Speech delivered to the Cuban delegates selected to represent Cuba at the IX World Festival of Youth and Students, at the Comodoro Hotel, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

26 June 1965 · IX World Festival of Youth and Students · Comodoro Hotel

Context
Castro addressed Cuban delegates selected for the IX World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana on June 26, 1965, amid a political crisis in Algeria, the planned host country.
Main themes
IX World Festival of Youth and Students, Cuban delegation selection, Algerian political crisis, revolutionary solidarity, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, revolutionary versus diplomatic language, Cuba's international stance, mass mobilization of Cuban youth
Duration
~65 min
96th percentile
Words
7,823
96th percentile
Sentences
246
93rd percentile
Readability
40
35th percentile
Grade
15.5
80th percentile
Syntax
3.40
90th percentile
Vocabulary
2.24
58th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 63%61%
  • Institutional 17%16%
  • Social 8%7%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Environmental 5%5%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

246 sentences in 96 paragraphs

Comrades and fellow delegates to the IX World Festival of Youth and Students:

For many months, the selection of our youth's representation at the IX Festival has significantly occupied the attention of our people.

The enthusiasm with which the preparatory events and the selection of the Cuban delegation were carried out could possibly rival what was being done in any other country.

We do not know how delegates are chosen; we naturally think that organizations strive to select the best everywhere. But we can feel absolutely secure and satisfied that thanks to a revolutionary mass procedure, Cuba has selected a representation of the highest quality, that is, a true representation of the best of our people and our Revolution.

And the entire people supported this effort. The millions of arrobas cut, the thousands of caballerías cleared, the endless or countless works, as well as the countless efforts that were made as a tribute to the IX Festival, speak for themselves of the warmth with which the entire nation focused its effort on this activity, even in the midst of the sugar harvest. And the efforts were reconciled: the harvest served to help highlight many, and the selection and effort made to designate Cuba's representatives, in turn, helped the harvest.

It is said that an effort was made as if the IX Festival were to be celebrated in Cuba. The country chosen as the host, our relations with the people of that country and with the revolutionary movement that that country represents, served as a stimulus to our effort. And undoubtedly, extraordinary work had been done.

And our delegation was practically ready with their bags packed, the ship had already set sail, when suddenly the stage where the IX Festival was to take place changed abruptly. It would no longer be a clear and eloquent slogan to speak of the World Festival of Youth and Students for Solidarity, Peace, and Friendship, taking place there where at this moment "solidarity, peace, and friendship" are truly very dubious concepts. Because it can be said that at this moment the circumstances that Algeria is going through are very different from the circumstances that led the organizers of the Festival to choose it as the venue for the event.

It is not pleasant in any way — and it is always a very thorny subject — to judge events that may occur in a country beyond our borders. It is even more painful, and more thorny, when those events take place in a country whose heroic people have won the sympathy of the whole world and, as part of that world, of our people; when those events take place amid a revolutionary process that also awakened the interest of all the peoples of the world, but especially the interest of the peoples who have been fiercely fighting against colonialism and imperialism, of the peoples who have liberated themselves or are fighting to free themselves from those yokes, and also of the peoples that cannot be called underdeveloped, whose progressive layers were extraordinarily interested in that revolutionary process.

These are the circumstances that, although they make the analysis doubly painful and thorny, justify the concern — also universal — for the events that are occurring there; and justify, something more than the right, the duty to express an opinion. We do not intend with our opinions to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, but we do intend with our opinions to exercise the right to analyze those events, wherever they may occur, that necessarily influence the rest of the world, that necessarily affect the interests of the rest of the world, that inevitably affect the revolutionary feelings of the rest of the world and the revolutionary interests of the rest of the world, because to a certain extent the events in Algeria affect us all.

And that is why what happens there, in that country, which in its long and extraordinarily heroic years of struggle garnered sympathy and engendered solidarity and aid from very diverse points in the world, is something that in one way or another concerns us all. And that is the reason why tonight, in this meeting with the young people selected to depart for Algeria, and in light of the unavoidable need to respond to the question of "what are we going to do?" we find ourselves compelled to address this issue and answer that question.

We are not going to speak in diplomatic language; we are going to speak in revolutionary language. Diplomatic and revolutionary are not always opposed; sometimes they are opposed, and other times they are identified. In this case, we forget the diplomatic aspects of the issue and focus on the purely revolutionary aspect. Why mince words?! This topic cannot be approached without offending a few, even if there is no intention to offend anyone, without hurting a few; it is not possible to address this issue without it leading to enmities.

