Speech delivered at the student event on the occasion of the XXXIV Anniversary of the Assault on the Presidential Palace and Radio Reloj, held at the old Presidential Palace, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

13 March 1991 · XXXIV Anniversary of the Assault on the Presidential Palace and Radio Reloj student event · old Presidential Palace

Context
Castro addressed Cuban students and families of fallen combatants at the old Presidential Palace on the 34th anniversary of the 1957 assault on the palace and Radio Reloj.
Main themes
Commemoration of March 13 assault, José Antonio Echeverría and student martyrs, Cuban revolutionary history, student movement and FEU, sacrifice for national independence, Sierra Maestra and Granma expedition, Batista dictatorship resistance, revolutionary solidarity and tribute
Duration
~63 min
96th percentile
Words
7,510
96th percentile
Sentences
262
94th percentile
Readability
52
70th percentile
Grade
12.8
55th percentile
Syntax
3.35
86th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 67%66%
  • Ceremonial 11%11%
  • Economic 7%7%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Environmental 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

262 sentences in 87 paragraphs

Dear family members of the combatants of March 13;

Dear comrades from the FEU, the FEEM, and the pioneers:

Today we had a meeting, as we do every Wednesday; the members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers were gathered. Of course, for us, meetings are like classes; we feel it is an obligation to be there. I have sometimes said that what I like most about meetings are the breaks; but then, along that line, I came to the conclusion that there is a part of the meetings that is better than the breaks, and that is the end.

In any case, we always take our daily work very seriously, and it just so happened that Wednesday coincided with March 13. We had said: "On such and such Wednesday," and we did not realize what could arise. So we were in the meeting when we remembered the invitations we had received from you, and I asked my colleagues: "Have you received invitations for the March 13 event?" Almost all of them replied that yes, they had received invitations, and then I proposed: "Why don’t we take a break in the meeting and go participate with the students in the commemoration of March 13?"

No matter how important any meeting is, it is much more important to remember a date like this. I do not believe there is anything more important at this moment than to pay tribute to those who sacrificed themselves for the independence and dignity of the nation.

This is a day not only for you students but for the generation that directly participated in the battles of those years, which is impossible to forget. We were then in the very heart of the mountains — and we were not even a large group — when, at about this time, at the foot of one of the highest mountains in the Sierra Maestra where we were moving, we turned on the radio and only heard the signal from Radio Reloj; not a single word could be heard. We understood that something serious, something of great significance was happening at that moment, since that silent radio could not be explained; indeed, dramatic events had just occurred, José Antonio had just spoken, and only his signal remained in the air from the station.

We waited impatiently until the first news of what had happened began to arrive via the radio. We also quickly learned — I do not remember exactly after how long, I think it was the same afternoon — of José Antonio's death.

The news was known in fragments. And, as always in these circumstances, some of the fighters, when they were captured, were murdered. That day was a day of terror in the city, where various people were murdered.

We knew José Antonio very well; we had just finished our studies at the university when José Antonio arrived. From the very first moment, he was characterized by his cheerful, friendly nature, the kind of person who, just by his way of being and his behavior, wins the sympathy of others. He was very active. I remember him in the first months after the coup d'état of 1952, in the demonstrations and in the struggles of the students — he was not yet a student leader; he was a young man from the architecture school, if I remember correctly; they called him Manzanita because he had a rosy complexion, a characteristic of his physique, and he came from Cárdenas — and everyone already knew him; he was popular from the very beginning because of his constant activity, his energy, his participation in the front lines of the demonstrations, and his bravery. Those were the characteristics of José Antonio.

With us, he was always really very kind and friendly, despite the fact that sometimes there are those phenomena where newcomers to the university do not like the presence of those who were there before; and when events like the coup d'état of March 10 occurred, there were people at the university who were competing with others, and some saw us as rivals, who might become leaders of the Revolution, and they had a bit of jealousy. That is the truth — these things are rarely talked about — but that was never José Antonio's attitude, never, ever!, but rather the opposite.

He began to stand out and rose up, and in that very tough struggle, which became much tougher after July 26, 1953, José Antonio rose until he reached the position of president of the University Student Federation.

