people.

The presence of women is by no means a political issue. In the female sector, there is an enormous combative potential, since in the male sector are all the regular troops, many of the reserves; women have not been included in Military Service, and we have an enormous potential of many young women in excellent physical condition for combat.

In our war, the combat capacity of women was demonstrated. And it was not easy; men had many prejudices then. I remember that when I organized the "Mariana Grajales" platoon, I even participated in the training of those comrades; there were rebel fighters who were furious; they did not like the idea of a platoon of women. We precisely had some M-1s, and the M-1 was considered a good weapon; it was a light weapon, we thought it was suitable for women. There were some who said why they should have a Springfield and give a woman an M-1. On some occasions, a bit annoyed, I had to tell one: "because they are better fighters than you". And the reality is that they proved it. A large group of women participated in the troop that advanced towards Holguín. Near Holguín, the women's platoon engaged in a very tough fight with Army troops; the enemy seriously wounded the leader; as a general rule, a patrol, a platoon, had the habit of retreating when their leader was wounded, which is not correct, but it was a bit of a habitual thing, when the leader was killed or seriously wounded. The platoon had attacked a truck of soldiers, and despite the serious injury to the leader, they did not get discouraged; they continued the fight, destroyed the truck, and seized all the weapons. It was truly exceptional behavior.

I also remember the squad of women that remained in that position, under a terrible bombardment of artillery and aviation, for 10 days.

So it is not a political issue, or a simple struggle for equality — in this, of course, the struggle for equality is manifested, just like in many other ways — it is a necessity and an extraordinary potential of strength that we have in women as fighters for the defense of the homeland. Therefore, it was decided that in each Provincial Territorial Troops Regiment, there would be a battalion of women; in each municipal battalion, a company of women. That is to say, each province will have its battalion of women; each municipality will have, at least, its company of women.

I sincerely believe that we are constituting a formidable force, an extraordinary force that will multiply the combat capacity of our Revolutionary Armed Forces and our people.

Today has been very exciting, comrades, this act, this oath. And it is exciting for its depth, for its sincerity, and for its seriousness.

We would not want to find ourselves one day in the need to use this force; rather, we wish for peace to prevail, not only in our homeland but in the world, so we can dedicate ourselves to creative work. But there should be no doubt whatsoever that if circumstances require it, we will employ this force, and this is a fearsome and invincible force.

You have received your guidons and your flags. The Bayamo Regiment has received its standard. We wish for you, and we are sure that if one day we find ourselves in the need to fight, you will be able to emulate and even surpass the extraordinary heroism of those who, between November 20 and 30, 1958, fought in Guisa and liberated the city. And that you will be up to the defenders of that hill that today bears the name "Coroneaux," that you will be up to the spirit, courage, and heroism of the platoon of that Captain and the extraordinary women of the squad that defended that position.

I know that everywhere in our country, in any corner, in any mountain, in any town, our people, our soldiers, our reservists, our fighters will fight with determination and will be able to give everything for their homeland. But we also know that you, the fighters of Guisa, the fighters of Bayamo, and the fighters of Granma will be among the first.

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!