But in circumstances like these, what matters is the correct point of view, the fair and objective analysis as far as possible.

First of all, the military pronouncement that overthrew the revolutionary government of Ben Bella cannot be qualified by anyone as a revolutionary pronouncement.

It is true that the crisis arose within the Revolution and among the ranks of the revolutionaries; it is equally true that the men who were at the forefront of that pronouncement participated prominently in the struggle for Algeria's independence; and it is also true that among those figures are some who had a good revolutionary line up to that moment, alongside figures who — although they had distinguished themselves in the revolutionary process — did not have a good revolutionary position.

In our relations with Algeria, we made contacts with the revolutionaries, with the representatives of that country, seeing them all as part of a single entity. Thus, we got to know various figures from there, many of whom visited our country, many of whom conversed and exchanged extensive information with representatives of our country during visits made here or there, and some of those men are now on one side or the other, some of them victims and others perpetrators.

But regardless of the names, figures, and personalities, the qualification of revolutionary or not of the military pronouncement essentially derives from the facts. There can be revolutionary military pronouncements, in which case it would no longer be so correct to call it a pronouncement but a revolutionary movement; while a pronouncement can also be something that, to put it more crudely, can be qualified as a "putscherazo," a coup, or a gorilazo.

The objective against which the pronouncement is directed is, first and foremost, one of the elements that determine the qualification, although it will not depend solely on the objective against which it is directed, but also on the ends to which it is directed.

A little over 10 years ago, in another country in North Africa, the United Arab Republic, a king named Farouk ruled, representing a feudal monarchy and foreign monopolistic interests. It meant a regime of the most brutal exploitation of workers and peasants, and under those circumstances, a military movement arose that led to the overthrow of that king, the establishment of the republic, and the true independence of that country.

That movement was led by a military man and carried out by the military. That pronouncement, from the very moment it took place, could undoubtedly be qualified as a revolutionary military pronouncement. The mere fact of being directed against the most anachronistic form of government and against the representatives of the interests that exploited the country qualified that movement, from the first moment, as a revolutionary movement, or revolutionary military pronouncement, or simply revolution.

Those circumstances were radically different from the circumstances in which this Algerian pronouncement takes place. In Egypt, the progressive forces of the army faced the social system and the government that represented it; revolutionaries faced feudalists, faced imperialists.

Are these the circumstances in which the Algerian pronouncement takes place? No. It is, first of all, a painful clash within the revolutionary ranks, a painful and lamentable conflict within the revolution, in which arms and force are wielded against revolutionaries, not against a feudal king, not against a representative of imperialist interests, not against a spokesperson for the exploiters and reactionaries, not against an enemy of the people but against the representative of the Algerian revolution, against a revolutionary and anti-imperialist fighter; against a combatant whose position, in the international arena, in the struggle of peoples against imperialism, gained considerable prestige in his country and outside of it in just a few years.

The arms of the revolution and the people are wielded against someone who undoubtedly had the support of the people, against someone who undoubtedly represented the majority will of the people.

This consideration of what the overthrown government represented against which the military pronouncement was directed has nothing to do with the judgment of that government's work, has nothing to do with the successes or mistakes that men and governments inevitably commit.

This is not intended to be a detailed analysis of X years of government, what could have been done better or worse, because that is a more debatable topic, that is a matter of opinions, of criteria. One could opine whether more could have been done or not, whether they did more than they could or less than they could, but what we were referring to were facts, which is not a matter of opinions or criteria but facts accepted by everyone.

Because, who could deny that Ben Bella was the leader of the Algerian people, who could deny his historical participation in Algeria's independence and in the Algerian revolution? Who? What government, what party said, before the treacherous overthrow of President Ben Bella, that Ben Bella was not a revolutionary, that Ben Bella was not an interpreter of the feelings of Algeria, that Ben Bella was a traitor to the revolution or that Ben Bella was pro-imperialist, a conservative, a reactionary, a despot?

The Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, just like the Youth Festival, was to be held there. No one proposed to hold it in South Vietnam, in the capital of the pro-imperialist puppets; no one proposed to hold it in South Korea or Taiwan or the Federation of Malaya or in any of those countries where the governments are genuine representations of anti-social and anti-national interests. By virtually unanimous consensus of all progressive and revolutionary movements, it was decided that the conference would be held in Algeria, that the Festival would take place in Algeria. No one, no government, no party, said that this man was a turncoat or a traitor or a despot or an enemy of the Algerian people.