He infused the Student Federation with all his energy and spirit, and the fighting spirit of the students grew significantly; they fought tremendous battles against the police. I remember that we were imprisoned and they were in the streets in various protests and struggles. Later, when we had already left Cuba to prepare what later became the "Granma" expedition — at that time, there was no boat and we did not know what it would be called — the students also fought great battles, strong, very strong, against the police; they were pitched battles, and there was José Antonio, always on the front lines.

When we were about to return to Cuba — the Revolutionary Directorate had already been created — a delegation from the Directorate visited us in Mexico; we discussed the problems of Cuba at length and made an agreement to act united, the 26th of July Movement and the Revolutionary Directorate. For us, that was of utmost importance because the strength of our movement was joined by the strength of the Revolutionary Directorate and figures of national prestige, among them, fundamentally, José Antonio. We made what was called the Pact of Mexico, to act together in the battle for the overthrow of Batista.

Then we, according to our plans, organized the expedition and landed in the eastern province — at that time it was a single province — we landed at Las Coloradas, on the yacht "Granma," after adventures that are well known and we will not repeat.

This occurred two or three days after the uprising in Santiago de Cuba because we, within the movement, sometimes had differing viewpoints. To tell the truth, we were in favor of landing first and that the uprising would occur afterward. We did this for one reason: we considered ourselves well prepared and better armed. We believed that our force was not numerous — it was almost 100 well-trained men, really, for the fight — and our idea was that, upon landing, the army forces would head towards us, and then, when the bulk of the forces moved towards us, the uprising in Santiago de Cuba would occur in the enemy's rear.

That was a topic we discussed a lot with the leadership of the movement that was acting in Cuba. I believed I had convinced them because they wanted to synchronize, for the uprising to occur on the same day as our arrival, and we arrived two days late, although, in reality, we had no blame. In reality, we knew very little about seamanship; we only knew that a boat could get to Cuba. The resources we had to acquire vessels were very scarce, and we bought a yacht, which is the one that is on the other side of the Palace. As you can see, it is suitable for a family to take a trip, but it is not suitable for carrying an expedition, and we had nothing else and were determined to come.

We had proclaimed a slogan — and be careful with slogans because they must be fulfilled! — and just as we now say "Socialism or Death!" "Homeland or Death!" at that time we said: "In 1956 we will be free or we will be martyrs". And we wrote that in all the proclamations.

Some people, historians and others, have wondered why we did it and if it was correct to announce a landing with a fixed deadline, why commit ourselves. I would say that this can be discussed; I have no objection to discussing that. But what element influenced? The skepticism that existed among many people about the possibilities of a revolution in Cuba, combined with the enemy propaganda that all of that was a tale and that no word would be fulfilled, that it was nothing more than a slogan, and a lot of campaigning was done.

In reality, there are two moments: there is the moment before we launched the slogan, which was pure skepticism, that no, we would not make any revolution, that we had to follow the legal and electoral course laid out by Batista; when we launched the slogan, then they campaigned that we would not fulfill it.

That was a special situation; we were determined to fulfill it, and even when we acquired the weapons, mobilized them, and stored them, we always left a small group of weapons, 15 or 20, because I said: "In any case, we will fulfill it." It can be discussed, I repeat, whether it was correct or not, but the promise has been made, the promise has been made and it must be fulfilled! And we said: "Well, even an airplane." Perhaps we would have been hijackers of a plane and would have landed who knows where, but near some mountain. The point was that we would return to the country before December 31; we had said it and were ready to fulfill it.

Of course, we wanted to return with as many men as possible, in the best possible conditions. At first, when the strategy was conceived — and we had already conceived it from prison — the idea was to gather 300 men with automatic weapons; we took into account the enemy aviation and even then thought that with the fire of automatic weapons, in a certain way, enemy aviation could be neutralized from the ground, which was later demonstrated by the Vietnamese in their war when they had many automatic weapons. But when we came on the "Granma," we really only brought one automatic weapon; instead of 300 automatic weapons, just one; the others were bolt-action rifles, which were not bad. We had about 55 scoped rifles; people had acquired good practice in shooting with scopes, capable of hitting a target at 500 or 600 meters on a plate and, at times, on a plate from the side — you can imagine the level of marksmanship — but they were not, really, automatic weapons.

The number of men on the "Granma" was 82; we could not bring some remaining ones. Do you know how we finally made that selection list? By order, of course, of those who had more experience, more practice, etc., etc., and in the end, there were about 15, more or less, in the same category, and then we said: "To take the largest number, what do we do?" And we chose them by weight and size: the smallest of our troops were ultimately chosen, and three or four heavier ones stayed behind — I warn you — those did not come, and later there was no convincing them why they had not been brought, and simply they had not been brought because where one came, two could fit, and to reach 82 on the "Granma," we had to do that.

These were the conditions under which our return to Cuba occurred, very difficult. The comrades from Santiago de Cuba launched the uprising on the 30th because, according to the calculations we had made, we would arrive in five days; but there was a calculation that only some of you, who study mathematics or naval engineering or something, could have done better than us because we tested the boat in calm waters and, moreover, with a small crew. No one knew enough to realize that by loading 82 men on that boat, which were a few tons of men, plus the weapons, water, fuel, food, that boat was going to significantly decrease its speed. Not only did it decrease its speed, but it almost sank because, in addition, there was a storm the same night we left, on November 25; that was a nutshell dancing in the Gulf of Mexico. And, indeed, it was sinking; it started taking on water. No one knows exactly how the boat was saved, and we, desperately, were bailing water; the thing was very simple as we understood later, as the boat sank more with the weight, the boards that were normally out of the water were less watertight and water began to enter there, but with the very humidity of the water, the gap began to close as the boards expanded, and finally, after hours, we won the battle of keeping the boat from sinking. And so, under those conditions, our return was undertaken, at night, at dawn.

I tell you all this so that you understand how difficult it was at that time to coordinate an action between Mexico and Havana. But the fact is that we took two more days; the boat was sailing at two-thirds of the calculated speed. We had the misfortune that a comrade fell overboard at around 2:00 in the morning on December 2, and we did not want to resign ourselves to losing that comrade. We turned around and around until we finally made one last effort and heard some shouts of: "Here, here!" in the dark night and in the quite choppy waters, and we managed to rescue the comrade. That raised morale a lot, of course, for that effort that was made, but it made us lose an hour, and we should have arrived an hour earlier. In reality, that was an inconvenience; we arrived during the day, in a highly dangerous situation, because Batista's planes already knew that a boat had left from there and were searching for the aviation and the navy everywhere.

We passed far south of Cuba, but we entered directly towards the current province of Granma, near the southwestern tip of the province, close to Niquero.

There were many difficulties; the issue is that we could not disembark because the captain we had — who had been a naval officer — did not have much knowledge of that area. He made one turn, a second turn, a third turn. I asked him a question in the end — and it’s not that I was ignorant, because you learn some geography in high school — I said to him: "Are you sure that is the island of Cuba?" Of course, there could have been a small cay, there could have been something, and that was the risk. We could already see some mountains, and I said: "Straight ahead, we can’t make any more turns!" He wanted to make a fourth turn to orient himself, all this in broad daylight. We had to run aground, disembark under very difficult conditions; and we were not lucky, a little more and we would have disembarked at a dock as planned, and instead we disembarked in a swamp, that was horrible! Those were the conditions that preceded our return to Cuba.

The way in which the students and, in general, the Directory would support us was not coordinated. That would depend on the resources they had, on the weapons they had, and on how they decided to support us.

But the fact is that when the landing occurred, preceded by the uprising of November 30, since there was no coincidence — and that was one of the risks of trying to follow a tactic of exact coincidence, because any incident delays you at sea, and that’s what happened to us — we were delayed two days, and consequently, the uprising occurred two days earlier. The entire army fell upon the people of Santiago, and after they dominated the uprising, the entire army fell upon us. So, the happiest formula in that coordination was not achieved.