I therefore start from realities, which is not a matter of opinions, but of facts and universally accepted truths.

The day after the inglorious coup, it already entailed a delicate situation for all governments and for all parties: What to do? For us, it also entailed the question of what to do. And the what to do, why. And what our attitude should be towards those events.

A government that was eminently friendly to us had been overthrown, a government with which we maintained excellent relations, because we saw in it the representative of the revolution. It is not, as some have tried to insinuate, that we see this problem in the light of friendship, no! In the light of truth, in the light of principles, and in the light of dignity!

Our relations with President Ben Bella were simply the expression of our relations and our sympathies towards the Algerian Revolution and the Algerian people.

It is true that there were great sympathies towards President Ben Bella personally from our people, because we did not forget, of course, that gesture — which cannot be easily forgotten — of the revolutionary leader of Algeria, the president of the new independent State after seven years of heroic struggles, who, on the eve of those critical days of October in 1962, in an atmosphere of growing tension, came to the United States invited by the government of that country, that country which maintained such a high degree of hostility towards us, that country which judges men and governments and takes reprisals against them to the extent that they are more friends or more enemies of ours; and we must not forget that the representative of that war-torn country, ravaged by war, rejecting all pressures from the imperialist government of the United States, with nothing to expect from us, nothing to receive from us, spontaneously and without hesitation accepts to visit our country, affronting the imperialists and traveling from Washington to Havana, precisely in those days, in those critical and tense days.

We remember our contacts with that leader, his decent, kind, revolutionary character, but not with words, but with deeds! Because the true revolutionary is not the revolutionary of words, but the revolutionary of deeds!

And it was not cheap talk; it was a deeply supportive and revolutionary gesture, so fully understood by our people that they gave the visitor one of the warmest receptions ever extended to a foreign visitor in our country.

But we also remember the embarrassing situation we found ourselves in with the visitor, because the crisis was brewing. The government of the United States had made certain proposals in response to the concerns expressed by the visitor regarding the hostility of the United States towards Cuba. And they had told him that if the weapons in Cuba were not offensive, there would be no problem; that if the weapons were offensive, then there could be problems.

This was in that unacceptable, for us, classification of the weapons. Because the sovereignty of a country does not entail, nor can it entail, under any circumstances, the obligation to account for its armament.

And when the United States was making its military agreements with Turkey — bordering the Soviet Union, geographically closer to the Soviet Union than Cuba is to the United States — or with Japan, or with Italy, or with any of the numerous countries with which they had military agreements, and in which they placed the type of weapons they deemed appropriate, from strategic rockets with thermonuclear warheads to bases for atomic submarines or atomic bombers, they did not admit — neither they nor the governments with which they made their agreements — that anyone could ask them for an account, nor did they consider themselves obliged to account to anyone.

And that is why we never accepted those distinctions; we never agreed with those distinctions. We will not stir up the mud of those days, because for us they were the expression of the most extraordinary heroism that a people can show and of the utmost dignity that a people can display.

But we will not delve into the tactical errors in the realm of politics, in the public statements that could have played into the enemy's hands. Because when one has the right and the truth to do something, it is not necessary to resort to lies, and it should never be necessary to resort to lies.

But it is a fact that the imperialists had developed that doctrine of offensive or non-offensive weapons. We understood very clearly that they could be strategic weapons, if you will, or non-strategic, nuclear weapons or conventional weapons.

But in the days when President Ben Bella visited us, very close to the crisis, the entire plan for the military strengthening of our country was in full swing, and the establishment of nuclear weapons was nearing completion. What to do with that visitor? Accept quietly the explanation he gave of what the imperialists had proposed? Let him leave without saying a word, without explaining to him the storm that was brewing and the truth of the facts? Reveal, perhaps, secrets or facts that had to be kept strictly secret? Disclose the extent of the military strengthening of our country and the nature of that strengthening?

It was indeed a delicate and embarrassing situation. And what did we do? We did not tell him that we were going to have nuclear weapons, but we made him understand. We explained the philosophy of our position, the truth of our situation regarding Yankee imperialism, its incessant interference in our affairs, its relentless hostility, its aggressive plans, its criminal intentions to crush our homeland, the dangers looming over our country, the danger of a conventional war whenever they pleased, in addition to the danger of a nuclear war if it erupted for any reason anywhere in the world.