Upon disembarking in a swamp, we could not advance quickly towards the mountains, as our plans were, possibly with the capture of one of those barracks, which we would have surprised, and continue towards the mountains; it could not be, we were already exposed and then we had to try to advance towards the mountains under very difficult, extremely difficult conditions: surrounded on all sides.

That, combined with a certain carelessness due to inexperience, led to the army surprising us on December 5, almost at dusk; they distracted us with planes flying low and flying low. No one noticed a troop approaching on land, and attacking by surprise scattered the expedition that we had organized with so much effort and sacrifice; they dispersed us and reduced us to an insignificant number of men.

At that moment, the movement stopped. Batista considered it all liquidated; he based it on what today a philosopher would call: objective data. If the expedition had been dispersed, liquidated, it was completely impossible, according to all calculations, to continue that struggle.

I remember that I stayed with two men at dawn on December 6; we were three and had two rifles: one had very few bullets at that moment and mine had the bandolier with about 80 bullets. And no one else, we did not see anyone else around, and a terrible pursuit was unleashed to eliminate each of the isolated fighters. That’s how it happened; many of those who died in the "Granma" expedition were murdered when they were captured in those places, due to thirst, hunger, ignorance of the terrain; they were captured in various ways; except for three groups, which were the ones we could continue: the group of three, Raúl's group, and a group where Che, Almeida, and other comrades were.

In reality, the number of rifles we had when we regrouped was very few, about seven or so, and we decided to continue our struggle.

For those who wondered whether the Revolution was possible or not, or who said that they needed an army to fight the other, or I don’t know how many millions, or I don’t know how many thousands of weapons, our response was to resume the struggle with seven rifles, those carried by Raúl's group and those I carried. The other group had made agreements with some peasants, who set as a condition to pass them first through the enemy lines and then pass the weapons, because they did not know the area at all, and those weapons were lost. Therefore, that third group where valuable comrades came was unarmed. But we, with seven weapons, said: "Yes, our ideas are just, our strategy is correct, our conception is correct, we are going to fight in the mountains and we are going to eliminate Batista's army." I believe all this is very important because it demonstrates what a man can do in the face of the theory of sophisticated weapons.

At the moment we embarked on our struggle with seven rifles, Batista had dozens of tanks, hundreds of armored cars, thousands of trucks, dozens of planes, hundreds of cannons, thousands of machine guns, all kinds of automatic weapons, and between 70,000 and 80,000 men. And we with our seven little rifles. Later, some weapons that had been left scattered were collected. And we decided to continue our struggle because we were convinced that our struggle was just, that we were right, that the tactic was correct. But we had to have, without a doubt, firm convictions: the kind of convictions we ask of revolutionaries, the kind of convictions we ask of the communist youth, the kind of convictions we ask of our party militants, the kind of convictions we ask of all young people, of students. Because you also had to have a lot of conviction to attempt to storm this palace as we saw this afternoon, observing the pioneers reproducing the scenes of that afternoon. But that conviction is fundamental, fundamental in everything! It is not the weapons, it is the man; it is not the weapons, it is the people that decide! And with that, we decided that battle.

For every rifle with which we decided to continue the struggle, Batista had 10,000 rifles. It is very good to remember this, now that the imperialists have made a great show of their technology and their planes and their bombs with laser rays and all that. They cannot scare us; a people like this cannot be scared, really, by that.

I already said that we are not concerned about what has happened in other parts of the world because our conceptions are different, our ideas, in every sense, are different. This has been the path of the Revolution since we began because our people have prepared, because today we have the doctrine of the war of the whole people, which is something different.

The imperialists are swimming in a sea of triumphalism and speak as if they own the world. They cannot be owners of the world because at least they are not owners of us.

The world is very difficult to govern; there will be no one to govern it, moreover, because in the world there are billions of hungry people, alongside a few hundred million from the developed capitalist countries that have plundered the peoples of the Third World for centuries and today have wealth; but even there there are beggars, even there there are abandoned children, gambling, corruption, millions of things in those developed capitalist countries. The world is ungovernable.