And we explained how we directed our strategy towards the simplification of this problem, to get out of this alternative and remain with a single risk over our heads, the risk that we were running anyway of thermonuclear war, if it erupted for any reason anywhere.

And to a good listener, few words. And Ben Bella proved to be a magnificent listener, a comprehending listener, an intelligent listener.

It goes without saying that this is not the only reason for the presence of strategic weapons, since we were not only thinking of our purely national interests, but our thinking, when the decision was made, was not solely on the security of our country, but our thinking was essentially on the security of the entire socialist camp, on the security and strengthening of all the enemies of imperialism. And it must be said that in the view of the Cuban leaders, when they made the decision, it was not the security of the country that was the essential foundation, but the full coincidence of the two policies: our national policy and our international policy; the full identification, without contradictions of any kind, of our revolutionary policy, because it strengthened our homeland and strengthened the socialist camp.

Naturally, it can be the subject of multiple discussions, if one wishes, because everything can be discussed, about whether it meant or not a strategic strengthening of the socialist camp; about whether rockets were needed here or not; about whether they were hard or soft, that is, whether they were buried or on the surface. The truth is and the unquestionable fact — without pretending to definitively clarify the issue — that history will clarify that the strategic missiles located in Cuba had to travel a distance incomparably shorter than the strategic missiles installed in the territory of the Soviet Union.

We believe that this is not the present hour, and that it is up to history to clarify the intentions of each and every one of those who acted on that occasion.

Governments change, new situations arise; men pass, but the facts remain, and history will collect the facts of men. But I simply say that — in our view and not without very solid foundation —: The presence of the missiles in Cuba implied the strengthening of the power of the entire socialist camp!

This, so as not to overlook this delicate issue without clarifying one or two points that should not remain obscure. But essentially I was referring — and it is the reason I bring it up today — to the practical problem that presented itself to us with the visit of Ben Bella at that moment, hours after having spoken with the President of the United States. And what was our attitude and what was his? Because, what did he understand? He understood soon and well; and, moreover, he told us that it was fine, that he understood our position. And something more: when the Cuban-Algerian communiqué was drafted — and it must be said that when those communiqués are drafted, more radical and less radical positions always appear, and the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not at that moment more radical — the clearest and most radical positions in the communiqué were represented by Ben Bella, not by the Algerian Foreign Ministry.

I do not remember if this Butterfly or "Butterflyka" was the chancellor or a predecessor of his. But it is true that when that communiqué was drafted, we will never forget that, once presented to Ben Bella — a communiqué that had to be the result of the proposals of both parties, in which on our part we had neither to propose nor should we in any way propose things that would be difficult for the other party, for our visitor, to accept our proposals — I remember that once the final communiqué was read, just before he was about to leave — apparently recalling the conversation we had about offensive or non-offensive weapons, and when I clarified this I did not say, I involuntarily omitted, that in addition to that explanation about the alternatives we also explained our position regarding the classification of weapons as offensive or defensive — apparently, recalling that conversation which had undoubtedly been the most important issue we had dealt with, he said to us: "We must add this phrase to this communiqué: 'that Cuba has the right to adopt any measures it deems appropriate for the defense of its security'".

And that phrase, more or less verbatim, must be in the archives, in that communiqué. And it was at his initiative, demonstrating how well and clearly he understood our position and how he awakened in us sufficient trust, sufficient gratitude for his gesture at that moment that, without delving into the strictly case-specific or concrete, we did not hesitate to explain to him the philosophy of our position and the bases of our position, and everything else he deduced. From which an extraordinarily important secret — without something — much of that important secret he learned when he visited our country.

And those relations and that friendship between the two peoples grew ever greater. Circumstances came later, moments of crisis for Algeria, difficult moments for the Algerian revolution, when they sought our help, and men and weapons from our country! crossing the Atlantic in record time, arrived in Algeria, ready to fight alongside the Algerian revolutionaries! And when our men went there, those who today are divided were together, alongside Ben Bella were those who today have turned their weapons against him in fratricidal struggle.

The distance was not an obstacle that time for the first to arrive. Proletarian internationalism in fact, in deeds and not in cheap talk. We, the small country, constantly threatened by the imperialists, stripped ourselves of part of our most important armaments and sent them to the Algerian people. All these facts marked the relations and the friendship between both peoples, in their best and most glorious moments.

Perhaps, or without perhaps unfortunately, those weapons that once left for the revolution and for the defense of the Algerian people, in a glorious moment of beautiful solidarity, have been used in an inglorious moment, in a fratricidal act, against the government and the Algerian people.

But what is important, what remains, are the facts that forge a history in the relations between two countries and between two revolutions. It will be up to Algerian historians, or from any country, because everyone considers themselves entitled to opine on what happens anywhere, to judge Ben Bella's work at the head of the Algerian government. Many may be satisfied and many may not be satisfied, but some, perhaps many — and among those are us — have no doubt about the extraordinary good faith with which Ben Bella worked, about the honesty of his intentions and his positions in the international conferences where Cuba was present; and where we are also exceptional witnesses that the most revolutionary positions were represented by Ben Bella and not Bouteflika, that Foreign Minister, whose insubordination marked the culminating moment of Ben Bella's overthrow, because — without anyone doubting it — that "intellectual of the coup" is not a revolutionary, but a right-wing man — as such the Algerian people know him and the world knows him — a right-wing man, an enemy of socialism, that is, an enemy of the Algerian revolution, although in that proclamation — as in all proclamations in these cases — a certain revolutionary language is used, not even a whole language, but a certain one, because there is not a single word about the liberation movement of the peoples, about the help to the liberation movement of the peoples; help that, without any doubt, Ben Bella never begrudged, solidarity that Ben Bella never denied.

And that gentleman, spokesperson, and one of the leading figures of the coup, is a right-wing man, he is a reactionary. And I believe that these profiles serve to define a situation.

And at that international conference, Ben Bella's position was the most revolutionary. It cannot be easy for us to judge, and we must stick to the facts. Each one will have their opinions, each one has their style; others perhaps would have done other things. Perhaps with a little more malice, with less nobility and kindness, he would not have been a victim of what he was a victim of, and would have foreseen the danger, a danger that we unfortunately saw. Because we saw that around Boumedienne a cabal was swirling, we saw that around Boumedienne officers were gathering who liked to speak ill of Ben Bella. And here, unfortunately, many times during visits of delegations, our companions could see with pain that a certain caste of military men manifested a certain disdain for the Algerian President, evidently influenced by a certain militaristic conception.

Naturally, we were not going to spread gossip, because that was also a fairly generalized attitude among the men surrounding Boumedienne. I am not judging Boumedienne. Let us omit the judgment for what he has done now, so that history may judge him for what he did now and what he will do later. But it is unquestionable that around his figure... He is a very quiet man, few words, difficult to know what he thinks; but his followers were not few or short of words.

And unfortunately, the coup occurred. If Ben Bella had been more cunning and less naive, there would not have been a coup; the masses would have taken care of disarming the coup plotters; but unfortunate events took place. And, I repeat, we base ourselves not on ponderations but on what we know for certain, and this does not involve the analysis of Ben Bella's work, but rather the analysis of his intentions, his characteristics, his decency, his nobility, his goodness, his passion for the revolution and for Algeria, demonstrated on numerous occasions.

And now, in light of the news of the events, were we going to disregard all this history, all the ties that united us to the Algerian revolution and its most legitimate representatives, to take advantage of the fallen tree because he no longer governs in Algeria and to try at all costs to win the goodwill of those who came to power by the point of the sword or with the point of the sword? No! Because we would be incurring the most repugnant political opportunism.

Could we express our support for the coup? No, because under Algerian conditions, in the midst of the revolutionary process, we find no justifiable way in which they proceeded. We could, at most, wait to see if the improbable and almost impossible occurred, that having employed ignoble and treacherous procedures, they later demonstrated —without any doubt whatsoever— truly revolutionary intentions, demonstrated that they are more revolutionary than Ben Bella and demonstrated that they are ahead and not behind the Algerian revolution. By then, we could well exonerate them or be tolerant of their grave faults today based on how they might be able to rectify them tomorrow, but it is not, it is not possible to expect this. It is not probable; it may be possible, but it is not probable.