I remember that sometimes, conversing with some American politicians who came to visit, legislators or other types of politicians, who came with their story, the tragedy, the threat of communism and the theory that the USSR wanted to take over the world, and I would tell those politicians: "Look, if you believe that there is someone so crazy in this world who wants to take over the world, why don’t we just give it to them?" Because the world is not Luxembourg; the world is countries with hundreds of millions like India. India alone has 800 million and grows by 10 million each year; and you have to see, as much as Cuba is today, India grows in a year. And all the countries of Africa, Latin America, and a large part of Asia live in terrible poverty, but that is also a growing poverty, it is a poverty that grows, it is a misery that grows, unemployment that grows, hunger that grows, it is a situation that worsens. That is the world. I say: "Does anyone want to take over that world?" I would give them some examples: "It’s as if you accused us of wanting to take over a country, with all the problems that our own country has. That is a theory of fantasy, it is a crazy theory." And today the Yankees, in the current conditions, not only want to take over the world, they already feel like owners of the world, of that world I speak of that cannot be governed.

Allow me to say that in the image I used, I should have said: Let’s give it away excluding Cuba. But we could include ourselves too, yes, we could have included ourselves to be with everyone in the struggle. Of course, I am giving a simple image.

I would tell them: "Does anyone want the world with all its problems, with that enormous mountain of problems? Give it to them. Do you think that the USSR, really, which has to solve many of its own problems, which has to work on its own development, could want to take over any world?" And I would use that graphic image, as if to say it was madness and that no one could believe that, and that all those premises of McCarthyism, of the Cold War, and of anti-communism were absurd; that countries, first of all, had to solve their own problems; that socialist countries, first of all, had to solve their own development problems.

Now the Yankees believe they own the world. Let’s see if this world can be governed, that is the first thing to see, because it is a colossal mountain of problems and it is really madness, that desire for universal domination that imperialism has. Now they want to establish their order, and you have to see the speeches of the President of the United States with a triumphalism like never seen in history, as a consequence of the events in Iraq.

I will limit myself to saying two things about the war in Iraq: Cuba's positions on this are very well known, but very well known, moreover, very brave, very dignified; really, Cuba's prestige grew because we condemned what had to be condemned, such as the invasion and annexation of Kuwait, which was unacceptable, and we opposed in the Security Council what had to be opposed. Total blockade of food, who will it affect? Millions of women, children, the elderly. Total blockade of medicines, who will it affect? Millions of children, women, and the elderly, first of all, not the soldiers. And we opposed that, we opposed the unilateral actions of the United States, the unilateral military blockade that the United States decreed, and we opposed, of course, that declared war for January 15 and said: "This is unacceptable, unacceptable!" But that clashed with a numerical majority of the United States in the Security Council, a few countries aligned with them and their allies.

The United Nations committed one of the greatest infamies in history, something shameful, dishonorable that will never be forgotten, because it has decreed war as a solution, and our theory was that that problem could be resolved without war, even with measures of isolation, I am no longer talking about the blockade of medicines and food for children and women; the level of isolation, the international political situation made it impossible to resist that situation.

An American leader — I believe it was Carter — said with considerable wisdom that one day of war is more expensive than a year of waiting. But the Yankees were desperate to test their new weapons, to demonstrate their power, to make a solemn act of taking possession as the heads of the world. You know how all that was, you know the position that each country had, and you know the position that Cuba had.

Now, if it had been a country with nuclear weapons, would they have decreed nuclear war too? Anyone can realize that no; it was a Third World country that had made a great mistake, a very serious mistake, a grave international political fault that was unacceptable and had to be rectified, that was our position and in that we employed our diplomatic effort, arguments. There are documents out there, which one day may be published, of what Cuba said, of what Cuba did, with great moral authority to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to rectify that mistake it had made, which would do a gigantic favor to the United States, to imperialism, which would do great harm to the countries of the Third World — all the arguments are there, clear and irrefutable; that this would not be the war of Vietnam or Korea, countries that had a rear guard at that time, that Iraq was totally isolated geographically and would have no logistical supply, that it could have nothing, that the political circumstances in which those wars occurred were different from this one, that imperialism had managed to make a great coalition with its NATO allies, with Muslim countries and even with Arab countries, and that it was a great mistake the steps they had taken and that they should rectify, that they should use the courage to rectify those mistakes. That was our position.

In the United Nations, everything that seemed just to us, I repeat, we supported, and everything that seemed unjust to us, we fought against, and I believe that history will take care of recording this.

And many of the nations of the world, although they do not say it out loud, far from it —who dares to speak out loud today? Very few in the world dare to speak out loud—, they tell us that they admire our brave position and that they feel envious of not having been able to play the role of Cuba. And there it happened what we knew was going to happen and we told the Iraqi leadership itself, that they were going to wage a technical war against them, with sophisticated weapons and with the least number of human casualties possible.

Regarding what happened in the Gulf, what I think, essentially, is the following: Wars should never be provoked, that is, wars should not be provoked, that is the first point; secondly, wars, once unleashed, must be well executed, and thirdly, wars cannot end except with victory or death!

From this, our reality is perfectly deduced: First, we will not provoke wars, we have not done so in more than 30 years of Revolution; that is, if there is a war, it will not be provoked by us; if there is a war here, it is because it is imposed on us, that is clear. Secondly, if a war is imposed on us, we will know how to wage a well-executed war, and for that, we have been preparing for many years. Thirdly, if a war is imposed on us, that war will not end except with victory or death. I have stated general principles, now comes our particular one: It will end with victory, no matter the cost! (APPLAUSE AND SHOUTS OF: "Fidel! Fidel!" AND: "For whatever it takes, Fidel, for whatever it takes!")

In a war of that type, the people will not be watching the events as if from a stadium, just like they observe the matches between Havana and Henequeneros or Serranos and Vegueros; in a war, this would not be the Pan American Games, it would be the people participating actively. In the places where imperialists have recently carried out their military adventures, in Grenada, in Panama, in Iraq, we find that in Grenada they had committed suicide with the division, with the assassination of Bishop the process had divided, self-destructed, if not even in that small country they could have offered great resistance; in Panama, there was no people prepared to defend the country, and in Iraq either. A large conventional army, many tanks, many things; but not a people prepared for war, there was no doctrine of the war of the whole people. It was a conventional war, and conventional war is older than Maricastaña. As a military conception, it is inconceivable that you would develop the strategy of a conventional war against the United States. That is the reality.

You also do not send all the soldiers to one corner of the war stage. The encirclement of any army that has been positioned in a corner is as old as wars; the idea of going around it, that happened in World War I, and especially in World War II, classic tactics. I was completely sure that the imperialist maneuver would be to wear down first, and then attack by encircling the ground forces of Iraq, that is what happened and at that moment the Iraqi command gives the order to withdraw its forces, with thousands of planes in the air. The troops were poorly positioned, even within that conventional war, because even within conventional war, means and troops can be used much better, anyone knows that; however, a great error of that nature was committed and then the withdrawal.

There they massacred. The vast majority of the tens of thousands of Iraqi dead were on the roads, while the caravans of civilians, military, and everyone else were retreating under a rain of planes, a tremendous multitude of attack planes and helicopters. In those conditions, those battles were fought. That does not resemble in any way our military conceptions, our ways of fighting.

Now, what were the Yankees trying to prevent? The clash of man to man; that is, they were trying to reduce their own human casualties at all costs, because politics did not allow accepting a certain number of casualties.

It is incredible that, with such fabulous power and a superiority of force as they had on land, in the air, and at sea against a poorly positioned troop that could be quickly encircled, NATO and United States forces took a month to attack. They did not want to confront the enemy on land, despite the gigantic superiority they had: the superiority in helicopters, the superiority in planes, in artillery, in information, satellites constantly monitoring and reporting everything.

A month passed and they did not attack. The Yankees would like to wage war where there was no one, and win it, moreover, through terror.