Let us imagine that these gentlemen were even more revolutionary, that they found the Algerian revolution short and lazy, that they wanted to deepen it, go further, reach further; let us imagine for a moment that the arguments or motives that inspired their action had foundations, at least in intention; let us hypothetically imagine that they were right. When one is right, is it necessary to resort to treason? Was the military pronouncement the only path left to them? Was it perhaps the situation of Nasser in Egypt, facing King Farouk? Not at all! If many of the ministers are still there.

If it is true that the authors of the coup represented a sentiment of the people, if it were true that they were right, why did they resort to the coup? Why did they not present the problem to the masses, to the people? Why did they not present the problem within the party, within the ranks of the revolutionaries? How could we, as Marxist-Leninists, accept, under the specific conditions of Algeria, a coup, with the aggravating factors of nocturnality and treachery that remind us so much of that March 10, by the time and manner in which it was carried out, as it reminds us of the first forms of repression that they are already using against the people, employing soldiers, fire trucks, gunfire, blows, and sirens wailing?

With deep sadness, it reminds us of the days following March 10. It would not be fair to say that this coup is similar to that of March 10 in the composition of the forces. No, but in methods, it resembles one drop of water to another. And it has to resemble, because whenever soldiers move against the sentiment of the people, repression arises. And repression against the people and against the masses is very similar anywhere, at any time.

If they considered themselves to be right and interpreters of the sentiment of the majority of Algerians, why did they not turn to the masses, why did they not turn to the party? If in addition to force, if in addition to military command they had the right and had the sentiment of the people, why did they resort to force? Why did they not clarify the problem before the masses and before the political organization of those revolutionary masses? And I believe that anyone who is truly convinced that they are right and that they have the sentiment of the people would not lack the courage to present things before the people and before their representative institutions. Those who are not sure of having the right and of interpreting the sentiment of the people do resort to the only thing they might have at a given moment: force. And we, as Marxist-Leninists, cannot condone that coup-like procedure against the masses and against the party.

Regardless of what they do afterwards —if they were more revolutionary than Karl Marx himself— we would not cease to tell them, while being able to recognize their virtues, to express their errors and the faults they have committed, and the damage that may arise from their conduct for the Algerian revolution, and the damage to the revolutionary movement in Africa and other parts of the world, the distrust they may awaken within other liberated countries in Africa, and the unfortunate nature of establishing in that continent, in the midst of a revolutionary process, the coup-like method.

And how —if they truly wanted to be more revolutionary— would they carry out those more revolutionary intentions? Could they, with a divided people, do what Ben Bella, filled with good intentions, could not do with a united people? Could they, with a divided people, confront the imperialist danger? Could they wage hard battles, the hard battles that a process of radicalization of a revolution inevitably entails? How could we have fought those hard battles with a divided people? Battles that we have won as a united people, with all the forces of the united people! Where will the energies be generated behind the masses? Will they be generated from the barracks? No! The energy that emanates from the barracks, divorced from the people, will never be enough to withstand the power of the imperialists, which can only be countered with the tremendous revolutionary energy and the strength that is generated in the people, especially in the united people!

Radicalizing the revolution under those conditions would be extraordinarily difficult; it would certainly not be impossible. But to face those extremely difficult battles and those extremely difficult situations would require —on the part of those who have replaced Ben Bella— a political talent and a revolutionary audacity that Bouteflika and company do not seem to display, a support that would not be that of the conservatives, but that of the revolutionary masses, of the workers, of the peasants, of the students. And I see poorly that anyone could win the will of those masses with gun butts and bullets; I doubt that those who do not believe in the masses, who despise the strength of the masses and pretend to replace it with the strength of the barracks, behind the people, could win the will of the masses.

The authors of the coup did everything possible to prevent the character of the Algerian army from becoming popularized, to closely associate the armed forces, the working class, and the peasantry, as has happened in our country. Because for the purpose of fostering a militaristic spirit, it is counterproductive to organize armed forces that are distinctly popular and revolutionary, deeply rooted in the people and in their revolutionary and progressive classes. By repressing students, young people, and workers, I see poorly that anyone, no matter how possessed they were, no matter how well-intentioned, no matter how imbued with revolutionary ideas and purposes, could march anywhere.

And as we see the news, the cables, the repressions, we believe that the events will increasingly demonstrate the unjustifiability of the procedure and the painful consequences it may bring for Algeria. But there is something more: the Algerian army emerged in considerable part from among the revolutionary fighters. It is very difficult for any clique, in such a short time and in the midst of a revolutionary process, to have instilled a caste spirit, to have eradicated the patriotic and revolutionary sentiment of the men, of the fighters who make up that army. And armies of that type are not suitable for repression; armies of that type cannot be led for long against the people, revolutionary-origin armies, in the midst of a revolutionary process, against the revolutionary people, it is madness and suicidal to count on their unconditional adherence.