We are not particularly concerned about the events in the Gulf. If the Yankees confront us —hopefully that does not happen, because we have no reason to be giving them lessons at a high price; hopefully it does not happen, since we would have to pay a very high price—, they will see how different everything is. How different it is to have to confront the man, with that man of the machete charges of Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez! With that man of the 10 years of struggle for independence without the supply of a single bullet! That man who fought so hard for independence against one of the most powerful military powers of the time, with this people that overthrew the tyranny without weapons! Then they will see what man is. Now, where will that man be? They cannot even imagine where that man will be!

We have been working for many years in all directions, not only in a military sense but also in a moral sense, a patriotic education, concepts, a very deep conviction of the justice of the cause we defend, and today more profound, because we have remained among the few privileged defenders of the most just ideas, among the few privileged defenders of the most just social system, among the few who, if capitalism is mentioned, simply feel their stomach turn; because anyone who knows what capitalism is, who truly knows it, can feel nothing but repulsion, disgust for what that system is.

Yesterday we saw it when the health event in Cuba was inaugurated, the data, the figures. It is truly impressive what a horrible system capitalism is, that cannot guarantee even its own people employment, cannot guarantee health, adequate education; that cannot prevent youth from being corrupted with drugs, with gambling, with vices of all kinds.

So, what has capitalism given to the world? Four billion hungry human beings who constitute a volcano that no one knows when, how, or where it will erupt. That is what capitalism has given in four centuries: a terrifying poverty for a large part of humanity. They have poisoned the seas and the air; they have been producing with their waste of fuel and resources an ecological catastrophe whose consequences are unknown.

Now imagine a society based on the concept that each individual should have a car. Imagine every Chinese with a car, I want you to imagine it for a minute, and every Indian with a car. Then there would only be one question: How many days does the oil last? that oil that is already so expensive. That concept applied to the Third World as a model of society is nonsense, it is madness.

If the rest of the world lived as those consumer societies do, oil would not last a year, and the pollution that would bring would make life on Earth impossible.

Capitalism has no future as a model of society, as anything; it is nonsense from beginning to end, it is an injustice from beginning to end, it is the empire of selfishness, it is the law of the jungle, and there are still idiots out there who believe they will solve the problem with capitalism.

There are idiots who do not know that to build capitalism, not only capital is needed, but also capitalists, and they do not even have that. In exploiting people, capitalists are champions. Are they going to come to compete with them? All of that is a gigantic madness.

But in the midst of universal madness, we must know how to be equitable and wise; in the midst of universal madness, we must be clear and have a clear thought about what needs to be done. That is why I say today that our people have special responsibilities.

We have prioritized programs in the special period, but among those programs is defense, which does not neglect for a second the preparation of the people for war, the protection of the people, not only of the military units but also of the people. The country has been working intensively on this and will not diminish one iota the effort we have been making in that direction.

No one has asked for such high responsibilities as those that have fallen today on our Revolution and our people; but, simply, we must know how to fulfill them. The problems do not matter, the difficulties do not matter: our people and our Revolution will know how to fulfill their sacred obligations, and we must elaborate all the philosophy around this.

I am going to say something, with the hope that none of you forget it. The Revolution, the independence of the country, the freedom of the country, the honor of the country, the strength of the country is no one but each one of you.

I say that this idea is very important. Each one of you must say: I am the Revolution! I am the independence of the country! I am the honor of the country! I am the strength, the army of the country! wherever you are, alone, isolated, or in a group, or in a patrol, in a platoon, in a battalion, or all by yourself. You must say as we said, that little group that persevered: "Our cause is just, our cause will triumph; no matter the enemy's advantages in arms, our cause will triumph; no matter the enemy's power, our people will triumph".

This concept is very important, because as long as there is a man or a woman, there will be Revolution, there will be independence, there will be homeland, there will be strength, wherever they are, on a mountain, in a basement, among the ruins of a collapsed building, in a trench, in a street, behind a tree, next to a trunk in the mountains; as long as there is a man and a woman with those ideas and that conviction, there will be homeland, there will be Revolution.

That is what the Yankee imperialists must know, so they know who we are and how we are, and what people they would have to come to wage war against, what people they would have to come to try to dominate and subjugate.

I believe this should be lesson number one of all; this should be the first law of our revolutionary political education, of our Marxist-Leninist education, of our communist education, that idea and that conviction in every man and woman of our homeland. With those convictions, the foundations of our Revolution were built throughout history, before the triumph and after the triumph.

Before the triumph, a few months after our landing, the comrades of the Directory, who had made an agreement and had still not been able to participate in the armed struggle, felt it was their duty to fulfill that agreement they made with us in Mexico, and when we were a handful of men in the mountains, they stormed the Palace to fulfill their commitment; they stormed the Palace to make their contribution, they stormed the Palace to support us, who were fighting under very difficult conditions.

You have to have conviction —as I said before— to come with a group of men, in a few cars, and penetrate this building to liquidate the tyrant. It was very difficult that under such disadvantageous conditions they could achieve their objectives, but they did not hesitate in the attempt.

That is why today, on this March 13, you gather, with so much respect and devotion, to remember this heroic act in which the blood of patriots was shed, the blood of students was shed. A day like today it was necessary to reflect on these examples I have mentioned from our history, how nothing could stop us in the effort to return to the country. We fulfilled our word. What would have happened if it had been impossible? Let us imagine that the ship caught fire, let us imagine that all the weapons were lost —and almost all were lost, because in the end we left Mexico in the midst of a tremendous pursuit and an intense search for our combatants; they were looking for the ship, the weapons, everything. However, we did not hesitate to proclaim our commitment, and what would we not have done to fulfill it? The storm did not stop us, the risk of that ship sinking did not stop us, because not even when that ship was sinking did we change course towards Cuba. We could have sunk on the way. Accepted!, sunk, that is fine, but we were not going to turn back.

Above all, I believe that from those pages of history, the lesson that can be most beneficial to us at this moment is how we, when we had one rifle against 10,000, one man against 10,000 men, did not hesitate, did not lose confidence, did not doubt our decision to move forward, precisely because of our convictions.

These were the convictions of the men since the independence struggles began in this country: they were the convictions of Maceo in Baraguá, they were the convictions of July 26, they were the convictions of March 13, they were the convictions of November 30 — which had already occurred in Santiago de Cuba — they were the convictions of Girón. Our men fought against the Yankee fleet; they were there as witnesses, waiting for an order to intervene, aircraft carriers, battleships, and our men did not rest for a minute, nor would they have hesitated to continue the fight against the Yankees if they had landed. Dozens of planes were flying in the vicinity of Girón, Yankee planes!

That was the conviction of those who fought in Girón, the conviction of those who faced the October Crisis, when it seemed that things were going to end in nuclear war. And I must tell the truth, no one blinked, I do not remember seeing anyone blink. It is an admirable thing, it takes a lot of conviction.

That was the conviction of our internationalist fighters when they went to fulfill missions in Angola and in other countries; it was the conviction of our soldiers in Cuito-Cuanavale, who were decorated right there before the battle was over, see if we were convinced or not that the enemy's force was going to crash there!; it was the conviction of our troops that advanced through the southwest of Angola. In each page of our history, that conviction has been present.

Today that conviction is needed more than ever; today, after the collapse of the so-called socialist countries of Eastern Europe; today, after the crisis of socialism in a country as large and important as the USSR; today, when our Revolution faces a special, difficult period, but which could become much more difficult as events in the USSR continue to evolve unfavorably.

We must be with the newspaper every day watching what news arrives, because, well, important economic relations and exchanges between the USSR and Cuba are still maintained. But that will not depend only on the will of the leaders, that will not depend only on the will of a group of men, but on the ability to manage the internal situation itself; because if there are strikes here, strikes there, if there are products that have to arrive and do not arrive, if the situation becomes more serious internally in that country, our situation will also considerably worsen, and it is then that we need that conviction.

In peace — if we can call peace this circumstance in which our peoples have to live — or in war, this conviction that we remember today on this historic March 13 is so important, so decisive; that which we must always remember, what I said and repeated today: I am the Revolution!, I am the independence of the homeland!, I am the honor of the homeland!, I am the strength, the army of the homeland!, I am the victory of the homeland!

Long live the example of March 13 forever!

Socialism or Death!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!