That is why, with pain, we see the situation in Algeria today. Deep in our hearts, we wish that this brother country could bridge the enormous chasm that they have opened at their feet, overcome their difficulties without bloodshed. For that, it would be necessary, it would be necessary for those who embarked on the adventure to understand in time the scope of their actions and the consequences they may bring for their country; it would require almost a miracle, because in the dilemma they are in, to move forward firmly and decisively, demonstrating with actions the intentions they intend to display, in which case —if they were audacious, if they had the capacity, if they understood that this battle cannot be fought without the people— they would have a difficult path, though not impossible, great obstacles, though not insurmountable.

The path of counter-revolution cannot be established in Algeria; military despotism, political reaction, and repression cannot endure in a country whose people only a few years ago emerged to independence and freedom at the cost of hundreds of thousands of dead, of a people that learned to wield arms and to fight against an army many times more numerous and better armed than Boumedienne's. Repression, reaction, and counter-revolution have no possible place in Algeria.

Our attitude will be determined by the facts and based on principles. Our desire is that they would be able to understand the barbarity they have committed. And if they are not capable of this, our desire is that they have the courage to demonstrate with actions that they are more revolutionary than the man they have overthrown, that they are capable of justifying with actions what cannot in any way be justified in terms of procedures. And our position will be determined by what they do, no matter what they do now. If they decide to break relations with us, they would not be the first coup plotters to do so. We do not think of today; we think of tomorrow, and we do not act as opportunists but as Marxist-Leninists.

If those who carried out the coup demonstrate with actions that they are against imperialism, demonstrate with actions that they are wholeheartedly with the Algerian revolution and are with body and soul with the revolution of the oppressed peoples of Africa and the whole world, then we will not deny them our support, we will not deny them our backing.

And if one day the imperialists, for being revolutionaries, turned against them and threatened Algeria, we would not deny them our moral support, we would not deny them our blood to help them, to help the Algerian revolution, to help the Algerian people.

Because, with whom are we and will we be? We are and will be with the Algerian people and those who interpret their revolutionary will. And the Algerian people will be with the revolutionaries! And our support will therefore be for the revolution, and the people will be the ones to determine it tomorrow, and they are already determining it today.

For these reasons, we consider that our delegation should not go to the Festival of Algeria, since the circumstances that justified our presence there have disappeared, since our presence, the presence of our exemplary delegation cannot go to endorse there what cannot be considered exemplary in any sense, but, in any case, a very bad example.

This means that we will not go to Algeria. And where will we go? Wherever!

We cannot determine if it will take place in another country, in which country. If it is in Algeria under the current conditions, we will not go; if it is held in any other country where conditions justify the presence of this delegation and the presence of youth delegations from other countries, we will collaborate with the same enthusiasm and our delegation will fully participate in that Festival. But that will be determined —and surely it will be determined soon— by those who organized the Festival. If the Festival, due to the unfortunate Algerian events, cannot take place with the participation of all, then we will wait for better times. We would agree that another date, another place be chosen, and we would attend if the conditions allow for the attendance of the representations of the youth from all over the world and if there existed, as there have always existed, the requirements and conditions that justify our presence.

For you, I know very well that this is in no way bad news. Interpreting your sentiment, I am sure that it is, on the contrary, the news that morally satisfies you the most.

And before the eyes of the entire people, the trip and the congress or the Festival itself was only a part, because a very important, extraordinarily valuable part has been the methods and the path followed in the selection of our youth, and the title of "exemplary delegation" was not going to be received outside of Cuba, but was received in Cuba and by the people. And if this year there were no Festival and it were to take place next year, or the year after, this delegation, the young people who make it up and who surely, in their almost entirety, and probably in their entirety, would continue to exhibit the same behavior that motivated their designation, this delegation would be the one to represent Cuba; because you are not going to age in a year, nor in two years, nor are you going to change, and therefore you will continue to be our exemplary delegation, even if there is no Festival this year.

And in the meantime, what do we do? Where do we go? We could do something even better than coffee, while we wait for the problem of the Festival to be resolved, or while we wait for there to be a Festival; if there is none, the time that was going to be invested in travel and in the Festival — and that is the idea I want to suggest — could be spent moving to an area in the East and starting with your effort what could be one of the most useful and at the same time most suitable, most appropriate, and most promising activities for our youth today, which is to initiate in a revolutionary way the reforestation of our country.

Since the beginning of the Revolution, efforts have been made in this regard, but when we visit many places in Cuba and look at entire regions, mountains under the destructive effect of erosion completely devoid of forests, wasting the land, affecting climatic conditions, and we see that these regions devastated by an unscrupulous and ruthless exploitation, short-sighted, that razed the forests of this country, and we see that these areas encompass hundreds and hundreds of thousands of hectares where the foundations of an incalculable wealth could be laid that would contribute thousands and thousands of millions to the economy of the country in a future not even very distant, of which all the youth would be beneficiaries, I think that only with a revolutionary and mass effort, well organized with the forestry front, mobilizing the youth in the summer to areas that are truly healthy, pleasant, truly capable of attracting any young person, preparing nurseries in the necessary quantities, making plans in advance, gathering resources, we could, starting this year with this effort that would be relatively modest, like planting, for example, a million pines starting from a vast plateau of impressive beauty located near the area of Mayarí, in the pine forests of Mayarí.

To start in a practically symbolic way and for the experience to serve so that our youth proposes in the coming years, through mass mobilization — since the coffee can be attended by about 20,000 young people and already this year there are more than 40,000 as available force. There is ahead a task that could become one of the most positive, most beautiful, and useful objectives from all perspectives for our youth: the commitment to rebuild what was destroyed by exploitation; the commitment to create — with all the wealth and beauty it entails — the forests of our homeland once again.

And in the course of a few years, those hundreds of thousands of hectares could be planted again, they could be cared for by groups of workers dedicated to the maintenance and care of the forests, with all the modern techniques to fight against fires and to protect them. And our youth, with their effort and enthusiasm, with a minimum of investments, could create a fabulous wealth that no one but them and better than them will enjoy.

Because if we invited our elders to plant the forests with trees that will be cut down in 10 or 15 years, it would seem absurd. But I am sure, even, that many men, for the pleasure of creating, interpreting that beautiful sentiment of Martí that to be a man it was required — to feel fully a man — three things: to write a book, to have a child, and to plant a tree; I am sure that many would plant a tree just to plant a tree, even if they expected nothing from that tree. But, is it not very logical to invite the youth to this task? Who, if not the young people of this country, should be invited to do those things that they more than anyone else will enjoy?

And we could take advantage of this occasion and this circumstance to start with you, exemplary youth, this task to which I am sure you would give such moral impetus and such strength, that later taking this enterprise in their hands our communist youth would carry it to a successful conclusion and would enter into the broad course of the Revolution and into the history of the Revolution with one more positive achievement, with a new creation.

I therefore take this circumstance and this opportunity to present to our youth this beautiful task and to invite you to plant the first trees of that great effort.

I do not believe we lack the small trees to plant a million pines. In a recent visit to that area, where a few million have already been planted, we were informed that they would plant 3,600,000 this year; that is to say, there must be enough little pines so that none of you is left without planting a few.

In addition, we have already been discussing a plan with the comrades from Reforestation so that next year that entire plateau will be planted. And next year right there a much greater effort could be made, mobilizing several thousand and planting a few tens of millions if they manage to get all the seeds. Now the comrades have dedicated themselves to collecting all the little pine seeds, from the pine that grows there, throughout the island. And if they manage to gather all the seeds, the complete plan could be finished next year; to plant about 20,000 or 25,000 hectares. And thus progressively until not a single bare, sterile, and eroded mountain remains.

A COMPANION FROM THE AUDIENCE.- Fidel: tell the youth to take me with them. Throw me a blanket, Fidel, tell the youth not to leave me.

COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO.- I believe that youth is not just a vital state, but a right of anyone who does not let themselves be defeated by the years and never loses their youthful spirit.

I think that with this we have a concrete task in which to invest our activity while we wait for events, while we wait for this Festival, or to invest the time that we would have invested in the Festival.

We have the concrete task and we also know what our line is and what our position is. And there is no more suitable place, and no more distinguished auditorium, to present this international political line of our country and this concrete work plan for our youth.

And it is almost unnecessary to say that we are sure that you will take this line and this task in your hands and make it your own.

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!